Expert knowledge use and deliberation in local policy making

This article analyzes the extent to which public administrators make use of expert knowledge (i.e., research or evaluation reports) when they prepare policy advice, and the extent to which politicians deliberate on the information provided to them by the administrators. The study is based on original, quantitative data from local politics in Sweden. We find that expert-informed policy advice from the administrators and critical reflection by the politicians are more pronounced when there is a lot of public attention. Furthermore, administrators use expert information more when they operate in a context in which there are large political disagreements. However, politicians deliberate less on the administrators’ policy advices in such environments. Thus, conflict seems to generate a pressure on the administrators to search for expert knowledge. But at the same time, within a context of political disputes, politicians make less effort to understand and critically reflect over the information provided to them by the administration, and are less inclined to change their opinions even if good arguments are presented to them. Thus, the empirical analysis indicates that what role expertise gets in policy making is very much a consequence of the local political environment.     

The Effect of Safety Net Generosity on Maternal Mental Health and Risky Health Behaviors

Single mothers are more likely to experience mental health problems and stress-related negative health behaviors than their married counterparts, but a more generous safety net may improve these outcomes. We use a simulated safety net eligibility approach that accounts for interactions across safety net programs and relies on changing policies across states and time to identify causal effects of safety net generosity on psychological distress and risky behaviors of single mothers. Results suggest that a more generous safety net is protective of maternal mental health: a $1,000 increase to the simulated potential combined cash and food benefit package reduces severe psychological distress by 8.4 percent. Breaking out effects by individual programs while still controlling for potential benefits from other programs, we find protective effects of tax credits, cash benefits provided by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and food benefits provided by Supplemental Nutritional Assistance, but no effects of Medicaid eligibility. The effects are primarily driven by single mothers with the lowest levels of education. We find no significant effects of generosity on daily smoking, but we find evidence that benefits reduce the likelihood of heavy drinking. Results suggest that government investments in resources available to low-income families can be effective at improving well-being.     

It Takes a Village: Peer Effects and Externalities in Technology Adoption

Do social networks matter for the adoption of new forms of political participation? We develop a formal model showing that the quality of communication that takes place in social networks is central to understanding whether a community will adopt forms of political participation where benefits are uncertain and where there are positive externalities associated with participation. Early adopters may exaggerate benefits, leading others to discount information about the technology's value. Thus, peer effects are likely to emerge only when informal institutions support truthful communication. We collect social network data for 16 Ugandan villages where an innovative mobile-based reporting platform was introduced. Consistent with our model, we find variation across villages in the extent of peer effects on technology adoption, as well as evidence supporting additional observable implications. Impediments to social diffusion may help explain the varied uptake of new and increasingly common political communication technologies around the world.     

When Governments Regulate Governments

This article advances a political theory of regulation that accounts for the choices of regulators and regulated entities when both are governments. Leading theories of regulation assume that governments regulate profit‐maximizing firms: Governments set rules, to which firms respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior. But often the entities that governments regulate are other governments. We argue that government agencies and private firms often face different compliance costs, and that agencies have greater incentives than firms to appeal regulations through political channels. Simultaneously, the typical enforcement instruments that regulators use to influence firm behavior may be less effective against governments. Our empirical subjects are public and private entities’ compliance with the U.S. Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. We find that, compared with private firms, governments violate these laws significantly more frequently and are less likely to be penalized for violations.     

On the value of formal assessment of uncertainty in regulatory analysis

The US Office of Management and Budget introduced in 2003 a new requirement for the treatment of uncertainty in Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of proposed regulations, requiring agencies to carry out a formal quantitative uncertainty assessment regarding a regulation’s benefits and costs if either is expected to reach $1 billion annually. Despite previous use in other contexts, such formal assessments of uncertainty have rarely been employed in RIAs or other regulatory analyses. We describe how formal quantitative assessments of uncertainty – in particular, Monte Carlo analyses – can be conducted, we examine the challenges and limitations of such analyses in the context of RIAs, and we assess how the resulting information can affect the evaluation of regulations. For illustrative purposes, we compare Monte Carlo analysis with methods typically used in RIAs to evaluate uncertainty in the context of economic analyses carried out for the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Nonroad Diesel Rule, which became effective in 2004.     

The many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta‐analysis of EU and UK cases

Research on regulation has crossed paths with the literature on policy instruments, showing that regulatory policy instruments contain cognitive and normative beliefs about policy. Thus, their usage stacks the deck in favor of one type of actor or one type of regulatory solution. In this article, we challenge the assumption that there is a predetermined relationship between ideas, regulatory policy instruments, and outcomes. We argue that different combinations of conditions lead to different outcomes, depending on how actors use the instrument. Empirically, we analyze 31 EU and UK case studies of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) – a regulatory policy instrument that has been pivotal in the so‐called better regulation movement. We distinguish four main usages of RIA, that is, political, instrumental, communicative, and perfunctory. We find that in our sample instrumental usage is not so rare and that the contrast between communicative and political usages is less stark than is commonly thought. In terms of policy recommendations, our analysis suggests that there may be different paths to desirable outcomes. Policymakers should therefore explore different combinations of conditions leading to the usages they deem desirable rather than arguing for a fixed menu of variables.     

Political and institutional environment and privatization prices

We study the link between the political and institutional context and privatization sales prices. The latter serves as a measure for assessing the extent to which privatization goals have been met. Whereas this link has been studied theoretically, there are very few, if any, empirical papers on this relationship. We use data from 308 privatizations around the world and apply a cross-country approach, including instrumental variables. We find that while the overall political regime does not matter much for prices, the political processes beyond the basic regime do matter. Institutional context also produces a significant impact on prices. Both results are robust to changes in specification.     

Political environment and voluntary disclosure in the U.S.: Evidence from the Carbon Disclosure Project

We investigate whether the political leaning of the state where a given firm is headquartered is related to that firm's decision to voluntarily disclose climate change information. We study S&P 500 firms that were surveyed by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms headquartered in more Democratic states are more likely to disclose carbon emissions information to the CDP. Furthermore, firms in more Democratic states are more likely to permit public disclosure of their survey responses and tend to receive higher disclosure scores. We consider two political variables, one based on political power and one based on public political preference. Our results are consistent with political power driving the firm's willingness to voluntarily disclose information about climate change. These results suggest that the relation between the political environment and disclosure is more closely linked to concerns over regulatory threats as opposed to acquiescence to social norms.     

Politics,unemployment, and the enforcement of immigration law

Immigration control-related audits and their resulting sanctions are not solely determined by impartial enforcement of laws and regulations. They are also determined by the incentives faced by vote-maximizing politicians, agents acting on their behalf, and workers likely to compete with immigrants in the local labor market. In this paper, we use a unique data set to test the extent to which congressional oversight determines the bureaucratic immigration enforcement process. We examine the decisions made at each stage of enforcement from over 40,000 audits from 1990 to 2000. This includes analysis of (1) whether a firm is found in violation, (2) whether a fine is issued, (3) the size of the fine issued, and (4) how much of a dollar reduction fined employers were able to negotiate. We find that the number of audits conducted increases with local unemployment. We also find that a congressman’s party affiliation and its interaction with committee membership and party majority status, as well as firm size and local union membership, correlate to decisions made at every stage of enforcement.     

府际管理理论与长株潭城市群政府合作机制

城市群政府间合作困境是困扰城市群一体化的主要问题.长株潭(长沙、株洲、湘潭)城市群在一体化过程中,政府间合作受到政治绩效竞争、政府"经济人"部门、经济社会发展差距、府际协调与合作落后等诸多因素制约.但是,经济一体化、上级战略和惠民效应等因素又将继续形成动力,客观上要求政府间形成可行的合作机制,破解当前困境以带来城市一体化的共惠共利.运用府际管理的基本理论,结合中国政治行政体制的特点,提出以构建政务环境、经济环境、生态环境和信息环境为基础平台的网状政府合作模式,其中特别强调从制度设计的角度来制约政府的毁约和不合作行为,要求政府间合作项目必须由以"法规、监督、激励"思想为核心的制约制度来保证实施.这种合作机制是解决当前省域内城市群政府间合作问题的一种新思路,在不实行政治和行政一体化的前提下,可以有效地实现城市群公共事务的合作,并且降低不履行契约和不合作的风险.     

Institutional influences on business power: how ‘privileged’ is the Business Council of Australia?

• This paper explores the institutional and political dynamics of the Business Council of Australia (BCA), a unique form of big business association which relies on the active involvement of its one hundred or so CEO members. The paper argues that associations such as the BCA confront a range of serious institutional problems in their attempts to wield political power, or more modestly perhaps, policy influence. First, they confront a disconnect between ‘structural’ and ‘instrumentalist’ articulations of business power. The key source of business power resides in business control over the economy and the investment process, a form of power wielded at the company level not at the level of business associations. When engaged in instrumentalist or overt forms of political activism, the BCA also confronts serious collective action problems. It is also argued that the influence of the BCA seems to have declined over time and that this can partly be traced back to declining CEO commitment rooted in changing institutional and structural dynamics in the corporate world.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between political attitudes and political participation: Evidence from monozygotic twins in the United States,Sweden, Germany,and Denmark

Many studies have shown that political efficacy, interest in politics, and political knowledge are strongly related to political participation. In most analyses, these variables are described as having a causal effect on participation. In this paper, we examine the extent to which the relationship between political attitudes and participation is confounded by familial factors. By using the discordant twin design, which relates within-pair differences in political attitudes to within-pair differences in political participation, we are able to examine the relationship net of confounding factors rooted in genes and the early rearing environment. Using four samples of monozygotic twins from the United States, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, we find that the relationship between political attitudes and political participation is confounded to a large extent. This study makes an important contribution to the literature on political attitudes and political participation given the longstanding idea that attitudes cause political participation. Our findings also have practical implications for those interested in elevating levels of political participation. In addition, they have important implications for how scholars theorize about, model, and examine political participation in the future.     

Regulatory harmonization and agricultural biotechnology in Argentina and China: Critical assessment of state‐centered and decentered approaches

The international harmonization of technology‐related regulations seeks certain norms across diverse contexts. Harmonization efforts are based primarily on the promulgation of state‐centered command and control forms of regulation, though they may also be accompanied by the diffusion of more plural approaches that are decentered from the state. We contrast the ways in which the “proper” use of transgenic cotton seed technologies is understood in harmonizing regulations with the way this technology is used in practice in regions of Argentina and China. We find divergence that poses challenges for both state‐centered and decentered approaches to harmonization. While state‐centered approaches are blind to some critical processes on the ground, decentered strategies are found wanting in situations where norms remain deeply contested amongst actors situated in very uneven power relations. In both cases, we find that establishing and securing norms that are socially just and environmentally sustainable means attending much more explicitly to the political economies in which technological practices actually take root.     

Continuity,change, and priorities: The quality and use of regulatory analysis across US administrations

This paper compares the quality and use of regulatory analysis accompanying economically significant regulations proposed by US executive branch agencies in 2008, 2009, and 2010. We find that the quality of regulatory analysis is generally low, but varies widely. Budget regulations, which define how the federal government will spend money or collect revenues, have much lower‐quality analysis than other regulations. The Bush administration's “midnight” regulations finalized between Election Day and Inauguration Day, along with other regulations left for the Obama administration to finalize, tended to have lower‐quality analysis. Most differences between the Bush and Obama administrations depend on agencies' policy preferences. More conservative agencies tended to produce better analysis in the Obama administration, and more liberal agencies tended to do so in the Bush administration. This suggests that agencies more central to an administration's policy priorities do not have to produce as good an analysis to get their regulations promulgated.     

Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union

Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems without lobbying legislation.     

Can the use of minipublics backfire? Examining how policy adoption shapes the effect of minipublics on political support among the general public

Academics and practitioners are increasingly interested in deliberative minipublics and whether these can address widespread dissatisfaction with contemporary politics. While optimism seems to prevail, there is also talk that the use of minipublics may backfire. When the government disregards a minipublic's recommendations, this could lead to more dissatisfaction than not asking for its advice in the first place. Using an online survey experiment in Belgium (n = 3,102), we find that, compared to a representative decision-making process, a minipublic tends to bring about higher political support when its recommendations are fully adopted by the government, whereas it generates lower political support when its recommendations are not adopted. This study presents novel insights into whether and when the use of minipublics may alleviate or aggravate political dissatisfaction among the public at large.     

Fear and Loathing in California: Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication Among Latino Voters

Environments having candidates or policies deemed threatening to an individual or group have previously been found to trigger feelings of anxiety that in turn motivate people to closely monitor political affairs. Racially charged ballot propositions, and the strong feelings they evoked, made California in the mid-1990s just such an environment for Latino citizens—resulting, we believe, in higher levels of political information. Using the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute's 1997 postelection survey of Hispanic citizens, we compare levels of political knowledge between naturalized and native-born Latino citizens in California and similarly situated Latino citizens in Texas. We find that, as a result of these highly publicized and controversial initiatives, Latino immigrants in California (a) are more likely than native-born Latinos and Latinos outside California to perceive racial issues as most important, and (b) manifest higher levels of political information than their fellow native-born Latinos and Latino citizens outside of California, controlling for other well-recognized predictors of political information levels.     

When Is Science Used in Science Policy? Examining the Importance of Scientific and Technical Information in National Research Council Reports

A frequent lament among researchers is that public policy makers should pay more attention to scientific and technical information (STI). If there is any single area where one might expect STI to be used in public policy making and agenda setting it is in science and technology policy. Many of the policy makers in science and technology policy are themselves scientists or researchers and presumably would prove especially receptive to STI. However, STI is only one of many types of information used in policy making and policy actors often differ in the extent to which they view STI as credible, particularly compared to other types of potentially policy‐relevant information. Research on credibility (the believability of information, information types, and media) has shown variance and policy makers’ “credibility maps.” Thus, some policy makers have preference for formal information generally and STI specifically, but others privilege raw data, personal experience, authority, history and anecdote, analogical reasoning, or conformance to ideology, to name just a few of the information choices. Here, we build on the current researchers’ previous bibliometrics‐based work and use data from 41 semi‐structured elite interviews with National Research Council (NRC) executives and staff and NRC committee members concerning the use of STI in reports issued by the NRC. Findings show that the use of STI in NRC reports varies according to the nature of the inquiry and the sponsor. Information used in the reports is based on not only the assessed credibility of information but also its perceived direct relevance and the availability of STI as compared to other types of information. In general, the amount of STI in the NRC reports tends to have modest effects on the likelihood that reports will be used in policy making or by the mass media. More important factors include the timing of the report with respect to political agendas, the party requesting the report, and the enacted roles of NRC staff members and committee chairs.     

Firm‐level political capabilities and subsequent financial performance

While there is a robust literature on corporate political activity, scholars have not adequately framed these activities as being part of a strategy to garner political capabilities. In this paper, we incorporate political capabilities and argue that those firms that more intensely commit resources to political activities have associated subsequent performance benefits. In a sample of 87 Fortune 500 firms from 2005 to 2011, we find that both political action committee and lobbying intensity were associated with higher return on invested capital and return on assets after controlling for other factors. Additionally, we find support that the cumulative effect of political action committee and lobbying intensity on performance is also significant. Finally, we moderate the main effects with industry concentration and find that returns are greater in more consolidated industries. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.