Risk,Precaution, Responsibility,and Equal Concern

Systemic risks are risks produced through interconnected non‐wrongful actions of individuals, in the sense that an individual's action is a negligible cause of the risk. Due to scale effects of interaction, their consequences can be serious but they are also difficult to predict and assess via a risk assessment. Since we can have good reason to engage in the interconnected activities giving rise to systemic risk, we incur a concurrent collective responsibility to ensure that the risks are fairly distributed and well regulated. James argues that fairness in this context requires taking reasonably available precautions ensuring for each risk‐bearer a favourable ratio of expected benefits over expected losses. In sections 2 and 3 we argue that such a conception of fairness applies but only on the condition that the systemic risks created are irreversible risks and that the general background conditions of justice are imperfectly fair. When risks are reversible, compensatory justice can correct for unfairness in risk imposition. Where risks are irreversible, compensatory justice necessarily fails, giving rise to a collective responsibility to regulate fairly ex ante. Additionally, where background conditions of justice are fully fair and the systemic risk is well understood, risk bearers can be said to have consented to the systemic risk. If they are not fair, we argue that the primary political obligation should lie in fixing the fairness of the backgrounds of justice. A related reason for addressing the general background conditions of fairness is that James’ account of fairness in systemic risk imposition encounters a baseline problem. If expected risks and benefits are calculated again an unfair historic background condition, systemic risk imposition would not be fully fair. Section 4 shows why differences in evidentiary uncertainty as to probability and levels of harm and effective responses require a normatively appropriate response in the form of additional precautions. We show that the evidentiary standards set for risk‐based cost‐benefit analysis have a connection with deontology because they express a postulate of equal treatment in formal terms. Systemic risks can have different possible degrees of epistemological certainty due to factors of social and natural origin, such as more available research funding or higher degrees of complexity for some systemic risks but not others. These differences have to be mitigated by taking even greater precautions in difficult‐to‐research systemic risks.     

Changing Definitions of Risk and Responsibility in French Political Scandals

In the 1990s in France, a large number of political scandals developed and many political actors were prosecuted. This process of making politicians responsible related, in particular, to the rise of 'new risks' regarding public health and security. In this paper, I analyse the diffusion and the crystallization of discourses linking public risk and political responsibility. First, I point to some of the social and cognitive bases in which the recent uses of the notions of risk and responsibility are rooted. Second, I focus on the mechanisms through which the notions were mobilized and invested with new definitions in the course of the scandal hearings. Third, I explore some of the effects of the changes which occurred during the 1990s: new perception frames in terms of risk and responsibility are consolidated and are progressively appropriated by social actors located in various professional spheres.     

Creating the Reasonable Child: Risk,Responsibility, and the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

In common law, trespassers could not sue for injuries. In the early 1870s, however, courts exempted child trespassers injured by industrial machinery from this rule. The development of the hotly contested “attractive nuisance” doctrine illustrates turn‐of‐the‐twentieth‐century debates about how to allocate the risk of injury from industrial accidents, which linked responsibility to the capacity to understand danger and to exert self‐control. Although at first courts in attractive nuisance cases perceived children as innocent, irrational “butterflies,” they gradually reconceived child plaintiffs to be rational, risk‐bearing individuals, a change reflected and accelerated by the Safety First campaign launched by railroad corporations. This reframing of children's ability to bear risk created the standard of the “reasonable child,” which transferred responsibility for industrial accidents to children themselves. Although by the 1930s the attractive nuisance doctrine had been widely accepted, in practice the “reasonable child” standard posed a difficult hurdle for child plaintiffs to overcome.     

会计责任与审计责任之比较

审计责任和会计责任是注册会计师市计业务中常用的两个概念,在注册会计师事业迅速发展的今天,进一步分清 两者的区别和联系,合理界定各自的责任范围,对于发挥审计在现代经济管理中的积极作用有重要的现实意义。 从两者的内涵、区别以及实际工作中应注意的问题等方面进行了分析。     

论醉酒与刑事责任

本文认为我国刑法对醉酒人犯罪刑事责任的规定存在一定的缺陷,并根据现代司法精神病学对醉酒问题已经取得的科学认识,建议我国刑法对醉酒人犯罪刑事责任的规定应进一步具体化、明确化和科学化．还要增加一些程序性的规定。     

Responsibility and Global Justice

The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level either limit the applicability of justice to states—the only distributions that can be just or unjust, strictly speaking, are within the state—or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend in On Global Justice (Risse 2012 ) rejects both of these approaches. Instead, my view, and thus my attempt at meeting the aforementioned challenge, acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. My purpose here is to explain what my view has to say about responsibility. First of all, I explain what my view implies about the responsibilities of the state for the realization of justice. Then I explain that in addition to obligations of justice, my view also gives rise to obligations of account‐giving. I end by sketching what all this implies for institutional reform at the global level.     

Parental Responsibility

Families are the first level in our society with the responsibility and authority to prevent substance abuse by their children and to intervene if their children become involved. They are responsible for exemplifying and teaching the values of drug-free lives for their children. These responsibilities are more than the practice of good parenting skills. They are inherent responsibilities recognized by society and by law. Supported in their efforts by community services, parents must be encouraged to fulfill their roles and to recognize themselves as accountable.     

我国安全事故中政府责任与企业责任承担问题研究——以山西“溃坝事件”，河北“三鹿奶粉事件”与深圳“火灾事故”为中心

在我国的安全事故中，企业作为引发安全事故的直接主体，对事故的发生应当承担相应的法律责任，受到法律制裁，并通过这一责难发挥一般预防的功能，从而降低安全事故的发生率，确保人民的生命和财产处在安全的环境之中。同时，政府的职能部门作为安全事故的监管主体，因其未履行法定的监管职责或履行监管职责未到位对安全事故的发生应当承担监管不力的责任，并借助问责督促职能部门通过有效的监管措施尽力避免企业发生安全事故。     

Roemer on Responsibility and Equality

Law and Philosophy -     

Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence

Criminal Law and Philosophy - We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising...     

批判的精神与责任

书名： A Critique of Adjudication,{fin de sié cle} 作者： Duncan Kennedy 出版： Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press 1997 评论人：臧东升,美国哈佛大学法学院,法学博士。 书评 　　肯尼迪教授对于中国研究法学理论的学者来说不算是陌生的, 80年代后半期介绍和评价美国批判法学的作品对肯尼迪教授多有所涉及,〔 1〕 90年代中期由中国人民大学朱景文教授主持的美国批判法律研究运动的研究中对肯尼迪教授有比较多的介绍。〔 2〕我国学者对他的理论魅力及在批判法学中的领袖地位给予充分肯定,并对他的理论动向有比较浓厚…     

平台责任与私权力

网络平台是网络空间“生态系统”中的基本单元、重要枢纽和关键节点.在网络平台的“生态”中,不同的私主体事实上处于不同的地位,进而形成了不同特征的法律关系.通过分析这些法律关系框架中的私权力现象,继而探讨私权力的规制机制,可以更加清晰地认识平台责任的基础和边界.     

对以责任为核心的官员问责制的反思

我国目前实施的以责任为核心的官员问责制,无论是在实践中还是在制度建设上都取得了一定的成就,但还存在着许多问题。本文就官员问责制的完善在行政伦理及制度化上对其进行反思,力求找到促进问责制完善的突破口,并在此基础上从行政生态环境及制度化建设等方面提出建设路径。     

论公司的社会责任

公司不仅要为股东营利,而且要对社会承担法律责任和道德责任。正确处理公司社会责任与公司营利性之间的关系是界定公司社会责任含义的关键。公司社会责任理论是对股东利益最大化这一理论的修正和补充。我国应当从不同的角度对公司社会责任立法进行完善。     

论未成年人的刑事责任

如何确定未成年人的法定刑事责任年龄是刑法中一个重要问题 ,必须审慎对待。对未成年人犯罪运用刑罚和案件的诉讼程序均需要进一步完善。根据我国刑罚的目的 ,研究未成年人的刑事责任与研究未成年犯的教育改造应当联系起来。     

Raz on Responsibility

Standard treatments of responsibility have been preoccupied with issues of blame and punishment, and concerns about free will. In contrast, Raz is concerned with problems about responsibility that arise from the “puzzle of moral luck,” puzzles that lead to misguided skepticism about negligence. We are responsible not only for conduct that is successfully guided by what we take to be our reasons for action, but also for misexercises of our rational capacities that escape our rational control. To deny this is to lose sight of the ways “moral luck” is an inescapable feature of our agential engagement in the world. The present essay attempts to set out Raz’s argument as sympathetically as possible. Raz’s shift of focus is a powerful counter to current tendencies and points us in new and promising directions. Nonetheless, as it stands, it may just relocate skepticism about negligence to a different place.     

Responsibility Determination: Free Will and Legal Responsibility in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Free will is the foundation of determination of responsibility. Genetic enginnering represented by technologies of gene editing, artificial medical devices and AI have fundamentally challenged the concept of free will and so have significantly influenced determination of legal responsibility. These challenges are fundamental, not instrumental, and can be divided into two aspects in legal philosophy. First, the direct challenge, that is, the emerging technology represented by genetic engineering and artificial narrow intelligence (ANI) has challenged the concept of free will. Second the would-be ultimate challenge, that is, presented by an artificial general intelligence (AGI) agent that is considered to reach humanlevel free will, can be a legal subject, thus taking full legal responsibility. The direct challenge constitutes a new “forgiveness” condition for taking responsibility. The would-be ultimate challenge deserves significant attention, because the concept of free will is not only about human responsibility, but also about human dignity.