Constraining Federalism: Formalizing Expectations about Redistributive Policies in Decentralized Systems

Whether states keep welfare benefits low in order to preventin-migration of benefit-seeking individuals is one of the greatquestions in the study of federalism. Assessing this questionis challenging, however, because it is difficult to specifyexactly what constitutes evidence that states inhibit theirspending for this reason. This article develops a model whichprovides a micro-founded framework for thinking about the issue.The model suggests that competition on redistributive programsdoes not induce "racing" among states, but does constrain spendingto be less than what the states would spend if migration werenot a concern. The model also provides specific guidance forthe form of this downward pressure.     

Budgeting Rights: The Case of Jail Litigation

Judicial decisions are one element in the erosion of local government budgetary discretion. For example, litigation concerning constitutional rights forces local government officials to allocate resources toward the rights-based population. While rights-based allocation decisions may narrow the budgetary discretion of public officials, some managers may, paradoxically, be "better-off"—defined as the ability to protect and defend their budgets — when discretion is reduced. This thesis is tested through a case study of jail overcrowding litigation in a county government.     

论赋予设区市的地方立法权

赋予设区市的地方立法权是城市经济发展、解决社会矛盾、处理地方事务以及发挥法治在地方改革引领作用的必然结果。但在全面赋予设区市地方立法权时如果制度设计不当,可能会带来法治碎片化、立法质量下降、助长地方保护主义以及侵蚀中央立法权的危险,对此要有充分的准备和对策。对设区市地方立法权的赋予可采取稳步推进方式,实现成熟一个赋予一个的渐进性路径,在一定期限内还要对受赋权的地方立法加强备案审查以及定期评估,并科学配置地方立法权限,以确保地方立法质量。     

Welfare and state centralisation

The expansion of the welfare state is said to have led to the direct involvement of local government in the provision of social services. Increased participation of local government in welfare services would furthermore produce a centralisation of power. In this article, the above sequence of links is investigated in eight West European countries. One observes no strong correlation between the level of welfare provision and the level of state centralisation. But this absence of links results from two strong associations: one positive between welfare effort and local government involvement, and the other negative between the latter and state centralisation.     

Targeting Benefits for Electoral Gain: Constituency Marginality and the Distribution of Grants to English Local Authorities

We model the spatial allocation of resources over constituencies as an optimization problem in which governing parties face uncertainty about voter preferences, but seek to increase their chances of getting re-elected. We show that a rational government should allocate extra resources to marginal constituencies and especially favour opposition-held marginals. We test this hypothesis on data about central government grants to larger English local authorities. We consider whether Conservative controlled and 'flagship' local authorities also benefit. Our empirical results suggest that the government allocated around £500 million more to local authorities containing marginal constituencies and around £155 million more to 'flagship' local authorities than they could have been expected to get on the criteria of social need and population.     

The impact of government form on resource allocation in local government,evidence from municipal court closures

Differences in managerial expertise and political incentives associated with local government form may affect local government spending levels as well as the allocation of resources. This paper explores the latter possibility by estimating how the distribution of resources in council-manager and mayor-council municipalities responds to a positive fiscal shock resulting from the abolition of a municipality's court. We find that court abolition has a distinct effect on the allocation of resources in council-manager and mayor-council governments. As expected, mayor-council municipalities allocate the marginal dollar to policing. However, council-manager municipalities react to court closure by reducing police expenditures over the long-term.     

The voluntary provision of a pure public good with diminishing marginal returns

In experiments investigating the voluntary provision of a pure public good, participants consistently allocate resources to this good when the Nash prediction is to allocate nothing. This paper explores the robustness of this result when the Nash prediction calls for a division of resources between the private and public goods. We consider how a change in individual resource endowments and supplemental earnings information affect allocations to the public good. Results indicate that, under both the high and low endowment conditions, groups continue to allocate more resources than the Nash prediction. However, providing participants with detailed instructions that describe the declining marginal benefit to the public good leads to a significant decrease in allocations to the public good.     

An empirical analysis of municipal efficiency and local resident satisfaction by council type in Victorian local government

Although a voluminous empirical literature has examined local government efficiency, much less attention has focused on municipal effectiveness and almost no effort has been directed at the relationship between efficiency and effectiveness. In this paper, we seek to add to the latter nascent literature by investigating the relationship between operational efficiency and local resident satisfaction for three different municipal categories (metropolitan, regional, and rural councils) in the Victorian local government system over the period 2014–2015 to 2017–2018 using data envelopment analysis and an advanced regression model. We find that although a strong relationship exists between efficiency and satisfaction for metropolitan and regional councils, the same is not true of rural councils.     

Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment

The tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) "movement" of the 1970s and 1980s can be characterized in part as a struggle between local autonomy and state control. Undeniable shifts have occurred over the same period in state and local revenue systems and functional responsibilities. This article places these shifts within the context of this movement, using pooled, cross-sectional, time-series techniques for the period between 1970 and 1990, in an effort to assess its impacts. Findings suggest that TELs have resulted in increased centralization, lessened local responsiveness, increased use of local non-tax sources of revenue, and a sector less accommodating to the needs of dependent populations. TELs may have also had dubious effects on both the allocative efficiency and equity of the state and local public sector.     

The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Public Spending: The Korean Case

The local government reforms of the 1980s and 1990s in Korea involved devolution of substantial resources from the central to local governments. Fiscal realignment between the levels of government occurred during the same period of time. This article places these changes within the context of fiscal decentralization, using a variety of time-series regression techniques, in an effort to assess its impact. Findings suggest that fiscal decentralization serves as a constraint on the behavior of central government, while it serves as a booster on behalf of underdeveloped local governments. Fiscal decentralization may be a very effective means of self-government, and plays a key role in improving the fit between the provision of public goods and citizens' demand in Korea.     

How High Should They Jump? An Empirical Method for Setting Municipal Financial Ratio Performance Benchmarks

Heightened concerns regarding the financial sustainability of local councils have resulted in an increasing reliance by municipal regulators on financial ratio performance benchmarking. However, these benchmarks are often assigned without explicit justification and despite a paucity of empirical evidence. Furthermore, regulators typically allocate a single performance benchmark across an entire local government system despite the fact that individual councils may face entirely different operating environments. Failure to take account of the environmental challenges facing councils can result in inappropriate or unattainable performance benchmarks that may give rise to unintended consequences, such as the well‐documented threshold effects. To address this problem, we develop an empirical method for allocating performance benchmarks with respect to the current level of performance and environmental constraints facing individual local authorities. We demonstrate this technique in a case study using data drawn from New South Wales local authority operating ratios.     

Partnerships between local governments and community‐based organisations: exploring the scope for synergy

The utility of both local governments and community‐based organisations can be considerably enhanced when these agencies work in partnership with one another. Different roles will be played by local governments and community organisations in different types of partnership arrangements. Distinguishing among these roles helps allocate responsibilities better among the partner agencies, and it is also helpful for scheduling implementation, devising appropriate capacity building programmes and designing suitable accountability mechanisms. An analytical framework to help with these tasks is developed and presented in this article. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Renewal of the Local Conservative Party Campaign Capability: An Organizational Insight into Central Co-ordination

The importance of local campaigning for general election success is widely accepted. By focusing on the British Conservative Party, this article offers qualitative support through a research design in which interviews were conducted with local activists in four target constituencies and with regional officials; as a result, some understanding of the long campaign was also obtained. Embracing the contemporary view that campaigning effectiveness is a function of the party centre's ability to direct local parties, this study provides an organizational insight into how the centre was able to enhance its control, but also discusses the implications of this for local activists and for the local party organizational structure. The findings reveal that activist de-politicization and de-skilling, and a more formal and dismissive approach to party management, have undermined the local effort with the result that the party's local campaigning effort remains organizationally sub-optimal. The engagement of outside expertise and supporter networks has also changed the nature of the local party, so that it is moving towards a network of local political capabilities.     

House or home? Constituent preferences over legislator effort allocation

In many political systems legislators face a fundamental trade‐off between allocating effort to constituency service and to national policy‐making activities, respectively. How do voters want their elected representatives to solve this trade‐off? This article provides new insights into this question by developing a conjoint analysis approach to estimating voters’ preferences over their legislator's effort allocation. This approach is applied in Britain, where it is found that effort allocation has a significant effect on voter evaluations of legislators, even in a political system where other legislator attributes – in particular, party affiliation – might be expected to predominate. This effect is nonlinear, with voters generally preferring a moderate balance of constituency and national policy work. Preferences over legislator effort allocation are not well‐explained by self‐interest or more broadly by instrumental considerations. They are, however, associated with voters’ local‐cosmopolitan orientation, suggesting that heuristic reasoning based on underlying social dispositions may be more important in determining preferences over representative activities.     

Political accountability,fiscal conditions and local government performance—cross‐sectional evidence from Indonesia

Why are some local governments more successful than others in managing resources and delivering services? And even more vitally, how can malfunctioning governments be reformed so that they perform their responsibilities more effectively? This article contributes to our understanding of theses overarching questions by exploring the interactions between political institutions and public sector performance in the context of decentralisation and local governance. It shows–both theoretically and empirically–that performance outcomes are determined by the extent to which people can hold their governments accountable through political institutions. The basic hypothesis underlying this research is that political accountability, either by encouraging sanctions upon non‐compliant public agents or simply by reducing the informational gap regarding government activities, will create forceful incentives for elected officials and civil servants to reduce opportunistic behaviour and improve performance. Using a cross‐sectional regression the hypothesis is empirically tested against evidence from newly empowered local governments in Indonesia. The empirical findings broadly support our hypotheses. Improved public services on the ground, both in terms of quantity and quality, require informed and well functioning decision‐making processes that allocate resources to priority areas that meet the demand of the broader community. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization and access to social services in Colombia

Decentralization is meant to improve access to public services, but relatively few studies examine this question empirically. We explore the effects of decentralization on access to health and education in Colombia using an original database covering over 95 % of Colombian municipalities. We show that decentralization improved enrollment rates in public schools and access of the poor to public health services. In both sectors, improving access was driven by the financial contributions of local governments. Small increases in own-shares of spending led to surprisingly large increases in the access of the poor in both sectors. Our theoretical model implies that where local information dominates productive efficiency, elected local governments will provide services better tailored to local needs. Decentralizing such services should increase their use by the public. Together, theory and empirics imply that decentralization made the Colombian state more accountable. It provided local officials with the information and incentives they need to allocate resources in a manner responsive to voters’ needs and improve the impact of public expenditures.     

Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “re-election concerns” effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.     

三方互动：规范我国地方政府间竞争的思考

在我国当前的制度环境下,地方政府在竞争中可以采取4种策略:约束“掠夺之手”、减少公共品的供给、将危机转嫁给不具流动性的要素、树立壁垒干预市场。规范地方政府间竞争应当避免地方政府采用第3、4种策略。为限制地方政府树立壁垒干预市场,从中央层面来看,需要建立全国统一大市场,推行以公平为基础的政策、制度化中央与地方的权力分配;从地方层面来看,需要转变地方政府职能,加强地方公共财政建设,构建地方特色;从社会层面来看,为限制地方政府转嫁竞争危机,需要充分发挥居民在地方政府间竞争中的裁决作用,发挥民营经济的力量以及发挥第三部门的力量。     

On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes

Numerous empirical studies have investigated the direction of causality between democracy and economic growth (as well as the level of income per capita), but this empirical work has been paralleled by relatively few theoretical models that endogenize the institutional structure of the regime. Moreover, the different types of autocratic regimes have received relatively little attention. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes facing a revolt or an insurgency. In this model, there are three players: the regime, the rebels, and the masses. There are three stages in the game. In the first stage, the regime determines the level of infrastructure and the tax rate. In the second stage, the masses allocate their time between production and helping the rebels. In the third stage, the regime and the rebels simultaneously choose their fighting effort levels in a contest, in which the probability of survival of the regime is determined. It is found that autocratic regimes facing a revolt endogenously sort themselves into “tinpot” regimes that maximize their consumption at the cost of their survival, and (weak and strong) “totalitarian” regimes that maximize their probability of survival at the expense of their consumption. Empirical implications of the model are derived, and the relevance of the model to public policy is discussed.     

Local electoral rights for non-French residents? A case-study analysis of British candidates and councillors in French municipal elections

The French Constitution restricts local electoral rights to French nationals and EU citizens. Third country nationals have long been excluded from suffrage as France has maintained a stronghold on nationality and republican values. Academics have called for expansive and liberal citizenships that would allocate political rights to all non-citizen residents, independent of nationality. This paper argues that Brexit and cessation of Britons’ electoral rights present a pivotal moment to discuss expansive citizenship and alien suffrage. Taking a bottom-up approach, the paper presents actual experiences of Britons as candidates and councillors in French municipalities. It demonstrates the importance of residency, representation, participation and inclusion, rather than nationality at the local level to underpin claims for expanding electoral rights. These findings foreground an empirical case for further promotion of theoretical ideas that propose expansive citizenship based on effective residency rather than nationality. Consideration is also given to third country nationals.