The One-System View and Dworkin’s Anti-Archimedean Eliminativism

Many of Dworkin’s interlocutors saw his ‘one-system view’, according to which law is a branch of morality, as a radical shift. I argue that it is better seen as a different way of expressing his longstanding view that legal theory is an inherently normative endeavor. Dworkin emphasizes that fact and value are separate domains, and one cannot ground claims of one sort in the other domain. On this view, legal philosophy can only answer questions from within either domain. We cannot ask metaphysical questions about which domain law ‘properly’ belongs in; these would be archimedean, and Dworkin has long argued against archimedeanism. The one-system view, then, is best understood as an invitation to join Dworkin in asking moral questions from within the domain of value. Finally, I argue that Dworkin’s view can be understood as a version of ‘eliminativism’, a growing trend in legal philosophy.

     

20世纪英美法理学论战中的概念分歧

20世纪50年代以来的英美法理学异常繁荣,各种理论进路纷至沓来。哈特与凯尔森、哈特与富勒、哈特与德沃金、德沃金与菲尼斯、拉兹与菲尼斯、拉兹与科尔曼的争论此起彼伏。他们的法律理论回应了不同的问题并提出了不同类型的概念主张,他们的概念主张具有不同的理论目标。从概念分析的角度看,20世纪英美法理学中的许多论战都是概念分歧,法学家的争论无非是他们的各说各话,许多貌似冲突的主张实际上是相容的。     

法律判断客观性探询——从德沃金的阐释理论到罗纳根的理解哲学

罗纳根是专门研究人类理解学问的哲学大师,他在一般意义上回答了判断的客观性问题,德沃金则在法律领域论证了判断是有客观性的,相似的是他们都将判断客观性问题转化为判断结论的选择问题。罗纳根通过认知结构的经验、顿悟与判断三重机制,指出排除激情与偏见就能获得正确结论;德沃金认为只能借助偏见才能获得理解,并通过整体性原则与＂二步限缩＂的评估获得最佳答案。因为最佳结论是唯一的,正确判断是既定的,所以这两种路径都能通达客观目的。     

哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂——基于“分离命题”的考察

哈特与德沃金之争及其所开放出来的问题构成了当今英美法律哲学研究的理论坐标。哈特/德沃金之争的核心在于法律与道德有无必然的关联,哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然的关联;而德沃金认为,承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则,法律与道德存在必然的关联。法实证主义在回应德沃金的批判时,在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧,分裂为排他性与包容性的法实证主义。     

法律规则与法律原则:质的差别?

国内对法律原则的研究模式大量援引德沃金的相关理论,却没能突出德沃金的一个重要定性:法律规则与法律原则存在质的差别。在这种一般模式之外,国内外学者在抽象程度之别、实定性之别、形式原则之别、理由类型之别等方面试图实现对法律规则与法律原则质的差别的建构。但是,这要么不符合德沃金的基本论述,要么无法实现德沃金的理论目标——挑战法律实证主义的法律概念理论。本文尝试提出一种解读:放弃分类学模式,不把法律规则和法律原则看作两种规范类型,而将其看作两种不同的规则理论。     

哈贝马斯的法律“有效性”概念的四重意蕴

哈贝马斯的法律“有效性”概念具有四重意蕴：一是整合性意蕴,是对既有的法律有效性概念尤其是哈特和德沃金的法律有效性概念的总结和整合;二是超越性意蕴,哈特和德沃金将法律的事实有效性和规范有效性对立起来,而哈贝马斯的法律有效性概念则将这两个维度统一起来;三是反思性意蕴,他将现代法律理解为行动系统,是建制化和合法化的统一,揭示出现代法律的实质是“事实性和有效性之间的社会媒介”,法律之“应该”最终体现在法律之“是”上;四是批判性意蕴,哈贝马斯只是在“程序”这一维度上作出了自己贡献,现代法律的有效性应该是哈特的“形式”、德沃金的“内容”和哈贝马斯的“程序”这三者的融合。     

解释是一种“连锁活动”吗——法律解释理论的费什—德沃金之争

自20世纪80年代初至90年代中期,斯坦利·费什和罗纳德·德沃金进行了一场长达十多年的法律解释论战。该论战从德沃金的"连锁小说"隐喻开始,内容涉及法律规范的意义来源、文本和读者之间的关系、解释行为之限制甚至法律解释的道德性等更深层次的问题。费什从文艺批评和文学解释的角度对德沃金提出的批评和反驳极富启发性,他认为解释总是先在地渗透于我们的思考之中,受我们自身的镶嵌性背景所约束。这一观点无疑有助于丰富和深化人们对于法律解释性质的认识,对于正确看待解释者的自由裁量,增进对解释者解释合理性的信赖具有重要意义。     

二元规范理论下的法律原则检讨

当下法律原则理论的论争重心,已从"法律是什么"的概念分析,转向了司法实践中的原则裁判。自德沃金以来的"规则-原则"二元规范理论,对实际的司法裁判的解说力和作用力较为有限,也未能解决原则权衡这一关键性问题。"融贯性"命题和"籍由法政策权衡进行裁判"命题,是原则裁判理论的两大基石。但德沃金对融贯性命题的回答过于抽象,而阿列克希依比例原则和权重公式对权衡命题和原则理论的最新推进,却是一种不成功的自反性进化。这种自反性进化和理论反讽,表明作为一种"过度整合式"的裁判理论,原则裁判已然走到了穷途末路。     

司法确定性的寻求——析哈贝马斯的“程序确定性”理论

司法判决究竟有没有确定性？疑难案件的判决结论究竟具不具有＂唯一正解＂？司法判决正确性的理论基础何在？法律现实主义、法律实证主义、法律诠释学等理论对此都提出了自己的看法。德沃金在吸收这些理论的基础上提出了＂权利论＂的＂结果确定性＂理论。哈贝马斯则在批判德沃金的基础上提出了＂程序确定性＂理论,为回答法理学上的这一系列经典问题提供了一份程序主义的独特答卷。     

The role of coherence in legal reasoning

Many contemporary philosophers of law agree that a necessary condition for a decision to be legally justified, even in a hard case, is that it coheres with established law. Some, namely Sartorius and Dworkin, have gone beyond that relatively uncontroversial claim and described the role of coherence in legal justification as analogous to its role in moral and scientific justification, on contemporary theories. In this, I argue, they are mistaken. Specifically, coherence in legal justification is sometimes specific to a branch of law, and there is nothing isomorphic to this in the models of moral and scientific justification. Although Dworkin and Sartorius rely on the concept of coherence, they do not explicate it. In the course of examining their views, this essay offers a partial analysis of coherence on their models. Finally, two canons of relevance, governing when global coherence considerations are appropriate to legal justification, are presented.     

Theoretical Disagreement,Legal Positivism,and Interpretation

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.     

法的合法性与整全性的关联分析

法律资格纷争成为英美法理学传统的一道难题,对这一问题的回答形成了不同法学流派。从法的合法性判准的不同模式出发,证立整全性不仅可以进入法的合法性判准的行列,而且必然成为当下法的合法性判准的最佳选择。这一必然的最佳选择基于整全性在理论上符合法律的终极目的,即最高指令——人类"善"的生活,在法律实践中实现了平等尊重和普遍的人文关怀,只有这样的法律才是理想型的法律。如果这一论证结论确实可行,那么,我们就可以超越哈特与德沃金关于法律概念之争,终结和平息不同法学流派对法律资格的纷争。对于法律资格的回答将聚焦于法的合法性和整全性的关联考察,其对法理学的重述将开辟新的理论疆场。     

Legal System and Practical Reason. On the Structure of a Normative Theory of Law*

Abstract
It will be argued, firstly, that there is a link between the legal validity of a norm and the rational justifiability of a requirement that judges should apply this norm, based on a normative conception of legal validity and the postulate that judges should act as rational persons; secondly, that rational justifiability of legal norms requires the construction of a legal system in a model of principles that differs from theories, e.g., of Kelsen, Hart, Dworkin and Alexy, which are not fully adequate for a normative conception of law.     

New Legal Moralism: Some Strengths and Challenges

The aim of this paper is to critically discuss the plausibility of legal moralism with an emphasis on some central and recent versions. First, this paper puts forward and defends the thesis that recently developed varieties of legal moralism promoted by Robert P. George, John Kekes and Michael Moore are more plausible than Lord Devlin’s traditional account. The main argument for this thesis is that in its more modern versions legal moralism is immune to some of the forceful challenges made to Devlin by Hart, Dworkin and Feinberg among others. Second, however, the paper challenges the new generation of legal moralists and suggests some areas for further development. Although Devlin’s position has been scrutinized thoroughly in the literature on the philosophy of law, there has, to my knowledge, been no comparable, systematic critique of these different proponents of legal moralism.     

Does the Unconstrained Legal Actor Exist?

Abstract. The unconstrained legal actor, typically a judge, is a central character in modern jurisprudence. He is feared by legal formalists, legal positivists, and Ronald Dworkin alike. He is lauded by some legal realist and critical legal studies theorists. Stanley Fish says that all of this theorising is pointless because the unconstrained legal actor cannot exist. My paper evaluates Fish's arguments for this surprising position.     

Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II

In a circulated but heretofore unpublished 2001 paper, I argued that Leiter’s analogy to Quine’s “naturalization of epistemology” does not do the philosophical work Leiter suggests. I revisit the issues in this new essay. I first show that Leiter’s replies to my arguments fail. Most significantly, if – contrary to the genuinely naturalistic reading of Quine that I advanced – Quine is understood as claiming that we have no vantage point from which to address whether belief in scientific theories is ever justified, it would not help Leiter’s parallel. Given Leiter’s way of drawing the parallel, the analogous position in the legal case would be not the Legal Realists’ indeterminacy thesis, but the very different position that we have no vantage point from which to address whether legal decisions can ever be justified. I then go on to address the more important question of whether the indeterminacy thesis, if true, would support any replacement of important legal philosophical questions with empirical ones. Although Ronald Dworkin has argued against the indeterminacy thesis, if he were wrong on this issue, it would not in any way suggest that the questions with which Dworkin is centrally concerned cannot fruitfully be addressed. The indeterminacy thesis is a bone of contention in an ordinary philosophical debate between its proponents and Dworkin. Of course, if the determinacy thesis were true, no one should try to show that it is false, but this triviality lends no support to the kind of replacement proposal that Leiter proposes. I conclude with some general reflections on naturalism and philosophical methodology.     

Rules, Principles, Algorithms and the Description of Legal Systems

Abstract .
Although the Hart/Dworkin debate has as much to do with Dworkin's affirmative theory of judicial discretion as with Hart's more comprehensive theory of law, the starting point was of course Dworkin's attempt to demolish the "model of rules," Hart's alleged analysis of legal systems as collections of conclusive reasons for specified legal consequences. The continuing relevance of this attack for the prospects for any theory of law is the subject of the present essay.     

Striking back at the empire: A brief survey of problems in Dworkin's theory of law

Conclusion In Law's Empire Dworkin remains committed to carving out a middleground between natural law and legal positivism. But natural law andlegal positivism are best viewed as complementary answers to differ-ent questions, There is no middle ground between them. Nor is thequestion that Dworkin's Integrity asks one that could be coherentlyanswered i f it were an important question. Fortunately, it is not.     

法律原则在法律推理中的地位和作用——一个比较的研究

我国关于法律原则的讨论一般集中在立法过于笼统与立法所规定的法律基本原则这两个方面。这种意义上的法律原则与德沃金所说的法律原则存在重要区别。德沃金关于法律原则的讨论其目的是强调法律的确定性 ,而我们关于法律原则的讨论却在强化法律的模糊性。法律原则的讨论主要涉及法律推理过程中原则与规则之间的关系。基于法治的原因 ,法律推理必须坚持将法律规则作为法律推理的大前提 ;在法律规则含义不明确、模糊或者相互矛盾时 ,可以使用法律原则 ,但是 ,必须经过一定的法律原则的认定程序。     

论法律解释的融贯性——评德沃金的法律真理观

以融贯性作为检验法律真理的标准,是一种超越真理观上的绝对主义与相对主义立场的尝试。德沃金的法律解释思想以融贯论作为法律真理观,以罗尔斯的"反思性均衡"作为法律解释的方法,以信念之间、信念和经验之间的融贯性作为法律解释的标准,从而为"法律唯一正解"提供了哲学上的正当化根据。但是,原则之间的竞争与冲突是不容否定的事实,并不存在理想意义上的融贯;法官的类推解释只能达致局部融贯而无法形成整体融贯;法律的无穷解释使德沃金的解释理论陷入无法自拔的"明希豪森困境",这些理论上的难题使德沃金的法律真理图景成为一种虚假的幻相。