Rational Choice and Politics

The rational-choice approach brings scientific deductive methods to bear on politics. Appropriate methods are derived from physics, when actors interact probabilistically but non-rationally, and from game theory when they interact rationally. Collective action problems occur in the provision of public goods. As policies are themselves public goods, this leads to the game-theoretic analysis of voting, bureaucracy and lobbies. It is inconsistent to believe that economic actors are basically self-interested but that political actors are not. Rather, one should treat people as equally (not necessarily wholly) self-interested in each sphere. The paradoxes of social choice are then shown to have important implications for political science.     

War,pillage, and markets

Neoclassical economic theory has produced an extensive body of knowledge about market exchange based on cooperative relations: private property. This leads to an artificial dichotomy between cooperation and conflict though. It is best to view market exchange as lying along a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation are intertwined. From a game theoretic model of Hobbes' world, I show that a number of property rights structures are possible. Each is characterized as possessing varying degrees of conflict and cooperation. Finally, from a repeated game, I show how conflictual relations (mutual predation) may support more cooperative relations (private property). This new equilibrium is sub-game perfect.     

Because coconuts do not grow in Canberra: Complexity theory and capacity development in Solomon Islands Police Force

Statebuilding has been informed and captured by reductionist, linear change models. Defined by technocratic approaches to public sector (re)building and reform—it has been monitored, measured and evaluated by New Public Management artefacts such as log‐frames and Results‐Based Management. Through a case study on the capacity development of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, I explore the possibilities for using complexity theory to better understand, manage, and monitor capacity development interventions. The analysis of interview data with police practitioners from both sides of the intervention—advisors and local counterparts—reveals the explanatory power of complexity concepts (such as interconnectedness, emergence, initial conditions, and non‐linear change) in ways that could inform a rethink of how we frame public sector capacity building interventions.     

The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining, and Policy Consistency

Political science can offer few theoretical generalizations about the exercise of presidential power. From one perspective, this is no disadvantage: there are few presidents, and presidential leadership so intrinsically involves the interplay of ideas and persuasive deliberation that success depends on personal traits and the fit of the president's ideas with the times. Striving for inductive generalizations in such a case would mistake rote scientific method for the pursuit of knowledge. Others argue, however, that the dearth of theoretical generalizations is a temporary weakness, remediable by shifting to a deductive approach. Deductive theorizing can claim insights in other areas once typified by historiographic methods, notably in studies of Congress, and formal models of legislation have been extended to generate hypotheses about transactions between president and Congress. I suggest that neither side of the dilemma offers a satisfactory and complete approach to the puzzle of presidential leadership; it then goes on to specify how the contributions from each side fit together. Rational choice models, based on bargaining as the mode of influence and the repeated game as the image of process, show how institutional structures can produce stable decisions where majority rule tends toward endless cycling. But the cost is that the resulting decisions are typically ad hoc and disjointed. Achieving consistent and coherent policy requires more subtle coordination of individual expectations than legislative organizations can manage, and it is this limitation of bargaining that establishes the potential for presidential leadership. Presidents can attempt to capitalize on this opportunity either by intervening as an additional (but situationally advantaged) bargainer, or by employing persuasion, the explicit appeal to collective goals rather than particularistic trades. I develop the distinction between bargaining and persuasion as alternative strategies of advocacy, and illustrate their use with examples from President Reagan's interactions with Congress over his key economic policy proposals.     

On the Formation of Family Structures

Hitherto, models of family economics focus on explaining theorganization of monogamous and polygynous family patterns. A thirdexisting marriage pattern, polyandrous marriages, has beenneglected. This paper shows that – in contrast to the common view – a polyandrous marriage may be individually rational. I considera game theoretic model of a subsistence economy whose membersmaximize their personal reproductive success. In this model, allthree family formations can appear as equilibrium solutions.     

To the Short-Sighted Victor Belong the Spoils: Politics and Merit Adoption in Comparative Perspective

This article addresses a persistent puzzle in social science: Why do some rulers adopt merit systems, refusing to enjoy the spoils of their victories? Dominant explanations underscore the importance of interactions among core constituencies of voters, legislators, and executives in a democratic polity but cannot explain the adoption of merit in autocracies and are not corroborated empirically outside Anglo‐Saxon democracies. Based on insights from repeated game theory, this article proposes a simple theoretical explanation that focuses on the future discount rate of rulers—democratic or not—and their interactions with economic agents. An empirical test covering both cross‐country variations among 35 developing nations and within‐country differences among 39 Russian regions is undertaken to test the theory. Controlling for factors from prevailing theories, it is found that rulers' longtime horizons proved to be positively associated with the adoption of merit in both empirical settings tested.     

A Decision Theoretic Model of Public Opinion: Guns, Butter, and European Common Defense

Why do individuals support the public policies they do? We argue that individuals can have quite sophisticated policy preferences and that not correctly modeling those preferences can lead to critically misspecified empirical models. To substantiate this position we derive and test a decision‐theoretic model that relies upon three critical assumptions: (1) policies affect the provision of multiple goods about which individuals care; (2) individuals have diminishing returns to scale in those goods; and (3) preferences over at least some subset of those goods are correlated. Using this model, we demonstrate that arbitrarily small secondary policy effects can confound predictions over primary policy effects. Thus, not considering even arbitrarily small policy effects can cause one to conclude that evidence is consistent with one's theory when in fact it is inconsistent or vice versa. Testing this theory on support for forming a European common defense, we find evidence consistent with our model.     

The Quest for Certainty and the Demise of Political Theory

In this paper, I contribute to the ongoing conversation in New Political Science regarding the status of political science in general, and political theory in particular. I argue that the quest for certainty and desire to quantify knowledge has not been limited to empiricist political scientists. The emphasis on quantification and deductive logic is found in many places within the political theory tradition itself. Time and again, mathematics and the physical sciences are held up as the model for all knowledge. I argue that this focus has led theorists to distance themselves from politics, either out of despair or disdain for the ambiguity and variability present in political life. While I do not propose that Aristotle provides a magic remedy for the current problems in the discipline, I suggest that his combined interest in logic and the close examination of material detail provides a perennially viable framework for political theory.     

Cracking the whip: spatial voting with party discipline and voter polarization

The spatial voting theory literature has generally focused on either parties or candidates as the unit of analysis and ignored strategic interactions between them. I study a game theoretic spatial model of elections with many heterogeneous constituencies in which both party and candidate behavior are modeled. Parties choose a platform and a ‘whip rate,’ representing the proportion of final policy that will be made by the party, as opposed to by the successful candidates. Candidates are office-motivated and can choose both a platform and a level of advertising in order to defeat their opponent. It is shown that the introduction of whipping as a choice variable can cause party platforms to diverge and that parties will whip on some but not all issues, reflecting the empirical reality of parties influencing rather than determining policy outcomes exclusively. Further, parties respond to sharper voter polarization by reducing the power of the whip as well as distinguishing their platforms from one another, while more voter uncertainty has the opposite effect. Other real-world phenomena, including ‘safe seats’ and legislators voting with their party even when unwhipped, are also shown to be predicted by the model.     

Aggregation technology of common goods and its strategic consequences: Global warming,biodiversity, and siting conflicts

Abstract. The analysis of common goods needs to look closely at the characteristics of the goods in question and the social situations in which they are provided. Different characteristics lead to different strategic constellations and therefore to different opportunities for institutional solutions to the problems of provision. Basic differences in strategic constellations can be shown clearly by employing matrix games. In this paper a particular attribute of common goods, their aggregation technology, is systematically analyzed. Three variations in this dimension are exemplified by cases from environmental policy. It becomes clear that the analysis of one specific attribute of a good will seldom suffice to predict empirical behavior. Nevertheless, rigorous game theoretic analysis provides valuable insights into the links between the characteristics of common goods and the need for institutions.     

Aggregation technology of common goods and its strategic consequences: Global warming, biodiversity, and siting conflicts

The analysis of common goods needs to look closely at the characteristics of the goods in question and the social situations in which they are provided. Different characteristics lead to different strategic constellations and therefore to different opportunities for institutional solutions to the problems of provision. Basic differences in strategic constellations can be shown clearly by employing matrix games. In this paper a particular attribute of common goods, their aggregation technology, is systematically analyzed. Three variations in this dimension are exemplified by cases from environmental policy. It becomes clear that the analysis of one specific attribute of a good will seldom suffice to predict empirical behavior. Nevertheless, rigorous game theoretic analysis provides valuable insights into the links between the characteristics of common goods and the need for institutions.     

Evolutionary dynamics in the voting game

Voter participation is immense but theoretically doubtful because there exists cost of voting and the probability of casting the deciding ballot is low. Game theoretic models (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985) confirm this paradox of voting. Individual optimization in the voting game is problematic with respect to the rationality and information requirements of traditional game theory. Therefore in this paper a non-optimizing but learning individual is considered. By individual learning the adjustment processes and equilibria of voter turnout are determined. Voters are able to learn to participate and substantial voter turnout is possible.     

Simulation and Managerial Decision Making:A Double‐Loop Learning Framework

Systems approaches present opportunities for public managers and policy makers to view policies and programs in a broader context. This article presents a framework to explain how simulation modeling promotes double‐loop learning in management teams by building and exploring collective mental models as well as by enhancing accuracy of the mental models. The authors discuss the types of problems that may benefit from simulation modeling and illustrate how double‐loop learning occurs in the process of dynamic hypothesis testing. Using a case from New York State's Division of Disability Determination, the article shows how simulation modeling built confidence in a management team's decision by providing the team with tools to share and examine multiple hypotheses about a declining trend in initial disability recipients in the state between 1998 and 2004.     

Modeling Political Efficacy and Interest Group Membership

Traditionally, political efficacy is measured at the individual level and studied as an individual level attribute in isolation from macro level events. In many studies, political efficacy is viewed as largely static, affected primarily by levels of income and education. If, however, an individual's feeling of efficacy is partly conditioned on macro level occurrences or expected macro level occurrences, then individual efficacy cannot be studied in isolation from the macro level context. In this article, I create a game theoretic, micro level foundation for macro level interest group behavior. I use a simple participation game to model a form of individual level political efficacy and detail the empirical implications of the hypothesized individual level behavior for the aggregate levels of group membership. The results suggest that empirical studies of the effects of political efficacy on collective efforts are susceptible to sampling and measurement problems.     

Chess algorithms of supreme court decision making: A bioconstitutional politics analysis

This paper examines, from a biopolitical perspective, the methodologies by which Supreme Court justices have interpreted the Constitution, assessing their decisional algorithms against models owing an intellectual debt to evolutionary theory. The models themselves are drawn from the chess literature, itself the most viable game theoretic context for living constitutional play. A proper appreciation of chess mastery yields the salient conclusion that a functionalist algorithm of data characterization is optimally adaptive for these purposes, usually proving more robust than competing structuralist and heuristic algorithms in resolving complex constitutional issues.     

Unitary regulatory supervision or multi-entity supervision? A computational approach to a numbers problem in financial regulation

Policymakers globally have debated (and often implemented) the idea of consolidating numerous financial regulatory supervisory entities into one unitary entity. This article uses a computational model to explore the effect such a decision would have on supervisory performance. Using insights from organizational scholarship on consensus-making among individuals within organizations, the simulation suggests that under most conditions a unitary supervisory entity yields lower performance than smaller, numerous entities with unique mandates, keeping the number of regulatory inspectors constant. This result arises from the heterogeneity of perspectives being shared within the entity and the influence of precedent actions. The results also show a decreasing utility to disaggregation: performance decreases when too few inspectors share among themselves in building consensus. When insufficient heterogeneity within supervisors exists, unitary frameworks outperform multi-entity frameworks. These findings have implications on the design of supervisory frameworks and contribute to research on consensus-building, heterogeneous group membership, and computational modeling.     

Antigovernment Networks in Civil Conflicts: How Network Structures Affect Conflictual Behavior

In this article, we combine a game‐theoretic treatment of public goods provision in networks with a statistical network analysis to show that fragmented opposition network structures lead to an increase in conflictual actions. Current literature concentrates on the dyadic relationship between the government and potential challengers. We shift the focus toward exploring how network structures affect the strategic behavior of political actors. We derive and examine testable hypotheses and use latent space analysis to infer actors’ positions vis‐à‐vis each other in the network. Network structure is examined and used to test our hypotheses with data on conflicts in Thailand from 2001 to 2010. We show the influential role of network structure in generating conflictual behavior.     

Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War

Blainey (1988) argued that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about their relative power. Fey and Ramsay (2007) claim that this widely used “mutual optimism” explanation is theoretically incoherent. Their criticism neglects the need to specify a behavioral causal mechanism that links beliefs to the outbreak of war. We show how the rationalist game‐theoretic work on the causes of war provides such mechanisms—the risk‐return trade‐off and costly signaling—and demonstrate that these models are immune to Fey and Ramsay's critiques. We also show that the class of models Fey and Ramsay propose make the substantively unwarranted assumption that an actor can unilaterally impose peace on an opponent who strictly prefers war. Their finding that war does not occur in equilibrium has nothing to do with mutual optimism. We conclude that the mutual optimism explanation can be grounded on firm rationalist foundations.