Who pays more “tributes” to the government? sectoral corruption of China’s private enterprises

Which industry sectors bribe the government and, in turn, are exploited by the government the most in China? Or, as commonly satirized by the people, which sectors pay the most “tributes” (shanggong) to government officials? This article attempts to answer these questions by proposing a meso-level approach, which examines corruption in China at the sectoral level. We use a firm-level survey from 1997 to 2006 in China and treat two types of payments by private enterprises—public relations–building fees (yingchou) and forced apportionment of funds (tanpai)—as indicators of potential corruption in a sector. We find that the most corrupt sectors are those that rely on scarce and less mobile resources controlled by the government. Thus, further reform in the factor markets is necessary to reduce corruption caused by government intervention in the allocation of important resources.     

Staggered Terms for the US Senate: Origins and Irony

This article provides the first detailed study of the origins of staggered Senate terms, which typically have been interpreted as part of the framers’ intent to create an insulated, stable, and conservative Senate. I draw upon three sources of evidence—the meaning and application of “rotation” in revolutionary America, the deliberations and decisions at the Constitutional Convention, and the arguments during Ratification—to show that the origins of and intentions behind staggered terms offer little support for the dominant interpretation. Instead, staggered terms, a mechanism to promote “rotation” or turnover of membership, were added to the Constitution as a compromise to offset, not augment, the Senate's longer terms by exposing a legislative chamber with long individual tenure to more frequent electoral influence and change.     

What’s Wrong with Penal Populism? Politics,the Public,and Criminological Expertise

This article discusses “penal populism” and its conflict with criminological expertise. It considers the proper balance between professional expertise and community sentiment in the formulation of crime control and penal policy—especially in respect of policy measures where moral rather than instrumental considerations are involved. It raises theoretical questions about the nature of “public opinion”—does it exist other than as an artifact of survey instruments?—and its proper role in a democratic polity. And it considers the professional responsibility of criminological experts in relation to policy formation and political debate. The performance of public health experts during the COVID pandemic is presented as an instructive case in point. Can criminology establish itself as a credible form of social scientific knowledge worthy of public trust? And how should criminologists comport themselves when engaging with questions of public policy and political controversy?

     

Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s “Small Step” for a Grammarian and “Giant Leap” for Sanskrit Grammar

This paper is devoted to theoretical and methodical considerations on our study and understanding of macroscopic transitions in the world of Sanskrit intellectuals from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century (cf. Pollock, Indian Economic and Social History Review 38(1):3–31, 2001). It is argued that compared to his immediate predecessors Bha??oji Dīk?ita’s contribution to Prakriyā grammars was modest. It was to a large extent on account of changed circumstances—over the centuries mainly a slow but steady decline—in the position of Sanskrit and the general public’s need for a simple definition of authoritatively correct Sanskrit that Bha??oji’s grammar met with success so quickly, so widely, and so solidly. I once knew a little boy in England who asked his father, “Do fathers always know more than sons?” and the father said “Yes.” The next question was, “Daddy, who invented the steam engine?” and the father said “James Watt.” And then the son came back with “But why didn’t James Watt’s father invent it?” Gregory Bateson (1972, p. 21)      

Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law

In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche presents a history of metaphysics that can also be read as a history of jurisprudence. Nietzsche shows how—via Platonism, Christendom, Kantianism, and utilitarianism—the “real” or “true” world of ideals gives way to an “apparent” phenomenal world that is itself ultimately brought into question. This article shows how 20th-century legal thought, broadly construed, also moves away from “ideals” of law toward an understanding of law as observable social phenomena. It suggests that the move to the “apparent” world in legal thought raises questions similar to those raised by Nietzsche's work: Does sociological law point to a nihilistic destruction of the legal tradition or to a joyous possibility of overcoming that tradition?     

On Law and Disagreement. Some Comments on "Interpretative Pluralism"

Abstract This paper focuses on the question: Do persisting disagreements in constitutional interpretation affect the legitimacy of “the democratic system as a whole”? According to both Michelman and Waldron, the epistemic indeterminacy of interpretation—that is, the fact that principles do not possess stable meanings beyond, and independent of, their application to concrete cases—puts its finger on a point of the contractualist and prevailing political theory. But, if neither the legitimacy of any democratic order nor the standard of internal criticism can be founded on a broad background consensus on constitutional essentials, “what else makes a deliberative process of legislation and adjudication a generator of legitimacy so that citizens are induced to accept controversial results as ‘worthy of respect’?” The route pursued goes beyond all views that require legitimacy to be based on sharing a set of “thick” ethical beliefs. In this perspective, the author argues that the performative meaning of constitution‐making “provides a thin yet sufficiently strong base,” which corresponds to the minimal requirements inherent in the very practice of framing a constitution.     

Introduction: Yugoslavia Dismantled and International Law

Yugoslavia existed as a country for several decades. Competing explanatory narratives as to why and how this state ceased to exist—labeled “the self-destruction of Yugoslavia” and “the Hegemon did it”—are contrasted, and connected to two related viewpoints on the question “What role did international law play in the process of dismantling Yugoslavia?”: “reformist optimism” and “traditionalist realism”. It is argued that the former position leads not only to the marginalization of state sovereignty, but also impunitism, genocidalism, humanrightism, and most alarmingly to the decriminalization of aggression. A brief review of essay contributions to this special issue on “Yugoslavia Dismantled and International Law” offers a further argument in favor of traditionalist realism as the preferred postion to take regarding the current state of international relations and international law. In this regard, the case of Yugoslavia is extremely instructive.     

Social Justice and Individual Ethics*

Abstract. If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: (1) Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics of Rawls, the idea of a well-ordered society does not require maximin-guided choices at the individual level, and hence leaves room for legitimate incentive payments. (2) Despite Rawls's own neglect of this fact, a limited form of patriotism does constitute an individual “natural duty” following from a commitment to maximin social justice.     

Reflections on Habermas on Democracy

Jürgen Habermas is a radical democrat. The source of that self-designation is that his conception of democracy—what he calls “discursive democracy”—is founded on the ideal of “a self-organizing community of free and equal citizens,” coordinating their collective affairs through their common reason. The author discusses three large challenges to this radical-democratic ideal of collective self-regulation: 1) What is the role of private autonomy in a radical-democratic view? 2) What role does reason play in collective self-regulation? 3) What relevance might a radical-democratic outlook have for contemporary democracies? The author addresses these questions by considering Habermas' answers, and then presenting alternative responses to them. The alternatives are also radical-democratic in inspiration, but they draw on a richer set of normative-political ideas than Habermas wants to rely on, and are more ambitious in their hopes for democratic practice.     

The Identity of Person and World in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Caraka Saṃhitā</Emphasis> 4.5

This paper examines the puru?a concept in the Caraka Sa?hitā (CS), an early text of Ayurveda, and its relation to Indic thinking about phenomenal worldhood. It argues that, contrary to the usual interpretation, early Ayurveda does not consider the person to be a microcosmic replication of the macrocosmos. Instead, early Ayurveda asserts that personhood is worldhood, and thus the person is non-different from the phenomenal totality (spatial and temporal) of his existence. This is confirmed by the CS’s several definitions of puru?a, which are alternately posed in terms familiar to Vai?e?ika, early (pre-“classical”) Sā?khya, early Buddhism, and Upani?adic monism. It is likewise confirmed by the Ayurvedic logic of sāmānya (translated as “identity”), which governs the meaning of the list of person-to-world correspondences in CS 4.5 and its often misinterpreted claim, puru?o’yam lokasa?mita?. Finally it is confirmed in the program of Ayurvedic therapeutics, which aims at establishing various kinds of “appropriateness” for the sake of effecting samayoga—the “harmonious joining” of person and world.     

Some Themes Arising from the Last Edition of Family Court Review

In the last edition of the FRC, there are a number of articles which highlight ever‐present themes in the many dispute resolution industries. These themes are: The cyclical nature of family law and DR reform to and fro “faster, cheaper, less formal and more accessible”; Access barriers for the poor and middle class; Access barriers due to geography, distance, and cultural differences; Blossoming of a range of “abbreviated” (short and inexpensive) DR services; The essential, yet neglected, task of systematic diagnosis of possible causes of conflict, and of a possible range of helpful interventions: DR practitioners should aim to “at least do no harm”; If a DR practitioner exhibits care, and core communication skills, how much do different processes matter? The Hawthorne effect—all pilot projects tend to succeed?; There is a constant flow of stories, systematic and statistical knowledge in DR industries. Who is listening and translating this flow of information between the various DR silos and to the public?

Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• The repetitive and predictable cycles of family law reform.
• Access to DR services restricted by finances, geography and cultural differences.
• The old saying “at least do no harm” should find a prominent place in all family DR services and training.
• The Hawthorne effect—all pilot and new projects seem to “succeed” for awhile. What follows?
• In the many family DR silos, there are “truths” embodied in stories, systems and statistics. Who can translate helpfully from one silo to another?

     

Yogic Mindfulness: Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s Quasi-Buddhistic Interpretation of Smṛti in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20

This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda āra?ya’s unique interpretation of sm?ti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdar?an (1911), I argue that his interpretation of sm?ti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of sm?ti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on sm?ti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipa??hānasutta and Buddagho?a’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, he also builds into his complex account of the practice of sm?ti certain fundamental doctrines of Sā?khyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“ī?vara”) and mental identification with the Puru?a, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of sm?ti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of sm?ti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Mi?ra and Vijñānabhik?u straightforwardly identify sm?ti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the a??ā?gayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that sm?ti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the a??ā?gayoga.     

Technology transfer to developing nations

What’s a developing nation? For that matter, what’s technology transfer? When put in the context of exporting and importing technology, the answers are moot. Transfer still turns on how much someone — developed, developing or undeveloped — is willing to pay for the technology, and whether there is an identifiable need that it can satisfy with a minimum of sophistication. The simpler — and cheaper — the better. That may very well become the theme of a new worldwide movement called “appropriate technology”, which, among several other matters, is also discussed in this paper.     

The Force of International Law: Lawyers' Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s

Where does international law (IL) draw its authority from a still weakly institutionalized international scene deprived of the warrants of a state? To address this classical debate, the article draws from a case study on the social and professional structure of the “international legal community” as it emerged during the 1920s as part of the rise of multilateralism and international organizations. It focuses on the “situation of the international lawyers” of the time, starting with the multiple and often antagonistic roles they play (as legal advisers, scholars, judges, diplomats, politicians, etc.) and the variety of interests and causes they defend (states, international organizations, professional interests, etc.) in international politics. It argues this heteronomy of international lawyers helps understand the autonomization of international law. Far from being opposed to one another it has often been assumed—realism and idealism, national loyalty and international loyalty, political logic and learned logic—actually gain when analyzed as various modes of affirming a single cause—that of an international rule of law. This attention given to the “situation of international lawyers” and to the way they manage their various allegiances also accounts for the particular vision of the “International” and of “Law and Politics” relationships that are encapsulated in this emerging international corpus juris.     

MANDATED CUSTODY EVALUATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER

Kelly and Ramsey are clearly correct that a shift from a “how to” approach to custody evaluations to one that asks the more fundamental question “why” is long overdue. However, in addition to assessing the efficacy of custody evaluations (which Kelly and Ramsey propose), the legal system must also clarify the justification for imposing this extensive—and often expensive—intrusion into the privacy of parents. Three possible justifications for these intrusions are examined in this article: privilege, harm, and voluntariness. Is divorce a privilege, rather than a right, and can qualifications (including intrusive and expensive ones) be attached to requesting that privilege? Are custody evaluations instead justified as a means of avoiding harm to children? If a harm justification is asserted, exactly what harm do evaluations prevent, and how do they accomplish this harm avoidance? Finally, given the high value placed on parental cooperation by the family courts, is it simply too perilous for a parent to oppose a custody evaluation if one is suggested, either by the other parent or by the court? If so, are consents to custody evaluations truly voluntary?     

Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Argumentation by Consequence (thal ʼgyur): The Nature, Function, and Form of Consequence Statements

This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ?gyur, Skt. prasa?ga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānavini?caya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ?gyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic.     

A Semantic Profile of Early Sanskrit “<Emphasis Type="Italic">buddhi</Emphasis>”

The word buddhi is an important term of Indian philosophical discourse, but some aspects of its use have caused confusion and continue to occasion difficulties. This paper undertakes a survey of the usage of the word buddhi (“intellect”) in general Sanskrit literature from its earliest late Vedic occurrences up to the middle of the first millennium CE. Signifying fundamentally “awareness (of something),” the word “buddhi” is shown to refer often to a being’s persisting capacity or faculty of awareness (“attentiveness, mind, intelligence,” etc.) and also, often, to the content of a being’s awareness (“idea, notion, thought, disposition, resolution,” etc.). There are also instances where it is hard to determine which of these two kinds of reference are intended in our written sources, and there are other instances where both senses seem present simultaneously. Various examples attest to the use of the word to refer to an affective and volitional capacity in a being—and to affective and volitional content—as well as to a cognitive faculty and cognitive content. One feature that occurs frequently in the word’s use is that this faculty and, or, its content, regularly describe alterations of a subject’s knowledge of the surrounding situation, the transformation of surrounding complexity or multiplicity into a simpler and more manageable mental construct—an understanding, an interpretation, a decision, a plan, etc. As the word buddhi is related to the primary Sanskrit word-family used to describe the concrete experience of awakening—moving from no (or little, or muddled) awareness to clear awareness—it is not surprising that its more abstract usage would often incorporate a similar dynamic, a transition from less clear to more clear knowledge, a rendering of early knowledge to better and more useful knowledge, in short, a faculty of “intellect” that produces refined decisions, resolutions, and determinations. It is suggested that this element of its semantic profile contributed to the word’s eventually becoming the preferred word for the most important of the mental functions of beings in one of the most widespread philosophical psychologies of ancient India, that which ultimately became formally enshrined in the philosophical system “Sā?khya.”     

Artists in an Iron Cage? Artists’ Work in Performing Arts Institutions

This article discusses artists’ work in performing arts institutions in Norway. Many scholars describe Nordic performing arts institutions as slow-moving and heavy “art factories,” where artistic creativity is almost suffocated within bureaucratic “prisons.” The general problem that we raise in the article is whether this pessimistic picture of the relation between state control, market influence, and artistic work is relevant for studying the performing arts today. The study is primarily based upon twenty-seven qualitative interviews with informants in an institutional theatre and a symphony orchestra. We conclude that the actors in the Theatre are trapped—not so much within “a bureaucratic iron cage”—but rather within “an iron cage of charismatic leadership,” while the musicians in the Orchestra enjoy the relative freedom and democratic power of a rather soft bureaucratic organization.     

When Social Norms and Pressures Are Not Enough: Environmental Performance in the Trucking Industry

Why do some business firms and not others work hard to advance regulatory values such as environmental protection and comply with regulations? Previous research indicates that business firms are influenced in that regard by a number of variables—not merely the perceived likelihood of legal punishment but also the risk of negative reactions by societal actors (which we call “social license pressures”) and the intensity of managers' commitment to norms of law‐abidingness and environmentalism. This article reports on a study of control of diesel emissions in the trucking industry, a highly competitive market with many small firms, mobile pollution sources, expensive “best control technologies,” and weak regulatory demands. In contrast to findings in studies of large firms, we found that social license pressures on small trucking firms are minimal. Trucking companies' environmental performance—good and bad—flows from managers' economic choices, which are influenced by their particular market niche. In such highly competitive, small‐firm market contexts, these findings imply, significant improvement in environmental performance is not likely without strong direct regulatory pressures.     

Changing Frames in Buddhist Thought: The Concept of Ākāra in Abhidharma and in Buddhist Epistemological Analysis

It has been argued that the use of the concept of ākāra—a mental “form,” “appearance” or “aspect”—in Buddhist epistemological analysis or pramā?a exhibits continuities with earlier Buddhist thinking about mental processes, in particular in Abhidharma. A detailed inquiry into uses of the term ākāra in pertinent contexts in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako?abhā?ya brings to light different semantic nuances and functions of this term. The characteristic use of ākāra in Buddhist epistemological discourse turns out to be continuous with only some of the nuances it has in Abhidharma. Moreover, ākāra becomes associated with novel explanatory functions in Buddhist pramā?a. These discoveries underscore the need to pay closer attention to the reuse of terms and concepts, ideas and arguments in Buddhist philosophy, and to the often subtle adaptations and transformations that formed an integral part of its history.