The transformation of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

Between 2000 and 2005, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, until recently, the Food Stamp Program) caseload increased by half. As the Great Recession unfolded, the SNAP caseload grew even more rapidly. Further, over the past two decades the composition of the caseload has shifted sharply away from families combining food and cash assistance and toward families receiving food assistance in the absence of any other major, means‐tested income support. By analyzing components of the caseload separately, we provide new and more insightful estimates of the effects of food and cash assistance policies and the economy on both the change in the composition of the caseload and the large caseload swings over the 1990s and 2000s. We find that the economy can explain a portion of caseload changes, but not compositional shifts. Food and cash assistance policies help to explain both changes. In total, the combination of SNAP and welfare policy changes account for about half of the sharp increase since 1994 in the share of SNAP households receiving food, but not cash, assistance. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The Food Stamp Program and Supplemental Security Income

The Food Stamp Program (FSP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are important parts of national public assistance policy, and there is considerable overlap in the populations that the programs serve. About half of all SSI recipients reside in FSP recipient households. This article uses Social Security administrative data and the Food Stamp Quality Control samples for federal fiscal years 2001-2006 to study the prevalence of food stamp receipt among households with SSI recipients, the contribution of FSP to household income, and the importance of various FSP features in contributing to the well-being of recipient households. The prevalence of FSP participation among households that include SSI recipients is estimated to have grown steadily over the entire 2001-2006 period, rising from 47.4 percent in 2001 to 55.6 percent in 2006. This growth has occurred across all age groups of SSI recipients. The FSP contribution to household income has grown as well. In 2001, FSP increased the income of the households of SSI/FSP recipients by 13 percent; by 2006 the increase was 16.8 percent. Almost 80 percent of the food stamp recipient households that include SSI recipients receive increased benefits because of excess housing costs. In 2006, 44 percent of SSI recipients lived in households that did not receive food stamps. Given available information, it is difficult to gauge the FSP eligibility of nonparticipating households and, therefore, to assess the potential benefit of outreach efforts. Currently available measures of FSP take-up probably overstate participation among eligible households that include SSI recipients, and there is some evidence that enhanced state promotion of the FSP raises participation among households with SSI recipients. We conclude with recommendation for review and renewal of collaboration between the Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the agency responsible for administering the FSP) and the Social Security Administration in ensuring that eligible SSI recipients utilize FSP benefits.     

The effects of cashing-out food stomps on household food use and the cost of issuing benefits

The recent report produced by Vice President Gore's committee on government efficiency highlights the importance of streamlining government operations. But often there are trade-offs between administrative streamlining and accomplishing substantive program objectives. This article examines these tradeoffs in the context of the Food Stamp Program, an important component of the United States' safety net for providing low-income assistance. We estimate impacts on both administrative costs and substantive outcomes (participant food expenditures) resulting from issuing program benefits in the form of checks rather than the usual food coupons. The findings, which are based on experimental tests of the cashout approach in parts of Alabama and California, suggest that significant cost savings can be attained through cashout but that these savings may be achieved at the cost of weakening the program's ability to achieve its substantive objective of encouraging food use.     

Poverty, food programs, and childhood obesity.

Sixteen percent of children 6-11 years of age were classified as overweight in 1999-2002, four times the percentage in 1965. Although poverty has traditionally been associated with underweight as a result of poor diet, researchers have recently pointed to a paradox in the U.S., which is that low income and obesity can coexist in the same population. This paper first examines whether income is linked to overweight in school-age children. Second, it explores whether food programs such as the Food Stamp Program, the National School Lunch Program, and the School Breakfast Program are associated with overweight among children in different income groups. The data come from the nationally representative 1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics Child Development Supplement. No evidence either that poor children are more likely to be overweight or that food programs contribute to overweight among poor children was found.     

The Effect of Safety Net Generosity on Maternal Mental Health and Risky Health Behaviors

Single mothers are more likely to experience mental health problems and stress-related negative health behaviors than their married counterparts, but a more generous safety net may improve these outcomes. We use a simulated safety net eligibility approach that accounts for interactions across safety net programs and relies on changing policies across states and time to identify causal effects of safety net generosity on psychological distress and risky behaviors of single mothers. Results suggest that a more generous safety net is protective of maternal mental health: a $1,000 increase to the simulated potential combined cash and food benefit package reduces severe psychological distress by 8.4 percent. Breaking out effects by individual programs while still controlling for potential benefits from other programs, we find protective effects of tax credits, cash benefits provided by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and food benefits provided by Supplemental Nutritional Assistance, but no effects of Medicaid eligibility. The effects are primarily driven by single mothers with the lowest levels of education. We find no significant effects of generosity on daily smoking, but we find evidence that benefits reduce the likelihood of heavy drinking. Results suggest that government investments in resources available to low-income families can be effective at improving well-being.     

The national evaluation of the food stamp employment and training program

This article reports the results of the national evaluation of the Food Stamp Employment and Training (E&T) Program, based on an experimental study involving over 13,000 program participants in 53 separate local food stamp agencies. The story told by these findings begins with the types of individuals who participated in the E&T Program in FY 1988. Nearly 70 percent did not have children (removing this barrier to finding employment), and about half were single, highly mobile adults living alone. Most received no public assistance other than food stamps. For the most part, then, these were individuals who needed to work—food stamp benefits are not intended to meet total subsistence needs. It would, therefore, be expected that most of the E&T participants would be looking for work (whether or not they were successful) in the absence of E&T requirements. Next, it is apparent that large numbers of E&T participants did not engage in employment or training services in FY 1988. As currently structured, beyond imposing the obligation to meet the requirements of E&T, the program failed to provide any actual services to about half of those deemed eligible to participate. For the most part, the services received by E&T participants consisted primarily of referral to individual job search. In the absence of E&T, many of the individuals currently targeted by the program were able to obtain similar referrals on their own. Consequently, it is not surprising, that E&T was found to have no effect on participants' employment and earnings, and only a relatively small effect on average food stamp benefits.     

Salience,Food Security,and SNAP Receipt

Household food insecurity status in the United States is ascertained by a battery of close‐ended questions. We posit that the monthly nature of benefit receipt from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) creates experiences of food hardship, which become salient in the context of SNAP receipt, and in turn exert influence on the response to food security questions. We test this hypothesis by examining answers to a 30‐day food security module in relation to when SNAP benefits are received. We find that for SNAP households near the end of or at the beginning of the benefit month, the probability of being classified as food insecure increases by 11 percentage points, over a baseline of 42 percent. We also find that the probability of responding affirmatively to any of the first five items in the module increases during this time. We discuss the importance of these findings for the estimation of food security and its implication on program evaluation.     

The COVID Cash Transfer Study: The Impacts of a One-Time Unconditional Cash Transfer on the Well-Being of Families Receiving SNAP in Twelve States

There is growing interest in the use of unconditional cash transfers as a means to alleviate poverty, yet little is known about the effects of such transfers in the U.S. This paper reports on the results of a randomized controlled study of a one-time $1,000 unconditional cash transfer in May 2020 to families with low incomes in 12 U.S. states. The families were receiving, or had recently received, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits. We examine the impact of the cash transfer on five pre-registered outcomes (material hardship, mental health, parenting, child behavior, partner relationships) and several secondary outcomes (hardship avoidance, consumption, employment, benefit use). We find no statistically significant effects (powered to detect effects of 0.09 standard deviations) of the cash transfer on any outcomes for the full sample. In pre-specified exploratory analyses, we find significant reductions in material hardship (-0.17 standard deviations) among families with less than $500 of earnings in the previous month, roughly the bottom 50 percent of monthly earnings for the study sample.     

Disability benefit coverage and program interactions in the working-age population

Over three-fourths of the working-age population in the United States is insured for Disability Insurance (DI); this group is protected against a total loss of earned income typically associated with severe disability. However, little is known about the role the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program plays in protecting against the financial consequences of severe disability for this population. We find that over one-third (36 percent) of the working-age population is covered by SSI in the event of a severe disability. Three important implications follow, which we discuss in sequence below: (1) SSI increases the overall coverage of the working-age population; (2) SSI enhances the bundle of cash benefits available to disabled individuals; and (3) interactions with other programs also enhance the safety net, most notably in the area of health insurance coverage. Ignoring these implications could lead to inaccurate inferences about disability program coverage, health insurance coverage, and the well-being of working-age individuals with disabilities. The first major finding is that SSI substantially increases overall cash benefit coverage. Thus SSI dramatically increases protection against the financial risk of disablement in the working-age population. While roughly 23 percent of the U.S. working-age population was not insured for DI in November 1996, SSI provides coverage for more than half of this seemingly "uncovered" population. An important innovation of our analysis is that we account for the possibility that many of those who appear ineligible for SSI based on current income could become eligible as a result of a disability shock that causes their earnings to drop. Thus the estimated proportion that is protected by SSI increases when the possibility of earnings loss because of disability is considered. Considering DI and SSI together, roughly 90 percent of the working-age population would be potentially covered for benefits in the event of a disability. Those who are covered by SSI--as opposed to those covered by DI alone-tend to be relatively young, less educated, and in relatively poor health. The remaining 10 percent or so are not covered by either DI or SSI. This group is economically vulnerable in some sense (they are poorer, older, and more likely to be women than those covered only by DI), but they are not as economically vulnerable in terms of income, resource holdings, and private health insurance coverage as those who are eligible for SSI. A disproportionate share of those who are not covered by either DI or SSI consists of married women. The second major finding is that SSI substantially enhances the bundle of available cash benefits. Roughly one-third of those covered by DI are initially covered by SSI as well. SSI enhances the bundle of available cash benefits through two mechanisms: (1) SSI provides cash payments during the 5-month DI waiting period, and (2) SSI supplements the DI benefit after the DI waiting period for people whose initial SSI payment is larger than the DI benefit. We find that the role of SSI cash payments is temporary for most of those who are initially covered by both SSI and DI: They would receive SSI during the DI waiting period, but would lose SSI eligibility afterwards because the higher DI benefit completely offsets the SSI benefit. However, a smaller group of DI beneficiaries with low DI benefit levels would continue to be covered by both SSI and DI after the DI waiting period because the relatively low DI benefit would not completely offset the SSI benefit. The third major finding is that interactions with other programs also substantially enhance the safety net. The most important interactions involve health insurance coverage. In the working-age population, Medicare is available to DI beneficiaries, but only after a 24-month waiting period. By contrast, SSI is an important pathway to Medicaid benefits for severely disabled adults with limited income and resources and has no waiting period. SSI can provide a pathway to health insurance coverage during the 24-month Medicare waiting period for some DI beneficiaries through providing access to Medicaid. Interactions with other programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), workers' compensation (WC), and veterans' disability programs, modify the role of DI and SSI in protecting people against the adverse financial effects of disablement. The nature of the interactions with other programs differs depending on individual circumstances. Employment-related programs (including UI, WC, and veteran's disability programs) are particularly important for those who are covered by DI. By contrast, the means-tested programs (including TANF and Food Stamp) are more important for those who would be eligible for SSI. In conclusion, SSI plays a substantial role in protecting working-age people against the adverse financial consequences of disablement through three mechanisms: (1) providing coverage to many who are not DI insured; (2) providing additional cash benefits to many who are DI insured and also covered by SSI; and (3) enhancing the social safety net by interacting with other programs, most notably Medicaid. Through these mechanisms, the role of SSI is substantial enough that it cannot be safely ignored in econometric and policy research on DI.     

Controlling federal expenditures in the national school lunch program: The relationship between changes in household eligibility and federal policy

Under the assumption of widespread fraud and abuse, procedures were implemented in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) in 1981 to detect and deter misreporting by applicants for subsidized meal benefits. We, however, find that the incidence of fraud is actually small relative to normal temporal variation in income and household composition that leads to legitimate changes in eligibility for benefits. It is estimated that each month about 3 percent of all households approved for meal benefits have changes sufficiently large to alter their benefit status. Further, the amount of misreporting at the time of application, estimated to be 4.8 percent, is far smaller than previously assumed. Instead of focusing on the static problem of deterring initial applicant misreporting, the policy problem is now a dynamic one that includes how (or whether) to deal with normal changes in income and household size.     

Has the Food Stamp program become more accessible? Impacts of recent changes in reporting requirements and asset eligibility limits

This paper uses data from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to assess the impact of recent policy initiatives intended to increase access to Food Stamps. It finds that reductions in state certification requirements increased Food Stamp participation rates of income‐eligible families with children by one to two percentage points from 2001 to 2003, a change that is comparable to the impact of changes in economic conditions over this period. It did not find consistent evidence of an impact of relaxing vehicle asset limits, or of offering continuous eligibility through the Semi‐Annual/Simplified Reporting option. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Food security and access to healthy foods in Indian country: Learning from the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations

Food access, food security, and nutrition‐related health disparities have long been recognized as particular challenges for Native Americans living on tribal land. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides nutrition assistance to tribal communities through the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR). In 2016, we completed a study of the FDPIR program for USDA's Food and Nutrition Service. This was the first national update since 1990. We found that FDPIR continued to serve people of all ages. However, since 1990, participation by children decreased whereas participation by elders increased. Consistent with the 1990 study, we found that FDPIR households are a very low‐income population. Households reported significantly higher rates of food insecurity than national averages—34% experienced low food security, and about 22% experienced very low food security. Changing demographics call for continued attention to the diverse nutritional needs of young and elderly program participants in tribal communities. Although barriers to food access persist in Indian country, FDPIR and locally sourced food initiatives help to meet needs. Nutrition and wellness education addresses health disparities and fosters healthy lifestyles. Partnerships operating at multiple levels support food production and distribution, improve access to healthy foods, and encourage healthy diets. From a policy and practice perspective, the study findings offer insights for tribal communities and rural areas that have limited access to healthy food options and illustrate how nutrition assistance programs can coexist with local initiatives to provide practical approaches to ensure healthy and adequate nutritional support.     

Modeling SSI financial eligibility and simulating the effect of policy options

This article simulates eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) among the elderly, analyzes factors affecting participation, and looks at the potential effects of various options to modify financial eligibility standards for the federal SSI program. We find that in the estimated noninstitutional elderly population of 30.2 million in the United States in 1991, approximately 2 million individuals aged 65 or older were eligible for SSI (a 6.6 percent rate of eligibility). Our overall estimate of the rate of participation among eligible elderly is approximately 63 percent, suggesting that more than a third of those who are eligible do not participate in the program. The results of our analysis of factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly show that expected SSI benefits and a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables are associated with the probability of participation. We also simulate the effects of various policy options on the poverty rate, poverty gap, annual program cost, the number of participants, and the average estimated benefits among participants. The simulations consider the potential effects of five policy alternatives: Increase the general income exclusion (GIE) from $20 to $80. Increase the earned income exclusion (EIE) from $65 to $260. Increase the federal benefit rate (FBR) by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples and eliminate the GIE. Increase the asset threshold to $3,000 for individuals and $4,500 for couples. Increase the asset threshold to $6,000 for individuals and $9,000 for couples. Using 1991 microdata from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration administrative records and making adjustments reflecting aggregate program statistics, we present the results of our simulations for December 1999. The results show substantial variation in the simulated effects of the five policy alternatives along the various outcome dimensions considered. The simulated effects on the poverty gap of the elderly population range from a 7.9 percent reduction ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a 0.1 percent reduction ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). All simulated interventions are expected to increase the rate of SSI participation among the elderly from a high of 20.3 percent ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a low of 0.5 percent ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). We also find that the interventions that have greater estimated effects in terms of increased participation and reduced poverty tend to cost more. At the high end, we estimate that increasing the GIE from $20 to $80 could raise annual federal SSI cash benefit outlays by about 46 percent, compared with only 0.9 percent for increasing the EIE from $65 to $260. Similar to the EIE intervention, raising the resource thresholds by 50 percent would reduce the overall poverty gap of the elderly by only 0.2 percent, would increase SSI participation only modestly (by 1.3 percent), but would entail slightly higher program costs (by 1.4 percent). Increasing the asset threshold by 200 percent would have higher estimated effects on all three outcomes, but it would still be associated with relatively low increases in both costs and benefits. Finally, the simulated effects on the three key outcomes of increasing the FBR by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples, combined with eliminating the GIE, are relatively large but are clearly less substantial than increasing the GIE from $20 to $80. This work relies on data from the SIPP matched to administrative data on federal SSI benefits that provide a more accurate picture of SSI participation than has been feasible for previous studies. We simulate eligibility for federal SSI benefits by applying the program rules to detailed information on the characteristics of individuals and couples based on the rich array of demographic and socioeconomic data in the SIPP, particularly the comprehensive information SIPP provides on assets and monthly income. A probit model is estimated to analyze factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly. Finally, we conduct the policy simulations using altered program rules represented by the policy alternatives and predicted participation probabilities to estimate outcomes under simulated program rules. We compare those simulated outcomes to observed outcomes under current program rules. The results of our simulations are conditional on the characteristics of participants and eligibles in 1991, but they also reflect aggregate adjustments capturing substantial changes in overall participation and program benefit levels between 1991 and 1999.     

Federalism and the Safety Net: Delinkage and Participation Rates

Since the enactment of welfare reform legislation in 1996, thefederal government and the states have emphasized putting theneedy to work and reducing caseloads. Simultaneously, however,national policymakers delinked eligibility for cash assistancefrom eligibility for other safety-net benefits. Contrary tostated policy, though, this delinkage has led to declining participationin the case of Food Stamps and health-insurance programs forlow-income children. We highlight four factors that states mustshape if they are to narrow this gap between policy promiseand program performance by fostering higher participation. Weshow how our focus intersects with enduring questions of Americanfederalism—the level of state commitment to redistributiveprograms, their capacity to implement these programs effectively,and the degree to which states can augment governing capacityby becoming more genuine laboratories of democracy.     

SSI: trends in state supplementation, 1979-81

In December 1979, the number of persons receiving State supplementary payments under the Supplemental Security Income Program for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled totaled 1,942,000. By December 1981, the number totaled 1,875,000--a decline of 67,000 or 3 percent. This decrease paralleled the reduction in the number of persons receiving Federal Supplemental Security Income payments, which dropped from 3,687,000 to 3,590,000 or 3 percent during the 3-year period. Changes also occurred in the distribution of persons by eligibility category. The number of persons eligible because of age declined 9 percent, from 823,000 to 745,000; persons eligible because of blindness increased 1 percent, from 41,000 to 42,000; and persons eligible because of disability increased 1 percent, from 1,076,000 to 1,086,000. In contrast to the trend in the State supplementation caseload, expenditures for State supplementary payments continued to increase as they have since the beginning of the Supplemental Security Income program.     

Does state AFDC generosity affect child SSI participation?

This article examines the extent of interactions or spillovers between the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs for children. In the early 1990s, the Social Security Administration substantially relaxed child eligibility criteria for SSI benefits. Since the changes, the number of U.S. children receiving cash and medical benefits through SSI tripled to nearly 1 million. The article describes a family's decision to participate in SSI and/or AFDC, and uses state‐level data for three years before, and three years after, the Zebley decision to estimate the effect of state program generosity on child program participation. The expansions in child SSI eligibility increased child SSI participation and contributed to increased total program participation by children in the early 1990s. Child SSI participation increased more in states with lower AFDC payments and higher state SSI supplementation payments. These results suggest that families use SSI and AFDC as substitutes. At least 32 percent of the Zebley increase in SSI is likely attributable to the SSI–AFDC benefit gap for the median AFDC benefit state. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

Local Labor Demand and Program Participation Dynamics: Evidence from New York SNAP Administrative Records

This study estimates the effect of local labor demand on the likelihood that Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) beneficiaries are able to transition out of the program. Our data include SNAP administrative records from New York (2007 to 2012), linked at the person‐level to the 2010 Census, and linked at the county‐month‐level to industry‐specific labor market conditions. We find that local labor markets matter for the length of time spent on SNAP, but there is substantial heterogeneity in estimated effects across local industries. Using Bartik‐style instruments to isolate the effect of labor demand and controlling for the changing composition of entrants and program rules brought on by the Great Recession, we find that fluctuations in labor demand in industries with high shares of SNAP participants—especially food service and retail—change the likelihood of exiting the program. Notably, estimated industry effects vary across race and parental status, with black participants being most sensitive to changes in local labor market conditions and mothers benefiting less from growth in local labor demand than fathers and non‐parents. We confirm that our results are not driven by endogenous inter‐county mobility or New York City labor markets and are robust to multiple specifications.     

Paying for Happiness: Experimental Results from a Large Cash Transfer Program in Malawi

This study analyzes the short‐term impact of an exogenous, positive income shock on caregivers’ subjective well‐being (SWB) in Malawi using panel data from 3,365 households targeted to receive Malawi's Social Cash Transfer Program that provides unconditional cash to ultra‐poor, labor‐constrained households. The study consists of a cluster‐randomized, longitudinal design. After the baseline survey, half of these village clusters were randomly selected to receive the transfer and a follow‐up was conducted 17 months later. We find that the short‐term impact of household income increases from the cash transfer leads to substantial SWB gains among caregivers. After a year's worth of transfers, caregivers in beneficiary households have higher life satisfaction and are more likely to believe in a better future. We examine whether program impacts on consumption, food security, resilience, and hopefulness could explain the increase in SWB but do not find that any of these mechanisms individually mediate our results.     

Rental Housing Assistance and Health: Evidence From the Survey of Income and Program Participation

Interest in the health impacts of renter housing assistance has grown in the wake of heated national discussions on health care and social welfare spending. Assistance may improve renters’ health by offering (a) low, fixed housing costs; (b) protection against eviction; and (c) access to better homes and neighborhoods. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and econometric analysis, I estimate the effect of receiving assistance from the public housing or Section 8 voucher programs on low-income renters’ reported health status and spending. Assisted renters spent less on health care over the year than unassisted low-income renters did, after controlling for other characteristics. This finding suggests that assisted housing leads to health benefits that may reduce low-income renters’ need to purchase health services. Voucher holders’ lower expenditures are influenced by their low, fixed housing costs, but public housing residents’ lower expenditures are not explained by existing theory.     

Medicare utilization by disabled-worker beneficiaries: a longitudinal analysis

Medicare eligibility for Social Security disabled-worker beneficiaries begins after 2 years of cash benefit receipt. Extension of the current coverage is often proposed as a way to encourage beneficiaries to return to work. Little is known, however, about the long-run Medicare costs for the disabled and how costs vary by demographic and health characteristics. This article describes Medicare utilization and reimbursement amounts for 1974-81 for a cohort of disabled-worker beneficiaries under age 62 and first entitled to cash benefits in 1972. The data come from a first-time linkage of Disability Insurance program data with data on Medicare utilization. The tables provide a detailed look at several factors that are associated with variation in Medicare costs among beneficiaries and over time.