The politics of government reorganization in Western Europe

The reorganization of governments is crucial for parties to express their policy preferences once they reach office. Yet these activities are not confined to the direct aftermath of general elections or to wide-ranging structural reforms. Instead, governments reorganize and adjust their machinery of government all the time. This paper aims to assess these structural choices with a particular focus at the core of the state, comparing four Western European democracies (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom) from 1980 to 2013. Our empirical analysis shows that stronger shifts in cabinets' ideological profiles in the short- and long-term as well as the units' proximity to political executives yield significant effects. In contrast, Conservative governments, commonly regarded as key promoters of reorganizing governments, are not significant for the likelihood of structural change. We discuss the effects of this politics of government reorganization for different research debates assessing the inner workings of governments.     

Interesting but irrelevant: Social capital and the saliency of politics in Western Europe

Abstract. Many explanations of political involvement are based on the idea that higher levels of resources will be matched by higher levels of political involvement. Yet these kind of interpretations seem to overlook the fact that resources potentially increase individual autonomy and widen the scope of alternative actions, and so facilitate a decrease of political involvement. The analyses presented here are based on the rather paradoxical expectation that we will find a higher level of subjective political interest and, simultaneously, a lower level of political saliency among people commanding relatively high levels of social capital or other resources. The empirical evidence available for Western European countries in 1990 and 1998 essentially confirms the notion of diverging consequences of social capital (and other resources) for political involvement. People combining high political interest with a low saliency of politics are labelled spectators here. For them politics has lost its obligatory character – it is interesting and probably important to follow what goes on in this area, but compared with other matters its relevance is relatively low. Besides, a strong gender bias still can be found for each and every aspect of political involvement.     

Neo-corporatist theory and the politics of industrial decline

Abstract. The case of the French textile and clothing industry during the post-1974 crisis period illustrates a number of issues relevant to the debate about meso-corporatism and interest intermediation at the sectoral level in industry. It highlights the importance of attempts to understand the relationships between organised interests and the state in the analysis of the policy process. The pattern of state-industry relations which evolved was crucial in determining the outcome of conflict between state and industry over the management of restructuring during the crisis.
The inapplicability of the meso-corporatist model to this case becomes clear. There was a conspicuous absence of either political exchange or a shared policy agenda, each an important element of corporatist patterns of policy formation, in both the formation and implementation of adjustment policies in the sector. Mutual suspicion and a struggle to control the terms of the debate yielded a low level of co-operation. Eventually the industry was able to appropriate increased public funds on its own terms and to insist on a protective trade regime.
The complexity of the case points to the need to broaden the debate over models of interest intermediation and to relate it to issues in political economy. This is particularly important with regard to the structure of the bureaucratic state and notions of state autonomy.     

Financial bailouts and the decline of establishment politics

This article identifies and tests a mechanism to explain how exposure to financial bailouts accounts for the electoral decline of establishment parties. Given the limitation of economic voting theories to fully explain the electoral shifts observed in Europe from 2010 onwards, this research develops a different explanation. Citizens who were exposed to the macroeconomic conditions of financial bailouts not only observed the consequences of drastic fiscal adjustment packages but, possibly, also underwent a process of political learning. By putting economic responsibility before policy responsiveness, establishment parties showed citizens that voting for these parties did not necessarily implied policy change. This political learning led some citizens not to vote for these parties in subsequent elections. These theoretical claims are tested using individual data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey as well as data from European and parliamentary elections observed between 1991 and 2019 in eleven countries of the Eurozone.     

Bricks in the wall: the politics of housing in Europe

Abstract

Housing has important economic, political, and social ramifications for Western Europe and beyond. Despite its importance in shaping economic and political outcomes, however, housing remains in the peripheral vision of major comparative political economy debates. This introduction to the special issue accomplishes four objectives. First it demonstrates how housing defies current political economy typologies by failing to conform to their theoretical and empirical predictions. Second it summarises the current state of housing research within political science, which still remains in its infancy. Third it highlights how the contributions in this special issue expand our understanding of how housing causes and is shaped by political and economic outcomes in Europe. Finally, this introduction concludes by outlining how the special issue contributions demonstrate housing’s importance for the welfare state, political preferences and electoral shifts, regulatory and redistributive policies, and financialisation and household indebtedness in Europe.     

The rise and decline of new politics and the Greens in Sweden and Germany

Abstract. The failure of the Green parties at recent elections in Sweden and Germany makes it necessary to consider the future of 'new politics' in each country. With reference to modern organisation theory, the goal of this article is to explain the different character of the Green parties in both countries in terms of external political resources. Above all the features of new social movements on the one hand and the different party systems on the other are of particular importance. It is argued that both factors have an impact on the cleavage structure and social change in Sweden and Germany, as well as being important for the organizational survival of Green parties in both countries. The conclusion is that 'new politics' and the Greens have a more promising future in Germany than in Sweden.     

When market and territory collide: Thatcherism and the politics of regional decline

This article examines the politics of regional economic decline in two British administrative regions since 1979. Variations in economic problems and in government policy have combined with the presence or absence of indigenous resources to produce distinctive responses by groups and organisations in these regions. The findings highlight the strong influence of government policy in structuring the options for regional groups, as well as the mediational role played by regional civil servants. The politics of territory is alive and well in Britain, although it occurs within well‐defined parameters set largely by central government.     

Assessing the diversity of anti-establishment and populist politics in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

The more populism enters public debates, the more it needs close scrutiny. Central and Eastern Europe offers a useful context for exploring the diversity of parties identified as populist. Anti-establishment rhetoric provides a suitable conceptual starting point because of its pervasive role in the region’s political discourse. Using a new expert survey, this article details the relationship between anti-establishment salience and political positions, showing that anti-establishment parties occupy a full range across both economic and cultural dimensions and many occupy more centrist positions. Narrowing the focus to content analysis of anti-establishment parties’ thin ideology in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, it is concurrently found that for many actors (including those usually labelled as populist) anti-establishment rhetoric is indeed predominant, yet not always extensively combined with other elements of populism: people-centrism and invocation of general will. The findings are important for understanding multiple varieties of anti-establishment politics also beyond the region.     

The politics of Uber: Infrastructural power in the United States and Europe

Platform firms have been depicted as having structural and instrumental power and being able to prevail in regulatory battles. This article, in contrast, documents how they have often adapted to regulations and provide different services across locales. I show that platform firms have a specific type of power, infrastructural power, that stems from their position as mediators across a variety of actors. This power, I argue, is shaped by pre-existing regulations and the firms' strategic response, that I call “contentious compliance”: a double movement of adapting to existing regulations, while continuing to challenge them. I apply this framework to the expansion and regulation of Uber in New York City (US), Madrid (Spain), and Berlin (Germany).     

Ambient accountability: intelligence services in Europe and the decline of state secrecy

Abstract

In the 1990s, judgments in the European Court of Human Rights concerning state surveillance forced many West European countries to introduce new parliamentary bodies and formal systems for accountability. Promising both greater transparency and lawful intelligence, these frameworks were then energetically rolled out to Central and Eastern Europe. Although officials boasted about their effectiveness, these formal accountability mechanisms have failed to identify serious abuses over the last decade. Moreover, the security regime in much of Central Europe still remains largely unreconstructed. The article argues that a robust culture of accountability cannot be conjured into existence merely by introducing new laws and regulations, or indeed by the increasing tide of media revelations about intelligence. However, it suggests that we are now seeing the rise of a more complex pattern of ‘ambient accountability’ which is at last challenging the secret state across Europe.     

The effects of membership decline on party organisations in Europe

On election day, voters’ commitment is crucial for political parties, but between elections members are an important resource for party organisations. However, membership figures have been dropping across parties and countries in the last decades. How does this trend affect parties’ organisation? Following classics in party politics research as well as contemporary organisational theory literature, this study tests some of the most longstanding hypotheses in political science regarding the effects of membership size change. According to organisational learning theory, membership decline should induce an expansion of the party organisation. However, threat‐rigidity theory and the work of Robert Michels suggest that parties are downsizing their organisation to match the decline in membership size. To test the hypotheses, 47 parties in six European countries (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) are followed annually between 1960 and 2010 on key organisational characteristics such as finances, professionalism and complexity. A total of 1,922 party‐year observations are analysed. The results of multilevel modelling show that party membership decline triggers mixed effects. Declining membership size induces the employment of more staff, higher spending and a higher reliance on state subsidies. At the same time, it also triggers lower staff salaries and a reduction in the party's local presence. The findings indicate that today's parties are targeting an organisational structure that is custom‐made for the electoral moment every four years. Faced with lasting membership decline, the party organisation retracts its organisational resources and focuses more on election day. Members matter to parties, but votes matter more.     

Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe

Abstract. In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisciplinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background characteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N = 49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross-national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to differences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves.     

New populist parties in Western Europe

This article addresses the electoral success of far right political parties in West European party systems and suggests that there is a new type of party ‐ the New Populist. Differentiating between neo‐fascism and the New Populism is instructive in two senses. First, it reveals that the current wave of comparative electoral success is more associated with the New Populism than neo‐fascism. Second, it demonstrates that there are certain parallels between the New Politics and the New Populism thereby suggesting that changes in the contemporary far right may well be telling indicators of changes in West European societies that are deeper set than a simple resurgence of racist and anti‐immigrant sentiment.     

Economic dissatisfaction and political alienation in Western Europe

Abstract. Using Euro-Barometers 20 and 21, this research examines the role of economic discontent in promoting disenchantment with democracy in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy. Both cognitive and affective economic evaluations have a strong effect on one's level of political alienation. Those who believe the government will have a negative effect on the economy in the future and those who are angry over their government's management of the economy are likely to be dissatisfied with the way in which democracy is working in their country. After these economic evaluations the factors most closely related to alienation are support for the parties not in the governing coalition and post-materialist values. Even with these items included, however, economic evaluations continue to dominate the model of political alienation.