Parties in Elections, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias

Adam Meirowitz Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: ameirowi{at}princeton.edu Thomas Romer Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: romer{at}princeton.edu Political parties are active when citizens choose among candidatesin elections and when winning candidates choose among policyalternatives in government. But the inextricably linked institutions,incentives, and behavior that determine these multistage choicesare substantively complex and analytically unwieldy, particularlyif modeled explicitly and considered in total, from citizenpreferences through government outcomes. To strike a balancebetween complexity and tractability, we modify standard spatialmodels of electoral competition and governmental policy-makingto study how components of partisanship—such as candidateplatform separation in elections, party ID-based voting, nationalpartisan tides, and party-disciplined behavior in the legislature—arerelated to policy outcomes. We define partisan bias as the distancebetween the following two points in a conventional choice space:the ideal point of the median voter in the median legislativedistrict and the policy outcome selected by the elected legislature.The study reveals that none of the party-in-electorate conditionsis capable of producing partisan bias independently. Specifiedcombinations of conditions, however, can significantly increasethe bias and/or the variance of policy outcomes, sometimes insubtle ways.     

Parties and policy in Belgium

Abstract. An overview of the literature on the party-policy link suggests a weak, non-existent or even perverse relationship between parties in government and governmental policies in Belgium. It is argued that this weak relationship could be due to the methodology applied in this type of research, i.e. the treatment of the party variable on a much too high level of aggregation. The relative strength of the coalition parties, the parties' general ideological profile on a specific moment, the relative strength of the factions within the parliamentary party and in the Cabinet are not taken into account. On the other hand, several organisational factors with regard to the relation between parties, parliamentary groups, ministers and the administration tend to facilitate the impact of parties on policies in Belgium. Interview data with ministers suggest that the policy variable also needs further disaggregation. In particular, the qualitative aspects of policies should be more closely investigated.     

Demassified Mass Parties or Overloaded Cadre Parties? The Impact of Parties on Electoral Outcome in Finland*

This article examines the frequently cited hypothesis of the changes in modern party organizations towards the catch-all model, and of the attempt of political parties to counter threats of electoral failure by intensifying membership support. The results indicate that in Finland former mass parties have been demassified and cadre parties have been overloaded. However, there are differences in party alignments and in the internal organizational structure of the parties that make a strict application of the catch-all concept problematic The findings also give evidence of a threat of declining electoral success that has implications for the membership support in the parties in very special situations. The threat from other parties seems to have only little or no effect on the membership figures. But when this threat is combined with a steady erosion in the traditional social bases of the parties, then the party response can be strong for the purpose of widening the electoral market by personal influence, as was the case with the rural Center party in Finland.     

Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries

We develop a model of intraparty candidate selection under partisan electoral competition and voter uncertainty. Candidates for office belong to parties, which are factions of ideologically similar candidates. Each party’s candidate for a general election can be selected either by a “centralized” mechanism that effectively randomizes over possible candidates or by voters in a primary election. The electorate cares about ideology and valence, and both primary and general elections may reveal candidate valences. Our main theoretical result is that while primaries raise the expected quality of a party’s candidates, they may hurt the ex ante preferred party in a competitive electorate by increasing the chances of revealing the opposing party’s candidates as superior. Thus, primaries are adopted in relatively extreme districts where a clear favorite party exists. An empirical analysis of the adoption of direct primaries and the competitiveness of primary elections across U.S. states supports these predictions.     

Political Star Power and Political Parties

Abstract

Political parties, and more specifically public interest groups, budget extensive amounts of time and money to use celebrity endorsers for their candidate. Do celebrities bring forth enough value to warrant the time, effort, and money expended to make their endorsements public? Using a sample of first-time voters from the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election, the authors examine the extent to which celebrities influence voting while specifically assessing whether celebrity influence is greater for Republicans or Democrats. Implications and recommendations for future research are discussed.     

British Statewide Parties and Multilevel Politics

The article addresses how Britain's major statewide politicalparties—Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats—adaptedto political devolution in Scotland and Wales. It explores partyorganization, programs, and policymaking. It argues that theLabour Party experienced the most territorial intraparty conflictbut fairly rapidly achieved a new balance between British andScottish/Welsh party interests. The Conservative Party struggledafter its 1997 UK election defeat and failed to adapt to multilevelpolitics with any consistency. The Liberal Democrats experiencedthe smoothest adjustment, largely on account of their own federalparty constitution. The article concludes that the findingsprovide some backing to "rational choice institutionalist" hypothesesof party change but that a "historical institutionalist" approachcan provide a fuller understanding of how parties adapt to devolutionreforms.     

Change and Permanence in Political Parties

Incessant changes alter political parties in their organization, structure, recruitment and all other characteristics. Nevertheless, they are usually credited with stable features by which they are identified, and which enable them to be classified. If we consider French political parties, it is possible to demonstrate that both change and apparent stability arise from interaction within each party as well as between them and between the social organizations to which they are linked. These interactions and their effects must be related to general processes, such as social and cultural transformation; they cannot be solely explained by specifically political competition.     

Parties and Partisanship: A Brief Introduction

Political Behavior -     

Partisan Sorting and Niche Parties in Europe

Earlier research has concluded that European citizens do not update their Left–Right policy preferences or their party attachments in response to the content of parties’ election manifestos – i.e. partisan sorting is not observed in the mass public in response to shifts in the Left–Right tone of these manifestos. Here we extend this research to analyse whether we observe partisan sorting patterns that correspond with political experts’ perceptions of parties’ Left–Right policy shifts. Given that these experts plausibly consider all pertinent information when estimating parties’ Left–Right orientations – including party elites’ speeches, elite interviews, coalition behaviour, and legislative voting patterns – such a finding would imply that citizens do weigh the wider informational environment when updating their Left–Right orientations and their party support, even if they do not attach great weight to the parties’ policy manifestos. Our analyses provide support for this hypothesis with respect to niche parties, i.e. green, communist, and radical right parties, but not for mainstream parties.     

Brokers and Entrepreneurs in Human Stem Cell Governance Networks in the United States

The policy debate over embryonic stem cell (ESC) research in the United States mainly focuses on the extent to which the government ought to provide resources for that research. This article addresses the strategic use of network positions to mobilize an effective coordination system for lifting the moratorium on funding of ESC under the Obama administration since March 2009. By identifying patterns of interactions between members in a network of embedded ties, we can explore the major actors who play the role of brokers or entrepreneurs in stem cell research funding policy under the Obama administration. For that, this article utilizes social network analysis and the G&F brokerage roles framework to identify key brokers in facilitating coordination among various members engaged in funding human stem cell research in the governance network.     

Long-Term Performance of Political Parties

Abstract

Whilst politicians can “buy” votes in the short-term, most political parties are more interested in maintaining power over a period of years in order to implement their policies. This paper explores whether political parties can be considered to possess long-term competitive resources that sustain their competitive advantages. It employs the well-established strategic management concept of the Resource-Based View of strategy development for this purpose. Because such a concept has not previously been applied to political parties, the paper begins by considering the nature of the competition that exists between political parties and the role of resources in developing superior political performance. A series of theoretical propositions about why some parties maintain political power and influence for lengthy periods is then developed. We argue that the competitive resources of a political party such as its policies, leadership, organisational and communications skills require long-term investment and development, rejecting the notion that long-term electoral success is based primarily on the promises and resources deployed in the final election campaign.     

Endogenous Parties in an Assembly

In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide.