The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

The Proposed ‘Common European Sales Law’: Legal Framework and the Agreement of the Parties

The European Commission's Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (‘CESL’) seeks to create a European scheme of contract law available for parties to choose to govern cross‐border contracts for the sale of goods, supply of ‘digital content,’ and for the supply of related services. This article explains the background to the Proposal, sketches out the purposes and scope of the CESL, and considers and criticises its legal framework (and in particular its relationship with private international law) and the key requirement of the parties’ agreement. In the author's view, the CESL scheme remains an unconvincing basis for the achievement of its economic purposes and, as regards consumer contracts, puts too much reliance on the agreement of the consumer as a justification for the loss of their existing protection under EU private international law rules.     

The Origins of the ‘Nonmarket Economy’: Ideas,Pluralism & Power in EC Anti‐dumping Law about China

‘Market’ and ‘market economy’ exercise a powerful, even magnetic grip on our collective imagination. But what do we mean by ‘market economy’? Does it make sense to speak of a ‘nonmarket economy’, and if so, what does it mean? How are the ideas of ‘market economy’ and ‘nonmarket economy’ related? Focusing on EC anti‐dumping law, this article seeks to answer these questions. It argues that the legal concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law has been socially constructed, by means of relations among a plurality of institutional and normative sites, as part of a changing configuration of legal ideas in specific historical circumstances, and in contexts of political, economic, social, and symbolic power. This argument is articulated in three parts. First, the concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law, though drawing on earlier elements, had its main roots in the early Cold War. Second, starting in the 1960s, the GATT multilateral negotiating rounds began to define more specific international rules of the game, but a variety of more localised processes played essential roles as forces of change. Of special importance were, first, the tension between legislative rules and administrative discretion in the United States, and, second, the Europeanisation of foreign trade law in the course of European integration. Third, the EC law concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ was born in the late 1970s. The main reasons were changes in the international anti‐dumping law repertoire, specific ideas in Europe about comparative economic systems, and the perceived emergence of new economic threats, including exports from China.     

Responsive Adjudication and the ‘Social Legitimacy’ of the Internal Market

This article is concerned with the social legitimacy of EU free movement adjudication. What does social legitimacy entail within the multi‐level ‘embedded liberalism’ construction of the internal market? How can the objective of free movement (market access) and a commitment to social diversity both be pursued without one necessarily trumping the other? This article seeks to contribute to these questions on the basis of a discussion of what has come to be known as the argument from transnational effects and the development of an adjudicative model that can be termed ‘socially responsive’. On the basis of an ‘ideal types’ analysis of the case law of the Court, it is concluded that responsiveness to Member State social context is lacking in any coherent form in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, a responsive model of adjudication can be (re)constructed by streamlining the identified ideal type adjudicative rationales. In the midst of this process of discovery, an operational rationale to establish the substantive (social) scope and reach of the internal market shall be submitted.     

‘Consumer’ versus ‘Customer’: The Devil in the Detail

According to the European Commission, the objective of EU competition rules is enhancing ‘consumer welfare’. In EU competition law, however, ‘consumer’ means ‘customer’ and encompasses intermediate customers as well as final consumers. Under Article 102TFEU, harming intermediate ‘customers’ is generally presumed to harm ‘consumers’ and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. Using advances in economics of vertical restraints and, in particular, non‐linear pricing, this article shows that there are instances where the effect on ‘customer welfare’ does not coincide with the effect on ‘consumer welfare’ and the presumption can potentially lead to decisional errors. Thus, if the law is to serve the interests of ‘consumers’, the Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ‘consumer’ in ‘consumer welfare’; otherwise, it remains questionable whose interests EU competition law serves.     

Of ‘Landmark’ or ‘Leading’ Cases: Salomon's Challenge

This article seeks to question the two dominant conceptions of ‘landmark’ or ‘leading’ cases in English legal scholarship, using the House of Lords decision in Salomon v. Salomon Co Ltd. – the most famous case in corporate law – as a case study. It argues that neither the first dominant conception of ‘leading’ or ‘landmark’ cases, characterized by the analysis of the intrinsic merits of a case, nor the second, which looks at the historical contexts in which cases were decided, appears sufficient by itself to determine whether a case is landmark or canonical. Rather, we have to look at how the canonicity of a case is constructed by subsequent courts. The article seeks to advance the debate concerning the formation of landmark cases and aims to challenge certain prevailing views on the canonicity of corporate law's arguably most significant case.     

Does the European Company Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?

Abstract This article analyses the history of EU company law and locates a stable ‘non‐competitive equilibrium’. This equilibrium follows from Member States that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, Member States were determined to prevent the ‘Delaware effect’. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda‐setting in EU company law has changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as the recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion about competitive lawmaking in Europe.     

The ‘Reasonable Man’, his Nineteenth‐century ‘Siblings’, and their Legacy

The reasonable man is the best known, but not the only, legal construct to be born into the nineteenth‐century common law. This article introduces the man's siblings – including those from the areas of trust law, criminal law, contract law, and intellectual property law (both patents and trademarks). The fact that some of these ‘men’ changed the law is not controversial; this research further highlights that while several of these came to life in that century, only some had a significant role into the twentieth century. Those that did are tied to the foundations of our society through their role in facilitating innovation and consumer protection. The argument is that it was the constructs’ nature and their capacity to accommodate public policy issues that enabled the vitality of the ‘reasonable person ‘ (negligence) and the ‘person skilled in the art’ (patents).     

The Value of ‘Integration’ in European Law—The Implications of the Förster Case on Legal Assessment of Integration Conditions for Third‐Country Nationals

The European Court of Justice's Förster judgment can lead to a reduction of legal uncertainty caused by integration requirements for third‐country nationals. The judgment has created a strong ‘assumption of integration’ after five years of legal residence because it equalised integration requirements for European students to access the welfare system of host Member States with a requirement of five years legal residence. Almost all pieces of European legal migration law also contain five‐year residence requirements after which the status of third‐country nationals improves. However, these improvements are mostly subjected to the fulfilment of additional integration requirements. To keep coherence with European law, courts will not be able to disregard the Förster‘assumption of integration’ when assessing the legality of integration conditions for third‐country nationals put in place in addition to residence requirements.     

‘Citizens’ and ‘Foreigners’ in EU Law. Migration Law and its Cosmopolitan Outlook

Migration has become a controversial subject across Europe and beyond. At the same time, the EU has built up an impressive set of rules for third‐country nationals over the past two decades, which—unlike the mobility of EU citizens—received comparatively little attention apart from immigration and asylum specialists. This contribution presents the constitutional framework for ‘migration law’ towards third‐country nationals and shows in how far they depart from the paradigm of intra‐European mobility. It will be argued that differences can be rationalised by divergent objectives and do, nonetheless, not present a move towards ‘fortress Europe’. EU migration law maintains the distinction between citizens and foreigners at the same time as it protects migrants, including refugees. By accommodating migrants' rights and self‐government, EU migration law can be construed as an endeavour to replace traditional notions of alienage with constitutional rules with a cosmopolitan outlook.     

‘Country Rag Merchants’ and English Local Currencies in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, communities across England used country bankers’ notes almost as much as they used coins and Bank of England notes. Accounting for the relative success of these alternative currencies is challenging, however, due to the frequency of financial crisis during the period. If, during a crisis, all note holders attempted to enforce the promise to pay in gold coin against the issuing banker, the ‘law‐finance paradox’ would leave some note holders with gold coin, but would leave many more with merely ‘country rags’ or worthless pieces of paper. Building on both the credit approach to money and the relational approach to contract, this article shows note‐using communities successfully responding to financial crisis. They frequently did so by formalizing the bonds of reciprocity and trust tying the community to its note‐issuing banker – bonds sometimes made all the stronger by legal enforceability.     

‘On the Perimeter of the Lawful’: Enduring Illegality in the Irish Family Planning Movement, 1972–1985

Between 1935 and 1985, Irish law criminalized the sale and importation of condoms. Activists established illegal markets to challenge the law and alleviate its social consequences. They distributed condoms through postal services, shops, stalls, clinics, and machines. Though they largely operated in the open, their activities attracted little direct punishment from the state, and they were able to build a stable network of medical and commercial family planning services. We use 30 interviews conducted with former activists to explore this history. In doing so, we also examine the limits of ‘illegality’ in describing acts of everyday resistance to law, arguing that the boundaries between legal and illegal, in the discourses and practices of those who sought to challenge the state, were shifting and uncertain. In turn, we revisit ‘illegality’, characterizing it as an assemblage of varying selectively‐performed political practices, shaped by complex choreographies of negotiation between state and non‐state actors.     

‘Caminante,no hay camino,se hace camino al andar’1: EU Citizenship,Direct Democracy and Treaty Ratification

Abstract: This article argues that obligatory, simultaneous, and simple Treaty ratification by referenda is the next step in the consolidation of the political core of European citizenship. In the first part, general remarks about the special nature of EU citizenship highlight the relevance of referenda on EU Treaties for EU citizenship. In the second part, the normative and empirical case in favour of direct democracy is put forward. It is followed by the assessment of direct democracy in European integration as we have known it so far. The practice is irreversible and gaining in momentum. But it is in need of substantial reform due to procedural dysfunctions and discriminatory consequences for the citizens. Section V relates this result to a legal analysis of EU citizenship. The suppression of the discriminatory consequences of the Treaty ratification procedure is necessary from a legal point of view, but it cannot be expected from the ‘judicial incrementalism’ that has characterised the development of EU citizenship regarding free movement and residence. In section VI , the conclusions of the previous sections are drawn into the final proposal of obligatory, simultaneous and simple Treaty reform by referenda in all Member States. At the end, five counter‐arguments to the proposal are discussed.     

‘Accountable Independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing the Logics of Transparency

The European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the financial crisis not only as the institutional ‘winner’ but also as the most central—and powerful—supranational institution of our times. This article challenges the so‐called ‘accountable independence’ of the ECB across the range of tasks it carries out. Citizens ‘see’ the ECB today especially for its role in promoting austerity and its involvement as part of the troika and otherwise in the economic decision making of troubled Member States. Far from ECB monetary policy heralding a ‘new democratic model’, the ECB today suffers from a clear deficit in democracy. In between the grandiose concept of ECB ‘independence’ and the more performative ECB ‘accountability’ lies ‘transparency’. Across the range of ECB practices there is a need to take the related concepts of ‘transparency’ and of (democratic) ‘accountability’ more seriously, both in conceptual terms and in their relationship to one another.     

Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Austin claimed, unsuccessfully, that police kettling at a public protest in London amounted to a violation of her right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This case comment suggests that the court took an unexpected and unorthodox approach to the issue of ‘deprivation’ within Article 5. This decision may come to undermine the protections afforded by Article 5 and extend the current exceptions to Article 5 to an indefinite range of situations.     

Two Meanings of ‘Reasonableness’: Dispelling the ‘Floating’ Reasonable Doubt

The ‘reasonable doubt standard’ is the controlling standard of proof for criminal fact finding in several jurisdictions. Drawing on decision theory, some scholars have argued that the stringency of this standard varies according to the circumstances of the case. This article contends that the standard does not lend itself to the ‘sliding‐scale’ approach mandated by decision theory. This is supported through investigation of the concept of ‘reasonableness’. While this concept has mostly been studied as it operates with reference to practical reasoning, scant attention has been given to the meaning that it acquires when referred to theoretical reasoning. Unlike in the former case, reasonableness does not in the latter depend on the reasoner's attitudes in favour of the outcomes of a decisional process. Therefore, since criminal fact finding is an instance of theoretical reasoning, the question whether in this enterprise a doubt is reasonable is not susceptible to a decision‐theoretic approach.     

European Law Beyond ‘Ever Closer Union’ Repositioning the Concept,its Thrust and the ECJ's Comparative Methodology

The article investigates competing understandings of European law. It supports, against the prevailing EU‐centred understanding, an ecumenical concept that embraces EU law, supplementing international instruments, the European Convention on Human Rights and, importantly, various domestic laws enacting or responding to such transnational law, as well as European comparative law. To keep the concept in sync with European politics, it posits a new idea that binds the parts together: to provide for a European legal space rather than further European integration (the ever closer union). This idea can also serve as European law's functional equivalent to forming one legal order. European law thus conceived grasps the puzzling complex of interdependent legal orders, sets a common frame for corresponding reconstructions (European composite constructions, legal pluralism, network theories, federalism or intergovernmentalism) and allows forces with diverging outlooks to meet in one legal field, on one more neutral disciplinary platform. Within this framework, European comparative law finds a new mission as well as a sound legal basis.     

A 'European' Conception of Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich

This paper discusses the present ‘legal consciousness’ literature and seeks to identify two different conceptions of legal consciousness. Most of this literature originated in the United States, but there has also been a growing interest in issues of legal consciousness in Europe. The use of the term ‘legal consciousness ’ in these European discussions is, however, remarkably different from its use in the United States literature. It is argued that the most commonly used ‘American ’ conception of legal consciousness reflects important ideas of Roscoe Pound and asks: how do people experience (official) law? By contrast, a European conception of legal consciousness, which was first introduced by the Austrian legal theorist Eugen Ehrlich, focuses on: what do people experience as ‘law ’? After both perspectives are applied in a case‐study of a run‐down neighbourhood in the Netherlands, it is concluded that future studies of legal consciousness may benefit from an integration of the two conceptions.