What Limits for Government Control? Civil Liberties and Anti‐terror Measures after the Heathrow Bomb Plot

The threat posed by transnational terrorism has excited debate about how best to calibrate relations between government, the courts and parliament: how can the provision of internal security be facilitated, whilst respecting freedoms and ensuring that policies enjoy broad legitimacy? Attention has focussed primarily on the power of the courts. Sections of the government have mooted a curtailment of judicial competencies; by contrast, a broad range of actors calls for ‐ at the least ‐ the maintenance of current judicial powers as the best means to prevent government from exploiting its already large scope for manoeuvre, as well as to overcome public scepticism. Yet the current debate misses the point that relations between government, courts and parliament have already been altered. Government has gained extra political resources thanks to its participation in forms of international counterterrorist cooperation. This shift of power, and associated problems, were clear during the recent ‘Heathrow bomb plot’.     

Keeping the rascals in: Anti‐political‐establishment parties and their cost of governing in established democracies

Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral ‘cost of governing’. This cost varies across coalition partners, and is higher for anti‐political‐establishment parties. This is because, if such a party participates in a coalition, it loses the purity of its message by being seen to cooperate with the political establishment. In order to demonstrate that anti‐political‐establishment parties suffer an additional cost of governing, this article builds on the work by Van der Brug et al. and refines the standard cost of governing theory by ‘bringing the party back in’. The results of the analyses, based on 594 observations concerning 51 parties in seven Western European countries, cast doubt on the conventional concept of a cost of governing that pertains to all parties equally. The findings call for a major revision of the standard cost of governing literature, while adding a significant contribution to the debate on strategies against parties that may constitute a danger to democracy.     

Assessing Public Procurement of Innovation as a Cross‐Domain Policy: A Framework and Application to the Chinese Context

Despite the fact that public procurement of innovation (PPI) has become an increasingly popular policy tool, there has been a lack of holistic approaches to assessing policies promoting PPI. This article attempts to address this gap by proposing a framework which links the multiple levels and aspects related to the design and implementation of PPI policies. By adopting a systemic understanding of “public procurement” as well as “innovation policies,” this article positions PPI as a cross‐domain policy which is inherently a mix of procurement and innovation‐related interventions. The article develops an assessment framework using “vertical coherence” and “horizontal coherence” as criteria. It then illustrates the use of the framework by applying it to PPI policies in China. The framework can aid the conduct of ex ante as well as ex post assessment of PPI policies, which can further inform policy design, implementation, and learning.     

Anti‐Corruption Watchdog Accountability: The Limitations of Judicial Review's Ability to Guard the Guardians

Anti‐corruption watchdogs form an important part of integrity measures in Australia's system of government. Integrity theory places anti‐corruption watchdogs in a fourth branch of government and as a part of a national integrity system as a way of understanding how they detect and prevent corruption and promote integrity. Integrity theory claims that an important part of the oversight of watchdogs occurs through judicial review of watchdog decisions by the courts. However, it fails to recognise the unique limitations when undertaking judicial review of watchdog decisions. This article submits that it is important to recognise these limitations to properly assess the effectiveness of a national integrity system and a fourth branch of government. The article explores the unique limitations of the court's ability to hold watchdogs to account and offers suggestions for managing these limitations.     

Means,Motive, and Opportunity – Local Government Data Distortion in a High‐Stakes Environment

Regulatory authorities are increasingly relying upon performance data for developing public policy. However, this reliance necessarily assumes that the data are free from material distortion. This paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding the ‘means’, ‘motive’, and ‘opportunity’ for distorting data employed in high‐stakes performance‐management programmes. We present empirical evidence which suggests that the use of data drawn entirely from financial statements by no means guarantees a distortion‐free depiction of performance. In addition, we provide econometric evidence of some important determinants of performance data distortion. Taken as a whole, the following analysis provides a comprehensive picture of the salient matters which must be addressed to ensure accurate data for public policy‐making purposes.     

Decentralizing a Centralized State: Local Government Finance in Chile Within the Latin American Context

A major issue in Latin. America is the decentralization of public finances and the autonomy of local government. This article begins with a brief review of the ongoing decentralization debate. We then discuss key features of local government finance and autonomy among unitary and federal governments in Latin America. Against that backdrop, we focus on the Chilean case, which has been a widely celebrated success story in the economic development literature. We argue that despite major gains by municipal governments over the past two decades, financial decision making powers still rest with the national government. This creates financial complacency among local governments. To remedy this, we conclude with six proposals for promoting effective decentralization.