Naming the Seventh Consciousness in Yogācāra

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The Yogācāra School presents the seventh consciousness as the internal mental faculty of the sixth consciousness. According to the Hīnayāna...     

Gradual and Sudden Enlightenment: The Attainment of Yogipratyakṣa in the Later Indian Yogācāra School

Journal of Indian Philosophy - In the later Indian Yogācāra school, yogipratyak?a, the cognition of yogins is a key concept used to explain the Buddhist goal of enlightenment. It...     

Yogācāra Substrata? Precedent Frames for Yogācāra Thought Among Third-Century Yoga Practitioners in Greater Gandhāra

The connection between early yogācāras, or practitioners of yoga, and later Yogācāra-vijñānavāda philosophy has long preoccupied scholars. But these connections remain obscure. This article suggests that a text that has received little attention in modern scholarship, the Saddharmasm?tyupasthānasūtra, may shed light on aspects of early yogācāra contemplative cultures that gave rise to some of the formative dynamics of Yogācāra-vijñānavāda thought. I show how traditional Buddhist meditative practice and engagement with Abhidharma theoretics come together in the Saddharmasm?tyuasthānasūtra to produce a novel theory of mind that mirrors many of the philosophical problematics that early and late Yogācāra-vijñānavādins confronted and attempted to work out in ?āstric detail.     

Conceptuality and Non-conceptuality in Yogācāra Sources

This paper investigates the Yogācāra notions of “conceptuality”, represented by terms such as vikalpa, on the one hand, and of “non-conceptuality” on the other. The examination of the process of thinking as well as its absence has played a central role in the history of Yogācāra thought. The explanations of this process provided by Yogācāra thinkers in works such as the Yogācārabhūmi, the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and the Mahāyānasa?graha appear to be mainly concerned with the contents and the components of thoughts, categorizing them into different classes. These lists are far more than arbitrary collections. Instead they are meant to represent exhaustive summaries of a person’s conceptual experience. The first part of the paper focusses on conceptuality, exploring (mostly Abhidharmic) definitions of the relevant terms and ideas. The second part is mainly an investigation of the question which parts of the Buddhist path to liberation were considered to involve conceptual activity and which were described as non-conceptual.     

The Three Natures and the Path to Liberation in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Thought

This paper provides a new interpretation of the three natures theory of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thought by means of an examination of the path theory associated with it, which has not been previously examined in scholarly literature. The paper first examines this path theory in a number of foundational texts to show that the widely accepted pivotal model is not in fact the three natures model that predominates in foundational Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda literature. Second, the paper offers a new interpretation of the three natures theory as providing a new causal model of the arising of suffering, and a corresponding theory of its cessation. This new causal model both makes possible the continued use of the kind of dharma analysis that Abhidharma thought employs to provide a causal analysis of the arising of suffering, and also couches such dharma analysis within the Mahāyāna framework of the emptiness of dharmas.     

How Do We Understand the Meaning of a Sentence Under the Yogācāra Model of the Mind? On Disputes Among East Asian Yogācāra Thinkers of the Seventh Century

Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the Yogācārabhūmi, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks (sound, syllable, term, sentence and meaning) cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit.     

Mipam’s Middle Way Through Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika

In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the “content” of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika), the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.     

Nirvāṇa and Tathatā in the Early Yogācāra Texts: The Bodhisattva’s Adaptation of the Śrāvaka-Path

Indian and Chinese commentaries on the Bodhisattva-path assign to it a path of seeing analogous to that of the ?rāvaka-path. Consequently, the non- discursive insight of the bodhisattva is usually taken to be equivalent to the insight of the ?rāvaka when s/he experiences the unconditioned. Yet a matter of concern for the bodhisattva in the Prajñāpāramitā literatures and many other earlier Mahāyāna texts is that s/he should not realize the unconditioned (=nirvā?a) in the practice of the path before s/he attains Buddhahood. Because the bodhisattva has to accumulate immeasurable kalpas of merits in order to attain Buddhahood, s/he does not want to end the circle of existence by realizing the unconditioned. Ending the circle of existence would deprive her/him of the chance to attain Buddhahood. An early extant system of the Bodhisattva-path delineated in the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh), especially in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh) follows these early Mahāyāna sūtras in the treatment of the unconditioned. However, according to BoBh, the bodhisattva beginning from the first level can take rebirths at will and at the eighth level s/he enters into Suchness (tathatā) with non-discursive knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna). On the other hand, the bodhisattva has no esteem for the unconditioned and abstains from the abandonment of all defilements and the realization of nirvā?a. By comparing the Bodhisattva-path in BoBh with the ?rāvaka-path delineated especially in the ?rāvakabhūmi (SrBh) of the same YBh system this paper tests whether the insight of the bodhisattva or the insight of Suchness is endowed with properties equivalent to the transcendental status of nirvā?a or whether the insight of Suchness is a mundane insight, which still falls short of nirvā?a.     

Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

Does Early Yogācāra Have a Theory of Meaning? Sthiramati’s Arguments on Metaphor in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Triṃśikā-bhāṣya</Emphasis>

Can the early Yogācāra be said to present a systematic theory of meaning? The paper argues that Sthiramati’s bhā?ya on Vasubandhu’s Tri??ikā (Treatise in Thirty Verses), in which he argues that all language-use is metaphorical, indeed amounts to such a theory, both because of the text’s engagement with the wider Indian philosophical conversation about reference and meaning and by virtue of the questions it addresses and its motivations. Through a translation and analysis of key sections of Sthiramati’s commentary I present the main features of this theory of meaning and discuss the ways in which it is distinct from Vasubandhu’s ideas. I demonstrate how this theory of meaning enabled Sthiramati to present a unique understanding of discourse that distinguishes between varying levels of truth within the conventional realm. This understanding sat well with the Yogācāra soteriological and theoretical needs, and most importantly, enabled him to establish the meaningfulness of the school’s own metaphysical discourse. Securing this meaningfulness was especially important to Sthiramati in meeting the challenge posed by the radical conventionalism of the Madhyamaka, and his response as I interpret it suggests that one of the main disputes between the early Yogācāra with the Mādhyamika, at least as reflected in the Tri??ikā-bhā?ya, in fact turns on linguistic rather than ontological issues.     

On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology

This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form (sākārajñānavāda). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form (grāhakākāra/svābhāsa) grasps the objective mental form, the position of the subjective mental form becomes problematic—it becomes superfluous, as can be demonstrated with reference to Dignāga’s explanation of the Sautrāntika’s pramā?a-pramā?aphala argument. As a result, self-awareness itself becomes precarious. In connection with this problem, an argument on the relationship between self-awareness and the yogic perception of other minds given by Dharmakīrti leads us to discover that self-awareness is important for establishing subjectivity, in order to avoid another person’s access to one’s own mental states. Through examining Pramā?avārttika 3.448–459, this paper tries to find a way to interpret the svābhāsa-factor without relating to its object-factor (grāhyākāra), and to shed new light on the problem of subjectivity in the Sautrāntika epistemology.     

Traces of Yogācāra in the Chapter on Reality (<Emphasis Type="Italic">artha</Emphasis>) Within a Work on the Paths and Stages by Gling-ras-pa Padma rdo-rje (1128–1188)

This article aims to introduce some features of the literary output of Gling-ras-pa Padma rdo-rje, who was the teacher of the ‘Brug-pa bKa’-brgyud-pa school’s founder, gTsan-pa rGya-ras Ye-shes rdo-rje (1161–1211) in Tibet. The work that I draw upon here is titled A Torch of Crucial Points. A Condensation and Presentation of all Dharmas that are to be Practiced (gCes pa bsdus pa’i sgron ma ‘am| bslabs par bya ba’i chos thams cad mdor bsdus te bstan pa), a presentation of the entire outline of Buddhist practice that resembles the doctrinal stages (bstan rim) literary genre. Based on an edition and translation of the fifth chapter of the 17 that comprise the work, here I focus on several concepts, such as the three natures (trisvabhāva) and the allground consciousness (ālayavijñāna), that pertain to the system of Yogācāra and the terminology related to it. These are shown as they appear in the framework of the work, which is heavily influenced by the tradition of Mahāmudrā and the background of its author’s life as a wandering yogin in the lineage of Mi-la ras-pa (1040–1132).     

Studies in Dhāraṇī Literature I: Revisiting the Meaning of the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dhāraṇī</Emphasis>

The Mahāyāna Buddhist term dhāraṇī has been understood to be problematic since the mid-nineteenth century, when it was often translated as “magical phrase” or “magical formula” and was considered to be emblematic of tantric Buddhism. The situation improved in contributions by Bernhard, Lamotte and Braarvig, and the latter two suggested the translation be “memory,” but this remained difficult in many environments. This paper argues that dhāraṇī is a function term denoting “codes/coding,” so that the category dhāraṇī is polysemic and context-sensitive. After reviewing Western scholarship, the article discusses dhāraṇī semantic values and issues of synonymy, the early applications of mantras, the sonic/graphic background of coding in India extended into Buddhist applications, and the soteriological ideology of dhāraṇīs along with some of its many varieties.     

The Ocean of Yoga: An Unpublished Compendium Called the Yogārṇava

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The Yogār?ava (‘the ocean of yoga’) is a Sanskrit compendium on yoga that has not been published, translated or even mentioned in secondary...