Public choice and public policy: The vulnerability of economic advice to the interpretation of politicians

The confidence with which politicians defend their policies is in marked contrast to the qualifications which academic researchers attach to their results. The difference is indicative of a failure of the political market, whereby politicians have an incentive to select policies for electoral and ideological reasons and to minimise any uncertainty associated with policy effectiveness. In this scenario dissension between economists is of value if it alerts individuals to the sensitivity of policy answers to the framework in which they are derived. Moreover, with government failure, public choice analysts are faced with the problem of how best to amend policy advice in order to allow for potential distortion at the hands of politicians.The authors are Senior Lecturers in Economics and Members of the Centre for Fiscal Studies, University of Bath. They wish to acknowledge the very helpful comments of Professors Gordon Tullock, Harry Collins and an anonymous referee. Any errors that might remain are, of course, the sole responsibility of the authors.     

试论侦查策略的概念和本质

本文重点对刑事侦查策略的概念、刑事侦查策略与侦查措施的区别以及侦查策略的本质进行了阐述;通过阐述,初步对刑事侦查策略的概念进行了界定;通过比较,阐明了侦查策略与侦查措施的关系;通过论证,明确了刑事侦查策略是可知的,而非神秘莫测,其实质是认识的方法、过程和结果.     

Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance

Condorcet’s jury theorem provides a possible explanation for the success of democracies relative to other forms of government. In its modern form, the jury theorem predicts that majority decisions are well informed, because they are based upon far more information than possessed by any single individual. On the other hand, it is evident that democratic politicians and policies are not always as good as the jury theorem implies they should be. This paper uses simulated elections to explore the power and limitations of majority rule as an estimator of candidate quality or policy effectiveness. The simulations demonstrate that slightly informed voters can make very accurate choices among candidates using majority rule. However, as the ratio of slightly informed voters relative to ignorant voters falls, the accuracy of majority decisions declines. The latter implies that institutions, policies, and technologies that promote the dissemination of information also tend to improve the efficiency of democratic governance.     

试论推进警务公开进程的策略

警务公开是公安体制改革的一项重要内容,在新的公安执法环境中推进我国的警务公开化进程,必须从具体策略上注意解决以下几个问题:一是树立正确的行政观念(包括树立服务行政的观念,树立警务公开是公安机关的义务而不是恩赐的观念,树立警务公开是达到行政公平、公正前提的观念),二是必须使警务公开制度化与法制化,三是必须要有方便灵活的程序与手段,四是必须充分重视互联网对警察行政公开的革命性意义。     

试论美术教学中的教育因子

美术教学是通过有组织性的课堂形式,以教师施教和学生受教的特殊途径有目的性地进行知识传授和经验传递活动。美术教学最根本的职能是育人,感化人,使人最终成才。从革新传统教育观念、教学方式入手,分析了美术教学中潜在的＂教育＂因子,阐述了教师在美术课堂教学中对学生的引导作用和价值。     

论跨境追逃之侦查方略

跨境追逃是惩治外逃嫌疑犯的有效措施。我国与国际社会、内地与港澳台不同法域间开展这一合作 ,应当在符合一定形式要件的前提下通过平等协商 ,采取切实可行的侦查方略进行 ,使打击跨境犯罪取得成效。     

The design,purpose, and effects of voting advice applications

In recent electoral politics, one of the most striking internet-related developments is the increasingly widespread use of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs). In this introduction to the symposium devoted to analysing the design, purpose, and effects of voting advice applications, we briefly discuss the literature on these tools for voters, articulate the aims of the symposium, and summarise the six contributions. These papers represent the leading edge of an emerging subfield of electoral research, which has not only significant practical relevance but also research links with many other fields in political science.     

Distributional coalitions,state strength,and economic growth: Toward a comprehensive theory of economic development

High-performing economies in the Asia-Pacific region together with only mediocre economic development in Latin America prompts the question of what explains differential economic growth rates among developing countries. Combining a statist perspective with Olson's theory of interest group formation, this research hypothesizes that nations with weak distributional coalitions will more likely experience high growth and state intervention will be effective. Using a longitudinal research design, this secondary analysis involves a comparative and interactive examination of eight Asian-Pacific and twelve Latin American countries. By considering the role of the state in interaction with distributional coalitions in society, the results indicate that approximately two-thirds of the variance in national economic growth is explained.     

论经济自由与政府调控的关系——由美国经济危机引发的思考

美国次贷危机引发了如何正确处理经济自由与政府调控的关系的深入讨论.相当长一个时期以来,大多数西方学者和政要过分地夸大市场这只.看不见的手在经济生活中的作用,抑或说强调极端的经济自由.19世纪中叶以后,由于西方国家过分推崇强调经济自由,完全依赖市场这只看不见的手的弊端开始暴露.20世纪初的凯恩斯主义和罗斯福新政引导西方资本主义国家度过了经济危机,为资本主义的重新发展奠定了基础.在现代市场经济中,金融及其衍生工具是刺激经济发展的重要因素之一,但是,证券、期货等金融衍生工具本身就带有强烈的投机性和风险性,如果缺乏必要的监管,任凭其随心所欲地自由泛滥,就不可避免地出现问题.西方资本主义制度建立以来的历史证明,什么时候把自由规范在一个合理的限度内,经济和社会发展就健康有序,什么时候自由离开了必要的限制,就会引发灾难.     

Centralization, Access, and Influence: The Reagan Administration and the Semiconductor Industry's Trade Complaints

This article explores how the relative centralization of decisionmaking authority can affect a societal group's ability to achieve its interests. It examines the US semiconductor industry's efforts to persuade the Reagan administration to press Japan on its import barriers and its firms' trade practices. I find that the industry's eventual success was facilitated by an institutional change that centralized the structure of decisionmaking authority. Centralization proved more favorable to the industry's influence in this case because it reduced the number of competing state interests involved in policymaking and concentrated authority in state units that shared the industry's preferences. To account for the change in this structure I focus on the interplay between government officials and policy windows. The analysis suggests that centralization may under some conditions be more conducive than decentralized structures to societal influence, and that modest institutional changes can have significant policy implications.     

经济体制与政治稳定形态的关系探析

马克思主义认为,经济基础决定上层建筑,有什么样的经济基础,就会出现什么样的维护这一经济基础的上层建筑.计划经济产生静态的政治稳定,市场经济要求动态的政治稳定.静态政治稳定南于其封闭性和停滞性,与当前中国丰十会发展的方向和目标相背离.动态的政治稳定是新时期中国惟一可以选择的政治稳定形态.     

Channeling frustrations: institutions, economic fluctuations, and political behavior

While the literature suggests that clear lines of responsibility lead to greater incumbent dependence on economic conditions for support, little has been said about how electorates channel frustrations in systems characterized by 'fuzzy' lines of responsibility, i.e., the shape and status of parliamentary government in relation to possible choice of electors open to them. The argument presented here is that fuzzy lines of responsibility result in lower incentives to participate in political processes and greater system dissatisfaction given economic circumstances. This decline is greater in systems in which incumbent responsibility is less easily identified by the individual citizen. To test this, data are collected from eight European nations over the period 1975–1992. Split sample and slope intervention models with robust estimation are employed at the individual level. System level aggregates are analyzed using pooled time–series analysis to confirm individual level findings. Finally, election turnout data are also analyzed to obtain election level verification of survey findings. Evidence suggests that participation is more heavily influenced by economic conditions in fuzzy settings. Coupled with existing literature, this suggests that while clear settings encourage punishment of the incumbent unclear settings tend to cause individuals to become more withdrawn and alienated. However, economic conditions are also important to overall system effects. The findings herein suggest that unclear or fuzzy settings increase the role of economic conditions in determination of system affect.     

Channeling frustrations: Institutions,economic fluctuations,and political behavior

Abstract While the literature suggests that clear lines of responsibility lead to greater incumbent dependence on economic conditions for support, little has been said about how electorates channel frustrations in systems characterized by 'fuzzy' lines of responsibility, i.e., the shape and status of parliamentary government in relation to possible choice of electors open to them. The argument presented here is that fuzzy lines of responsibility result in lower incentives to participate in political processes and greater system dissatisfaction given economic circumstances. This decline is greater in systems in which incumbent responsibility is less easily identified by the individual citizen. To test this, data are collected from eight European nations over the period 1975–1992. Split sample and slope intervention models with robust estimation are employed at the individual level. System level aggregates are analyzed using pooled time–series analysis to confirm individual level findings. Finally, election turnout data are also analyzed to obtain election level verification of survey findings. Evidence suggests that participation is more heavily influenced by economic conditions in fuzzy settings. Coupled with existing literature, this suggests that while clear settings encourage punishment of the incumbent unclear settings tend to cause individuals to become more withdrawn and alienated. However, economic conditions are also important to overall system effects. The findings herein suggest that unclear or fuzzy settings increase the role of economic conditions in determination of system affect.