An overview of the state of research on women and politics in Spain

Abstract. This article is an overview of quantitative and qualitative research on women and political decision-making in Spain. Ten parts of the literature are examined including: government and legislative; public administration; political parties; employers' organizations; unions; pressure groups and lobbies; social movements and NGOs and womens' policy machinery. The future prospects of filling the enormous gaps in the research are negative, given the weak institutionalization of gender studies in Spain.     

Safety Considerations in Political Decisions: A Case Study of Changes to the Norwegian Aviation System

Following the international deregulation act of 1994, the structure of the Norwegian aviation system has undergone several important changes. This paper describes the terms dictated by the political environment and the different administrations for implementing the changes. Our analysis addresses the inclusion of safety considerations in the specific decisions, and questions whether safety evaluations have had any impact on the change processes. The changes included the restructuring of airlines, new terms of competition, regulatory changes, the separation and relocation of the civil aviation authority, and privatization and efficiency reforms in the new infrastructure company. Safety in aviation and the risk of aviation accidents were not issues that featured prominently during the early change management processes. These aspects were first considered when the parties realized that changes were imminent and conflicts began to emerge. The different parties involved used the safety concept in various ways to legitimize or counteract changes. Our analysis concludes that risk is a complex concept that is difficult to communicate in a rational political decision process, but the emotive element in the risk concept opens for political speculations that facilitate discussion of ethical responsibilities.     

Winners, Losers, and Efficiency: Achieving Multiple Goals in Japan's Financial System Reforms

When giving policy advice, economists often proceed as if efficiency is the only valid social goal. Although efficiency is important, we argue that single-minded pursuit of it is counterproductive. It unnecessarily erects political hurdles to the enactment of efficiency-enhancing reforms because policy proposals that ignore valid, nonefficiency concerns are more likely to meet political and bureaucratic resistance. Moreover, such resistance may be avoided. A number of design principals can be employed to craft proposals that address political goals without abandoning efficiency. We describe three classes of principles: creative design of market mechanisms, maintenance of marginal incentives, and compensation for losers.We then illustrate their practical application in the context of Japanese financial-sector deregulation. This policy area usefully illustrates the importance of considering multiple goals in policy design. While efficiency is a frequently expressed goal, Japan's continued policy paralysis indicates that the bureaucratic and political goals of major stakeholders make the straightforward deregulation of financial markets difficult to achieve. We do not purport to resolve the entrenched barriers to economic reform in Japan, but to the extent that we identify and address valid nonefficiency goals, the conclusions of the analysis are relevant.     

After the Public Interest Prevails: The Political Sustainability of Policy Reform

The prevailing political science wisdom is that narrow interests regularly triumph over the general public. Yet the stunning passage of broad-based policy reforms in the face of intense clientele opposition suggests that the U.S. political system has a greater capacity to serve diffuse interests than has often been thought. Some of the most provocative policy-oriented political-science research during the 1980s and 1990s examined how these surprising reform victories occurred. Unfortunately, general-interest reforms do not always stick; reforms may be corrupted or reversed after their enactment. The long-term sustainability of any given policy reform hinges on the successful reworking of political institutions and on the generation of positive policy-feedback effects, especially the empowerment of social groups with a stake in the reform&s maintenance. This paper explores the postenactment dynamics of three canonical instances of general-interest reform legislation: tax reform, agricultural subsidy reform, and airline deregulation. Only in the airline-deregulation case has the self-reinforcing dynamic required for political sustainability been unmistakably evident. For analysts and advocates of general-interest reform measures alike, the clear lesson is to attend far more closely to what happens after reforms become law.     

State and Local Governance Fifteen Years Later: Enduring and New Challenges

This article draws on the contributions to this issue and related evidence to assay the extent to which the states and larger local governments have moved in directions endorsed by the Winter Commission in 1993 . The commission’s recommendations targeted (1) the political context of state and local governance, with a particular focus on executive leadership, campaign finance reform, and citizen engagement; (2) the specifics of public administration, with primary emphasis on empowering managers through internal deregulation and bolstering human resource capacity; and (3) the nature of the relationship between the national government and the states in a key policy arena. Significant changes in the fabric of state and local governance have occurred in each of these three areas over the last 15 years. Many of these modifications are consonant with the thrust of the Winter Commission report, but the evidence also points to the limits of state and local reform. Further reform initiatives should be built on systematic efforts to advance knowledge concerning the origins, nature, and outcomes of the array of institutions and processes present at the state and local levels.     

Violence and/or Nonviolence in the Success of the Civil Rights Movement: The Malcolm X–Martin Luther King,Jr. Nexus

Nonviolent mass protests are often considered as having been mainly responsible for the two major legislative gains of the Civil Rights Movement half a century ago—the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) and the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA). In this article, I argue that it was the combination of that course and the threat of violence on the part of African Americans that fully explain those two victories. A close reading of the texts and actions of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X is indispensable for my claim. The archival evidence, as well, makes a convincing case for the CRA, its proposal by the John F. Kennedy (JFK) administration and enactment by Congress. For the VRA, its proposal by the Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) administration and enactment by Congress, the evidence is more circumstantial but still compelling. The evidence reveals that for the threat of violence to have been credible, actual violence was required, as events in Birmingham, Alabama, demonstrate. Such violence, the “long hot summers” of the 1960s that began with Birmingham, probably aided and abetted subsequent civil rights gains—a story that has potential lessons for today’s struggles for social equality.     

Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System

This article investigates causes of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants to enforce statutes. It specifies the statutory mechanism, grounded in economic incentives, that Congress uses to do so, and presents a theoretical framework for understanding how certain characteristics of separation of powers structures, particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, drive legislative production of this mechanism. Using new and original historical data, the article presents the first empirical model of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants, covering the years 1887 to 2004. The findings provide robust support for the proposition that interbranch conflict between Congress and the president is a powerful cause of congressional enactment of incentives to mobilize private litigants. Higher risk of electoral losses by the majority party, Democratic control of Congress, and demand by issue‐oriented interest groups are also significant predictors of congressional enactment of such incentives.     

Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law

Congress regularly passes significant laws. Some of these laws continue in their initial form, with the original bargain struck by the enacting coalition untouched by any future laws; others are changed—strengthened or weakened—soon after passage. What accounts for this variation in the stability of laws, in the longevity of the original legislative agreement? We contend that political conditions at the time of enactment—in particular, the existence of divided government and the level of ideological disagreement between the House and Senate—influence the likelihood that a law will be amended. We demonstrate that laws originally crafted by diverse political coalitions are less durable than those crafted by strong, unified coalitions, which are in a position to entrench their preferred policies and protect them from future change. Furthermore, we show that the probability of a law being amended is affected by future political conditions, the actions of the judiciary, and factors specific to the law.     

RECENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: ARE THE ‘IRON TRIANGLES’ IN RETREAT?

This paper tests the popular thesis that as a result of various changes over the past decade, the subsystemliron triangle model is no longer the central dynamic in federal water policymaking. A cross section of 30 authorities were interviewed on two aspects of this key dispute: (a) the extent to which iron triangle tenets were either central (traditional viewpoint) or secondary (revisionist viewpoint) to the Carter administrationls 1977 water projects "hit list" 81 defeat, 11 and (b) perceptions of the viability of the leading water alliances in the years since the hit list events. Major findings: (1) Although the two leading water subsystems are portrayed as having been weakened by recent challenges, they are viewed by subsystem insidersll and "outsiders" alike as the most powerful of six alternative explanations for the Carter "defeat." (2) The alliances are largely pursuing a strategy aimed at adapting (Ripley and Franklinls "adapting subsystems") to the threatening political climate based on extensive funding for operations and maintenance. (3) The argument is advanced that the traditional-revisionist dispute is bridged by cyclical policy dynamics, labeled the policy pacing dimension.     

Deregulation and the Racial Composition of Airlines

Economic theory suggests that the enhanced product market competition of deregulation reduces employers' ability to discriminate when hiring. Recent studies of the effect of deregulation on racial employment in the naturally competitive trucking industry find that deregulation increased minority employment. This study examines the effect of deregulation on racial employment in the airline industry. Because deregulation transformed airlines from wasteful service competition to rigorous price competition, deregulation's effect on racial hiring in this continuously competitive industry is not apparent. This study finds that deregulation only modestly changed the racial composition of major airline occupations, which suggests that the change in market structure as a result of deregulation may largely determine the effect of regulatory reform on the racial composition of an industry. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The 2015 Spanish election: the times they are a’ changing

The Spanish legislative election of 2015 speaks of change. This is the end of the traditional two-party system and the beginning of a new political era marked by institutional renewal. The Socialist Party and the Partido Popular have both lost significant parliamentary force, whereas two new parties (Podemos, and Ciudadanos) are now crucial to ensure stable government majorities. This new parliamentary scenario seems to better mirror the political pluralism of a changing society which has already demonstrated for change in striking events such as the 15-M Movement. However, political parties are far from showing conciliatory aspirations, possibly because a new election is suddenly a realistic option. This report outlines the political context of the election, indicates the main topics during the campaign and discusses the results.     

POLITICS AND REGULATION: THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH

Abstract: Government regulation of the economy has been the subject of criticism both on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Traditional economic theories explaining regulation may be deficient insofar as they assume a benevolent welfare maximizing government, intervening only to correct "market failures". Political theories of interest group influence (for example pluralist, capture, Marxist theories) provide some more realistic insights into regulation, but fail to yield rigorous, testable propositions. The theory of public choice applies the rigour of economic analysis to political behaviour and suggests some useful approaches to the explanation of regulation, focusing on the public goods problem of organizing large groups of actors for collective action and on the role of the political entrepreneur in mobilizing large numbers of voters. The public choice approach may also be useful in suggesting strategies for deregulation in some key areas of the Australian economy currently under scrutiny (for example banking, airlines, telecommunications).     

Bureaucratic Roles: Political Loyalty and Professional Autonomy*

Political leaders in many countries have experienced growing problems of capacity in the postwar period, a development leading to an increase in the delegation of authority to public administration and civil servants. This delegation of authority creates a significant potential for discretionary decision-making authority on the part of public bureaucrats. One way of studying how bureaucrats handle this situation is to focus upon bureaucratic roles. Bureaucratic roles traditionally contain both political and professional norms. This article discusses how these political and professional considerations can be defined and how these norms are balanced given the potential for conflict which is present. The discussion is illustrated by measuring the perception of bureaucratic norms and role enactment among civil servants in Norwegian ministries. Results indicate that civil servants appear to have few problems in attending to and balancing both political and professional role norms.     

Too Important to Leave to Parties: The Case for Constitutionalising Equal Representation

At the current rate of progress it will be another century before parity of representation between men and women is achieved in the House of Commons. This article explores why and how legal guarantees may now be the best available route to secure equality of representation following the repeated failure of the political parties to deliver any significant improvement in numbers through their own preferred, voluntary mechanisms. It explores how the concepts of equality and political representation need to be recalibrated in order to place greater emphasis on democracy rather than meritocracy, and on outcomes as much as opportunities, and offers a broad outline of how a legislative guarantee might be structured and operate in practice.     

These rules are made for spending: testing and extending the law of 1/n

What is the influence of the rules of political representation on local spending? This research tests the law of 1/n in the Portuguese local context and finds that the law fails to apply. We suggest an alternative measure—the density of representation—to assess the impact of the rules of city council representation on local public expenditures. Density of representation is defined as the number of elected officials in the city council divided by city population. We find an S-shaped relationship between the density of representation and the level of local government expenditures. The level of municipal spending initially declines with increases in the density of representation, reflecting an increase in the ability of constituents to monitor their elected representatives. At higher levels of representation density, the relationship becomes positive, suggesting that the dynamics of the budgetary commons become salient. The relationship becomes negative again for extremely high density of representation owing to increases in the transaction costs of legislative decision-making. This paper discusses the implications of our findings for the reform of local government institutions and the rules of political representation.     

Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties

This article shows that the disloyalty of political brokers causes party fragility. Lacking distinctive brands, organization, and activists to mobilize individuals, parties “hire” local notables to broker votes among a local, nonpartisan constituency. However, brokers may be unreliable agents, regularly changing political allegiances in search of better returns for their brokerage among the module of voters they control. This free agency from brokers hinders durable party–voter linkages and results in electorally vulnerable parties. Measuring how brokers influence parties is empirically complex, but taking advantage of the fact that in Brazil these agents are also local candidates, this article demonstrates the negative electoral consequences of brokers' free agency on party performance. Natural experiments and an unexpected, temporary institutional reform that discouraged disloyalty for brokers demonstrate this relationship.     

Rent-seeking in the deregulatory environment: State telecommunications

Proponents of rent-seeking theories argue that firms pressure and reward politicians and bureaucrats to pursue favorable policies so they can achieve higher than normal, market returns. In an era of deregulation, often with long transition periods toward unregulated competition, how do firms develop specific political strategies to achieve success in rent-seeking? Deregulation of telecommunications at the state level allows comparison of the strategies of the seven firms created in the AT&T divestiture in more than one political jurisdiction. One firm, U S West, has pursued the most aggresive political strategy. This paper argues that U S West executives correctly perceived that the political environment in which they operated differed greatly from that in the rest of the country and that a different deregulatory strategy was appropriate. The firm exploited institutional differences by bypassing state regulators and going directly to state legislators to get favorable policies.     

Politics,Fiscal Necessity,or Both? Factors Driving the Enactment of Defined Contribution Accounts for Public Employees

Recent conflicts over public sector defined benefit pension funding have inspired polarized debates about the need for reform, including the utility of replacing pensions with defined contribution accounts, which are popular throughout the private sector. Between 1996 and 2011, 15 American states enacted legislation to implement either mandatory or optional defined contribution accounts for certain public employees. What drove this process? This article investigates the role of political, budgetary, and contagion influences on the diffusion of defined contribution accounts for general state employees. Empirical results suggest that enactments were influenced by Republican legislative, but not executive, partisanship. Gains in state indebtedness also increased the likelihood of enactment independent of political and other factors. There is no evidence of policy learning based on neighboring state activity and no influence from two measures of organized labor power. Both quantitative and qualitative robustness checks largely reinforce these findings.     

Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform

Existing approaches to the study of economic reform have focused on the mobilization of special interests that oppose liberalization and have tended to assume that reform dynamics follow a similar logic across distinct policy arenas. Analysis of the dynamics of capital account and trade liberalization in 19 Latin American countries between 1985 and 1999 demonstrates otherwise. Movement toward liberalization is shaped systematically by the timing and salience of each reform's distributional costs and partisan political dynamics. In turn, the timing and magnitude of costs are mediated by the economic context, while salience depends on the informational environment. Our findings thus differ from the conventional wisdom on several scores, particularly by emphasizing the ways in which good rather than bad economic conditions can facilitate reforms, the conditionality of legislative politics of reform enactment on whether reforms are characterized by ex ante conflict or fears of ex post blame, and how the type of reform shapes its political dynamics .     

加强与完善党领导立法工作制度的若干思考

坚持党对立法工作的领导是国家立法活动中最具根本性的原则,加强与完善党领导立法工作制度,必须坚持正确的政治方向,认真贯彻落实党内法规和国家立法相关程序中的各项组织要求和程序规范。党领导立法工作制度可具体分解为党的立法主张形成程序、党的组织与立法机关互动程序和国家法律形成程序三个部分。党的立法主张形成程序,宜重点落实党的立法主张形成过程中党内法规的相关组织程序规定,提高立法主张的民主性和科学性;党的组织与立法机关互动程序,要重点理顺党领导立法与人大主导立法之间的关系,明晰党的组织与国家立法机构的职权界限;国家法律形成程序,应重点理清党员人大代表的双重身份,坚持党员代表的义务优先性原则,并确保其有效行使代表权利和职责。