论言谏制度是君主专制的监控和纠错机制

言谏是中国古代规劝君主并促使其改正过失的一种制度 ,它与御史弹劾相互配合、互为表里 ,御史纠察百官之非法 ,谏官谏诤君主之违误 ,两者比翼共同构成了古代监察制度的有机整体 ,在一定程度上发挥了“彰善瘅恶 ,激浊扬清”的作用。言谏制度作为对君主的监督和制约机制 ,是君主专制的调节因素和有益补充 ,也是我国古代对政治运行体制的完善和制度创新     

论中国古代言谏制度的正君作用

在君主专制时代,作为国家的最高统治者,君主拥有至高无上、无所不包的绝对权力。如何保证天子宪令的正确和国家机器的正常运转?我国古代在总结历史经验的基础上,逐渐形成了对君主进行制约的言谏制度。即设置兼职或专职谏官,建立相应的机构,如门下省、谏院和六科给事中等,以规劝君主并使其改正过失。言官谏诤是中国古代监察制度的一个重要组成部分,其作用是“匡正君主,谏诤得失”。     

论韩非的“因情而治”

韩非是先秦法家之集大成者.人们之所以称韩非为法家、法家之集大成者,是因为他集法、术、势于一身,力倡封建君主依法来治国;是因为他毕生都站在封建专制国家和封建专制君主的立场上,研究和论述如何治理国家,如何国富兵强的方略.可以说,韩非的每一篇宏论都是他献给封建君主的“治世良言”,都紧扣如何治理国家的主题,或是如何驾驭群臣的方术,或是如何使用民力的招法,亦或是封建君主自身的“修炼之术”.在他集中论述治国原则的《八经》中,“因情”被韩非列为治国的首要原则和根本原则,他向封建专制君主提出了“凡治天下,必因人情”的治国方略.“因情而治”既体现着韩非的治国方略,又蕴含着他的人性思想.尽管“因情而治”是韩非为封建专制君主和封建专制国家提出的治国方略,但这其中对人性的蕴含透视和以人性为基础建构的治国方略,是非常值得我们认真研究的.     

不为

北宋时，改革派章当了宰相，他把元年间的保守派核心人物，全部放逐到荒凉的岭南，有“布衣宰相”之称的范纯仁，也在贬谪的名单中，职务为武安军节度副使，安置在永州（今湖南）。     

浅析明代中央辅政制度

辅政制度作为明朝重要的政治制度之一,其职责主要在于建构君主与臣僚、皇帝与百姓之间的桥梁。明洪武十三年九月(1380年),在朱元璋宣布永远废除宰相制度半年以后,为了分担皇帝的政务,曾一度设置"四辅官",随着"四辅官"试行的失败,迫使朱元璋展开对另一形式辅政制度的探索。着重分析明朝的内阁和司礼监在不同时期所承担的不同政务以及二者的联系与区别,最终得出一个结论,两个不同的组织部门并行的最大优势就是既防止了有权力的大臣掌控国家,又有效地控制了宦官集团权力的滋生与蔓延。但是同时,二者的并行也存在着不可避免的弊端,进而影响明代政治的发展。     

制度变迁中中央治国者的行动逻辑

强制性制度变迁是中央集权国家中制度变迁的主要类型。中央治国者推动的制度变迁,其制度变迁效用主要包括政治稳定和社会效益最大化,而中央治国者的行动遵循着政治稳定首位、社会效益最大化次位的逻辑。明太祖废宰相制度是中央治国者在制度变迁中行动逻辑的生动体现,通过分析明太祖废宰相制度的行为,可以看出中央治国者在制度变迁中的终极目的取向。     

中国古代官僚制度的自主性分析

中国古代官僚制度作为君主专制的一个组成部分，必然形成对于君主的依附性，然而在官僚制度的实际运行中，又具有不受君主意志左右的自主性存在。本文即旨在对中国古代官僚制度进行具体考察，揭示这种自主性的表现，分析其根源与实质，考察这一自主性对官僚组织的功能以及对君主专制制度的影响，以此说明中国君主专制制度在实际运行过程中的复杂性。     

性善假设对政治意识文明的影响

在当代中国,公民民主意识 的缺失是政治意识文明的一 大障碍。公民民主意识的缺失又与我国封建社会主导的、性善假设影响下的“君主”意识有着历史的渊源,“君主”意识在现代主要表现为“清官情结”、“无限政府心理”。这种在一定历史时期形成的政治意识文明实际上己经成为现代政治文明的障碍。     

不谋下政

荀了曰：“主好要则百事详，主好详则百事荒”。意思是说君主善于抓要领，那么各种理情都会被处理得井井有条；如果君主喜欢样样都抓，那么事情反而会杂乱无章。这里说的是领导者的领方法和工作方法的问题。 领导干部在其位，固然要谋其政。但谋其政并非要事必躬亲，     

李绅的为官与为人

中唐时期，有一位人称“短李”的著名诗人，他的代表作《悯农诗》几乎家喻户晓，文学史上历来对其评价甚高，他就是李绅。当年李绅应进士举时，曾以占风行卷，吕温读了其中的《悯农》二首后，认为其人有宰相器，将来必为宰相，后来李绅果真当了宰相。     

Defensive versus Offensive Approaches to Administrative Reform in France (1988–1997): The Leadership Dilemmas of French Prime Ministers

From 1988 to 1997, all French prime ministers launched administrative reform programs with numerous concerns for increasing efficiency, strengthening responsiveness, or redesigning political and administrative roles within the state. However, these initiatives have never led to radical and disruptive changes. The institutional legacy seems to have strongly constrained the politics of administration. What, then, is the meaning of launching administrative reforms within the French political power configuration, and how does it “fit” with the way leaders try to establish their political authority? This article provides two empirical studies of different prime ministers (Michel Rocard under the Mitterrand presidency and Alain Jupp under the Chirac presidency) that can explain the nature of the French governments' commitments to these issues. It argues that understanding administrative reforms requires a mixture of institutional and actor‐centered explanations, because these policies are really leadership challenges to the preexisting institutional order. As such, they are reflexively shaped or constrained by what they try to control and define. This paper shows that for a French prime minister to define the administration as a problem while building his own leadership can jeopardize the resources he will get from that same bureaucratic administrative system. This “power‐reform dilemma” may explain why administrative reforms have proven more politically effective as an instrument of order‐affirming impulses rather than as a disruptive strategy.     

论北洋军阀统治时期熊希龄的国家结构观

在袁世凯统治时期,熊希龄曾入主内阁,在地方制度上提出采行单一制国家结构、实行中央集权的施政纲领,对袁世凯加强中央集权统治起到了推波助澜的作用.1917年至1926年,他改变立场,极力主张联邦制,20年代还汲汲于实际活动.熊希龄思想的变化具有复杂的背景和深刻的根源,典型地反映了立宪党人的政治见解和政治性格.     

Greek Everyman: Andreas Papandreou at 100

2019 marks 100 years since the birth of Andreas Papandreou, Greece's first socialist prime minister and an extraordinary figure of twentieth century European politics. Looking back, the central purpose of this article is to answer pivotal questions about Papandreou and his career. What have been the major turning points in his life? What were his main beliefs? What motivated him and his politics? What were his political priorities and methods? What did he want to achieve as prime minister? Why did he become so involved in foreign policy issues? What were his assets as prime minister? Did they outweigh his shortcomings as a politician and leader? Did power change him and how? What will be Papandreou's place in history?     

Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats

In this paper I study asimple game of the budgetary process. Thegame has three players. A spending proneminister, who proposes a budget, a primeminister, who accepts or vetoes, and abureaucrat who provides non-verifiableinformation about policy. The bureaucratis appointed by the spending minister. Ishow that in this setting public spendingis excessive. This result stems from theproposal power of the minister, and hisincentive to appoint a spending pronebureaucrat. Next, I examine two devices forcontrolling public spending: binding budgettargets imposed by the prime minister, anddelegating veto power to a spending aversefinance minister. It is shown that thelatter device is more effective than theformer device to curb a spending proneminister, because it not only reduces theproposal power of the spending minister,but also induces him to appoint lessspending prone bureaucrats.     

The Postwar Premiership League

The article reports the results from the latest survey of academic experts polled on the performance of post‐1945 prime ministers. Academic specialists in British politics and history rate Clement Attlee as the best postwar prime minister, with Margaret Thatcher in second place just ahead of Tony Blair in third place. Gordon Brown's stint in Number 10 was the third‐worst since the Second World War, according to the respondents to the survey that rated his premiership as less successful than that of John Major. The article compares public and academic opinion and rankings of prime ministers and their performance, noting significant discrepancies in contemporary and retrospective evaluations. Academic respondents to the survey also provided detailed ratings and evaluations of the performance and policy impact of the four prime ministers since 1979: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.     

Do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in public debt?

Using a unique dataset of the personal characteristics of national finance ministers in Western Europe (1980–2010), I show that a finance minister’s experience affects the national debt-to-GDP ratio. The increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is smaller if the finance minister stays in office for an additional year. This result is robust to the inclusion of the personal characteristics of prime ministers and a measure of political stability. However, the magnitude of the effect is sensitive to how finance ministers are selected in the econometric model when more than one minister holds office during a particular year. The estimation of interaction terms further reveals that experience particularly matters in election years or in times of negative GDP growth because an experienced finance minister has the power to restrict the usual increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, a finance minister’s educational background and ideological leaning have no significant impact on the debt-to-GDP ratio.     

The study of Western European cabinets

Abstract. We are still relatively unfamiliar with the structures and modes of behaviour of Western European cabinets and we need first to identify the range of the differences which exist with respect to two major dimensions along which cabinet governments can be located (collective v. hierarchical decision-making and political representation v. administrative and/or specialist skills). A valuable test can be obtained by considering in detail the cases of a number of countries in which the traditions of cabinet government are known to be different from those of the British model, both because of the existence of coalitions and because of specific traditions of 'administrative' and even 'bureaucratic' government. Marked variations emerge with respect to four elements: ministerial expertise, the large autonomy of ministers, the authority of the prime minister or chancellor, and the relatively limited influence of the council of ministers as a deliberative body. Cabinet government is a flexible machinery which has given rise to a number of different models corresponding to different traditions and to different conditions in which the political system operates.     

Australia's New Federalism: Recipes for Marble Cakes

In July of 1990, the prime minister of Australia announced aprogram to achieve a closer partnership between the three levelsof government. His concern was the degree of bureaucratic overlapin the Australian federation and the hindrances to mobility,portability, and uniformity which made the Australian economymore balkanized than Europe post-1992. The announcement capitalizedon dissatisfaction with Australian federalism that had beengrowing in the 1970s and 1980s, and its timing coincided witha range of catalysts making the current climate favorable forchange. The new federalism unleashed a process of review andreform across some forty program or subprogram areas over aneighteen-month period with a prime objective to attain roleclarification for the three levels of government in shared functionalareas, somewhat akin to the German horizontal model of federalrole allocation. The process survived a political challengethat toppled the prime minister, aspects of the new federalismforming a key element of that challenge. Constitutional changeis also part of the agenda and already the Australian experienceholds a number of lessons for other federal systems.     

Economic Conditions Affect Support for Prime Minister Parties in Scandinavia

Previous research has not been able to identify a relationship between objective economic indicators and support for governing parties in the Scandinavian countries. This is potentially problematic, as it suggests that political leaders are not held electorally accountable for the economic conditions they provide for their electorates. In this article, it is suggested that this null‐finding is a result of the particularities of the Scandinavian electoral context, which makes it difficult to identify the effects of the economy on electoral support. To bolster this argument, the relationship between unemployment, economic growth and support for prime minister parties is re‐examined in two datasets. The first is a dataset of Scandinavian elections, and the second is a yearly Danish vote function, which was constructed using election polls. Across both datasets, it is found that if one simply correlates support for the prime minister's party with economic conditions, there is no relationship; however, if one specifies a statistical model, which takes the Scandinavian context into account, it is possible to identify a statistically significant effect of economic conditions on electoral support. Based on this finding, the article concludes that economic conditions do shape electoral support for prime minister parties in Scandinavia.     

Disentangling Concepts of Ministerial Responsibility

Debates on ministerial responsibility have too often gone around in circles. The application of the principle is related to the incidence of resignations; analysis considers the reasons given for resignation or, rather more often, the reasons given for not resigning. The usual conclusions are that ministers resign occasionally when their personal involvement is unquestioned and when the prime minister determines that the political costs are less to let the minister go. But the ideas remain at a broad level because they relate to all the ministerial activities. This article seeks to disentangle these concepts, developing the ideas in Thompson and Tillotsen's article in this symposium, to see if a different set of concepts can better define this old notion.