Competing Approaches to the Study of American Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations

The development of theory in the study of American federalismand intergovernmental relations has long been marked by divergentapproaches. This article reviews the literature produced byfive "schools" within the field: (1) dual federalism, (2) cooperativefederalism, (3) pragmatic federalism, (4) noncentralized federalism,and (5) nation-centered federalism. As different as these approachesare, scholarly work in this field has made only sparing useof two other potentially useful approaches: distributive justiceand public choice theory. This article suggests how these alternateapproaches might contribute to reinvigorating a field that appearsto be otherwise at an intellectual impasse.     

Guess What Happened on the Way to Revolution? Precursors to the Supreme Court's Federalism Revolution

In recent years, the Rehnquist Court has been accused of usheringin a "federalism revolution." The Court's decisions have beencontentious and often viewed as assertions of the Court's anti-majoritarianpower. However, these assessments misunderstand the role ofthe Court in the American political system. Not only are theCourt's recent decisions relatively modest departures from existingconstitutional doctrine, but its rediscovery of federalism follows,rather than leads, developments in the elected branches. Effortsto rehabilitate federalism as a political value began in theelected branches as early as the 1960s. By 1980, federalismhad become an important cleavage issue between the parties;Republicans advocated a form of "fixed federalism" while Democratsadvocated a form of "flexible federalism." Despite the desireof the Reagan and Bush administrations to use the judiciaryto advance the GOP's view of federalism, confirmation hearingsfor members of the Rehnquist Court demonstrate that Democratsin Congress paid little attention to federalism. Attitudes aboutfederalism thus made their way onto the Court without noticeand without challenge, and the sharp disagreements that emergedon the Court during the late-1990s mirror the same party cleavagesthat developed much earlier in the elected branches.     

The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism

This article argues that the new judicial federalism, the increasedreliance by state judges on state declarations of rights tosecure rights unavailable under the U.S. Constitution, representsnot a return to an earlier federalism but rather something new.Although the basis for a state civil liberties jurisprudencehad long existed, the "discovery’ of state constitutionalguarantees did not occur until the Warren Court pioneered anapproach to civil liberties that state courts could emulate.This "discovery" has led to only intermittent reliance on stateguarantees. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that state judges willreturn to the total deference to federal rulings in civil libertiescases that characterized preceding decades.     

Federalism and Competing Values In The Reagan Administration

Ronald Reagan has made revitalizing federalism a central componentof his domestic agenda. Although this goal has sometimes complementedhis other policy aims, this article focuses on cases where conflictshave arisen between the president's devolutionary goals andother primary objectives of his administration, such as deregulatingthe private sector and reducing domestic expenditures. Judgedfrom this perspective, policies supportive of federalism, asdefined by the president, have fared less well in his administration.After a series of brief case studies analyzing such policy decisions,the implications for the future of federalism are discussed.     

Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism

"Executive federalism" or "federal-provincial diplomacy" haslong been considered the defining characteristic of Canadianfederalism, which combines federalism and Westminster-stylecabinet government. However, these processes have come underincreasing stress in recent years from a number of forces thathave affected the nature and conduct of federalism and intergovernmentalrelations in Canada. Executive federalism has not been displaced,but has been increasingly informed by a set of practices thatwe call "collaborative federalism," characterized more by theprinciple of co-determination of broad national policies ratherthan by the more traditional pattern of federal-leadership.     

What Role Does the "Federalism Bonus" Play in Presidential Selection?

The conflicting outcome of the electoral and popular votes inthe 2000 presidential election provoked calls to abolish oralter the electoral college. One prominent criticism is thatthe institution distorts election outcomes by providing disproportionateinfluence to small states. If each state receives a number ofpresidential electors equal to that states' number of membersin the U.S. House of Representatives plus the two senators,then the "federalism bonus" represents the two electoral collegevotes that correspond to the position of each state as an equalentity in the Senate. This research examines how the "federalismbonus" influences presidential selection by addressing threequestions. First, why did the framers include a federal componentin the electoral college? Second, under what circumstances hasthe "federalism bonus" played a role in presidential selection?Third, how would the various alternatives for reform affectthe federal component of the electoral college, and what isthe likelihood of adoption for each?     

Brussels between Bern and Berlin: Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union

In the current debate on the future European order, the European Union (EU) is often described as an "emerging federation." This article claims that federalism is not exclusively useful in deliberating about the future of the EU. Non-statecentric conceptions of federalism provide a better understanding of the current structure and functioning of the European system of multilevel governance than most theories of European integration and international relations do. We combine political and economic perspectives of federalism to analyze the "balancing act" between effective political representation and efficient policy-making in the EU. Drawing on the examples of Germany and Switzerland in particular, we argue that the increasing delegation of powers to the central EU level needs to be paralleled by strengthened patterns of fiscal federalism and an empowered representation of functional interests at the European level. Without such "rebalancing," the current legitimacy problems of the EU are likely to intensify.     

Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The "New" Politics of the Governors in Brazil

Although federalism is a potentially important variable in democratization,few studies explore its impact in democratic transitions andconsolidation. Scholars generally agree that federalism is quitestrong in contemporary Brazil. This study examines how and whystrong federalism reemerged in Brazil following twenty yearsof centralizing military rule. In brief, the 1964–1985military regime tried but failed to transform the state-basedorganizational structure and power base of Brazil's traditionalpolitical elite; Brazil's "transitional" electoral cycle alsoreinforced the strength of state governors. Examples are providedof how subnational actors influenced the transition processin the national government and how state based actors and interestschallenge Brazil's efforts to consolidate its democracy.     

Splitting the Atom of Sovereignty: Term Limits, Inc.'s Conflicting Views of Popular Autonomy in a Federal Republic

In his concurrence to U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, JusticeAnthony Kennedy described federalism as an attempt to "splitthe atom of sovereignty." As Term Limits demonstrates, the taskis an incredibly difficult one, which deeply rends the Court.One block, currently composed of Justices John Paul Stevens,David Souter, Ruth Baider Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, viewthe source of constitutional authority as residing in the peopleof the nation as a whole; the other block, made up of ChiefJustice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, argue that the constitutionalwellspring is the people of each individual state. Justice Kennedy,now occupying the Court's middle ground, stresses the "dualcharacter" of federal government. The debate is much morethanacademic. Depending on how it is played out, the argument mayhave profound implications for the understanding and practiceof U.S. federalism.     

Federalism at the American Founding: In Defense of the Diamond Theses

Vincent Ostrom's analysis of The Federalist's understandingof federalism fails to consider the historical and theoreticalcontext of The Federalist's arguments. Ostrom takes certainrhetorical devices of The Federalist too much at face value.He correctly sees that the authors of The Federalist view eighteenth-centuryfederalism as bad government. He incorrectly concludes thatsince it is bad government, that understanding could not havebeen the true meaning of federalism. The Federalist understandseighteenth-century federalism to be "the true meaning" of federalismas established by the political discourse of the times. TheConstitution departs radically from eighteenth-century federalism,but The Federalist seeks to conceal how radical the departureis, in part, by offering a looser definition of federalism thatwill allow the Constitution to be characterized as a federalsystem. A consideration of the writings of the opponents tothe Constitution suggests the limited success of this attemptat redefinition.     

"Europe of the Regions" and the Federalization of Europe

There is a close connection between regionalism, federalism,and the movement to create a united federal Europe. The recentmovement to create a "Europe of the Regions" is one expressionof these connections. However, there are many kinds of regions,and certain forms of regional policy that may not necessarilybe an expression of either regionalism or European federalism.It might be said, nevertheless, that a "Europe of the Regions"is emerging in the weaker sense that, in today s Europe, significantchanges are taking place in the nature and functions of thenation-state. These changes are providing new opportunitiesfor regions to become more important policy actors in a widerEuropean context. The nation-state, however, is unlikely todisappear.     

A New Start Toward a More Decentralized Federalism in Brazil?

Brazil's political history can be read as a cyclical alternationbetween centralization and decentralization—a contestbetween the center and the periphery. Centralizing tendenciesreached one height under the "Estado Novo" of GetúlioVargas (1937–1945) and peaked again under a series ofmilitary governments from 1964 to 1985. Forces favoring regionalismand more state and local autonomy have been given impetus duringthe 1980s by trends of regional differentiation, popular mobilization,return to civilian government in 1985, several key elections,and state and local financial crises. The constitution promulgatedin October 1988 features decentralizing fiscal provisions thatgive reason to believe that federalism may be revitalized inthe next several years in response to grassroots demands fromstate and local governments. However, these federalism reformsmay be threatened by the national government's attempts to thwartthe constitution's decentralization provisions and by nationaleconomic and political instability.     

The U.S. Senate and Federalism Policy in the 96th and 97th Congresses

Although the Congress of the United States has a major influenceon American federalism, there has been little systematic attentiongiven to what factors influence congressional voting on federalismissues. This article is an initial effort to address this question.Drawing on previous literature which has attempted to explainvoting decisions of congressmen, senators' "federalism" votingin the 96th and 97th Congresses is considered. The analysisindicates that ideology and party, especially the former, arethe major influences on senators' votes. Moreover, the variablesfound to be most important to senators' federalism votes appearsomewhat distinct from those that influence other domestic policies.Some suggestions for further research are also offered.     

Federalism in the 101st Congress

This article identifies important congressional roll-call votes,calculates a federalism score similar to that reported previouslyin Publius, and through factor analysis, examines the underlyingdimensions offederalism voting. The resulting federalism indicatorsare analyzed to determine their relationship to partisan andideological variables. Finally, the federalism orientation ofthe 101st Senate is compared with that of the 101st House ofRepresentatives as well as that of the 97th Senate.     

Changing Forms of Federalism and Party Electoral Strategies: Belgium and the European Union

The introduction of federalism to a political system changesthe locus of power and offers new incentives to political parties.However, the way in which the new system is introduced influencesthe strategies of parties under the new federal arrangements.When federalism emerges through decentralization, the processencourages a greater focus on regional interests and regionalstrategies by parties. When federalism emerges through centralizationof authority, parties are encouraged to use a federal strategy,emphasizing common interests and common bonds across regions.Using Belgium and the European Union as examples, this articletraces changing party strategies in the wake of institutionalchange.     

Europäisierung regionalen Regierens: Mit Sinatra zum „autonomieorientierten Systemwechsel“ im deutschen Bundesstaat?

Within the last years integration theory is focusing on studies analysing the impact of Europeanization on national and regional governance. This contribution demonstrates that the German Länder till the mid 90’ies have developed and still follow a twofold strategy in representing their interests in the European interactive system: interest representation through the German federal system and direct interest representation at the European level. Since some years the guiding ideas of the Länder have changed. Thus, the further development of co-operative and interactive policy-making was no longer on top of the agenda. Despite, the Länder asked for a clear cut of competence within the multi-level system — what is called here Sinatra-strategy, according to the song “I did it my way …”. This discussion at the European level is linked with the demand for reforming German federalism in the sense of “competitive federalism”. The contribution asks whether the Sinatra-strategy at the European level could have an impact on the German co-operative federalism and could help to transform it towards a more “autonomy oriented system”.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse

Indonesia cast off Dutch-imposed federalism in favor of a unitarystate. Soeharto's centralization made federalism taboo in theNew Order. In the current reform period, however, the conceptis re-emerging, but federalism has yet to be discussed in anopen, inclusive, and balanced manner. Decentralization policyis focused on the district, neglecting the political demandsof the larger province. This policy is accompanied by a confusedand misleading official discourse that is consistent with theideology of power retention and maintenance of patrimonial governance.As a result of greater democratization of the polity, federalismis slowly entering official discourse. Although its prospectsin the short term remain dim, support may grow for federal principleswithin Indonesia's unitary structure.     

The European Community: A Balancing Act

The European Community has traditionally been analyzed usingtheories and concepts drawn from international relations ratherthan from federalism. This article emphasizes the balance betweenthe representation of territorial and nonterritorial interestsin the Community and argues that concepts drawn from federalismcan be useful in analytically understanding the Community aslong as the American model of federalism is not viewed as thenecessary federal referent. It describes the relative importanceof the territorial dimension within the major Community institutions—theCommission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council,the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice.The Court of Justice, it is argued, is particularly importantin giving the Community a "federal" contour. However, its methodof operation differentiates it in important ways from the Americanjudiciary. The role of territorial politics within the Communityis such that the Community's policymaking process, while unique,is certainly recognizable to students of comparative federalism.     

A Reassessment of Federalism as a Degree of Decentralization

The central argument in this article is that it is wrong toconceive of federalism as simply a degree of decentralization.Decentralization can only be applied meaningfully to federalismin matters that belong to the central government. Even then,unlike unitary decentralization, which is entirely at the discretionof the central government, federal decentralization is bothmandatory and guaranteed. Much more than this, however, thekey to distinguishing federal systems from nonfederal systems,which also have "degrees of decentralization," lies in the conceptof noncentralization by which is meant that matters belongingto the states cannot ordinarily be centralized unilaterally.It is this noncentralization, which opposes decentralization(because decentralization presupposes centralization), thatmakes federalism a highly distinct form of "decentralization."