Cracks in the Opposition: Immigration as a Wedge Issue for the Reagan Coalition

The absence of a core means that a majority coalition can never choose a policy that will keep it safe from minority appeals to its pivotal members. In two dimensions, strategic minorities will always be able to offer pivotal voters attractive policy concessions. We argue that this instability of multidimensional politics explains why minorities raise wedge issues and how wedge issues result in partisan realignment in legislative politics. Applying agenda‐constrained ideal point estimation techniques to immigration debates, we show that the Reagan coalition—pro‐business and social conservatives—has been vulnerable on the wedge issue of immigration and that parties have switched their positions on immigration over the last three decades. We use the uncovered set as the best‐fit theoretical solution concept in this legislative environment, to capture the limits of majority rule coalitional possibilities and policy change in the two‐dimensional absence of a core.     

Why and how does the regulation of emerging technologies occur? Explaining the adoption of the EU General Data Protection Regulation using the multiple streams framework

Why and how the regulation of emerging technologies occurs is not clear in the literature. In this study, we adapt the multiple streams framework – often used for explaining agenda-setting and policy adoption – to examine the phenomenon. We hypothesize how technological change affects policy-making and identify conditions under which the streams can be (de-)coupled. We trace the formulation of the General Data Protection Regulation to show that the regulation occupied the legislative agenda when a policy window was exploited through policy entrepreneurship to frame technological change as a problem for data privacy and legislative harmonization within the European Union. Although constituencies interested in promoting internet technologies made every effort to stall the regulation, various actors, activities, and events helped the streams remain coupled, eventually leading to its adoption. We conclude that the alignment of problem, policy, politics, and technology – through policy entrepreneurship – influences the timing and design of technology regulation.     

Measuring Legislative Accomplishment, 1877–1994

Understanding the dynamics of lawmaking in the United States is at the center of the study of American politics. A fundamental obstacle to progress in this pursuit is the lack of measures of policy output, especially for the period prior to 1946. The lack of direct legislative accomplishment measures makes it difficult to assess the performance of our political system. We provide a new measure of legislative significance and accomplishment. Specifically, we demonstrate how item-response theory can be combined with a new dataset that contains every public statute enacted between 1877 and 1994 to estimate "legislative importance" across time. Although the resulting estimates and associated standard errors provide new opportunities for scholars interested in analyzing U.S. policymaking since 1877, the methodology we present is not restricted to Congress, the United States, or lawmaking .     

Spatial Models of Legislative Effectiveness

Spatial models of policymaking have evolved from the median voter theorem to the inclusion of institutional considerations such as committees, political parties, and various voting and amendment rules. Such models, however, implicitly assume that no policy is better than another at solving public policy problems and that all policy makers are equally effective at advancing proposals. We relax these assumptions, allowing some legislators to be more effective than others at creating high‐quality proposals. The resulting Legislative Effectiveness Model (LEM) offers three main benefits. First, it can better account for policy changes based on the quality of the status quo, changing our understanding of how to overcome gridlock in polarized legislatures. Second, it generalizes canonical models of legislative politics, such as median voter, setter, and pivotal politics models, all of which emerge as special cases within the LEM. Third, the LEM offers significant new empirical predictions, some of which we test (and find support for) within the U.S. Congress.     

Legislative strength and democratic satisfaction in presidential democracies

The gap between electoral winners and losers in democratic satisfaction has been well documented in the literature. Scholars further argue that in consensual systems, where the institutional design involves more power sharing, the winner-loser gap is smaller than in majoritarian systems. However, how the powers of legislatures, the primary national-level agency to impose restraints on the executive, affect the winner-loser gap has not been thoroughly studied. Utilizing data of 29 countries in the world over ten years, this paper verifies that in presidential democracies, when legislatures have more oversight power, the winner-loser gap in satisfaction tends to be reduced. The relationships are particularly evident when opposition parties have distinct policy platforms, as these oppositions are better able to utilize the legislative arena to voice their positions. Furthermore, the effect of legislative strength on losers’ consent is more pronounced among voters who are more interested in politics.     

Legislative agenda-setting in parliamentary democracies

Various strands of literature in comparative politics regard governments as the only noteworthy initiators and mainsprings of legislative policy making in parliamentary democracies. Opposition activity in policy making is more often associated with the intention to prevent, rather than to shape, policy. Does this perception reflect real‐life politics? To answer this question, this article discusses different arguments that link institutional and policy‐related characteristics to the incentives and constraints of different government and parliamentary actors to initiate or co‐sponsor legislative bills. More specifically, it relates policy‐, office‐ and vote‐related incentives, as well as institutional and resource constraints of legislative actors, to the likelihood that these actors will take the lead in legislative agenda‐setting. These arguments are confronted with original data on the universe of all legislative bills in four parliamentary systems over one and a half decades. The article concludes that opposition and, in particular, bipartisan agenda‐setting is indeed rare. Yet, in contrast to widely held maxims, it is neither absent nor spurious, but related to the allocation of power and the intensity of ideological conflict both within and between the (coalition) government and parliament.     

Revising Road Safety Policy: The Role of Systematic Evidence in Switzerland

In recent years, interest has grown in promoting and employing “evidence‐based policymaking.” This has been accompanied by an increase in available information about the performance of public policies. While existing research concludes that evidence about “what works” rarely prevails in democratic politics, it is inconclusive about which conditions affect the relevance of such evidence in decision‐making processes. This article aims first to clarify these conditions, and second, to present empirical findings from two case studies of road safety policy revision. The findings show how the creation and diffusion, as well as the political context, affect the role evidence plays in legislative policy revision in Switzerland.     

The impact of within-party and between-party ideological dispersion on fiscal outcomes: evidence from Swiss cantonal parliaments

The impact of the fragmentation of executive and legislative bodies on the level and composition of government expenditure is a feature of politics that has attracted considerable attention from economists. However, previous authors have abstracted from two important concepts: ideology and intra-party politics. In this paper, we account for these two phenomena explicitly, and make two main contributions. First, we show that both intra- and inter-party ideological dispersion matter in explaining the level of sub-national public spending. Therefore, it is improper to consider parties as monolithic entities. We also show that ideological dispersion matters especially for current expenditures, and not so much for investment expenditures. To do so, we construct a panel database (2003–2010) comprising data from a survey that quantifies the policy preferences of party members who were candidates in Swiss elections.     

Why Aren't We Laughing?: Grammatical Investigations in World Politics

This paper argues that the later Wittgenstein's notion of the autonomy of grammar opens up critical space for thinking about world politics. The claim that philosophy should be a 'grammatical investigation' involves considering how particular pictures, as representations of reality, hold us captive. Although the 'deep disquietudes' that are expressed in world politics may have similarities with the depth of a grammatical joke, I will look at a few reasons why we aren't laughing.     

Pork is policy: Dissipative inclusion at the local level

The article investigates the impact of local policies on human development indicators in Brazilian municipalities. This is an attempt to investigate the role of the legislative branch in reducing inequality and poverty through budget amendments, usually seen in derogatory form as pork barrel politics. We assess the effect of pork on municipalities using up‐to‐date policy evaluation techniques. Brazil is a case of extreme inequality and an active legislative branch in disbursing monies. The data set contains over 60,000 observations from all 5,500+ Brazilian municipalities for over a decade. We use matching and longitudinal data analysis techniques, treating pork as exogenous shocks, mapping how its effect reverberates on social and economic indicators in succeeding years. The results indicate a positive impact of such policies in improving local level development. However, these results are not sustainable over time, thus suggesting inclusion with a dissipative profile.     

Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal Points

This article introduces a model of policy preference formation in legislative politics. Emphasizing a dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and decision-making process, it ties the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative and cognitive political space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda setters. The model proposes that structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative actors successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the strategic provision of focal points. These ideas or images shift attention toward particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content and consequences. This interpretation affects both individual-level policy preferences and policy outcomes. The propositions of the focal-point model are tested empirically in a detailed examination of European Union legislation on cross-border takeover bids, using both qualitative and quantitative methods.     

THE POLITICS OF TRAFFIC LIGHTS: PROFESSIONALS IN PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY*

Abstract: This case study explores how organisational professionals cope with politics. It examines engineers responsible for synchronising traffic signals in Brisbane. How do engineers, working with complex statistical models of traffic flow, handle disruptive political demands for a pedestrian crossing or a shopping mall in the middle of an otherwise coordinated traffic signals system? And how do these organisational professionals, committed to installing and operating traffic signals, deal with politicians' recent preference for roundabouts as the preferred traffic control device? Simon's notion of “bounded rationality” is evoked, when it is suggested that traffic engineers deal with politics by restricting their world view to problem-solving rather than system control.     

The Role of Political Ideology in the Structural Design of New Governance Agencies

This paper employs theories of structural politics and delegation to develop a set of propositions about the legislative delegation of authority to quasi-governmental entities, known as "quangos." Legislators have incentives to condition their choice of structure for an organization charged with implementing policy on their own political attitudes toward "good government." The quasi-independence of quangos provides credibility for legislators to commit to a process that takes policy making out of their hands while creating a structure that increases the likelihood of achieving their policy goals. Theoretical implications are empirically examined using data on the financial autonomy of Dutch public bodies. The results support the argument that it is important to consider politicians' ideologies directly in governance studies because they form the key component of structural politics.     

Agenda-setting under pressure: Does domestic politics influence the European Commission?

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's ‘electorally connected’ institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non-majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda-setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation of legislative proposals by the European Commission. We argue that the Commission, as both a policy-seeker and a survival-driven bureaucracy, will respond to domestic issue salience and Euroscepticism, at party, mass and electoral level, through targeted performance and through aggregate restraint. Building on new data on the prioritisation of legislative proposals under the ordinary legislative procedure (1999–2019), our analysis shows that the Commission's choice to prioritise is responsive to the salience of policy issues for Europe's citizens. By contrast, our evidence suggests that governing parties’ issue salience does not drive, and Euroscepticism does not constrain, the Commission's priority-setting. Our findings contribute to the literature on multilevel politics, shedding new light on the strategic responses of non-majoritarian institutions to the domestic politicisation of ‘Europe’.     

The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies

The establishment of agencies at the European level is one of the most notable recent developments in EU regulatory policy. This article examines how politics has shaped the design of EU regulatory agencies. Building on the American politics literature on delegation, the article explains how principal-agent concerns and political compromise have influenced agency design in the EU context; shows how conflicts between the EU's primary legislative actors - the Council and the Parliament - and its primary executive actor - the Commission - have influenced the design of new bureaucratic agencies; and discusses how the growing power of the European Parliament as a political principal has changed the politics of agency design.     

If things can only get worse: Anticipation of enlargement in European Union legislative politics

Anticipation is a central feature of political behaviour. It has an impact on actors' choices and can change the timing of decisions. This article analyses anticipation in legislative politics. After delineating different objects as well as consequences of anticipation theoretically, a set of hypotheses about anticipatory behaviour in EU decision-making is derived. In particular, it is asked whether the EU Council anticipates the arrival of new Member States and how this affects legislative output. The theory is tested by estimating count models using a dataset that contains information on all binding EU legislation from 1976 to 2007. Covering five enlargement rounds, evidence is presented for anticipatory behaviour in EU legislative politics.     

Prominent Role Models: High‐Profile Female Politicians and the Emergence of Women as Candidates for Public Office

Can prominent female politicians inspire other women to enter politics? A woman occupying a high‐profile office directly impacts women's substantive representation through her policy actions. Here, we consider whether these female leaders also facilitate a mobilization effect by motivating other women to run for office. We posit that prominent women in politics serve as role models for other women interested in political careers, causing an increase in female candidates. We test this theory with data from the American states, which exhibit considerable variation in the sex of state legislative candidates and the high‐profile offices of governor and U.S. senator. Using a weighting method and data spanning 1978–2012, we demonstrate that high‐profile women exert substantively large positive effects on female candidates. We conclude that women in major offices are crucial for women's representation. Beyond their direct policy impact, they amplify women's political voice by motivating more women to enter politics.     

Legislators,organizations and ties: Understanding interest group recognition in the European Parliament

What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups as relevant policy actors? Addressing this question is fundamental for understanding the role of political elites in shaping patterns of interest representation and interest groups’ role in legislative decision making. Building on theories of legislative behaviour and informational theories of legislative lobbying, we argue that MEPs give recognition to those organizations that are instrumental for achieving key political goals: re-election, career-progression and policy influence. The pursuit of these goals generates different patterns of MEP recognition of interest groups. We contribute to the literature in three ways. Conceptually, we propose interest group recognition as a key concept for understanding interactions and links between legislative and non-legislative actors. We illustrate the high conceptual relevance of recognition for interest groups research while noting its conspicuous neglect in the literature. We address this gap and place the concept central stage in understanding legislators’ attention to and behaviour towards interest organizations. Theoretically, we build on a classic framework explaining legislators’ behaviour and refine it through the lenses of informational theories of legislative lobbying. We argue and show that legislators recognize organizations that enhance electoral prospects in their home Member States, and that legislator–group ideological proximity and an interest group's prominence in a specific policy field affect MEPs’ decisions to recognize some organizations as relevant actors. Our argument acknowledges the importance of the broader context in which MEPs operate and pays attention to how they react to and interact with it. Empirically, we propose an original and innovative research design to identify and measure recognition with the help of social media data. Our measurement strategy constitutes a significant improvement insofar that it reduces the challenges of measurement bias usually associated with self-reported data generated through interviews, surveys, or the textual analysis of newspaper articles and official documents. Our research design allows using fine-grained measures of key dependent and explanatory variables and offers the very first analysis of MEP interest group recognition that holds across decision-making events and policy areas. We test our argument on a new dataset with 4 million observations recording the recognition of more than 7,000 organizations by 80 per cent of MEPs serving in EP8. We find that MEPs are more likely to recognize organizations from their Member State, particularly under flexible- and open-list electoral institutions. MEPs are also more likely to recognize organizations that share their ideological affinities and are prominent actors in policy areas legislators specialize in.     

Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

This article presents an original model of policy making by multiparty coalitions at the international level. Specifically, it analyses how domestic institutions serve parties in enforcing policy compromises onto national ministers negotiating legislation in the European Union (EU). In contrast to existing research on coalition politics, the model accounts for the benefits of not only legislative but also executive institutions and incorporates opposition parties as pivotal actors under minority governments. Ministers propose policy positions at the EU level that represent domestic coalition compromises when cabinet participation, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight of EU affairs make it cheap for coalition partners to challenge the minister's position and when ideological divisiveness increases the incentive to do so. Statistical analyses of 1,694 policy positions taken by ministers from 22 member states in the Council of the EU provide strong empirical evidence for the model. The results support the claim of executive dominance in EU policy making but also highlight that, where institutions are strong, ministers represent domestic coalition compromises rather than their own positions.     

Capturing Government Policy on the Left–Right Scale: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 1956–2006

The left–right scheme is the most widely used and parsimonious representation of political competition. Yet, long time series of the left–right position of governments are sparse. Existing methods are of limited use in dynamic settings due to insufficient time points which hinders the proper specification of time-series regressions. This article analyses legislative speeches in order to construct an annual left–right policy variable for Britain from 1956 to 2006. Using a recently developed content analysis tool, known as Wordscores, it is shown that speeches yield valid and reliable estimates for the left–right position of British government policy. Long time series such as the one proposed in this article are vital to building dynamic macro-level models of politics. This measure is cross-validated with four independent sources: (1) it compares well to expert surveys; (2) a rightward trend is found in post-war British government policy; (3) Conservative governments are found to be more right wing in their policy outputs than Labour governments; (4) conventional accounts of British post-war politics support the pattern of government policy movement on the left–right scale.