Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations

A considerable body of unchallenged literature describes al-Takfir wa'l Hijra and its followers—“takfiris”—as a contemporary and highly dangerous trend within the global jihadi movement. Variously described as a network, movement, or group, its members are portrayed monolithically as ultra-secretive, highly skilled militants who easily blend into Western societies and specialize in “quality” operations against Western targets. This article critically assesses these claims using analytical approaches grounded in social movement theory and Netwar, and data drawn from historical and Islamist sources.     

Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia--The Genealogy of a Terror Network

The aim of this study is to analyze the process by which Al Qaeda has sought to co-opt essentially localized struggles in Southeast Asia into an evolving network of worldwide jihad. The article illustrates how, long before it was appropriate to speak of an entity called Al Qaeda, Islamists have been thinking transnationally since the 1980s. The argument attempts to piece together available evidence to reveal a plausible explanation of the origins, growth and direction of the main Islamist grouping in Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah, and its deepening relationship with Al Qaeda. The article suggests that the roots of a Southeast Asian terror network can be traced to two geographically separate ethno-religious struggles in the Philippines and Indonesia. The analysis demonstrates that these guerrilla groups orchestrating their distinct struggles were eventually combined through the auspices of Al Qaeda and the globalized franchising opportunities it exploited from the early 1990s.‐     

Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for U.S. Policy

Almost eight years after the September 2001 attacks, U.S. counterterrorism strategy would benefit from a clearer definition of its adversaries. Some have suggested that U.S. counterterrorism policy focus primarily on Sunni jihadists. This term would account for groups such as Al Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, but not Shi'ite militias in Iraq or Hizbullah. Although any attempt to narrow the scope of U.S. counterterrorism strategy has merit, it is worth noting that important distinctions exist between the various groups. To explore these distinctions, this article examines the different historical trajectories and current arguments between two of the most well-known Sunni jihadists: Al Qaeda and Hamas.     

Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making)

How can we tell if an Al Qaeda cell has been broken? That enough members have been captured or killed so that there is a high likelihood they will be unable to carry out a new attack, and military resources can be redirected away from them and toward more immediate threats? This article uses order theory to quantify the degree to which a terrorist network is still able to function. This tool will help law enforcement know when a battle against Al Qaeda has been won, thus saving the public's money without unduly risking the public's safety.‐