‘Hermann Heller and the European Crisis: Authoritarian Liberalism Redux?’

This essay tentatively buttresses Alexander Somek's view that Hermann Heller's 1933 essay, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism’, provides a useful starting point for thinking about the ongoing European crisis, in which European authorities are favouring rigid austerity and pro‐business policies while undermining basic liberal and democratic rights. Heller's unfortunate neglect, especially in Anglophone scholarship, is discussed. Nonetheless, Somek and other recent scholars who have turned to Heller to make sense of the European crisis downplay some of the tough questions raised by any attempt to apply Heller's analysis of the Weimar crisis to the contemporary setting. In particular, Heller's theory relied on a robust social democratic statism which has become increasingly unpopular even among theorists on the political left.     

European Studies and the European Crisis: Legal and Political Science between Critique and Complacency

European Studies used to be dominated by legal and political science approaches which hailed the progress of European integration and its reliance on law. The recent set of crises that struck the EU have highlighted fundamental problems in the ways and means by which European integration unfolds. The quasi‐authoritarian emergency politics deployed in the euro crisis is a radical expression of the fading prevalence of democratic processes to accommodate economic and social diversity in the Union. As we argue in this paper, however, the mainstreams in both disciplines retain a largely affirmative and apologetic stance on the EU's post‐democratic and extra‐constitutional development. While political science contributions mostly content themselves with a revival of conventional integration theories and thus turn a blind eye to normatively critical aspects of European crisis governance, legal scholarship is in short supply of normatively convincing theoretical paradigms and thus aligns itself with the functionalist reasoning of the EU's Court of Justice. Yet, we also identify critical peripheries in both disciplines which intersect in their critical appraisal of the authoritarian tendencies that inhere in the crisis‐ridden state of European integration. Their results curb the prevailing optimism and underline that the need for fundamental reorientations in both the theory and practice of European integration has become irrefutable.     

Reason of State and Public Reason

“Reason of state” is a concept that is rarely used in contemporary legal and political philosophy, compared to everyday parlance; “public reason,” in contrast, is ubiquitous, especially in liberal philosophy, as a legitimacy‐conferring device. In this article it is argued that the unpopularity of the notion of “reason of state” is partly due to its notorious ambiguity. Three different usages of the notion can be identified: a “thin” usage (where “reason of state” is equivalent to the common good); an “ironical” usage (where it is used pejoratively to denounce it as a pretext for application of illegitimate or illegal means); and a “pre‐emptive” usage (where “reason of state” functions as a legitimate second‐order exclusionary reason used to override otherwise mandatory first‐order rules of action). It is argued that only the “thin” usage is helpful in a by‐and‐large liberal‐democratic context. The article then discusses the main dilemmas related to the concept of public reason, especially in its most influential, Rawlsian interpretation, and defends the concept against common critiques. Finally, the two concepts of “reason of state” and public reason are compared, and it is argued that a “thin” usage of “reason of state” is functionally equivalent to public reason, and that both resonate with the theory of “input democracy” (focusing, as it does, on the legitimacy of reasons—or motivations—for applying coercive rules to individuals). The article also identifies a problematic feature of “reason of state”: its emphasis on the state as a privileged interpreter of such reasons and/or as identifying the pool of actors within which the “constituency” of public reason is ascertained. There are good reasons to resist both of these consequences: the former because of its potentially authoritarian consequences, the latter because of reasons provided by cosmopolitan political conceptions.     

Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?

The current crisis in Europe recalls the theory and practice of authoritarian liberalism, the idea that in order to protect economic liberalism and respect for fiscal discipline, representative democracy must be curtailed. This configuration was first identified by Hermann Heller in late Weimar as a response to the imperative to maintain the ideological separation of state and economy and presented by Karl Polanyi as conditioned by broader geo‐political pressure to maintain the gold standard in the inter‐war period. Authoritarian liberalism is now conditioned by conflicting imperatives to maintain the project of the single currency, respect ordo‐liberal concerns of moral hazard, and protect ‘militant democracy’ but only in one country. Does this reflect a broader geo‐political disequilibrium, due to tensions between market integration, constitutionalism and democracy?     

Delegation and Authority: Authoritarian Liberalism Today

In light of the reforms undertaken for the sake of the Euro, the article revisits the concept authoritarian liberalism that was introduced in 1933 by the German public law scholar Hermann Heller. This notion seeks to capture the liaison between the ‘strong state’ and economic liberalism. The article suggests that this notion can be fruitfully used to designate the new governance of economic and monetary union. It argues, particularly, that it makes sense to speak of an authoritarian style of governance even if the latter does not wear vestiges of outright repression. Two different faces of authoritarian liberalism can be distinguished: one that looks more towards authoritarianism and another one that views authoritarian rule as a managerial strategy that is good for the economy. The article then speculates whether the EU has been, indeed, successful because it shifts between the two. Disturbingly, there may be something deeply as well as more accidentally authoritarian about European integration.     

European Union Constitution-Making, Political Identity and Central European Reflections

Abstract: This article focuses on the European Union's constitution‐making efforts and their specific reflections in the Central European accession states. It analyses both the temporal and spatial dimensions of constitution‐making and addresses the problems of political identity related to ethnic divisions and civic demos. It starts by summarising the major arguments supporting the Union's constitution‐making project and emphasises the Union's symbolic power as a polity built on the principles of civil society and parliamentary democracy. The EU's official rejection of ethnically based political identity played an important symbolic role in post‐Communist constitutional and legal transformations in Central Europe in the 1990s. In the following part, the text analyses the temporal dimension of the EU's identity‐building and constitution‐making and emphasises its profoundly future‐oriented structure. The concept of identity as the ‘future in process’ is the only option of how to deal with the absence of the European demos. Furthermore, it initiates the politically much‐needed constitution‐making process. The following spatial analysis of this process emphasises positive aspects of the horizontal model of constitution‐making, its elements in the Convention's deliberation and their positive effect on the Central European accession states. The article concludes by understanding the emerging European identity as a multi‐level identity of civil political virtues surrounded by old loyalties and traditions, which supports the conversational model of liberal democratic politics, reflects the continent's heterogeneity and leads to the beneficial combination of universal principles and political realism.     

The Forms and Limits of Choice Architecture as a Tool of Government

Although the use of design‐based control techniques, broadly understood as the purposeful shaping of the environment and the things and beings within it toward particular ends, have been used throughout human history, until the publication of Thaler and Sunstein's Nudge, they have remained relatively neglected as a focus of regulatory scholarship. Nudge can be understood as a design‐based regulatory technique because it provides the means by which a choice architect intentionally seeks to influence another's behavior through the conscious design of the choice environment. But there are other forms of choice architecture besides nudge. The gunman who offers his victim “your money or your life?” is as much a choice architect as the cafeteria manager who places the fruit at eye level while placing the chocolate cake further back to encourage patrons to make healthier dietary choices and the supermarket owner who slashes grocery prices on their use by date to stimulate sales. This article focuses on three forms of choice architecture—coercion, inducements, and nudge—employed by the state in order to influence the behavior of others. It seeks to evaluate whether each form of choice architecture coheres with the fundamental values and premises upon which liberal democratic states rest and can therefore be properly characterized as libertarian. Chief among these values is the importance of individual liberty and freedom and the concomitant special status accorded to individual choice in liberal democratic communities. In so doing, it highlights different ways in which these techniques may be regarded as an interference with individual freedom, and the conditions under which such interferences might be rendered acceptable or otherwise justified.     

The Constitution's Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union1

Abstract: Our aim in this article is to consider whether the Union's deliberation over and decision‐making on constitutional norms, can contribute to render it more democratic. From a normative perspective, the way a constitution is forged has deep implications for its democratic legitimacy. In light of recent events, we consider how procedural changes in constitution‐making might contribute to rectify the Union's democratic deficit. To do so we first develop a thin model of constitution‐making based on the central tenets of deliberative democracy. Through this we seek to outline how a legitimate constitution‐making process will look from a deliberative democratic perspective. Second, we distil out some of the core characteristics of the Intergovernmental Conference (hereafter, IGC) model and assess this against the normative model, to establish the democratic quality of the IGC model. Third, we assess the current Laeken process by means of spelling out the central tenets of this mode of constitution‐making, and we assess it in relation to the normative standards of the deliberative model. In the fourth and final step, we consider what contribution constitution‐making might make to the handling of the EU's legitimacy deficit(s). We find that the Laeken process, in contrast to previous IGCs, was explicitly framed as a matter of constitution‐making. It carried further the democratization of constitution‐making, through its heightened degree of inclusivity and transparency. However, when considered in relation to the deliberative‐democratic model, it is clear that the Laeken Constitutional Treaty cannot be accorded the full dignity of a democratic constitution. The Constitutional Treaty can however lay the foundations for We the European people to speak.     

Locke on Toleration and Inclusion

As the product of liberalism's first encounter with the theoretical problems posed by legal discrimination and unequal treatment of minority groups, Locke's argument for religious toleration foreshadowed contemporary democratic theory's emphasis on non‐coercive discussion of diverse rights claims and broadly inclusive public deliberations. This study tries to illuminate the democratic dimension of Locke's toleration theory by focusing on his crucial account of the church as a voluntary association. Here Locke presented discursive possibilities for the articulation of diverse beliefs and interests that he believed would not only benefit both society as a whole and the minority religious groups contained in it, but also weave principles of contestation and deliberation into the very fabric of the liberal polity.     

Tolerance and Liberal Justice

Tolerance, the mere “putting up” with disapproved behaviour and practices, is often considered a too negative and passive engagement with difference in the liberal constitutional state. In response, liberal thinkers have either discarded tolerance, or assimilated it to the moral and legal precepts of liberal justice. In contradistinction to these approaches I argue that there is something distinctive and valuable about tolerance that should not be undermined by more ambitious, rights‐based models of social cooperation. I develop a conception of tolerance as a complementary principle and an interim value that is neither incompatible with, nor reducible to, rights‐based liberalism. Tolerance represents a particular, non‐communitarian expression of the general dictum that the liberal state, having released its citizens into liberty, rests on social presuppositions it cannot itself guarantee.     

‘Accountable Independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing the Logics of Transparency

The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the financial crisis not only as the institutional ‘winner’ but also as the most central—and powerful—supranational institution of our times. This article challenges the so‐called ‘accountable independence’ of the ECB across the range of tasks it carries out. Citizens ‘see’ the ECB today especially for its role in promoting austerity and its involvement as part of the troika and otherwise in the economic decision making of troubled Member States. Far from ECB monetary policy heralding a ‘new democratic model’, the ECB today suffers from a clear deficit in democracy. In between the grandiose concept of ECB ‘independence’ and the more performative ECB ‘accountability’ lies ‘transparency’. Across the range of ECB practices there is a need to take the related concepts of ‘transparency’ and of (democratic) ‘accountability’ more seriously, both in conceptual terms and in their relationship to one another.     

Democratic legitimacy in the European Union: Fulfilling the institutional logic

The European Union's delicate institutional balance between intergovern‐mentalism and supranationalism has been the source of both the EU's successes and its problems. This balance is under scrutiny as representatives of Member States and EU institutions pursue their particular visions of democratic legitimacy in the course of the 1996–97 Intergovernmental Conference. This essay examines three competing conceptualisations of democratic legitimacy: the Gaullist view, which associates legitimacy narrowly with national sovereignty; a national culture perspective that posits a unique correspondence of national character and national parliaments; and a parliamentary view that associates legitimacy with the role played by parliaments in scrutinising the behaviour of executives, whether at national or European level. Only the last of these perspectives acknowledges that democratic legitimacy is a continuous variable rather than an all‐or‐nothing concept, and that the EU may therefore accumulate legitimacy by improving both the process and substance of policy making within the logic of existing institutional structures.     

High‐End Demand: The Legal Profession as a Source of Judicial Selection Reform in Urban China

Most studies of comparative judicial politics suggest that judicial autonomy emerges from democratic competition, but despite its authoritarian political system, China has introduced reforms that increase merit‐based competition, transparency, and modest professional autonomy in local courts. Variations in judicial selection procedures across urban China reflect differences in local markets for professional legal services: when mid‐ranking judges can easily find lucrative local employment as lawyers, court leaders strategically reform appointment and promotion mechanisms to retain these young, but experienced, judges. These findings are based on nearly fifteen months of in‐country fieldwork, conducted between 2012 and 2014, including forty‐nine interviews with judges across three different cities: Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chengdu. Employing the subnational comparative method, this article not only builds theory regarding the legal profession's role in authoritarian states, but also offers new empirical detail regarding the selection, performance evaluation, and behavior of judges in urban China.     

The Great Recurrence: Karl Polanyi and the crises of the European Union

In his seminal 1944 book The Great Transformation, Polanyi describes the rise and fall of liberal capitalism during the long nineteenth century. Many have realised that Polanyi has a lot to tell about the European Union in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The paper begins with an overview of Polanyi's historiography of the failure of nineteenth‐century liberal capitalism and his account of the four elements that helped liberal capitalism thrive, while precipitating its collapse—the idea of the self‐regulating market, the gold standard, international peace and liberal constitutionalism. Thereafter, the paper describes the particular transformations that these four elements underwent in the course of European integration and after the financial crisis, with a particular focus on the case law of the Court of Justice. The paper argues that their current constellation has a destructive potential that exceeds the economic dimension of the Union and might pave the way for a much greater failure, one that might defeat Europe's greatest success: the establishment of peace. Ultimately, the paper assesses current reform proposals in light of these insights and makes a number of proposals for re‐embedding the economy in society.     

The Political Regime in Russia in the 2000s

The author analyzes the current political regime in Russia as a mild type of authoritarian neopatrimonial regime, based on inertia rather than tradition. He argues that changing conditions are undermining its stability and opening up an opportunity to create a democratic state based on law and capable of modernization.     

The Jury as a Translation of Democratic Participation and Political Conflict

In this response to Valerie Hans's Presidential address, I use her “legal translating” term to argue that the implementation of liberal democratic structures in new democracies opens new opportunities to translate the jury system into and onto new democratic societies. While policy makers have concerns about the strength and vibrancy of lay participation in the legal system, policy makers' decisions to adopt trial by jury are not always democratic. Nonetheless, the consequence of the translation of trial by jury furthers democratic development. Using Nicaragua, Mexico, and Russia as case studies, I suggest that one goal of policy makers who attempt to adopt trial by jury is to reduce the discretionary power of judges who remain from the prior government. Comparative trial‐by‐jury research can contribute more to our understanding of democratic development than prior research has indicated.     

After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy

From a social‐market perspective, European integration has reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social inequality. The article summarises the institutional asymmetries which have done most to constrain democratic political choices and to shift the balance between capital, labour and the state: the priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratise European politics will not be able to overcome these asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove them. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re‐foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that might facilitate democratic political action at both European and national levels.     

The state in Africa: Implications for democratic reform

Significant changes in the global political climate during the late 1980s sparked off dramatic enthusiasm for democratisation which swept across much of the developing world. Previously authoritarian governments, through the combined pressures from both external and internal arenas began to topple, to be replaced by regimes organised along liberal democratic lines. Internally, the public reacted to the corrupt and repressive tactics of a predatory patron-client state system which had continually failed to operate in accordance with societal needs, with street riots, strikes and other outbursts of discontent as a result. Such events played a major part in introducing multi-party politics by demanding accountability from those in power. Such dramatic changes were also a product of marked changes in the external environment, with governments no longer able to rely on uncritical donor support to secure a bulwark against communism. Furthermore, excessive state repression and intervention, in terms of human rights violations were no longer deemed to be acceptable behaviour. This is mirrored by a clear policy change as evidenced by the British Government's White Paper (1997) which clearly outlines the need for a more enabling, effective and strengthened role for governments in the developing world which enables them to become more dedicated to promoting the interests of the most disadvantaged sectors of society. Only governments which demonstrate a commitment to good governance may receive funding and not adhering to these policy dictates could have drastic consequences in terms of future levels and types of support. This article charts the issues concerning the new role for the state and its implications for achieving sustainable, participatory democracies in the context of the state in Africa. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Political Rights of Anti-Liberal-Democratic Groups

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether it is permissible for a liberal democratic state to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. My answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, I will argue that it is, in principle, permissible for liberal democratic states to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. On the other hand, I will argue that it is rarely wise (or prudent) for ripe democracies to exclude anti-liberal-democrats from parliamentary elections. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is related to the inherent stability of just institutions. The second is that exclusion can lead to group polarization and enclave deliberation that can engender political extremism and impair processes of interpersonal and intrapersonal deliberation in liberal democracies.     

Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy

This essay by Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel promotes visions of democracy, constitutionalism and institutional innovations which may help to open up new dimensions in the search for legitimate European governance structures and their constitutionalisation. Faced with Europe's legitimacy problems, proponents of the European project often react by pointing to the many institutional failings in the (national) constitutional state. These reactions, however, seem simplistic, offering no normatively convincing alternatives to the once undisputed legitimacy of a now eroding nation state. The essay by Cohen and Sabel forecloses such strategies. Summarising and endorsing critiques of both the unfettered market system and the manner of its regulatory and political correction, it concludes that the many efforts to establish new equilibria between well-functioning markets and well-ordered political institutions are doomed to fail, and opts instead for fundamental change: conservative in their strict defence of fundamental democratic ideals, such ideas are radical in their search for new institutional arrangements which bring democratic values directly to bear. How is the concept of directly-deliberative polyarchy complementary to and reconcilable with our notions of democratic constiutionalism? To this question the readers of the essay will find many fascinating answers. Equally, however, how might the debate on the normative and practical dilemmas of the European system of governance profit from these deliberations? Which European problem might be resolved with the aid of the emerging and new direct forms of democracy identified in this essay? How might direct democracy interact with the intergovernmentalist and the functionalist elements of the EU system? Although this essay contains no certain answers to these European questions, its challenging messages will be understood in European debates.