How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes

Donors in recent years have made some foreign aid conditional on progress toward democracy. This study investigates whether and how such conditionality works in practice. The promise of higher aid if the country democratizes only provides an incentive for democratization for political leaders who expect to remain in office after democratization occurs. I show that dictators with large distributional coalitions, who have a good chance of winning fair elections, tend to respond to aid by democratizing. In contrast, aid helps dictators with the smallest distributional coalitions hang on to power. I present a model that shows a dictator's decision calculus, given different a priori support coalitions and varying degrees of aid conditionality, and test the model implications with data from 190 authoritarian regimes in 101 countries from 1960 to 2002.     

Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government?

Building on the literature on public finance, I seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy. I hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the "flypaper effect," systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending. Results from a time-series cross-sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970–99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis. For middle- and lower-income nations, aid represents an important determinant of government expansion. Looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation, however, reveals a more perverse pattern of response: aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation. The results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective. Inter alia they point to the potentially self-defeating nature of efforts to promote market-oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending.     

How the Clinton Administration Can Make Foreign Aid Work

The changes taking place in the world today are exposing the inadequacies of the U.S. foreign assistance program. Beyond external changes such as the fall of communism, internal changes have occurred in the policy decisions and purposes governing the program, management and operations of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), level of public attention on scandal, and aggressiveness of congressional oversight. After describing the purposes of the foreign assistance program, this article assesses the evolving role of the agencies involved in foreign assistance planning, budgeting and implementation processes; the processes themselves; the changes affecting the program; and the decision-making structure. Three reforms are needed to make the U.S. foreign aid program more responsive to U.S. foreign policy interests and more effective in accomplishing its development mandate. First, a strong policy focus is needed to direct the program toward realistic objectives and the best mechanisms for achieving those objectives. Second, the foreign aid program must move away from implementing projects with limited objectives and toward programs that promote broad-based economic growth, pluralism and democracy. Finally, AID should be merged into the State Department, and its field structure reorganized and reduced to better integrate development and foreign policy considerations.     

Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict

In this study we resolve part of the confusion over how foreign aid affects armed conflict. We argue that aid shocks—severe decreases in aid revenues—inadvertently shift the domestic balance of power and potentially induce violence. During aid shocks, potential rebels gain bargaining strength vis‐à‐vis the government. To appease the rebels, the government must promise future resource transfers, but the government has no incentive to continue its promised transfers if the aid shock proves to be temporary. With the government unable to credibly commit to future resource transfers, violence breaks out. Using AidData's comprehensive dataset of bilateral and multilateral aid from 1981 to 2005, we evaluate the effects of foreign aid on violent armed conflict. In addition to rare‐event logit analysis, we employ matching methods to account for the possibility that aid donors anticipate conflict. The results show that negative aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onset.     

The Changing Politics of Foreign Aid — Where to Next?

The 1990s have seen the most systematic attempt yet to influence directly the government and politics of sovereign aid receiving states. Aid's conditionalities now include political as well as economic dimensions. The proclaimed objectives include democracy, human rights and good governance. But the old politics linking aid to donors' security and commercial interests has not disappeared. The future directions are uncertain. Some observers urge additional conditionalities emphasising social objectives of poverty alleviation. Others argue conditionality is bound to be ineffective. Aid's capacity to combat poverty, and thereby the contribution it can make indirectly to democratic prospects, is contested anyway. It should remain a durable object of social and political research.     

Foreign Aid,Human Rights,and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Does foreign aid improve human rights and democracy? We help arbitrate the debate over this question by leveraging a novel source of exogeneity: the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. We find that when a country's former colonizer holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union during the budget‐making process, the country is allocated considerably more foreign aid than are countries whose former colonizer does not hold the presidency. Using instrumental variables estimation, we demonstrate that this aid has positive effects on human rights and democracy, although the effects are short‐lived after the shock to aid dissipates. We adduce the timing of events, qualitative evidence, and theoretical insights to argue that the conditionality associated with an increased aid commitment is responsible for the positive effects in the domains of human rights and democracy.     

Effective Foreign Aid Following Civil War: The Nonstrategic‐Desperation Hypothesis

When does aid foster development after civil war? A testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development. This article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis, an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals. Paradoxically, incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income. Ten‐year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970–96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis. By focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients, and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals, the nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war, when institutions are weak.     

Claiming Citizenship: Marginalised Voices on Identity and Belonging

While the Roma in Finland share history and national myths with the majority population, they have maintained their particular sense of identity. In spite of increasing recognition, manifested in legislation, their socio-economic position is still poor. This article explores the articulation of citizenship, identity and belonging among Finnish Roma. The study is based on conversation-like interviews with Romani activists. Recognising the marginalised position of Finnish Roma, the interviews are seen as a form of claims-making. The overarching narratives which evolve from the material point to a threefold sense of exclusion from full citizenship, entailing a material, symbolic and emotional dimension. While notions of the “good state” constitute a rather dominant and inclusive narrative, exclusionary practices are located in the area between the public and private realm.     

Aid and ideology

Abstract. A conceptualization of international aid-giving behaviour, based on the notion of bounded rationality and involving the interaction of objective and subjective factors, is developed. From this conceptualization, four hypotheses are deduced to explain the variation of development aid expenditures as a percentage of GNP: the instrumental hypothesis, the humanitarian hypothesis, the ideological hypothesis, and the incremental hypothesis. These hypotheses are tested on data concerning aid allocations of 17 OECD donors for four points in time (1966, 1971, 1976, and 1981), through the use of a regression model. Results show that the model as a whole explains between 85% and 96% of the variance in the dependent variable. Tests of individual hypotheses show that the instrumental explanation is the best predictor of aid as a percentage of GNP if a lagged value of the dependent variable is used on the right-hand side of the equation. When the lagged value of the dependent variable is dropped from the equations, the best predictor is the ideological explanation. The contribution of the humanitarian explanation to the explained variance is negligible.     

谈谈信用与诚信

信用和诚信两个概念有联系也有区别.有些讲诚信的文章不加区分,把它们看作等同的道德概念,有些不妥.对这两个概念应该加以讨论,以推进社会主义市场经济的信用建设和诚信道德建设.     

论信用及其作用

在商品经济不断发展、市场经济不断深化的时候,人类的智慧对信贷的作用的认识也经历了一个从片面到全面、从一维到多维、从正效应到负效应的过程。信用的正效应包括:     

Claiming races,broiler contracts,heresthetics, and habits: ten concepts for policy design

The formulation of policy alternatives can be viewed as an exercise in institutional design. What concepts should inform the craft of institutional design? This essay draws ideas from three intellectual sources to develop and illustrate ten representative concepts for institutional design. First, it presents concepts from the economics of organization involving the creation of desirable incentives: (1) inducing third-party enforcement through the creation of value, (2) making commitments credible, and (3) maintaining competition through tournaments. Second, it presents concepts from heresthetics involving the favorable structuring of decisions: (4) fixing agendas behind the ‘veil of ignorance,’ (5) automating policy decisions, (6) linking policy dimensions, and (7) collapsing and unlinking policy dimensions. Third, it presents concepts from the behavioral perspective recognizing the importance of habits and norms: (8) adapting organizational routines, (9) instilling and exploiting norms, and (10) monitoring through reporting and diligence requirements. These concepts are intended to help policy analysts be more creative in the crafting of policy alternatives.     

Quality Control and Contracting Out of Legal Aid

This article reports on an evaluation of a pilot project in the tendering out of legal aid defence services for criminal matters in the Queensland District Court. Comparisons were made on quality and cost between the assignment of matters through competitive contracting and conventional assignment to private practitioners through a panel and scale fee system. Results show no significant differences in case outcomes and client perceptions of quality. In the interests of further cost reductions, any extension of tendering would need to focus on relatively simple, high-volume areas of prescribed crime, where there is less risk that competitive pricing will reduce the quality of service delivery. In addition, the evaluation indicated that greater savings might in future be obtained by enhanced utilisation of in-house (salaried) legal aid practitioners.     

Legislative Capacity and Credit Risk

Legislatures differ in their institutional capacity to draft and enact policy. While strong legislatures can increase the congruence of policy outcomes to the electorate's preferences, they can also inject uncertainty into markets with their ability to alter the political economic landscape. We argue that this uncertainty will manifest in a state's ability to borrow and hypothesize a negative relationship between legislative capacity and creditworthiness. Using ratings of general obligation bonds issued by the American states over nearly two decades and data on the institutional capacity of state legislative assemblies, we find support for the claim that having a legislature that is better equipped to affect policy change increases credit risk evaluations. The results we present broaden our understanding of the importance of legislative institutions, the determinants of credit risk, and the economic implications of democratic responsiveness.     

社会信用与经济增长

一、良好的信用能促进经济增长和社会发展诚信对经济发展有重要影响。最近我国一位经济学家算了一笔帐,由于欠款、赖帐;假冒伪劣;不能按时交货,或者交货不付款;三角债等,直接造成的损失6000亿,间接损失更大。因为“不信用”造成的各种法律纠纷、人事纠纷也都是花钱的,我估计整个损失加起来至少8000～9000亿,相当于我国国民生