Contests of citizenship: A comment

The language of citizenship is one of authority, legitimation and contest. Citizenship rights were brought about in some parts of Europe through struggle and revolution, and even then excluded the masses and women. But the ‘law‐state’ and constitutions they established were the necessary conditions for subsequent struggles by these sectors for inclusion and ultimately for cultural and social citizenship. The advocacy of human rights is frequently denounced as ‘Western’ imposition of an individualism alien to other cultures, but these culturalist defences act as a cover for communitarian and state authoritarianism. The establishment of legal rights does not contradict social bonds, but can ensure reciprocity of obligations and protection from communal authority. This is specially pertinent for women. Social bonds are not peculiar to the ‘East’ or ‘South’, but are universal, including the mythical ‘West’, and legal rights for the individual are a necessary condition for achieving justice in social relations.     

More on measuring budget-related rent-seeking: A comment

We wish to thank the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress, Jerusalem, for supporting our work on this topic.     

Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition: A comment

This comment is concerned with the relation between the basic model of elections and income redistribution in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and the model in Coughlin (1986a). Its purpose is to (i) isolate the (small set of) assumptions that separate these closely related models, (ii) identify a special case of the Lindbeck-Weibull model where their results immediately provide direct extensions of four of the results in my paper, and (iii) point out that one of the lemmata in my paper identifies the precise location of the equilibrium income distribution for this important special case of the Lindbeck-Weibull model. The comment also relates these observations to Lindbeck and Weibull's example of familiar assumptions that satisfy their sufficient conditions for the existence of a political equilibrium.I gratefully acknowledge (i) some helpful comments that Peter Ordeshook made as a discussant for Coughlin (1986a) (when I presented it at the 1986 Public Choice Society Meeting), which got me to start thinking about the issues that are addressed in this comment and (ii) some helpful suggestions provided by Peter Aranson.     

Capitalist profit calculation and inflation accounting: A comment

Abstract

Mises’ ‘calculation argument’ against socialism argues that monetary calculation is indispensable as a commensurable unit for evaluating factors of production. This is not due to his conception of rationality being purely ‘algorithmic,’ for it accommodates non-monetary, incommensurable values. Commensurability is needed, rather, as an aid in the face of economic complexity. The socialist Neurath's response to Mises is unsatisfactory in rejecting the need to explore possible non-market techniques for achieving a certain degree of commensurability. Yet Neurath's contribution is valuable in emphasizing the need for a balanced, comparative approach to the question of market versus non-market that puts the commensurability question in context. These central issues raised by adversaries in the early socialist calculation debate have continued relevance for the contemporary discussion.     

The utility maximizing government economic adviser: A comment

The author, drawing on his experience as a Chief Economic Adviser (Deputy Secretary) in the UK Government (1973–76) and occasional adviser in the 1980s, denies that his previous economic analyses of advice-giving support the thesis that government economic advisers become the slaves of politicians in power.     

Public responses to the presidential use of military force: A panel analysis

How do citizens respond to dramatic uses of military force? While we know a great deal about the conditions that driveaggregate changes in presidential popularity in response to a president's use of military force, we know surprisingly little about howindividuals respond to such events. What types of individuals operating under what types of conditions are more likely to support such actions? And to what extent does approval of the use of force affect subsequent changes, not only in presidential popularity, but also in more general foreign policy attitudes? We use panel survey data collected before and after the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 to investigate the individual-level dynamics of opinion change in response to this dramatic event. Because our study neatly brackets the Libyan air strikes, we are able to examine in some detail the antecedents and consequences of individuals' reactions to a president's use of military force. We find that watching President Reagan's dramatic televised speech had an unmistakable impact in moving respondents to support the bombing. We also find that support for the Libyan air strikes appeared to precipitate greater approval for a range of more “hard-line” military responses toward terrorism, thus creating opportunities for similar-or even broader—presidential initiatives in the future. Finally, because the bombing was the only significant event occurring between the waves of the panel, our quasi-experimental design ties approval of the bombing clearly to an upsurge in presidential approval. Implications for various perspectives on presidential leadership of public opinion in foreign affairs are discussed.