Party Size and Constituency Representation: Evidence from the 19th‐Century U.S. House of Representatives

Research on congressional parties assumes, but has not directly shown, that party size affects individual members' calculations. Drawing on a key case from the nineteenth‐century House—the secession‐driven Republican hegemony of 1861—this article explores the hypothesis that party voting not only declines but also becomes more strongly linked to constituency factors as relative party size increases. The analysis reveals that the jump in party size coincides with (1) a decrease in party voting among individual continuing members, (2) a strengthening association between some constituency factors and party voting, and (3) patterns of decline in individual party voting that are explained in part by constituency measures.     

Party Unity,Ideology, and Polarization in Primary Elections for the House of Representatives: 1956–2012

Increasing party polarization in Congress is a vexing phenomenon for political scientists, as it offers a theoretical conundrum. Members of Congress have become increasingly ideologically divided by party in recent years, which seems counterintuitive as the public electorally punishes representatives for excessive partisanship and ideological behavior. One explanation for this result is that members receive benefits for such behavior during primaries. This article examines the effect of ideological and partisan behavior on primary challenges and primary vote totals for incumbent House members. The results show that incumbents receive benefits in the primary from greater levels of partisanship but not greater levels of ideological extremity. This finding is substantively important as it provides further insight into the motivation of congressional incumbents and offers a partial explanation for the rise in congressional polarization.     

Gender Turnover and Roll‐Call Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives

A number of studies suggest that the gender of a legislator affects his or her congressional ideology. We argue that these studies may have produced misleading results because of insufficient controls for constituency influences. To better account for constituency effects, we use a longitudinal research design based on electoral turnover, which holds constituency constant while allowing gender and party to vary. We apply ordinary least squares regression to data from the 103d, 104th, and 105th Houses of Representatives and estimate the effect of gender turnover on changes in DW‐NOMINATE roll‐call voting scores. We find that, when we sufficiently control for both party and constituency influences, gender is not a determinant of the liberalness of a representative's roll‐call voting behavior.     

Geographic Representation in Party‐Dominated Legislatures: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag

Political representation in European democracies is widely considered partisan and collectivist. This article, however, stresses that there is more to the representative process in European democracies than just its textbook version. It emphasizes the role of geographic representation as a complementary strategy in party‐dominated legislatures that is characterized by two distinct features. First, legislators employ distinct opportunities to participate in legislative contexts to signal attention to geographic constituents without disrupting party unity. Second, these activities are motivated by individual‐ and district‐level characteristics that supplement electoral‐system‐level sources of geographic representation. We empirically test and corroborate this argument for the German case on the basis of a content analysis of parliamentary questions in the 17th German Bundestag (2009–13). In this analysis, we show that higher levels of localness among legislators and higher levels of electoral volatility in districts result in increased geographic representation.     

The politics of abortion in the House of Representatives in 1976

The discussion in the U. S. Congress preceeding the passage of the 1976 Hyde Amendment, prohibiting the use of Medicaid funds for abortions, was described and the results of a multivariate analysis of the factors influencing the votes on the amendment in the House of Representatives were presented. Between June 24-August 10, 1976 there were 3 roll call votes on the amendment in the House of Representatives and during this period support for the amendment increased from 54%-69%. Multiple classification analysis was used to analyze the relative influence of 11 independent variables on the voting behavior of the representatives. The 11 variables included 1) the age, educational level, sex, and religious affliation of the representative; 2) the representative's party affliation, degree of constituent support, and previous voting record on liberal issues; and 3) the average income, racial composition, geographical location, and the % of urban residents in the representative's district. The factor which served as the best indicator of the representative's vote on the amendment was the representative's previous voting record on liberal issues. Those with more liberal voting records tended to vote against the amendment and those with more conservative voting records tended to vote for the amendment. The 2nd best predictor of amendment votes was the religious affliation of the representative. Catholic representatives, compared to Protestant and Jewish representatives, were more likely to support the amendment. Geographical location of the representative's district was a moderate indicator of the representative's vote on the amendment. Representatives from the south were more likely to support the amendment. The degree of constituent support for the representative in his own district was also a moderate indicator of the representatives vote on the amendment. The 11 factors together accounted for 1/3 of the votes.     

Legislative voting in the pork-dominant parliament: evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives

In this paper I investigate how legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented, or pork-dominant, systems where virtually no party-line voting takes place and politicians strive to deliver individual/local benefits instead of national public policies. I argue that, in the pork-dominant context, most legislators vote with the president, who controls access to the pork pipeline, irrespective of their party affiliations. Thus, the president’s party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, regardless of voter demands for pork or policy; however, sometimes opposition-party legislators elected particularly from more-developed districts (where voters often desire policy over pork) should have strong incentives to vote against the president. These arguments are supported with quantitative studies of the post-authoritarian Philippine House of Representatives. It is found that, in the highly homogeneous legislature dominated by pork-seeking politicians, (1) most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent, (2) governing-party legislators almost always vote with the majority of the members of the parliament, regardless of voters’ socio-economic conditions, and (3) opposition-party legislators, especially in more-developed areas, tend to vote against the parliamentary majority. These findings indicate that voters’ high socio-economic status promotes programmatic accountability, leading their representatives to undermine voting unity within the extremely cohesive pork-dominant legislature.     

Tarnishing Opponents,Polarizing Congress: The House Minority Party and the Construction of the Roll‐Call Record

Existing research on congressional parties tends to focus almost exclusively on the majority party. I argue that the inattention to the House minority party hampers our understanding of the construction of the roll‐call record and, consequently, our understanding of the sources of polarization in congressional voting. Employing an original data set of House members' requests for recorded votes between 1995 and 2010, I demonstrate that votes demanded by the minority party are disproportionately divisive and partisan and make Congress appear considerably more polarized based on commonly used measures. Moreover, minority‐requested votes make vulnerable members of the majority appear more partisan and ideologically extreme.     

Special Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives: A General Election Barometer?

Vacancies in the U.S. House of Representatives are filled using special elections. These elections occur off the usual American electoral cycle, and their results are routinely portrayed by the American mass media as indications of what to expect in the next general election. We examined the predictive power of special elections results with respect to the general election outcomes for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1900 to 2008. We found that special elections that yield a change in partisan control do have predictive power regarding general election results.     

The “Production” of Corruption in China's Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a One‐Party State

Despite its rampant presence, judicial corruption in China has often been regarded as the idiosyncratically deviant behavior of a few black sheep eluding prescribed judicial conduct. This entrenched assumption has both discouraged in‐depth investigation of the phenomenon of judicial corruption and inhibited proper understanding of the functioning of China's courts. This article, based on an empirically grounded examination of the processing of court rulings tainted by corruption, showed that judicial corruption in China is an institutionalized activity systemically inherent in the particular decision‐making mechanism guided by the Chinese Communist Party's instrumental rule‐by‐law ideal. In investigating what has contributed to the institutionalization of judicial corruption, the interplay between law and party politics in China's courts was also examined. The findings, therefore, also shed light on behind‐the‐courtroom judicial activities and on the enduring perplexity of the gap between the law in the book and the law in action.     

Explaining Seat Changes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950–98

Abstract: Recent U.S. House elections have challenged existing models of congressional elections, raising the question of whether or not processes thought to govern previous elections are still at work. Taking Marra and Ostrom's (1989) model of congressional elections as representative of extant theoretical perspectives and testing it against recent elections, we find that the model fails. We augment Marra and Ostrom's model with new insights, constructing a model that explains elections from 1950 to 1998. We find that, although presidential approval ratings and major political events continue to drive congressional elections, the distribution of open seats must also be taken into account.     

A Cross‐National Analysis of Party Switching

Though instances of party switching have been widely documented, there is little cross‐national research on this phenomenon. The prevalence of switching is therefore unknown, and the factors influencing this behavior remain unclear. Using the most comprehensive dataset on party switching ever constructed, we illustrate both that interparty movement is more common than previously assumed and that there are substantial differences in its prevalence across parties. To explain this variation, we examine the relationship between legislators' motivations, institutional arrangements, and switching. We find that motivational explanations are correlated with interparty movement and that institutional arrangements exhibit only limited direct influence on switching.     

Toxicological Findings in Fatal Motor Vehicle Collisions in Ontario,Canada: A One‐Year Study

Drug‐impaired driving is a complex area of forensic toxicology due in part to limited data concerning the type of drugs involved and the concentrations detected. This study analyzed toxicological findings in drivers from fatal motor vehicle collisions (FMVCs) in Ontario, Canada, over a one‐year period using a standardized protocol. Of the 229 cases included in the study, 56% were positive for alcohol and/or drugs. After alcohol, cannabis was the most frequently encountered substance (27%), followed by benzodiazepines (17%) and antidepressants (17%). There were differences in drugs detected by age but no marked difference in drugs detected between single and multiple FMVC's. Not all drugs detected were considered impairing either due to drug type, concentration or case history. The findings indicate the importance of comprehensive drug testing in FMVCs and highlight the need to consider a variety of factors, in addition to drug type and concentration, when assessing the role of drugs in driving impairment.     

The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives

Our research addresses how individual member behavior and institutional variables affect legislative success in the U.S. House of Representatives. Using new measures of activity from the 103d Congress (1993–94), a count dependent variable, and negative binomial regression, our analysis assesses member effectiveness. We find that a member's activity level encourages legislative success, but gains are limited when members speak or sponsor too frequently. Our results provide a clearer picture of the role of legislative context and the relevance of institutions in determining a member's legislative successes and failures.     

Intended Consequences: Jurisdictional Reform and Issue Control In the U.S. House of Representatives

The power of congressional committees rests in large part on their ability to set the legislative agenda in particular issue areas. But how do committees acquire their issue jurisdictions? Existing research points to informal committee turf wars— not collective reforms—as the roots of jurisdictional allocations (King 1994, 1997). Yet the House of Representatives has made nearly 150 formal changes to its committees' jurisdictions since 1973. We investigated the effects of one prominent instance of extensive jurisdictional changes, the Bolling‐Hansen reforms of 1975, and found that this body of reforms advanced collective goals of improved policy coordination and enhanced information sharing.     

Carbon‐Based Fingerprint Powder as a One‐Step Development and Matrix Application for High‐Resolution Mass Spectrometry Imaging of Latent Fingerprints

Carbon‐based materials are often used as matrices for matrix‐assisted laser desorption/ionization mass spectrometry (MALDI‐MS) and its imaging (MALDI‐MSI). However, researchers have refrained from using carbon‐based fingerprint powder (CFP) as a matrix due to high background and contamination. In this work, the compatibility of CFP is reevaluated with MALDI‐MSI using a high‐resolution mass spectrometer (HRMS) and compared to traditional organic matrices. Relevant fingerprint compounds were easily distinguished from carbon cluster peaks when using HRMS. For fair comparison, half of a fingerprint was dusted with CFP while the other half was dusted with traditional organic matrices. All compounds studied had comparable, or higher, signal‐to‐noise (S/N) ratios when CFP was used as the matrix. Additionally, chemical image qualities closely followed the trend of S/N ratios. CFP proved to be an effective one‐step development and matrix application technique for MALDI‐MSI of latent fingerprints, when carbon cluster peaks are well separated by a HRMS.     

Preferences,Partisanship, and Whip Activity in the U.S. House of Representatives

Using Democratic whip counts from the 92d House, we compare representatives' stated intentions to their actual roll‐call votes to detect evidence of party pressure. After arguing that this strategy understates real party influence, we nonetheless point to evidence of member conversion by party leaders. On 16 bills analyzed, two‐thirds of the switches between the count and the vote occur in the direction favored by party leaders. We examine one bill in depth, showing how the efforts of party leaders were consequential to the outcome. The pattern of movement on this bill, along with data from the larger set of bills, provides evidence that leaders act strategically, targeting the members whose persuasion requires the fewest resources.     

War for the Floor: Partisan Theory and Agenda Control In the U.S. House of Representatives

This article extends recent research on partisan agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives to the issue of procedural control of the legislative agenda via special rules. In particular, we draw out a facet of cartel and conditional party government theories that has not been addressed in prior analyses: the simultaneous interrelationship between positive and negative agenda control. Using roll‐call data on two procedural matters—votes to order the previous question on a special rule and votes to adopt a special rule—over the 1953–2002 period, we found that, in the area of procedural control of the floor agenda, the majority party's amount of agenda control depends to a significant degree upon the party's homogeneity and power.