Dimensionen der Disproportionalität – Erststimmen und Direktmandate in den Bundestagswahlen von 1953 bis 2009

This article looks at how candidate votes have been translated into district mandates in the plurality tier of Germany’s mixed electoral system in all Bundestags-elections since 1953. Two questions in particular are addressed: How has disproportionality changed over time? And: What are the main determinants of disproportionality? To answer these two questions the article employs a modified version of the cube rule that accounts for the fact that the number of district parties in a mixed electoral system is higher than in a pure majoritarian system. The article identifies the effective number of district parties as the most important determinant of the disproportional translation of candidate votes into district mandates, i. e., the higher the number of district parties, the less proportional the translation.     

Theorien als latente Quellen von Normativität und Verantwortung in der Hochschullehre: Die Bedeutung von didaktischen und fachspezifischen Theoriedebatten am Beispiel des politikwissenschaftlichen Teilgebiets „Internationale Beziehungen“

The article deals with normative aspects that are negotiated in didactic and subject-specific theoretical debates and thus gain relevance in teaching. It turns out that the didactic theories provide divergent answers to the question of what should be taught how and by whom. Similarly, the example of theoretical debates in International Relations shows that, from a subject-specific perspective, there can often be a lack of consensus on the essentials that are to be taught. Such conflicting requirements, however, demonstrate the instructors’ scope for action, which they should realize and use responsibly. Due to academic pluralism, it seems possible that the societal pluralism, which is sometimes perceived as crisis-laden, can be used productively for teaching.     

Die personalisierte Verhältniswahl unter den Bedingungen des gesamtdeutschen Parteiensystems. Eine Analyse der Entstehungsursachen von Überhangmandaten seit der Wiedervereinigung

Germany’s mixed-member proportional system, internationally known as the ‘German model’, has been recently criticized, since the 1994 Bundestag elections saw the genesis of several surplus mandates giving the CDU-FDP-government a safer majority in parliament. Due to this institutional effect, a lot of political scientists and lawyers have argued that the electoral system is no longer in conformity with the constitutional principle of electoral equality. From the perspective of empirical political analysis, two important aspects have not been taken into account in this debate. First, the complex relationship between different factors causing surplus mandates have not been analysed in a systematic-comparative manner. Second, the literature does not explain why so many surplus mandates have appeared in all national elections since 1990 whereas almost none were produced in Bundestag elections before the reunification. This study analyses the genesis of surplus mandates having appeared in the three German Bundestag elections since reunification (1990–1998). In contrast to monocausal explanations it confirms the hypothesis that in the present political context almost all surplus mandates result from complex relationships between generally known explanatory variables. Furthermore, the empirical analysis shows that the genesis of surplus mandates is not only caused by particularities of electoral districting in certain Bundesländer, but also by politico-structural differences between East and West Germany.     

Die Eigendynamik zur Eindimensionalität des Parteienwettbewerbs: eine Simulationsstudie

While German ideological space is often characterized with two dimensions, empirical estimation demonstrates that party positions can be placed on a uni-dimensional scale. This seems to be inconsistent with conventional spatial models of party competition, since parties should, accordingly, exhaust the two-dimensional space to maximize their votes. This paper suggests an alternative spatial model which adjusts or removes some restrictive assumptions of the conventional models. Most importantly, the model suggested here allows parties to influence the salience and (non-)separability of both dimensions at voters’ decision processes. The simulation results demonstrate that the vote-maximizing parties can coordinate themselves in favor of inequality of the salience or non-separability of both dimensions. This, in turn, leads to a certain level of unidimensionality of party positions.     

Begrenzte Rationalität und regulatives Lernen in der EG: die Liberalisierung der Elektrizitätsversorgung

The article analyses the liberalization of the EC electricity supply industry. Confronting the intergovernmental approach, the case study is based on the premise that the member state executives act within the limits of a bounded rationality and do therefore not always represent clear and fixed interests in EU negotiations. Taking the examples of France and Germany, it shows that the national positions and preferences may change greatly during the course of the decision making process. While the French positional changes may be reasonably well explained by the intergovernmental approach, the German preference changes are attributed to effects of the EC institutions and negotiations. Institutional principles, policy-concepts and fairness criteria guide member state orientations and behavior and hinder the pursuit of unilateral advantages. Incremental negotiation techniques within the Council induce learning processes and cause reassessments of the domestic situations. Furthermore, the EC decisions may cause behavioral changes which clearly surpass their regulatory content even if they contain extensive flexibilisation mechanisms.     

Die Einflussmöglichkeiten der Europäischen Kommission auf die europäische Politik

The means of the European Commission to influence European policies are being discussed predominantly with view to its agenda-setting powers. Institutionalist analyses have shown how the Commission can use agenda setting to bring to bear its own political preferences on the Council. With view to other Commission rights, in contrast, there have not been similar systematic analyses to show the Commission’s impact on European policies. In this article it is shown how the Commission can use its rights following from its role as a guardian of the Treaty and from competition law strategically. By simultaneously imposing threats on the Member States, the Commission can present its proposals to the Council as a “lesser evil”, pressurizing the Council into acceptance. The paper shows the scope and limits of this strategy and takes into consideration how other studies discussing the Commission’s powers fit into this framework of analysis.     

Parteien, Vetospieler und der Wettbewerb um Wählerstimmen: Die Arbeitsmarkt-und Beschäftigungspolitik der Ära Kohl

The paper develops a model to explain the labour market and employment policies of the Christian-liberal coalition in Germany between 1982 and 1998. It takes partisan theory as its starting point, but expands it by taking into account the effects of party competition and veto players as well. For the first period of observation, the years 1982 to 1989/90, only moderate reforms can be observed. This can be explained by the fear of the coalition that more far-reaching reforms could exert negative effects on its electoral performance on the one hand, and by the strong influence of the labour union wing of the Christian democratic party on the respective policies on the other hand. During the first years after German unification the government could not implement far reaching partisan reforms either. This was due to the necessity of reacting to the external shock of the unification and the problems associated with it. Only during the last three years in office the coalition was able to push through more coherent reforms due to the huge problems on the labour marker which put the government’s re-election at risk. These reforms could be carried through because the CDU’s labour wing had lost its veto power and because the Bundesrat’s approval was not necessary.     

Dynamiken von Gesetzgebungsinitiativen der Bundes- und Landesparteien im deutschen Föderalismus. Eine Analyse für den Bereich der Rechte Minderjähriger, 1990 bis 2014

The article explores how parties influence legal change in federal systems. Analysing 310 initiatives to change German legislation concerning minors’ rights (which fall into federal and land jurisdiction) for the period from 1990 to 2014, the study opens up empirically a new legislative domain which has been largely ignored by political science so far. It investigates the initiating parties, issues, positions, timing, and cross-level government constellation and corroborates that parties in Germany coordinate their legislative initiatives across lands and levels. At the same time, the data indicate that German land parties are not mere agents of the federal parties and do not utilize the länder level for law-making against federal majorities. The many federal and länder initiatives instead give room for discourse and provide incentives for (re)adjusting party positions which in the long run fosters legal changes.     

Staatskapazität und Verwaltungsreformen in hybriden und autoritären Regimen – am Beispiel der Steuerverwaltung in postsowjetischen Ländern

In order to enlarge state capacity, authoritarian regimes have undertaken considerable efforts to (re-)construct and modernize their administrations. Combining various research strands, this literature review links basic findings of research on authoritarian and hybrid regimes to those on administrative reforms in post-soviet countries. As tax administrations are essential for increasing state capacity, a particular focus is laid on these reforms. Drawing on the cases of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazachstan, the article reveals that stable, hegemonic authoritarian regimes seem to succeed better in increasing administrative efficiency and capability. While professionalizing their civil services, however, tax administrations can still be used to repress opponents. Hybrid regimes which are shaped by frequent government turnovers, by contrast, seem to avoid longsome efficiency-oriented reforms of their administrations.