WHAT IS THE PERCEIVED SERIOUSNESS OF CRIMES?

Although criminologists have measured the perceived seriousness of offenses for decades, there is no consensus on the meaning of seriousness, nor is there clear evidence as to what individuals have in mind when they rate the seriousness of crimes. Seriousness judgments could reflect normative evaluations of offenses (i.e., their wrongfulness) or factual judgments about their harmfulness to victims. Survey data from Dallas residents show that the two dimensions are distinct and that conventional classes of crime (personal, property, public order) systematically differ on the two dimensions. Where crimes are perceived to be more wrong than harmful, seriousness mirrors wrongfulness. Where crimes are perceived to be more harmful than wrong, harmfulness predominates. A substantial minority of respondents, however, did not perceive differences in the moral gravity of crimes, judging the seriousness of crimes solely on the basis of harmfulness. These and other findings indicate that seriousness judgments are more structured and complex than commonly supposed and that conventional measures of seriousness, when applied to substantive problems, may mask or obscure distinct mechanisms of evaluation.     

THE PREVENTIVE EFFECTS OF THE PERCEIVED RISK OF ARREST: TESTING AN EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF DETERRENCE

In a reexamination of the perceptual deterrence literature. Williams and Hawkins (1986) have suggested that previous tests of the deterrence doctrine have been guided by too narrow a conception of the deterrence process. In essence, they argue that the preventive mechanisms are triggered by formal sanctions should be included in the accounting of the deterrent effect of formal sanctions. In this paper, we test this expanded conception of deterrence. We find little evidence to support the argument of Williams and Hawkins. Alternative interpretations of the results and future directions for research are discussed.     

THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF PERCEIVED CERTAINTY AND SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT REVISITED*

This paper synthesizes and extends recent criticisms of cross-sectional and panel studies of perceptual deterrence and then uses those criticisms to design a better cross-sectional study. A series of scenarios involving the noncompliance of a hypothetical plumber were posed to a sample of predominantly middle-aged administrators. The respondents were asked to estimate the probability that the noncompliance would be detected and, if detected, the probability that it would result in criminal prosecution. Respondents were also asked to project their own behavior if in the plumber's position. The results contrast sharply with prior findings, especially of the panel studies. Not only do perceptions of detection risk play an important role in deterring tax noncompliance, but fear of criminal prosecution appears to be a powerful deterrent.