Ingredients of institutional reputations and citizen engagement with regulators

The purpose of this study is to examine the link between the reputational components of efficacy and moral reliability of institutions, and citizens' compliance with institutional recommendations. Research on bureaucratic reputations highlights the significance of positive political reputations based on credibility and legitimacy, but the impact of these components is not systematically isolated and studied. We draw insights from political psychology to move beyond a positive‐negative valence‐based approach of reputation, and highlight the different effect of efficacy and moral reliability components of reputation on citizens' cooperation, engagement in water saving activities, and levels of complaints. We use the Cypriot Water Authority as a case study and inquire how its institutional reputation influences Cypriot citizens' behavior regarding water use. Our data was collected via a representative national survey administered to a random sample of 800 Cypriots in the spring of 2009 and show that favorable perceptions of particular components of institutional reputation shape the levels of satisfaction with specific organizational outputs.     

Building organizational reputation in the European regulatory state: An analysis of EU agencies' communications

Organizational‐reputation literature has advanced our understanding about the U.S. regulatory state and its agencies. However, we lack contributions on what a reputational account can add to our knowledge about the European regulatory state, the strategic behavior of supranational agencies, and their endeavors to legitimize themselves in a multilevel political system. We know little of how reputation‐management strategies vary across EU agencies and why. The study offers the very first mapping of organizational‐reputation‐management patterns across all EU agencies, as well as the first empirical assessment on how reputational considerations guide supranational agencies' legitimation strategies. The results indicate that EU agencies facing higher reputational threats revert to their avowed raison d'être (i.e., technical conduct). We find that regulatory agencies utilize a more diverse set of reputational strategies by emphasizing the technical, procedural, and moral reputations more than nonregulatory agencies, whereas social‐policy agencies foster their technical reputation more than economic‐policy agencies.     

…And keep your enemies closer: Building reputations for facing electoral challenges

Rather than occupants of a position in an ideological policy space, we conceive of legislators as reputation builders – the reputation they think will best serve them in the next election. Our theory suggests that legislators will seek to undercut the efforts of the challenger they fear most – the one in the primary or the one in the general election. We test our reasoning by examining legislative cosponsorship patterns in the U.S. House of Representatives. We find evidence that legislators respond to information about their potential future electoral challenges by building reputations as loners, partisans, or dissidents. We also show that these choices have implications for an incumbent's prospects in the next election. Building the wrong reputation increases the strength of future challenges.     

Capturing vote-seeking incentives and the cultivation of a personal and party vote

Electoral rules establish incentives that encourage candidates to strike a particular balance between cultivating their own personal reputations and cultivating shared party reputations. Higher levels of intraparty competition stress the need for an individual reputation and minimize the usefulness of a shared, party reputation. We develop a new indicator of intraparty competition that addresses shortcomings pointed out in previously used indicators. We also identify new, particularly intuitive indicators of ”personal” and ”party” vote seeking. Using within-system and across-system variation in parliamentary elections in Japan, we find that candidate manifestos contain more frequent uses of first-person pronouns and candidate names and fewer references to political parties when intraparty competition is stiffest.     

Voting, Rationality and Reputation

Why do people vote? This paper presents a solution to the voting paradox in rational choice theory, based on the interaction between two concepts: externalities (James Coleman) and reputation (Einar Overbye). Elaborating on the idea that voting is an investment in one's reputation, I will argue that there are two concepts of reputation: reputation-of-power and reputation-of-trust. The solution to the voting paradox can be found in the reputation-game between social actors holding these two different forms of reputation. During an electoral campaign, powerful opinion leaders can employ their reputation-of-power (power to impose sanctions) in order to get mere voters to vote in a certain way. The aim of the powerful opinion leaders is not to influence the outcome of the election but simply to acquire or maintain their reputation, while mere voters have an interest to vote as told in order to appear trustworthy (reputation-of-trust) to powerful opinion leaders. The act of voting is an unintended consequence of this power game.     

Reputation shifting

• The study of reputation has often focused on such relatively narrow areas as creation of good reputations rather than developed systematic theoretical approaches to understanding the means by which reputations are modified, or shifted, and the factors affecting such shifts. This paper introduces the concept of reputation shifting, with an explicit theory that relates reputational endowments, content characters, audience characters, and opportunity/change factors to reputational stickiness. It also identifies five reputational actions (discard, conceal, redefine, transfer, create), and the strategies that can be taken to manage reputations.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating the success of urban success stories: Is reputation a guide to best practice?

Abstract

Do the reputations of central cities that have reportedly revitalized match reality? Can reputation alone be used to select best practices in urban public policy? In replicating research conducted a decade ago, we asked a panel of urban and economic development experts to identify, out of the universe of large, distressed central cities in 1990, those that had successfully revitalized between 1990 and 2000. We compared the performance of these successful cities with the performance of cities not perceived to be successful on a composite index of the change in the economic well‐being of residents from 1990 to 2000, as well as on a weighted index of economic, social, fiscal, and demographic change between 1990 and 2000.

Regardless of which index was used, there was a low correlation between reputation and reality. We draw lessons from this experiment on relying on best practice reputations in formulating and propagating public policies.     

Human Rights as Reputation Builder: Compliance with the Convention Against Torture

A strong record of human rights protections is an important factor for a state to maintain a positive international reputation. In this article, we suggest that states will use compliance with human rights treaties as a mechanism by which to improve their reputations to help achieve their foreign policy goals. We hypothesize that international human rights compliance is a means to improve a state’s reputation in three specific situations: when the state is facing regional pressures as the result of a desire to join a regional organization; when the state is facing regional pressures not to run afoul of a court within a regional organization; or when a state seeks foreign assistance from an entity with human rights requirements for the receipt of such assistance. We examine our theory by analyzing human rights reports regarding state compliance with specific treaty obligations outlined in the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While the evidence for our hypotheses is mixed, we do find some support for our assertion that state compliance is linked to reputational concerns. In particular, states comply with the CAT when they are part of a regional organization that has a human rights court, and when they are receiving conditional aid from the European Union.     

Reputation and Interstate Conflict

In international politics, states learn from the behavior of other nations, including the reputations states form through their actions in the international system. This article presents a model of how states process this information and examines how this learning affects international conflict. The model builds off of cognitive balance theory and foreign policy learning models and breaks new ground in its ability to provide a contextual assessment of reputation in world politics. The article then investigates whether a dyad is more likely to experience conflict if at least one state has a reputation for hostility. This hypothesis is tested empirically across all dyads in the international system from 1817 to 2000. The results indicate that states do engage in this learning behavior and that the information generated by extra-dyadic interaction of states has a significant bearing upon the likelihood of dyadic conflict .     

Collective Reputations Affect Donations to Nonprofits

Maintaining their organization's reputation is an important challenge for nonprofit managers. Organizations are often linked via a common reputation within their industry or sector such that publicity about one organization can spill over to affect how stakeholders view its peers. The linkages of common reputations may be particularly pronounced among nonprofits because important dimensions of their quality are difficult to observe directly. In this paper, we show that when the third‐party evaluator Charity Navigator rates nonprofits and displays ratings of their peers, it creates a collective reputation among groups of nonprofits performing similar functions in the same region. Through an analysis of 3,413 charities from 1993 through 2008, we find that donations to nonprofits rated by Charity Navigator rise and fall with the published Charity Navigator ratings of their peers. The effect appears to be due to the charity updating fundraising choices in response to the ratings rather than donor reactions. The presence of collective reputations has important implications for nonprofit management, such as collective self‐regulation programs.     

Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda

We offer a framework for analyzing the impact of monitoring—a commonly recommended solution to poor leadership—on the quality of democratically elected leaders in community organizations in low‐income countries. In our model, groups may face a trade‐off between leader ability and effort. If the group's ability to monitor the leader is low, then the leader may exert too little effort. A higher level of monitoring increases leader effort, raising the value of the public good. However, more intense monitoring may also drive higher‐ability members to opt out of candidacy, reducing public‐goods value. The result is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the level of monitoring and the value of the public good. The trade‐off between leader effort and ability, however, only exists in the presence of sufficient private‐income opportunities. These predictions are assessed using original data gathered from Ugandan farmer associations.     

The reputational basis of policy success in comparative perspective: Evidence from the education sector in Peru and Bolivia

This article, building on the emerging theoretical corpus of “reputation theory” provides an alternative explanation about how successful policies are obtained in contexts of bureaucratic weakness and volatile politics. The argument is that politicians choose to intervene in delivering successful policies based on how contributable such policies are to construct their political reputations. The findings suggest that in both countries, less tenured politicians face higher incentives to build their reputations, so they choose to deliver better policies to accumulate “successful experiences” as vitae for electoral purposes. Tenured politicians, in turn, opt for inaction or strategic delivery, to preserve their already won political reputations. The present article brings evidence from the education sector of Peru and Bolivia, a sector that has been at the core of these countries' priorities for decades. Through a mixed methods approach involving a panel regression and in-depth interviews, results obtained largely confirm this article's claims.     

Personalized politics: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics

What role do political party leaders play in individual vote choice? Recent literature argues that leaders are increasingly important for decisions at the ballot box. Moreover, scholars suggest leaders may be particularly consequential in volatile, under-institutionalized party systems, like those of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Accordingly, we investigate the extent to which leader evaluations matter for individual voting decisions, and whether these evaluations are more consequential than ideological proximities between voters and parties. We also explore whether leaders matter more for leader-centered, ideologically blurry, and populist parties. Through a comparison of the 2017 Czech and 2020 Slovak elections, we find that leader evaluations are strongly associated with voting decisions and that these evaluations tend to be more consequential than ideological proximity. We also show that leaders are more important for parties with strong “brands” – those that have most differentiated themselves from their competitors.     

Political leadership in Southern Europe: Research problems

The role played by political leaders in the transition and consolidation of Southern European democracies has not been adequately explored. This article argues that the contributions of political leaders to both processes have been particularly important. They ought, therefore, to be specifically analysed and not submerged into structural and configurative studies. More precisely, it is suggested that the leaders’ contributions can be more accurately evaluated within their political contexts, in the light of the resources available to them, with reference to the problems to be faced. However, this is not meant to encourage a country‐by‐country nor a leader‐by‐leader approach. It requires instead a proper comparative analysis. Only by so doing will the processes of transition and democratic consolidation be fully illuminated and provide useful lessons.     

Survival of the Ministers: On Ministerial Durability in Postwar Norway

The field of ministerial durability, showing why some ministers are dismissed and others not, has increased in size over the last decade. Specifically, linking ministerial performance through resignation calls with durability has been applied to both majoritarian and semi‐presidential systems, whereas this link is less explored in consensual electoral systems. Thus, this study explores the relationship between ministerial performance and durability in postwar Norway, drawing on the principal‐agent theory for parliamentary democracies and the accountability link between party leaders and ministers. The main finding is that there are many similarities to other studies’ ministerial durability and performance. By measuring performance in resignation calls coming through the media, it is found that ministerial durability is decreased when performance is low: the more resignation calls a minister gets, the more likely the minister is to be removed by the party leader. Consequently, it is argued that ministers generally are held accountable by their party leaders whenever they are perceived to perform badly. Even though it is argued in the article that studies on ministerial durability and performance would benefit from alternative performance measures, the analysis shows that resignation calls give a good indication of how party leaders hold ministers accountable.     

How Europe’s Political Leaders Made Sense of the Euro Crisis: The Influence of Pressure and Personality

The Greek announcement of its excessive debts led to one of the most severe crises the EU has faced since its inception. The crisis soon evolved into a full leadership crisis as European political leaders struggled to come up with a common solution to the challenges they faced. Theories of leadership and crisis management identify several factors that may contribute to these differences. This article examines to what extent leaders’ personal traits and external pressure influenced how six political leaders made sense of the situation. The study finds that a leader’s belief that they can control events, their self-confidence, as well as economic pressure provide a partial explanation of how European leaders make sense of the crisis. The traits of cognitive complexity and openness to information do not exert an influence in the cases discussed here. These findings indicate that any comprehensive understanding of how leaders make sense of crises should take note of specific individual as well as contextual factors.     

Gender Differences in Assessments of Party Leaders

Is there a relationship between party leader gender and voters' assessments? The answer is ‘yes’ according to theses on gender identity and stereotyping. A voter survey during the 2011 Danish general election allows for a comprehensive analysis of a less likely case with four male and four female party leaders. Female party leaders are assessed more positively by female voters than male voters both in regard to general party leader sympathy and assessment of specific characteristics, whereas it is not the case that male party leaders are assessed more positively by male voters than female voters. The impact of gender does not increase with age; in fact, the opposite is the case among men since younger male voters have less sympathy for female party leaders. Furthermore, there is no support for the expectation that voters with more education or with higher levels of political interest and knowledge are more positive towards party leaders of their own gender than voters with less education. Also, the relationship between gender and voter assessment is not stronger prior to an election campaign than immediately after an election. Hence, in sum, gender identity does not seem to require a higher level of political sophistication, nor does it decrease with higher levels of information.     

Explaining Fascism and Ethnic Cleansing: The Three Dimensions of Charisma and the Four Dark Sides of Nationalism

Ideas and leaders matter. Fascism's syncretic ideology is crucial to understanding its rise and support. So too is the coterie charisma exerted by leaders like Hitler over an inner core even in the wilderness years; his centripetal charisma went on to help attract the masses to the 'Führer party' for very diverse reasons; and the cultic charisma leaders developed especially when in power further helps explain their appeal. The four dark sides of nationalism – namely, its ethnic , religious , scientific and economic dimensions – are also crucial to understanding genocide. So too is leadership: no Hitler, no Holocaust. Genocide also points to the importance of lower levels of leaders, who were sometimes influenced by the charisma of the 'great' leader, although in other cases, such as Milosevic's Serbia, the charismatisation of the national idea was more influential.     

Fight,Flee or Fulminate: Prime Ministerial Challengers,Strategic Choices and the Rites of Succession

Prime ministers often have to work with prime ministerial aspirants, senior ministers who regard themselves as possible successors. But can these challengers seize the job when the prime ministers are reluctant to stand down? Using evidence from Canada, Britain and Australia, the article explores the conditions in which successions have taken place and the capacity of the prime ministerial aspirants to expedite the process. It identifies three alternative strategies that are shaped by the party rules in the different countries. The aspirants may flee, fight or fulminate. Which strategy will best improve their chances of winning the top job depends on the traditional or developing modes of leadership election that their parties have adopted. Some processes provide the means to assassinate the leader. Others have no opportunity to act; rivals can do nothing but wait, either in or outside parliament. The article finds that the broader the constituency that elects the leaders, the more secure those leaders are when their reputation declines.     

In Capable Hands: An Experimental Study of the Effects of Competence and Consistency on Leadership Approval

Current research demonstrates that instances where leaders’ promises and actions are inconsistent leads to lower public approval and support. While there are exceptions to this trend there is no cohesive framework to address this issue. We introduce a conceptualization where public reactions to a leader’s inconsistency is placed in a broader context of public perception of the leader’s overall competency. We claim the public evaluation of the leader is dependent on her competency. And while inconsistency of a particular act can negatively affect public evaluations of the leader, the extent of that effect is conditioned by leaders’ competency. To test this perspective we experimentally manipulate both the competency of the leader as well as her consistency in following up on her promises. Furthermore, we expand the context of inconsistency to include both international and domestic domains. We find both leaders’ competency and inconsistency matter in public approval. Our findings hold across policy domains and levels of issue salience.