非正式制度、中心化国家构建与现代中亚政治的形成

独立伊始,中亚就面临着构建现代国家的重要任务。西方主流学界创造了中亚研究的核心概念体系与命题,强调中亚政治分析的正式与非正式制度的二分法,夸大非正式制度的重要性,甚至将新庇护主义模式作为解释中亚政治演进的核心内容,忽视中亚国家在国家建设中制度建设与制度互融的成就。制度构建不仅是中亚政治的核心内容,也是中亚政治现代化的关键。通过不断发明和建立新制度,同时将非正式制度权力网络融入正式制度,这些是中亚现代国家建设的核心内容。一些中亚国家形成了独具特色的中心化国家(centralized states)发展模式:减少地方主义、族群矛盾以及部族政治给现代国家建设带来的负面效应;同时,吸纳地方政治精英以增强国家能力,发展象征符号来凝聚共识,构建国家意识形态以重建合法性。中亚政治突破了制度正式/非正式二元逻辑,正在形成现代中亚政治。     

“新哈萨克斯坦”政治改革分析

哈萨克斯坦2022年“一月骚乱”后,托卡耶夫从纳扎尔巴耶夫手中接管了全部权力,成为实质上的全权总统。这标志着纳扎尔巴耶夫时代结束,托卡耶夫执政时代开启。托卡耶夫于2022年提出全新的政治、经济和社会改革方案,开启建设“新哈萨克斯坦”和“哈萨克斯坦第二共和国”。“新哈萨克斯坦”的政治改革以“先政治后经济”理念为指导,以“公正”为核心,以“强力的总统-权威的议会-负责任的政府”政体模式为目标,旨在打造新型国家管理体制和模式。实践证明,托卡耶夫的政治改革顺应了民情,符合哈萨克斯坦独立30年后的发展需求,取得了不错的效果,有助于社会稳定,也为哈萨克斯坦赢得了国际声誉。与此同时,由于改革触动了既得利益集团,加上国内和国际环境变化,实施过程中也面临一定困难。     

哈萨克斯坦司法改革评述

哈萨克斯坦三十余年的发展累积了大量社会问题,制度性腐败日益制约经济发展,因此推行了以消除腐败与权力寻租、资源及权力高度集中、财富分配不均等突出问题为目标的司法改革。2022年“一月骚乱”以后,托卡耶夫总统实施新政,建设“新哈萨克斯坦”,启动新一轮政治、经济、司法改革。司法改革主要围绕司法制度革新、司法保护向民众及企业倾斜、司法管理数字化等展开,提高检察机关监督职能、推进司法权独立、引入行政司法、司法管理数字化成为亮点,在规范法院院长权力、提高庭前和解、公正处理公民与国家机关纠纷、数字司法方面取得了突破性进展。与此同时,司法腐败和司法权不独立仍是司法体系中的顽疾,改革成效的释放尚需时日。至少从短期来看,改革并没有完全扭转民众对司法机关信任度低的局面。与制度优化和技术革新相比,法官队伍素质提升、法官思想观念进步需要更长的时间,或成为司法改革中最困难的部分。司法改革在哈萨克斯坦全面改革的大框架内进行,能否与其他领域改革同频共振,直接关系到司法改革的成败。     

哈萨克斯坦对欧亚经济联盟的参与及限度——结构制约与精英偏好的影响

欧亚经济联盟是俄罗斯整合后苏联空间的最新尝试,而成员国对组织的认同和参与攸关其成败。因此,在分析欧亚经济联盟的发展轨迹及其发展趋势时,中小成员国对该组织的参与同样值得关注。哈萨克斯坦是欧亚经济联盟中除俄罗斯之外最具实力的国家,其对联盟的参与至关重要。哈萨克斯坦对欧亚经济联盟的认知和参与,从最初的积极拥抱变为谨慎支持。哈的立场变化同时受到结构制约与精英偏好的影响。俄罗斯在地区一体化机制中的主导地位、哈国内族群结构、哈地理位置等结构性因素,决定了哈萨克斯坦需要参与欧亚经济联盟。然而,乌克兰危机在一定程度上削弱了俄在后苏联空间内的结构性权力,这增加了哈萨克斯坦的行动自由。与此同时,俄罗斯在乌克兰危机后为维系自身的国际和地区地位,加强了对后苏联空间的整合力度。但俄采取的一些做法被哈精英解读为对其国家主权和自主发展道路的威胁,这削弱了哈精英对欧亚经济联盟的认同度和参与度。     

俄罗斯第一宗大型石油公司并购案探析

9·11恐怖主义袭击事件和伊拉克战争发生后,各石油进口国政府及其石油公司的兴趣重新集中到了油气储量丰富且购买价格便宜的俄罗斯,将俄罗斯视作替代麻烦不断的中东地区石油的来源地,想方设法通过各种投资途径进入俄罗斯油气部门。在这种背景下,英国石油公司(BP)成功并购了俄罗斯第四大石油公司秋明石油公司(TNK),从而成为通过并购进入俄罗斯油气业上游领域的第一家外国石油公司,对BP公司自身和俄罗斯产生了深远的影响。     

民粹政治与东南亚政治精英的分化和合流

近年来,东南亚地区涌现出诸多构建“民众—精英”对立话语、塑造领袖魅力、实施跨阶层政治动员以竞争权力与资源的民粹政治现象,但是不同民粹政治进程中民粹领袖与传统精英的互动却呈现出分化合流的显著差异。探讨民粹政治中的精英政治问题是有效的切入点。民粹领袖尝试构建政治纲领、汇集民意穿透精英政治壁垒,但是由地主、资产阶级、宗教领袖以及军官团等构成的东南亚传统精英依托土地、资本、宗教权威、强制力量等要素,占据着政治权力与利益分配机制的核心位置,限制了精英分化合流的互动过程。因而,政治方略决定了民粹领袖能否实现对精英的“挟制”:再分配与制度变革取向的革新政治将会引发传统精英反制与精英分化;改良政治以利益相容与权力制衡的形式“挟制”传统精英,以合作与妥协两种方式实现精英合流。精英分化合流的现实意味着东南亚国家追求制度改革的民粹主义浪潮不仅难以打破既有政治经济秩序,而且可能陷入“精英合流”与“精英反对精英”的轮回。     

哈萨克斯坦“祖国之光”党的组织体系和发展趋势

哈萨克斯坦是中国重要邻国,是"一带一路"倡议的支点国家。"祖国之光"党自2004年至今一直是哈萨克斯坦的执政党。2019年3月,纳扎尔巴耶夫辞任总统,但依然保留着党主席一职,这意味着"祖国之光"党将继续在哈萨克斯坦政治生活中发挥重要作用。基于在哈萨克斯坦实地考察的一手材料,本文从中央组织、地方和基层组织、党的干部、政党经费等四个方面,阐述"祖国之光"党的组织结构和运作方式,探讨其发展趋势。现有的文献在观察原苏各国政党转型和政治发展时,大多将议会式政党预设为比较样板和发展终点。然而,研究发现,哈萨克斯坦"祖国之光"党近年来重新采用了诸多列宁主义政党的做法,其政治发展受议会政治和列宁主义的双重影响。     

中亚的政商关系:比较分析的方法

在大多数国家里,政府(政治与公共管理)与企业的关系对经济活动的运行、经济决策和企业战略发挥着显著的作用.在中亚的后苏联国家,现行的政商关系既是改革策略的内生结果,又影响着进一步的制度变革,表现出极大的差别.本文旨在理解哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的各种政商关系如何影响了这些国家市场经济制度框架的发展,重点考察了中亚国家政商关系的两个方面的内容:模式的内容(由代理人的偏好及其相对权力决定)和正式和非正式制度的一致性.     

中俄油气合作浅析

俄罗斯是世界上的油气大国,西伯利亚和俄远东部分是石油心脏地带的重要组成部分,而中国位于“内新月型地带”的东端,因而,俄油气对中国有很强的吸引力。随着国民经济的快速发展,我国成为仅次于美、日的第三大石油消费国,供需缺口逐年增大,经济发展对石油的依赖程度不断增强。因此,随着俄油气工业政策的调整及“东向油气战略”的实施,对于中俄这两个欧亚最大的邻国来说,如何认识中俄在油气领域的合作有着十分重要的政治经济意义。     

欧盟的非正式治理模式刍议——以欧盟难民政策的发展为例

不同于对欧盟的主流认识。欧盟各个政策领域中背离正式规则的政治实践无处不在。就欧盟非正式治理的发生机制而言。特定政治风险与正式规则的组合会形成非正式治理的变革窗口,而特定的认知框架则会促进或限制非正式治理的发生。本文主要提出中心化和去中心化两种类别的非正式治理,然后将现有文献中众多的非正式治理模式按照不同的非正式治理类别和政策阶段做出完整的类型划分。最后。本文认为在欧盟难民政策实现共同体化以后,只有部分国家面临难民风险,加上难民问题的安全化认知导致难民政策一直由去中心化的非正式治理主导;但是近期由于难民问题发展成为席卷整个欧洲的危机以及欧洲民众对难民问题认知框架的改变,难民政策的非正式治理受到了限制。因此,对难民政策的考量还将放到非正式治理和正式规则之间的互动中以及一体化发展程度等宏观背景下进行深入研究。     

The ideology of development and legitimation: beyond ‘Kazakhstan 2030’

The paper analyses the multifaceted discourse of development and nation-building in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. It addresses the regional clan–central elite relations and Nursultan Nazarbayev regime's legitimating agenda through the Kazakhstan 2030 Strategy for development. The economic developmental component in Nazarbayev's ideological discourses is primarily an exercise of control over regional economic and political elites and that helped building further legitimacy for the regime in various socio-ethnic constituencies on both the regional and central levels. Kazakhstan 2030 was deployed by the regime to substitute the Soviet version of ideology, legitimize the regime among various ethno-lingual audiences, and discipline the behaviour of regional elites. The paper shows how the study of elites’ interests can best explain the nature of national ideology and development projects.     

Regional Implications of China’s Quest for Energy in Latin America

This paper analyses the Chinese quest for energy resources in Latin America, arguing that the strengthening of relations in this sector can only be explained by a conjunction of interests on both sides. Looking at the presence of Chinese national oil companies in the regional energy sector, we show that China’s incursion has allowed the region to shift its traditional energy partners, introducing a factor of change into economic and political relations with geopolitical implications for the regional arena.     

Natural resource policies and standard of living in Kazakhstan

This paper evaluates Kazakhstan's natural resource policies and their impact on the standard of living of the Kazakhstan population within the framework of three determinative factors: globalization and international markets; Soviet legacy and ‘resource nationalism’; and Nursultan Nazarbayev and his authoritarian leadership. It argues that natural resource policies of Kazakhstan failed to improve the living standards of the majority of people in Kazakhstan, especially the poor and those living in oil-producing and rural areas, despite increasing oil prices and revenues. The argument will be supported with an analysis of Kazakhstan's oil wealth distribution in light of global initiatives as well as with evidence derived from official reports and statistical data to find out whether Nazarbayev's widely discussed ‘resource nationalism’ is ‘nationalistic’ enough to favour the whole nation.     

Discourses of Russian-speaking youth in Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan: Soviet legacies and responses to nation-building

ABSTRACT

Research into post-independence identity shifts among Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking minorities has outlined a number of possible pathways, such as diasporization, integrated national minority status and ethnic separatism. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with young people in Almaty and Karaganda, I examine how Russian-speaking minorities identify with the state and imagine their place in a ‘soft’ or ‘hybrid’ post-Soviet authoritarian system. What is found is that Russian-speaking minorities largely accept their status beneath the Kazakh ‘elder brother’ and do not wish to identify as a ‘national minority’. Furthermore, they affirm passive loyalty to the political status quo while remaining disinterested in political representation. Russian-speaking minorities are also ambivalent towards Kazakh language promotion and anxious about the increasing presence of Kazakh-speakers in urban spaces. This article argues that two factors are central to these stances among Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking minorities: the persistence of Soviet legacies and the effects of state discourse and policy since 1991.     

Grassroots Bureaucracy: Intergovernmental Relations and Popular Mobilization in Brazil's AIDS Policy Sector

How does the state ensure the implementation of national policies in a context of decentralized political authority? This article identifies a new strategy utilized by national bureaucrats to regulate the behavior of subnational politicians: mobilizing civil society as government watchdog and political advocate. In the context of decentralized governance, in which local politicians administer most social sector programs, reform‐minded bureaucrats often find that they have little control over the implementation of their progressive policies. In Brazil's AIDS policy sector, however, bureaucrats have ensured the successful implementation of their policies by developing allies outside government. These state actors—here called activist bureaucrats—have been largely overlooked in the English‐language literature, yet they form a new layer of politics in Latin America.     

Russian Energy and the Korean Peninsula

The recent agreements concerning North Korea’s nuclear program raise possibilities for providing North Korea with energy (oil and gas) to compensate for the termination of its nuclear program and of integrating it more broadly into the Northeast Asian economy. Russia has long wanted to play the role of provider of oil and gas to North Korea and these agreements open up new opportunities for it to do so. However, serious obstacles in the nature of North Korea’s precarious economic situation and its consequences, international rivalries in Northeast Asia, and Russia’s own energy policies present serious obstacles to the realization of Russia’s ambitions as regards North Korea and as energy provider to Northeast Asia as a whole.     

台湾海归与台湾政治

对20世纪80年代以来台湾历任最高领导人及各部委第一负责人最高学历的分析统计显示,在美国、欧洲地区各国及日本名校获得高学历之海归人士,已经构成台湾政坛的精英主体。本文梳理台湾政坛海归的基本构成、比例及影响,剖析台湾海归在台湾政治中具有的特殊软实力,同时也指出他们的政治软肋,评介台湾当局成文与不成文的相关政策法规,深化对海归参政之现实意义的认识。     

The First Time as Tragedy,the Second as Farce? Lebanon’s Nascent Petroleum Sector and the Risks of Corruption

This article analyses the risks of corruption in Lebanon’s nascent governance structures established in preparation for a thriving petroleum sector. Engaging with comparative theory on the ‘oil curse’, the article assesses the risks of corruption in the institutional and regulatory measures and policy tools that have thus far been developed down the sector’s value chain and including revenue management and expenditure. Lebanon’s political settlement, or the ways in which its political decision-making process evolved since the Ta’if Accord, consistently caused disappointing outcomes when it comes to sound institution-building and countering corruption; despite signs of awareness of the large stakes involved, this tendency is once again discernible in the country’s preparations for petroleum sector governance.     

The Monetisation of Consent and its Limits: Explaining Political Dominance and Decline in Malaysia

ABSTRACT

Malaysia’s 14th General Election in 2018 toppled the Barisan Nasional government after six decades in power. Barisan Nasional’s longevity was due to its performance legitimacy and a capacity to manipulate electoral mechanisms. However, it was the use of money in eliciting consent that led to a political change. This article traces how sustaining the dominance of the Barisan Nasional under Najib Razak used a strategy which we term the monetisation of consent. However, when monetising consent loses its efficacy, political dominance is challenged. We discuss why and how manufacturing consent through the use of money has its limits when regime legitimacy is challenged. Intense political competition on the electoral terrain from 2008 and the multiplication of Malay-Muslim political parties induced Najib’s greater personal grip on state funds to gain political support. This resulted in the Najib regime’s kleptocratic turn. Beyond the disbursement of largesse to political power brokers and business elites, his government monetised consent as a populist strategy. The reduced efficacy of electoral manipulation made the monetisation of consent imperative for regime survival but the use of money and unpopular fiscal policies, which deprived citizens of disposable income, led to a legitimacy crisis and the Barisan Nasional’s defeat.     

Militarizing Japan’s Southwest Islands: Subnational Involvement and Insecurities in the Maritime Frontier Zone

Abstract

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions.