“I Won't Back Down?” Complexity and Courage in Government Executive Decision Making

Senior government executives make many difficult decisions, but research suggests that individual cognitive limitations and the pathologies of “groupthink” impede their ability to make value‐maximizing choices. From this literature has emerged a normative model that Irving Janis calls “vigilant problem solving,” a process intended for the most complex decisions. To explore its use by senior public officials, the authors interviewed 20 heads of subcabinet‐level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking how they made their most difficult decisions. The initial focus was on whether they employed a vigilant approach to making decisions that were informationally, technically, or politically complex. Most executives identified their single most‐difficult decision as one that required courage; they often made such courageous decisions after personal reflection and/or consultation with a small number of trusted advisors rather in ways that could be described as vigilant. The different approaches for making complex decisions, compared with those involving courage, are discussed and a contingency model of effective executive decision making is proposed that requires leaders (and their advisors) to be “ambidextrous” in their approach.     

“Tell It Like It Is”: Decision Making,Groupthink, and Decisiveness among U.S. Federal Subcabinet Executives

In addition to difficulties gathering and evaluating complete information, cognitive limitations and biases preclude individuals from making fully value‐maximizing choices when making decisions. It has been suggested that, done properly, involving advisors can compensate for individual‐level limitations. However, the “groupthink” tradition has highlighted ways group‐aided decision making can fail to live up to its potential. Out of this literature has emerged a paradigm Janis calls “vigilant problem‐solving.” For this article, we interviewed 20 heads of subcabinet‐level organizations in the U.S. federal government, asking questions about how they made important decisions. Ten were nominated by “good‐government” experts, 10 chosen at random. We wanted to see whether there were differences in how members of those two groups made decisions, specifically, to what extent executives in the two categories used a “vigilant” process. We found, however, that similarities between the two groups overwhelmed differences: As best as we were able to measure, decision making by U.S. subcabinet executives tracks vigilant decision making recommendations fairly closely. The similarity reflects a common style of senior‐level decision making, which we theorize grows out of government bureaucracy's methodical culture. We did, however, develop evidence for a difference between outstanding executives and others on another dimension of decision making style. Outstanding executives valued decision making decisiveness—“bias for action”—more than the comparison group. Perhaps, then, what distinguishes outstanding executives from others is not vigilance but decisiveness. Contrary to the implications of the groupthink literature, the danger in government may be “paralysis by analysis” as much or more than groupthink.     

The Cognitive Foundations of Humanistic Governance

ABSTRACT

The debate about the kind of knowledge needed for intelligent governance is an old one, but a new perspective based on cognitive psychology has recently emerged. This perspective emphasizes evidence about the heuristics and biases that distort human judgment, particularly the so-called “availability heuristic,” in which vivid imagery leads us to overestimate the probability that a risk will actually materialize. I argue that this perspective neglects the constructive role that “availability” plays in rationality. Research in cognitive science suggests that without close attention to exactly the kind of vivid imagery that distorts probability judgments, experts may rely on an inaccurate representation of the nature of the event whose probability they seek to estimate. This essential ingredient of intelligent decision making is especially precarious in government, since public officials regularly make decisions that will affect people whose experiences they do not share. I discuss how participatory democracy and humanistic research can help counteract this bias in public decision making.     

The complications of controlling agency time discretion: FDA review deadlines and postmarket drug safety

Public agencies have discretion on the time domain, and politicians deploy numerous policy instruments to constrain it. Yet little is known about how administrative procedures that affect timing also affect the quality of agency decisions. We examine whether administrative deadlines shape decision timing and the observed quality of decisions. Using a unique and rich dataset of FDA drug approvals that allows us to examine decision timing and quality, we find that this administrative tool induces a piling of decisions before deadlines, and that these “just-before-deadline” approvals are linked with higher rates of postmarket safety problems (market withdrawals, severe safety warnings, safety alerts). Examination of data from FDA advisory committees suggests that the deadlines may impede quality by impairing late-stage deliberation and agency risk communication. Our results both support and challenge reigning theories about administrative procedures, suggesting they embody expected control-expertise trade-offs, but may also create unanticipated constituency losses.     

A decision analytic model to guide early‐stage government regulatory action: Applications for synthetic biology

Synthetic biology (SB) involves the alteration of living cells and biomolecules for specific purposes. Products developed using these approaches could have significant societal benefits, but also pose uncertain risks to human and environmental health. Policymakers currently face decisions regarding how stringently to regulate and monitor various SB applications. This is a complex task, in which policymakers must balance uncertain economic, political, social, and health‐related decision factors associated with SB use. We argue that formal decision analytical tools could serve as a method to integrate available evidence‐based information and expert judgment on the impacts associated with SB innovations, synthesize that information into quantitative indicators, and serve as the first step toward guiding governance of these emerging technologies. For this paper, we apply multi‐criteria decision analysis to a specific case of SB, a micro‐robot based on biological cells called “cyberplasm.” We use data from a Delphi study to assess cyberplasm governance options and demonstrate how such decision tools may be used for assessments of SB oversight.     

House money effects on trust and reciprocity

In a typical laboratory “Investment Game” experiment, participants’ endowments are provided by the experimenter; thus, the worst case for the investor is that she loses all of her “found” money. By contrast, in naturally occurring environments, investment decisions can often lead to a loss of one’s own money. This paper investigates whether “trust” found in one-shot anonymous laboratory interaction is robust to “own money” environments. Our results show that, consistent with previous investment game results, most investors send a positive amount, and most trustees return at least the transfer amount, regardless of whether the investors purchase or are gifted their endowment. However, investments are on average lower when participants use their own money, and the fraction of maximum investments (the most “risky” investment decision) is only half as large under “own money” as it is under gifted endowments. Our results explain why one should exercise caution in placing trust in any government’s ability to spend other people’s money prudently.     

Lobbying: An art and a science—Five golden rules for an evidence‐based lobbying strategy

In the battle for influence, public affairs professionals make crucial strategic decisions every single day. “Should we go public with this case?” “Who are we going to lobby, and how?” “Should we form a coalition with other organisations?” Public affairs professionals often make these decisions based on their experience or their gut feeling. In practice, lobbying is often more of an art than a science. It is an intuitive and creative process, rarely involving any insights rooted in science. And yet many public affairs professionals are faced with uncertainty about the added value of their activities. “Does what we do really matter?” “What kind of impact do we have?” “Are we making the right strategic decisions?” Some colleagues seek to compensate for these doubts with an overwhelming dose of self‐confidence. An experienced lobbyist recently said during a lecture: “The day I can measure my influence is the day I can double my rates.” Other public affairs professionals are a little more modest and try to assess their impact with key performance indicators. They systematically review the lobbying tactics used. This systematic approach has gained a lot of traction in recent years. The smoky back rooms, the cigars, and whisky of the past are now giving way to evidence‐based lobbying, based on facts, building a bridge between art and science of lobbying.     

Reluctant policy innovation through profit concession and informality tolerance: A strategic relational view of policy entrepreneurship in China's urban redevelopment

This paper engages with the theoretical perspective of policy entrepreneurship to examine the pattern and process of policy change in the context of China's urban redevelopment. Drawing upon a strategic-relational reinterpretation of policy entrepreneurship, this paper identifies a distinctive form of reluctant policy innovation in the “three old renewals” scheme initiated in Guangzhou where profit concession and informality tolerance were practiced to create a small window of opportunity for the project of urban redevelopment to break ground. The motivation of policy entrepreneurship in the successful urban renewal projects in Guangzhou was heavily contingent upon the geographically important location of the project site and the historically incidence of hosting the 2010 Asian Games, which forced municipal government to become entrepreneurial and innovative in decision making and income redistribution in order to get things done as quickly as possible. The distinct fashion of policy innovation identified in the case of Guangzhou points to the polymorphous and dynamic nature of policy entrepreneurship and advocates a relational treatment of the strategies and motives of policy entrepreneurs embedded in concrete geographical and historical context.     

BETWEEN POSITIVISM AND POSTMODERNISM:

A growing body of scholarship has pointed to the problems of positivist assumptions that underlie policy analysis. Scholars have noted that neither the ends nor the methods by which judgments are derived are unambiguous or value-free. In the place of a positivist epistemology, some scholars have argued for a view of policy analysis as a rhetorical activity. In this view, the analyst becomes a participant in strategies of persuasion in-which the reasons for decisions are rhetorically constructed. Neither view, though, provides an adequate basis upon which the analyst is to form judgments that can claim public validity. In this essay, we draw on the work of Hannah Arendt whochallenges the distinction between “subjectivity” and “objectivity” upon which much of the contemporary debate hinges. Arendt argues for a notion of “impartiality” that arises from the imagining of other perspectives. In this way, the validity of judgments depends on a broadened perspective gained through a grasping of particulars. It is within this context that we can understand the importance of narratives in policy evaluation and judgment.     

Policy entrepreneurship and institutional change: Who,how, and why?

In the past three decades, “policy entrepreneurship” has emerged as a key analytical concept helping to explain institutional and policy change. Despite this, however, the literature on policy entrepreneurship remains theoretically vexed, producing limited theoretical knowledge or explanatory models able to draw firm conclusions. Theory building on policy and institutional change, for example, how policy entrepreneurs institute and navigate change agendas, using what tools, strategies, resources, and capacities remains opaque. This is especially the case in developing country contexts, where most analytical investigation of policy entrepreneurship has addressed “first world” case examples. This special issue seeks to address this analytical gap in the literature, focusing on cases specific to developing country contexts, deepening our empirical knowledge of policy entrepreneurship in developing countries, but also exploring theoretical and conceptual debates as they relate to developing countries.     

Incrementalism in Appropriations: Small Aggregation,Big Changes

U.S. federal budget dynamics, as a major attribute of the legislative and bureaucratic decision‐making processes, increasingly calls into question the scholarly focus on incrementalism. What constitutes a “small” change is largely unspecified in previous research that has also been unable to assess incrementalism across multiple levels of aggregation. Using a unique budgetary database, this article analyzes whether budgetary changes are in fact “small” at different levels of aggregation. Surprisingly, a low proportion of changes are small by any logical standard. During most years, more than one‐fifth of budgetary changes are greater than 50 percent, and nearly half are more than 10 percent. The level of aggregation is also important for assessing whether political variables influence incrementalism. A salient finding: change in party control reflects greater influence within micro‐level budget decisions, while divided government manifests more impact on aggregate‐level budget decisions.     

Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system

Theories of political entrepreneurship usually focus on the construction of coalitions necessary to change policy. We argue that political entrepreneurs who are unable to secure favored policies may redirect their efforts to a “higher tier,” attempting to change the rules of the game to enable the exploitation of future political profit opportunities. We present a taxonomy of three levels of political rules—pre-constitutional, constitutional, and post-constitutional—and identify the salient characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship that targets rules at each level. The development of the congressional committee system is explored as a case study in entrepreneurship over post-constitutional rules.     

Playing games of governance: How and why Fair Trade pioneers evade corporate capture

The concept of power in political governance has traditionally focused on domination and the preservation of the status quo. In an economic context, institutional and organizational studies have expressed growing interest in the dynamics of agency and institutional change, captured in the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship.” In the context of global free trade, the Fair Trade movement's experience shows that ongoing institutional entrepreneurship is important for entrepreneurs to transcend absorption by corporate hegemony. In this article I examine the capacity for agency in market institutions through the lens of “defiance” to illuminate the imaginative “game players” who evade institutional capture in the evolution of market governance.     

Freedom,Choice and Public Well-Being: Some Psychological Perspectives

Optimization of well being with minimal regulations seems like a reasonable goal. The problems (and recent progress) in measuring well being are described. The complex meanings of freedom are discussed, with a contrast between “actual” and perceived freedom. Then, the limitations of humans as decision makers in the current complex world in which decisions may have global impact, are described. For the domain of regulations related to food and public health, it is noted that our current scientific knowledge is limited, and policy is influenced by political as well as scientific factors. The risks of misguided regulations are substantial. Finally, the determinants of decisions are described, with particular emphasis on moralization: the historical conversion of a preference into a moral value, as with cigarette smoking in the United States. The consequences and causes of moralization are considered.     

Help-seeking from public authorities: Who arrives at the agency door?

For ordinary citizens, political life is increasingly characterized by a request for a check, not a trip to the polls. Yet for all their frequency, very little is known about help-seeking encounters. This article asks the question “Who gets to the agency door?” or, more formally, “How do individuals decide to apply for public social benefits or services, and what does that decision signify?” Three topics are explored. The first defines help-seeking as a type of political participation. The second conceptualizes the process by which individuals decide to seek help from public social agencies. The third presents an agenda for research and action on the politics of help-seeking.     

Understanding Street‐Level Bureaucrats' Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program

Personal interactions between clients and street‐level bureaucrats are significant in explaining why street‐level bureaucrats behave as they do. Not all bureaucracies that apply program rules to individuals, however, engage face‐to‐face with their clientele. As more intake procedures are automated, such “one‐on‐one” encounters decrease. The author generates and tests hypotheses about frontline bureaucratic decision making in the Social Security Disability program, by applying bounded rationality theory. The findings show that eligibility decisions by street‐level bureaucrats are affected by their adherence to subsets of agency goals and perceptions of others in the governance system. How quickly they make decisions also has an impact. There is no evidence that the way in which bureaucrats evaluate clients explains their decisions when they lack face‐to‐face contact.     

Trade‐Offs,Limitations, and Promises of Big Data in Social Science Research

The promise of “big data” is a grand one. The collection and aggregation of massive datasets and the development of analytical tools by which to study these data is part of cutting‐edge efforts across scientific disciplines, with social, behavioral, and economic sciences leading the way in many of these efforts. There has been a recent rise in National Science Foundation funding for “big data” research across directorates that coincides with scholarly, public, and governmental attention to the topic. Nonetheless, there are limitations and trade‐offs to “big data” research, particularly as it corresponds to scientific modes of inquiry and the limited range of topics that fall under its umbrella, that must be recognized and incorporated into the general understanding of its long‐term promise.     

Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization,the Division of Cognitive Labor,and Epistemic Performance

This article describes how issue specialization through deliberative institutions called “issue publics” can improve the quality of democratic decision making. Issue specialization improves decisions by instantiating a cognitive division of labor among the mass public, which creates efficiencies in decision making and grants large groups of average citizens a scalable advantage over small groups of even the smartest and most capable individuals. Issue specialization further improves decisions by capturing issue-specific information, concentrating it within the specialized deliberative enclaves of issue publics, and refining citizens’ issue preferences. These advantages are brought to bear in wider democratic politics and policy through information shortcuts and through the specialized electoral incentives of representatives. The article responds to concerns about political ignorance, polarization/partisanship, rent seeking, and socioeconomic bias and argues that issue specialization can provide a valuable brake to polarization yet needs institutional supplementation to engage marginalized citizens and combat bias.     

When Are Nudges Desirable? Benefit Validity When Preferences Are Not Consistently Revealed

Cost-benefit analysis, as a tool of general use in policy analysis or as a mandated analytical process in some rulemaking, provides protocols for assessing the relative efficiency of policy alternatives. However, inconsistent and apparently irrational decisions by consumers in some situations call into question the validity of inferring the values that consumers place on outcomes from their observed choices. It also opens the door for “nudges” that change the architecture of choice to promote more “rational” consumer choice. Differences between decision utility and experience utility and the willingness of consumers to pay for reductions in temptation provide conceptual bases for thinking about the efficiency of nudges. However, assessment of nudges and their role in behavioral public administration should also recognize that heterogeneous preferences can result in increases in utility for some and decreases for others. Therefore, nudges require systematic assessment like other policy instruments.     

Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary Cooperators

Why are people more willing to accept some governmental decisions than others? In this article, we present results from a series of original experiments showing that people's reactions to a given outcome are heavily influenced by the procedure employed to produce the outcome. We find that subjects react much less favorably when a decision maker intentionally keeps a large payoff, thereby leaving the subject with a small payoff, than when that same payoff results from a procedure based on chance or on desert. Moreover, subjects react less favorably to outcomes rendered by decision makers who want to be decision makers than they do to identical outcomes selected by reluctant decision makers. Our results are consistent with increasingly prominent theories of behavior emphasizing people's aversion to being played for a “sucker,” an attitude that makes perfect sense if people's main goal is not to acquire as many tangible goods as possible but to make sure they are a valued part of a viable group composed of cooperative individuals.