POLITICIANS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES

Policy scientists can make important contributions to the study of policy distribution, a question that is likely to be among the most crucial national issues to be discussed throughout this decade. One aspect of this question that has been neglected is the theoretical assumption associated with public choice theory that politicians, once elected, will reward their supporters through the distribution of policy benefits. However, empirical research indicates that policy benefits seldom are distributed in this way. Instead, politicians follow the principle of universalism. In league with bureaucracies and policy communities, politicians define need and then ask bureaucracies to allocate benefits. This makes politicians roles as distributors of policy very different than simplistic models suggest.     

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURAL POLICIES AND THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

Structural policy has two elements: rules of competition and concentration in the marketplace, and deliberate attempts to structure industrial sectors. Historically, Europe, Japan, and the U.S. have pursued quite dissimilar structural policies, reflecting their differing perceptions of the national interest, different international imperatives, and different conceptions of the role of the state. The automobile industry offers sharp cross-country comparisons of structural policy at i t s most vigorous. In this paper, the successes and failures of U.S. antitrust activity toward the automobile industry are considered in comparison to the relative absence of such policies abroad. Similarly, governments' attempts to develop internationally competitive automobile industries in Europe and Japan contrast with the domestic regulatory orientation in the U.S. This historical analysis suggests the current need for reorientations in national structural policies in order to deal effectively with internationalized markets, firms, and competition in the automobile and other industries today.     

THE NEXT DECADE: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT OF EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING POLICIES

The conservative challenge of the Reagan administration has not produced a full-scale reversal of the liberal policies and social programs developed by earlier administrations and seems unlikely to do so now. Nevertheless, the continuities in American social and political history, the changed economic and fiscal circumstances of the current era, and growing public appreciation of the limits of federal action and of institutional capabilities are likely to effect a reduction in the level of federal spending for social programs in the foreseeable future and force the states to assume larger fiscal and programmatic roles. Implications for future employment and training policies include continued decentralization, a shift in focus away from training new entrants to retraining mid-career workers, and greater emphasis on meeting cost-effectiveness tests as program goals seek to promote economic efficiency rather than social objectives.     

THE EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR INNOVATION

This article is based on two premises: current innovation polices are based on very limited understanding of how Innovation occurs and the contribution to understanding that available policy research might make is severely limited by its fragmentation. The author cites Nelson's three models of the policy process as an example of the different paradigms that have guided innovation research. But, he argues, new developments suggest that the rigid boundaries are breaking down. Three examples are offered in support, each nominally based in one of the three paradigms but representing a loosening of its strictures.     

COMPETITIVE TENDERING POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Abstract: This paper compares and contrasts the application of competitive tendering policies in the public and private sectors. It is based on information derived from a large-scale survey of public and private sector organisations in New South Wales. Analysis of the survey responses suggests a common approach to the basic elements of the tendering (market-testing) process. However, there are also some important differences, the most striking of which is that public sector organisations advertise more frequently and generally review more tenders. Despite this, there appears to be little difference in the degree of effective competition achieved between the two sectors. More generally, while nearly all organisations surveyed collect information that is relevant to performance evaluation, it does not appear to be systematic or rigorous enough to secure contract compliance.