论农民宪法权利平等保护目标——实质平等

农民宪法权利平等保护是尊重和保障人权的内在要求。农民宪法权利要受到与市民平等地对待和保护,这种平等应当不仅是形式上的而且是实质上的。农民宪法权利平等保护存在诸多的现实困境与认识误区,制约了农民宪法权利的真正实现。农民宪法权利平等保护目标应是建立在形式平等基础之上的实质平等。这一目标的提出具有正当性和现实性,也契合平等理论、人权理论及其普遍实践的趋势。农民宪法权利实质平等的保护目标及其路径选择是改变城乡二元结构,构建社会主义新农村,解决三农问题的实现之道。     

The Supreme Court's spring term: abortion, the right to die, and the decline of privacy rights

Wing analyzes the constitutional significance and the important long-term implications for health policy of three 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Hodgson v. Minnesota, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. Hodgson and Ohio upheld state statutes requiring parental notification of a minor's impending abortion. Cruzan upheld a state court decision refusing to allow the family of a patient in a persistent vegetative state to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. Wing argues that these decisions reach far beyond "the abortion issue" or "the right to die." Not only have they narrowed the constitutional protection of individual privacy, but they allow states to regulate activities like abortion in a manner that indicates that the Court is prepared to repeal the notion that individual privacy is entitled to enhanced judicial protection.     

平等权原则与宽容——以平等和自由的关系为向度

平等和自由之间是存在张力的,且经常表现为一种矛盾关系。国家强制平等往往通过一定的制度来实现,而这种制度如果不能在自由与平等之间保持某种适度平衡,就会导致来自国家或社会的歧视与缺乏宽容。就平等权原则在世界各国宪法上的规定及其实践而言,虽然不同国家的宪政制度和法治文化传统不同,但都体现了宽容的内在性要求,一如美国的"平等保护原则"和德国的"法律上的平等与禁止恣意原则"。鉴于我国人民代表大会制度下的"立法归类"可能造成的歧视和不宽容,将"法律面前人人平等"单纯理解为平等权或法律适用上的平等原则,都是不甚妥当的,它仍然有进一步诠释的余地。在更为根本的宪法原则层面,宽容理念要求确立社会法治国原则,以对传统法治国原则进行修正,以进一步调和自由与平等之间的内在紧张关系。     

Conforming to the rule of law: when person and human being finally mean the same thing in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect people from discrimination and harm from other people. Racism is not the only thing people need protection from. As a constitutional principle, the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to its historical origin and purpose, but is available now to protect all human beings, including all unborn human beings. The Supreme Court can define "person" to include all human beings, born and unborn. It simply chooses not to do so. Science, history and tradition establish that unborn humans are, from the time of conception, both persons and human beings, thus strongly supporting an interpretation that the unborn meet the definition of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legal test used to extend constitutional personhood to corporations, which are artificial "persons" under the law, is more than met by the unborn, demonstrating that the unborn deserve the status of constitutional personhood. There can be no "rule of law" if the Constitution continues to be interpreted to perpetuate a discriminatory legal system of separate and unequal for unborn human beings. Relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court may overrule Roe v. Wade solely on the grounds of equal protection. Such a result would not return the matter of abortion to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.     

刑法面前人人平等原则——对《刑法》第4条的法理解释

平等,在本体论意义上是一种作为个体的人认识到自己与他人的共同性之后激发的一种本能性需要;在法学意义上是一种以法律的手段来确认、平衡现实生活中那些反映历史必然的以实质不平等为内容的平等;“对任何人犯罪,在适用法律上人人平等”,这是宪法规定的“法律面前人人平等原则”在刑法适用中的具体体现。     

宪法审查的穷尽法律救济原则

"穷尽法律救济原则"是各国宪法审查制度普遍采行的启动要件,它在集中式审查模式中主要存在于宪法诉愿程序中,而在分散式审查模式中主要体现为"穷尽行政救济"。然两类规范形态具有相通的双层结构规范内涵:在判断是否已穷尽相关法律救济之后,对于未穷尽者,进一步判断其是否属于具有普遍性意义或者会产生重大且无法避免之损害的例外情形,以谨慎决定宪法审查是否可提前。这既体现出宪法审查的备位性,也说明备位性须受到人权保障之价值目标的限制。     

Webster and women's equality

The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF) co-authored an "amicus curiae" brief in "Webster." The brief was written for 77 organizations who believe in equality of women. The brief said that constitutional protection of a woman's right to choose is guaranteed by the right to privacy. The brief said that if abortions were illegal, women would not be able to take place in society equally with men. Liberty would be taken away from women. If the state interferes with abortion, the principle of bodily integrity is violated. In "Winston v. Lee," the Supreme Court found that the state could not compel a criminal to undergo an invasive surgical procedure to retrieve a bullet necessary for the state to prosecute with. 1 in 4 women have a cesarean section, which requires a larger incision in the abdomen, and has many risks. Bearing and raising children often puts a damper on women's employment opportunities. Therefore, if the Supreme Court denied women the right to bear children when and where they wanted, women would not have the right to plan their futures. If the Supreme Court were to agree that "interest in potential life outweighs" a woman's tight to procreate autonomously, states could declare all abortions illegal, investigate them to see if they were induced on purpose, and murder women who induced them. Contraceptive devices could be declared illegal. Laws could be used to force women to submit to cesarean sections and other fetal surgery. Pre-viability abortion restrictions should be rejected because they have old-fashioned notions of women's role in society. They reinforce stereotypes. Missouri's law stresses aiding "potential," rather than actual life.     

Administrative "health courts" for medical injury claims: the federal constitutional issues

Our article analyzes whether the federal government may constitutionally supplant a traditional system of common-law trials before state judges and juries with new federal institutions designed by statute for compensating victims of medical injuries. Specifically, this article examines the federal constitutional issues raised by various proposals to replace traditional medical malpractice litigation in state courts with a federal system of administrative "health courts." In doing so, we address the following constitutional issues: 1. Is there federal authority to preempt state law (the commerce clause and spending clause issues)? 2. May jurisdiction be created in non-article 3 tribunals, and may claims be decided without trial by jury (the separation of powers and Seventh Amendment issues)? 3. Would pilot programs that require some claims to be pursued in a federal administrative forum while other claimants are left to pursue traditional state tort law remedies be constitutional (the equal protection issue)? The article concludes that a federal compensation system through administrative health courts should be constitutional provided the statute is appropriately drafted and that appropriate factual findings are made concerning the benefits to patients and the public as well as to doctors and their insurers.     

论文化权利的宪法保护

公民的文化权利与公民所享有的政治、经济和社会权利一样,都是公民作为国家和社会主人翁所必须享有的法律利益。我国是社会主义国家,保护公民权利是社会主义事业一贯的宗旨。从宪法角度来保障公民的文化权利,最主要的是应当加强相关的制度建设。应当在宪法文本中明确文化权利的基本权利宪法地位,明确国家和政府在保障文化权利方面应当承担的职责或义务,加强对文化权利的平等性的保护以及应当制定文化基本法律,来保障文化权利的实现真正做到有法可依。     

妇女平等权的立法保护与性别预算——基于国际和国内比较的视角

妇女享有与男子同等的地位与权利是实现两性平等以及妇女自身充分发展的必要条件。将妇女平等权纳入宪法及法律成为世界发展的潮流。本文基于国际和国内比较的视角,对中国妇女平等权的立法保护进行了梳理,继而分析了"性别立法"和"性别预算"等促进妇女平等权的新政策工具在中国的开展和实施,以期进一步推动男女平等在中国的真正实现。     

Plessy as "Passing": Judicial Responses to Ambiguously Raced Bodies in Plessy v. Ferguson

The Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) is infamous for its doctrine of "separate but equal," which gave constitutional legitimacy to Jim Crow segregation laws. What is less-known about the case is that the appellant Homer Plessy was, by all appearances, a white man. In the language of the Court, his "one-eighth African blood" was "not discernible in him." This article analyzes Plessy as a story of racial "passing." The existence of growing interracial populations in the nineteenth century created difficulties for legislation designed to enforce the separation of the races. Courts were increasingly called upon to determine the racial identity of particular individuals. Seen as a judicial response to racial ambiguity, Plessy demonstrates the law's role not only in the treatment of racial groups, but also in the construction and maintenance of racial categories.     

取消农业税合乎平等原则吗——兼论对优惠措施的合宪性审查

2005年12月29日,第十届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十九次会议决定废止《中华人民共和国农业税条例》。此后,农业生产者的纳税义务即被免除。其实这种取消农业税的措施,在宪法理论上可以被称为"优惠措施"。如果从宪法学的角度看,作为一项抽象性的立法决定,取消农业税的惠农措施并不一定具有合宪性;因为作为一项针对特定主体的优惠,对于其他主体可能会产生不平等,从而有违宪法上的平等原则。但是否违反平等原则,却是需要通过宪法上特定的审查标准;只有通过这种检验,优惠措施才能获得那种可通过违宪审查的宪法正当性。     

Access to health care and equal protection of the law: the need for a new heightened scrutiny

Proposals to reduce national expenditures for health care under Medicare and other programs raise questions about the limits on legislative power to distribute health care benefits. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection has been a weak source of protection for the sick, largely because they fail to qualify for special scrutiny under traditional equal protection analysis. Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court suggest that the Justices seek a newer, more flexible approach to reviewing claims of unequal protection. This Article examines the application of the equal protection guarantee to health-related claims. It argues that traditional equal protection analysis is too rigid and newer rationality review too imprecise to provide just eligibility determinations. The Article concludes that courts should subject claims of unequal protection in the health care context to heightened scrutiny, as health care plays a special role in assuring equality of opportunity.     

卢梭宪政思想论要——以《社会契约论》为中心

宪政思想是卢梭思想的重要组成部分,也是解读卢梭及其思想的重要方面。以《社会契约论》为中心,可以真切体悟到卢梭对人民主权、法治、人权等重大命题的关注、思索与追求,同时它也构成了现代国家宪政理论的基础与源泉。在卢梭的宪政思想体系中:人民主权是合理内核;限制权力是外部表征;保障人权是价值取向;法律之治是直接体现;宪法至上是逻辑归宿。     

失地农民社会权保障的宪法分析

社会权作为失地农民的一项基本权利,由于制度性根源、法律根源和公共政策根源造成了失地农民社会权的贫困,并且未得到宪法等法律的有效保护。从构建和谐社会角度看,加强失地农民社会权的宪法保障,以人为本是失地农民社会权宪法保障的哲学伦理学基础,阶层平等是失地农民社会权宪法保障的法理基础,人格尊严与个人自治是失地农民社会权宪法保障的人权法价值。失地农民社会权的宪法保障离不开宪法本身的完善和宪政制度构建的支持,实现失地农民社会权宪法保障是国家应尽的义务。     

行政法上的客观法与主观法

针对如何理解行政法上客观法与主观法的关系,存在三种基本立场。主客观法分离立场认为维护公益的行政法与公民个人权利形成对峙。该立场存在无法关联违法性与侵权性、抱持无视宪法的行政法观等疑问。主客观法结合立场主张从客观法中分出一部分请求权对应行政主体法定义务。该立场存在宪法与行政法平台错位、公益与私益纵向割裂等局限。主客观法统一立场将客观法当作主观法的全部集合,权利由客观法分解得来。该立场是理解行政法主客观法关系的妥当见解。在分配行政与利害调整观念下,特定或不特定复数私人主体间基于行政法律规范的各种利益与不利益冲突、对立并交织而成的利害关系网才是行政实体法律关系的本质,行政法上的实体权利应当由此导出。遵循“利害关系→合法权益”而非“合法权益→利害关系”的逻辑顺序才是判断行政诉讼原告资格的正确方法。     

Taking Abortion Rights Seriously: Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt

In Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt the Supreme Court of the United States passed down its most important decision on abortion for just under a decade. By a majority of 5‐3, the Court ruled that two provisions in a Texas law regulating abortion on grounds of women's health were constitutionally invalid, placing a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the way of women seeking to exercise their right to abortion. This comment delineates the key ways in which the Court's application of the standard of constitutional review under Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992) to the Texas provisions marks a landmark development for the protection of the constitutional right to abortion established in Roe v Wade, not the least by making clear that state abortion regulations which cite ‘women's health’ justifications should not pass constitutional review where those justifications lack a credible factual basis.     

Brief for 885 law professors in support of maintaining adherence to the Roe decision

This brief opposes the overturn of "Roe v. Wade" and resists weakening "Roe's central holding" that would allow states to overturn legal abortion. The brief was written for 885 law professors. "Roe" was not a "constitutional aberration," or "an exercise of raw, judicial power." Some members of the Supreme Court seem to think that the state has "an overriding interest" in protecting fetal life. Some Court members have questioned "Roe's" trimester framework. A person's decision to abort should be done privately. If women are not free to choose abortion, they will not have equality. There is an absence of "express rights of privacy and procreational freedom" in the Constitution. "Roe" was 1 instance of the Court's recognition of constitutional rights that are not named explicitly. Historical materials are drawn on to show the link between trends in society and the "judicial recognition of unenumerated rights." The most serious questions about "Roe" deal with its trimester framework. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion said that the 1st trimester of pregnancy was personal. "Roe" said that abortions created a medical risk at the beginning of the 2nd trimester. Therefore, the government was more interested in the health of the mother at that time. The state could then regulate abortion "in ways that are reasonable related to maternal health." The start of the 3rd trimester was when the fetus was viable. The right of a woman to end her pregnancy "offends powerful moral forces." Some of "Roe's" critics had their scientific facts wrong. Medical authorities think Justice O'Connor is mistaken when she says that "Roe" is "on a collision course with itself." The 23rd to 24th week of pregnancies where the fetal organs can "sustain life outside the womb." This has not changed since "Roe" was decided in 1973, nor is it likely to in the future. Some "amici" believe that the state can never have an interest in the fetus. The state can not have an interest in the fetus distinct from the woman who will give birth to it. During previability, restricting a woman's procreational rights would not be scientifically supportable. The state does have an interest in "upholding the value of human life." "Roe" is "within the mainstream" of constitutional jurisprudence and should be reaffirmed.     

Legal abortion: the impending obsolescence of the trimester framework

Women who wish to terminate a pregnancy, and physicians willing to perform abortions, are subject to increasing harassment from groups which challenge the constitutional abortion right upheld by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. Their vulnerability, in fact, parallels the vulnerability of the abortion right. This Article analyzes the inherent weakness and impending obsolescence of the trimester framework established in Roe. Present medical evidence of maternal health risks and fetal viability demonstrates that the trimester framework is inconsistent with current medical knowledge, and will likely be rendered obsolete by developments in medical technology. The Article suggests that adoption of an alternative constitutional basis for legal abortion is necessary to preserve the abortion right, and explores the utility of two arguments grounded in the equal protection doctrine. Finally, it discusses means of preserving legal abortion within the confines of the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade.     

社会福利保障的宪法路径选择

世界各国宪法保障社会福利有两种模式,一种是在宪法中列举各种社会权利的"社会权"保障模式,另一种是仅在宪法中明确建设社会国家的原则或者类似条款的"社会国"保障模式。从我国《宪法》的现有规定及其变迁、宪法的解释与学界的解读看,我国属于"社会权"模式。"社会权"保障模式的缺陷是随着民众追求平等意识的成长、市场机制的扩展和公民权利意识的增强,社会福利可能借助宪法无序、无限地扩张。通过淡化社会福利的权利性质、转变社会权的合宪性审查的方向、扩展反射利益推进社会福利以及贯彻宪法设立的可承受性、适度性原则,可以推进我国社会福利宪法保障模式由"社会权"模式向"社会国"模式转换。