Śubhagupta on the Cognitive Process

In his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (BASK), “Verses on the Establishment of the External Object”—extant only in Tibetan translation—?ubhagupta (720–780 CE), a philosopher connected with the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism, argues the reality of external objects of cognitions. In this article, I shall provide an account of ?ubhagupta's theory of the cognitive process, as expressed in BASK 35–44, particularly in light of his view that the images (ākāra) of those objects do not appear in cognition. BASK is part of an internal Buddhist debate over the reality of external supports of perceptions, wherein ?ubhagupta disproves the views of thinkers like Di?nāga and Vasubandhu. On the other hand, he is one of the main opponents addressed in the Bahirarthaparīk?ā (BAP) of the Tattvasa?graha (TS) by ?āntarak?ita (725–788 CE) and the Tattvasa?grahapañjikā (TSP) by Kamala?īla (740–795 CE). Therein, the two authors, while demonstrating the absence of the characteristics of apprehended (grāhya) and apprehender (grāhaka) with regard to cognition, keenly refute his ideas and quote selected Sanskrit verses that can be identified as the original Sanskrit of stanzas in BASK. Accordingly, I shall examine ?ubhagupta’s theory of the cognitive process in two steps: (i) analyzing the arguments that ?āntarak?ita and Kamala?īla advance against him based on their interpretation of ?ubhagupta’s views; and (ii) analyzing the arguments that he brings forward against his opponents (namely, Di?nāga and Vasubandhu), by means of the investigation of BASK 35–44 in their original context.     

Notes on the Śivadṛṣṭi by Somānanda and its Commentary

A somewhat problematic book has recently been devoted to one of the most fascinating (and neglected) works of Kashmirian ?aiva Advaita: the ?ivad???i by Somānanda. This furnishes the occasion for further reflection on the textual transmission and interpretation of several passages of the ?ivad???i and the only extant commentary upon it, the insightful Padasa?gati by Utpaladeva, unfortunately covering only the first three āhnikas and a part of the fourth. This important text (along with its commentary), the first philosophical presentation of non-dual ?aivism and foundation stone of the Pratyabhijñā school, still awaits a fully reliable edition and translation.     

On the Distinction Between Epistemic and Metaphysical Buddhist Idealisms: A Śaiva Perspective

Modern scholarship has often wondered whether Indian Buddhist idealism is primarily epistemic or metaphysical: does this idealism amount to a kind of transcendental scepticism according to which we cannot decide whether objects exist or not outside of consciousness because we can have no epistemic access whatsoever to these objects? Or is it rather ontologically committed, i.e., does it consist in denying the very existence of the external world? One could deem the question anachronistic and suspect that with such an inquiry we project onto Ancient and Medieval India a distinction that remains profoundly alien to it, were it not for a few preserved texts where Indian authors themselves distinguish between two such kinds of idealism within the Buddhist philosophical tradition. As already pointed out by Dan Arnold, this is the case in the commentary by Manorathanandin on Dharmakīrti’s Pramā?avārttika; but the difference between two varieties of Buddhist idealism is also alluded to in Hindu sources, both Mīmā?saka and ?aiva. The present article offers a new analysis of Manorathanandin’s short and somewhat ambiguous distinction, and it examines in this connection some important remarks found in the works of the ?aiva nondualists Utpaladeva (c. 925–975) and Abhinavagupta (c. 975–1025). It shows that according to these authors, in fact the epistemic version of the Buddhist argument in favour of idealism is already metaphysical insofar as it necessarily involves a denial of the existence of the external world, and it attempts to assess the faithfulness of this ?aiva interpretation to its Buddhist sources.     

Śrīharṣa on Knowledge and Justification

In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of ?rīhar?a can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in ?rīhar?a’s masterpiece, the Kha??anakha??a-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification (pramā?a) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting ?rīhar?a’s polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that ?rīhar?a is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing ?rīhar?a’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of ?rīhar?a’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants.     

Vedāntic Analogies Expressing Oneness and Multiplicity and Their Bearing on the History of the Śaiva Corpus. Part II: Vivartavāda

Journal of Indian Philosophy - This article, divided into two parts, traces and discusses two pairs of analogies invoked in Sanskrit(ic) literature to articulate the paradox of God’s oneness...     

Vedāntic Analogies Expressing Oneness and Multiplicity and their Bearing on the History of the Śaiva Corpus. Part I: Pariṇāmavāda

Journal of Indian Philosophy - This article, divided into two parts, traces and discusses two pairs of analogies invoked in Sanskrit(ic) literature to articulate the paradox of God’s oneness...     

Saṅghabhadra’s and Śubhagupta’s Defence of Atomism,Their Similarities and Differences

Journal of Indian Philosophy - As Buddhist externalists, both Sa?ghabhadra and ?ubhagupta claim the existence of an external object on the basis of atomism. In this paper, I will show...     

Nirvāṇa and Tathatā in the Early Yogācāra Texts: The Bodhisattva’s Adaptation of the Śrāvaka-Path

Indian and Chinese commentaries on the Bodhisattva-path assign to it a path of seeing analogous to that of the ?rāvaka-path. Consequently, the non- discursive insight of the bodhisattva is usually taken to be equivalent to the insight of the ?rāvaka when s/he experiences the unconditioned. Yet a matter of concern for the bodhisattva in the Prajñāpāramitā literatures and many other earlier Mahāyāna texts is that s/he should not realize the unconditioned (=nirvā?a) in the practice of the path before s/he attains Buddhahood. Because the bodhisattva has to accumulate immeasurable kalpas of merits in order to attain Buddhahood, s/he does not want to end the circle of existence by realizing the unconditioned. Ending the circle of existence would deprive her/him of the chance to attain Buddhahood. An early extant system of the Bodhisattva-path delineated in the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh), especially in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh) follows these early Mahāyāna sūtras in the treatment of the unconditioned. However, according to BoBh, the bodhisattva beginning from the first level can take rebirths at will and at the eighth level s/he enters into Suchness (tathatā) with non-discursive knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna). On the other hand, the bodhisattva has no esteem for the unconditioned and abstains from the abandonment of all defilements and the realization of nirvā?a. By comparing the Bodhisattva-path in BoBh with the ?rāvaka-path delineated especially in the ?rāvakabhūmi (SrBh) of the same YBh system this paper tests whether the insight of the bodhisattva or the insight of Suchness is endowed with properties equivalent to the transcendental status of nirvā?a or whether the insight of Suchness is a mundane insight, which still falls short of nirvā?a.     

Do Śrāvakas understand emptiness?

Conclusions The present study has attempted to artriculate a central issue of Mahäyäna soteriology through an examination of the writings of two Mädhyamika masters, Bhävaviveka and Candrakïrti. The purpose here has been to demonstrate a further criterion for the retrospective designation of their respective philosophies with the terms Svtantrika and Prasangika an exhaustive study of the nature of the Hinayäna wisdom according to the Mädhyamika school would entail an analysis of the writings of many other masters, especially those who produced what has been called the Yogäcära-Mädhyamika synthesis. To attempt to determine the position of Maitreyanätha, for example, on this issue would entail an analysis of the famous Five Treatises (the Dharmadharmatävibhaa, the Madhyäntavibhaga, the Mahayanasutrlamkara, the Uttratantra, and the Abhisamayälamkära) as well as the myriad commentaries on these works. It is possible to speculate briefly here on what the position of Nägärjuna may have been on this issue and then go on to discuss the implications and possible motivations of the views of Bhävaviveka and Candrakïrti.     

A Śaiva Interpretation of the Satkāryavāda: The Sāṃkhya Notion of Abhivyakti and Its Transformation in the Pratyabhijñā Treatise

It is a well-known fact that the ?aiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sā?khya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sā?khya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the ?aiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, in perfect contradiction with the Sā?khya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the ī?varapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr?ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other ?aiva sources, including Somānanda’s ?ivadr???i and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sā?khya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (?akti), and that his criticism of the Sā?khya understanding of causality might target the ?aiva dualists as well as Sā?khya authors.     

Shifting Concepts: The Realignment of Dharmakīrti on Concepts and the Error of Subject/Object Duality in Pratyabhijñā Śaiva Thought

Contemporary scholars have begun to document the extensive influence of the sixth to seventh century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti on Pratyabhijñā ?aiva thought. Utpaladeva (925–975) and Abhinavagupta’s (975–1025) adaptation of Dharmakīrti’s apoha (exclusion) theory provides a striking instance of the creative ways in which these ?aivas use Dharmakīrti’s ideas to argue for positions that Dharmakīrti would emphatically reject. Both Dharmakīrti and these ?aivas emphasize that the formation of a concept involves both objective and subjective factors. Working within a certain perceptual environment, factors such as a subject’s desires, habits, and conditioning lead him or her to form a concept (vikalpa) based on excluding what is not relevant to the accomplishment of his or her goal. However, the two differ in their account of the relationship between concepts and subject/object duality itself. While Dharmakīrti claims that the division of a cognition into subject, object, and awareness is nonconceptual, the subtly shifted definition of a concept that these ?aivas employ allows them to claim that the error of subject/object duality is actually conceptual. This seemingly small difference in their respective evaluations of the nature of subject/object error has surprisingly large consequences. If, as these ?aivas claim, any awareness involving a duality is conceptual, then subject and object are concepts. Moreover, if the formation of a concept requires desire, then some kind of desire must be inherent to consciousness itself before the formation of a limited subject/object pair. In short, ultimate consciousness must be ?iva, who possesses the freedom to will any and all possible realities.     

Nondualism in Early Śākta Tantras: Transgressive Rites and Their Ontological Justification in a Historical Perspective

This paper examines the ritual and philosophical meaning of the term ‘nondual’ (advaya/advaita) in early ?ākta Tantras (6th–9th centuries), including some early sources of the anti-ritualist kaula cult. It shows that nondualism denoted only ritual nondualism in the earliest texts, namely, the principle of seeing and using pure and impure substances in ritual without distinction, rejecting the pure-impure dichotomy of orthopraxy. The ontology these tantras presuppose is basically dualist, for they usually see the Lord and the created world as different and regard original impurity (mala) as a removeable material entity, similarly to the classical system of the dualist ?aiva Siddhānta. Nondual ontology evolves gradually, starting with scattered statements about the nature of the god and the phenomenal world, usually in a ritual context. It appears in a form similar to the classical one only in the Krama and related systems, as argued in Sanderson (in: Goudriaan (ed.) Ritual and speculation in early tantrism: studies in honour of André Padoux, 1992).     

On Śaiva Terminology: Some Key Issues of Understanding

The goal of this paper is to reconsider some key concepts of nondualist Kashmirian ?aivism whose interpretation and translation have generally been the subject of some sort of silent consensus. Through the close examination of a particular text, the Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta and its commentary by Yogarāja, as well as of related texts of the system, I shall attempt to improve upon the understanding and translation of terms such as ghana (and the compounds derived therefrom), the roots sphar, sphur, pra]kā? etc., and their derivatives, bhavanakartr?tā, and the names of the three malas. Further, bhāvanā will be discussed in its ?aiva acceptation and a more suitable translation suggested.     

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The present article was first prepared for a panel on Tibetan developments of Dharmakrti's thought, which was part of the International Association of Tibetan Studies Congress in Oslo 1992. My thanks to Ernst Steinkellner and Georges Dreyfus for comments and to Helmut Tauscher for photocopies of 'U yug pa's text.     

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