Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one‐third. Further, we show that the results obtained by Segal are the product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. We also discuss how our estimation highlights the usefulness of Krehbiel's model of legislative decision making.     

Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court

How do interest groups influence U.S. Supreme Court justices to vote in favor of their preferred outcomes? Following prior research on the influence of the Solicitor General, we develop and expand on the signaling theory of interest group influence via amicus curie briefs. We argue that an interest group's ideological reputation and the nature of the ideological signal it sends in its brief both function as powerful heuristics that convey information to the justices depending on the justices' own ideological preferences. When an organization files an amicus brief advocating for an outcome seemingly contrary to its traditional preferences (i.e., an unexpected signal), this signal should be more noticeable and credible than a signal in accordance with a group's conventional views (i.e., an expected signal). However, unexpected signals should have greater influence on justices who share the brief filer's preferences. We test our signaling theory on the terms from 1991 through 2002. We find that unexpected signals (but not expected signals) are associated with Supreme Court voting, and the influence of unexpected signals appears to be particularly strong among justices who share the ideological preferences of the brief filer.     

U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case Salience, and the Attitudinal Model

Does case salience condition the role of ideological preferences in the decisions of U.S. Supreme Court justices? Does the attitudinal model of judicial behavior hold equally true in high salience and low salience cases? In this article, we analyze the role of case salience as a moderating influence on the explanatory capacity of the attitudinal model and test the strength of the model in high salience versus low salience contexts. Using civil rights votes during forty‐seven Supreme Court terms, from 1953 through 2000, we find that the attitudinal model is sensitive to case salience and that justices rely significantly more on ideological preferences when deciding high salience cases than low salience ones. Our findings represent an important qualification to the attitudinal model.     

多数主义的法院:美国联邦最高法院司法审查的性质

长期以来,美国联邦最高法院的司法审查虽被视为法治和人权的捍卫者,却被作为民主的对立面.结果,它在理论上陷入难以自拔的合法性困境,或者说"反多数难题".本文结合法律和政治学者的讨论,考察美国司法审查的现实图景,指出它具有很强的"多数主义"性质.具体表现为,多数司法判决符合当下多数公众的意见,最高法院这一机构和司法审查这一制度获得多数民众的持久认同;不但如此,司法审查能够在一定程度上回应公众意见,从而在较长时段与主流意见的变迁保持一致.这种"多数主义"的性质,是由法官自身对公众意见的关注和尊重、其他部门和公众对宪法含义的争夺以及法官任命体制等外在制衡,共同促成和保障的.美国联邦最高法院在与其他机构的竞争合作中动态地表达民意,它受制于民主过程,也塑造民主过程.在此意义上,司法审查是美国民主体制的一部分,具有民主合法性.对于"反多数难题"的讨论而言,真正的问题不是司法审查是否符合"民主",而是现有的民主理论是否符合政治现实.     

最高人民法院关于修改《最高人民法院关于仲裁司法审查案件报核问题的有关规定》的决定(法释[2021]21号)

根据审判实践需要,经最高人民法院审判委员会第1850次会议决定,对《最高人民法院关于仲裁司法审查案件报核问题的有关规定》作如下修改:一、将第三条修改为:“本规定第二条第二款规定的非涉外涉港澳台仲裁司法审查案件,高级人民法院经审查,拟同意中级人民法院或者专门人民法院以违背社会公共利益为由不予执行或者撤销我国内地仲裁机构的仲裁裁决的,应当向最高人民法院报核,待最高人民法院审核后,方可依最高人民法院的审核意见作出裁定。”     

Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation

Amicus curiae participation is a staple of interest group activity in the U.S. Supreme Court. While a reasonably large body of scholarship has accumulated regarding the effectiveness of this method of participation, little attention has been paid to examining the reasons why amicus participation might increase litigation success. In this article, I test two separate, but not mutually exclusive, theories as to why amicus briefs may be effective. The first, the affected groups hypothesis, suggests amicus briefs are influential because they signal to the Court how many groups and individuals will be potentially affected by the decision. The second, the information hypothesis, proposes that amicus briefs are effective because they provide the Court with added information that buttresses the arguments of the direct parties. When subjected to empirical verification, the results indicate that not only does amicus participation increase litigation success, but also that this influence may be best explained by the information hypothesis.     

The Impact of Supreme Court Activity on the Judicial Agenda

When the Supreme Court takes action, it establishes national policy within an issue area. A traditional, legal view holds that the decisions of the Court settle questions of law and thereby close the door on future litigation, reducing the need for future attention to that issue. Alternatively, an emerging interest group perspective suggests the Court, in deciding cases, provides signals that encourage additional attention to particular issues. I examine these competing perspectives of what happens in the federal courts after Supreme Court decisions. My results indicate that while Supreme Court decisions generally settle areas of law in terms of overall litigation rates, they also introduce new information that leads to increases in the attention of judges and interest groups to those particular issues.     

最高人民法院裁判、司法解释的法律地位

本文结合审判实践详细分析了最高人民法院司法解释的各种类型及其相应的法律地位,并从对最高人民法院裁判的两种认识——“个案既判力说”和“解释义务说”出发,进一步提出了“习惯法说”,指出最高人民法院的裁判和司法解释中的“立法型”解释可以构成我国以裁判和司法解释为载体的习惯法,它们的普遍效力来源于习惯法并因具有习惯法的品格而成为法律的非正式渊源。基于此,本文主张最高人民法院“立法型”司法解释和值得刊登于公报上的裁判,应尽量以习惯法的构成要求为标准,具备“人们普遍认为它是正确的”品质。     

Interest Group Participation, Competition, and Conflict in the U.S. Supreme Court

In this article, we analyze how pluralistic, competitive, and conflictual interest group amicus curiae participation is in the U.S. Supreme Court. Examining participating organizations and briefs during the 1995 term, we address three inquiries. First, we scrutinize the types of organized interests who participate as amici curiae. We find that the Court is open to a wide array of interests and that particular types of groups do not dominate amicus activity. Second, we analyze the frequency with which amici file briefs on opposing sides of dispute. We reveal few strict patterns of competition, suggesting that Supreme Court cases are salient to a diverse spectrum of interest groups, many of which are not usually thought of as being in competition with one another. Third, we investigate how often and which amici directly cite one another for purposes of invalidating each other's argumentation. While amici have a great deal of opportunity for this form of direct conflict, it is surprisingly rare. Nonetheless, when amici engage in this express form of discord, they play a clear role in shaping the flow of information at the Court.     

美国最高法院关于专利纠纷的一项最新决定

2002年5月28日,美国最高法院就FESTO一案做出决定。此案涉及等同原则(Doctrine of Equivalents)和禁止反悔原则(Prosecution History Estoppel)。 一、案情简介 上诉人FESTO公司拥有两项工业设备专利,其中一个专利在审查过程中被美国专利商标局审查员基于美国《专利法》第112条驳回。申请人对其权利要求进行了进一步限定,即限定该设备含有两个单向密封环,其外套筒用可磁化材料制造。另一个专利在复审程序(Reexamination)中也进行了修改,加入了上述密封环限定。     

The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making

Law professors and political scientists generally subscribe to opposed theories of Supreme Court decision making. Law professors, to a great degree, adhere to an internal view: Supreme Court justices decide cases according to legal rules, principles, and precedents. Political scientists follow an external view: justices decide cases according to their political ideologies or preferences. This article develops an interpretive-structural theory that harmonizes these seemingly opposed views. This interpretive-structural theory not only explains why the internal and external views often are both effective but also why, sometimes, one approach might be more effective than the other. The article concludes by comparing the interpretive-structural theory with the "new institutionalism" that is emerging in political science.     

司法裁判供给中的利益衡量:一种诉的利益观

任何提交司法机构要求予以审判的民事纠纷都必须具有一种获得本案司法裁判的必要性 ,对于这种必要性 ,大陆法系民事诉讼理论冠之以“诉的利益”。诉的利益概念的出现与利益法学思潮对民事诉讼领域造成的影响密切相关 ,其本质是国家在其司法裁判供给问题上的一种判断。诉的利益的判断过程实际上就是一个利益衡量的过程 ,这种利益衡量又主要在两个层面上进行 :一是原告与其他纳税人之间 ,二是原告与被告之间。在诉的利益问题上所进行的利益衡量存在一定的尺度 ,它要求法官立足于社会需求作出符合基本正义的衡平。     

美国联邦最高法院对Harper ＆ Row出版股份公司等诉Nation企业等侵犯版权案的判决

著作权(或版权)是指作者对其创作的文学、艺术和科学作品依法所享有的权利。关于著作权法或版权法为何要保护作者的这一权利的问题,学理上有不同的观点,其中以“激励说”最为引人注目。就目前世界各国著作权法的具体规定来看,“激励说”占有着相当重要的地位。依据这一学说,国家制定著作权法(或版权法)赋予作者对其独创作品在一定期限内享有垄断性或排他性的权利,其宗旨是促进本国的科技和文化事业的发展。也就是说,国家以法律保护作为手段,以期达到发展和繁荣本国文化事业之目的。因此,如何平衡作者的利益与社会的利益之间的矛盾,也就成了著作权法所无法回避的问题。毫无疑问,作者在创作过程中经过了艰苦的思维,付出了辛勤的汗水,甚至投入了大量的资金,如果其所创作的作品得不到法律的有效保护,则作者的创造性劳动就难以得到回报,作者也就缺乏创作动力。由此看来,对作品加以保护是必要的。然而,作者的所谓“独创”是在前人留下的基础上进行的,那种不依赖前人所积累的知识而进行的抽象的创作是不存在的,也是不可能的。所以,为了社会的利益,为了鼓励更多的作品的创作,并降低创作成本,从而有利于知识的学习和传播,各国著作权法在对作者的著作权施加时间上的限制的同时又规定了对作品的合理使用。