Physicians' conflicts of interest in Japan and the United States: lessons for the United States

Japanese health policy shows that even with physician ownership and the absence of for-profit, investor-owned health care, physicians' conflicts of interest thrive. Physician dispensing of drugs and ownership of hospitals and clinics were justified in Japan as ways to avoid commercialization of medicine. Instead, they create physicians' conflicts and fuel patient overuse of services. Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) has responded by introducing per-diem payment, thereby creating incentives to decrease services in ways similar to those of American managed care organizations, but with none of their benefits, such as coordination of care, oversight of physicians practices, and quality assurance. Although the United States and Japanese health care systems are organized and financed differently there is convergence in the source of their physicians' conflicts and the way they are addressed. The United States is starting to integrate institutional and physician payment and align their incentives, in a traditional Japanese way. In so doing, the United States creates new physicians' conflicts and reduces the role of countervailing incentives and power, an advantage of previous policy. Japan, in turn, has combined incentives to increase and decrease services, thus moving closer to the U.S. policy.     

Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation

We develop a simple multi-task principal-agent model to analyze the interplay between optimal reimbursement schemes for hospitals and liability rules (basic model). We then extend our model and assume that the hospital is intrinsically motivated to exert positive effort for quality and cost reduction. This effort, however, is biased towards quality. Moreover, the intrinsic motivation may be crowded out by monetary incentives. In such a setting, we find that a pure prospective payment system (PPS) that has become widespread in recent years can only be optimal in the unlikely case where malpractice liability holds hospitals fully responsible for expected harm. For other cases, we confirm the prejudice that PPS may lead to inefficiently low quality. Then, the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) system is superior if the intrinsic motivation is high and relatively little biased towards quality, whereas mixed systems should be chosen otherwise. Our model sheds light on why countries like the USA with a tough liability system haven been less reluctant to switch from FFS to PPS than Germany, for instance.     

Per case prospective payment for psychiatric inpatients: an assessment and alternatives

Psychiatric hospitals and clinics are exempted from the Medicare prospective payment system. In this paper we examine the appropriateness of the DRG classification system for psychiatric patients and argue that, using this system as the basis of payment, two types of problems are likely to arise. We categorize these problems as "risks to hospitals" and "risks to patients" and examine the existing literature to determine whether these risks are likely to be significant. We propose a different approach to paying prospectively for psychiatric care, and suggest modifications that could be made to the structure of PPS to mitigate negative incentives embedded in the current system. Although the main focus of the paper is on the unit of payment, we also make some observations about issues arising in connection with the level of payment.     

Barriers to achieving a cost-effective workforce mix: lessons from anesthesiology

As pressures to control health care costs increase, competition among physicians, advanced practice nurses, and other allied health providers has also intensified. Anesthesia care is one of the most highly contested terrains, where the growth in anesthesiologist supply has far outstripped total demand. This article explains why the supply has grown so fast despite evidence that nurse anesthetists provide equally good care at a fraction of the cost. Emphasis is given to payment incentives in the private sector and Medicare. Laudable attempts by the government to make Medicare payments more efficient and equitable by lowering the economic return to physicians specializing in anesthesia have created a hostile work environment. Nurse anesthetists are being dismissed from hospitals in favor of anesthesiologists who do not appear "on the payroll" but cost society more, nonetheless. Claims of antitrust violations by nurse anesthetists against anesthesiologists have not found much support in the courts for several reasons outlined in this essay. HMO penetration and other market forces have begun signaling new domestic physician graduates to eschew anesthesia, but, again, Medicare payment incentives encourage teaching hospitals to recruit international medical graduates to maintain graduate medical education payments. After suggesting desirable but likely ineffective reforms involving licensure laws and hospital organizational restructuring, the article discusses several alternative payment methods that would encourage hospitals and medical staffs to adopt a more cost-effective anesthesia workforce mix. Lessons for other nonphysician personnel conclude the article.     

Medicare program; prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals RY 2007: annual payment rate updates, policy changes, and clarification. Final rule

This final rule updates the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs). The payment amounts and factors used to determine the updated Federal rates that are described in this final rule have been determined for the LTCH PPS rate year July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2007. The annual update of the long-term care diagnosis-related group (LTC-DRG) classifications and relative weights remains linked to the annual adjustments of the acute care hospital inpatient diagnosis-related group system, and will continue to be effective each October 1. The outlier threshold for July 1, 2006, through June 30, 2007, is also derived from the LTCH PPS rate year calculations. We are also finalizing policy changes and making clarifications.     

Medicare program; home health prospective payment system rate update for calendar year 2012. Final rule

This final rule sets forth updates to the home health prospective payment system (HH PPS) rates, including: the national standardized 60-day episode rates; the national per-visit rates; and the low utilization payment amount (LUPA) under the Medicare PPS for home health agencies effective January 1, 2012. This rule applies a 1.4 percent update factor to the episode rates, which reflects a 1 percent reduction applied to the 2.4 percent market basket update factor, as mandated by the Affordable Care Act. This rule also updates the wage index used under the HH PPS, and further reduces home health payments to account for continued nominal growth in case-mix which is unrelated to changes in patient health status. This rule removes two hypertension codes from the HH PPS case-mix system, thereby requiring recalibration of the case-mix weights. In addition, the rule implements two structural changes designed to decrease incentives to upcode and provide unneeded therapy services. Finally, this rule incorporates additional flexibility regarding face-to-face encounters with providers related to home health care.     

Medicare program; prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals: annual payment rate updates, policy changes, and clarification. Final rule

This final rule updates the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs). The payment amounts and factors used to determine the updated Federal rates that are described in this final rule have been determined based on the LTCH PPS rate year July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006. The annual update of the long-term care diagnosis-related group (LTC-DRG) classifications and relative weights remains linked to the annual adjustments of the acute care hospital inpatient diagnosis-related group system, and will continue to be effective each October 1. The outlier threshold for July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006 is also derived from the LTCH PPS rate year calculations. We are adopting new labor market area definitions for the purpose of geographic classification and the wage index. We are also making policy changes and clarifications.     

Medicare program; prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals: annual payment rate updates and policy changes. Final rule

This final rule establishes the annual update of the payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs). It also changes the annual period for which the rates are effective. The rates will be effective from July 1 to June 30 instead of from October 1 through September 30, establishing a "long-term care hospital rate year" (LTCH PPS rate year). We also change the publication schedule for these updates to allow for an effective date of July 1. The payment amounts and factors used to determine the updated Federal rates that are described in this final rule have been determined based on this revised LTCH PPS rate year. The annual update of the long-term care diagnosis-related groups (LTC-DRG) classifications and relative weights remains linked to the annual adjustments of the acute care hospital inpatient diagnosis-related group system, and will continue to be effective each October 1. The outlier threshold for July 1, 2003, through June 30, 2004, is also derived from the LTCH PPS rate year calculations. In addition, we are making an adjustment to the short-stay outlier policy for certain LTCHs and a policy change eliminating bed-number restrictions for pre-1997 LTCHs that have established satellite facilities and elect to be paid 100 percent of the Federal rate or when the LTCH is fully phased-in to 100 percent of the Federal prospective rate after the transition period.     

Medicare program; prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals RY 2008: annual payment rate updates, and policy changes; and hospital direct and indirect graduate medical education policy changes. Final rule

This final rule updates the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs). The final payment amounts and factors used to determine the updated Federal rates that are described in this final rule were determined based on the LTCH PPS rate year July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008. The annual update of the long-term care diagnosis-related group (LTC-DRG) classifications and relative weights remains linked to the annual adjustments of the acute care hospital inpatient diagnosis-related group system, and continue to be effective each October 1. The final outlier threshold for July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2008, is derived from the LTCH PPS rate year calculations. We are also finalizing policy changes which include revisions to the GME and IME policies. In addition, we are adding a technical amendment correcting the regulations text at Sec. 412.22.     

Medicare program; prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals: annual payment rate updates and policy changes. Final rule

This final rule updates the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs). The payment amounts and factors used to determine the updated Federal rates that are described in this final rule have been determined based on the LTCH PPS rate year. The annual update of the long-term care diagnosis-related group (LTC-DRG) classifications and relative weights remains linked to the annual adjustments of the acute care hospital inpatient diagnosis-related group system, and will continue to be effective each October 1. The outlier threshold for July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005 is also derived from the LTCH PPS rate year calculations. In this final rule, we also are making clarifications to the existing policy regarding the designation of a satellite of a LTCH as an independent LTCH. In addition, we are expanding the existing interrupted stay policy and changing the procedure for counting days in the average length of stay calculation for Medicare patients for hospitals qualifying as LTCHs.     

Medicare program; inpatient psychiatric facilities prospective payment system--update for rate year beginning July 1, 2011 (RY 2012). Final rule

This final rule updates the prospective payment rates for Medicare inpatient hospital services provided by inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs) for discharges occurring during the rate year (RY) beginning July 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012. The final rule also changes the IPF prospective payment system (PPS) payment rate update period to a RY that coincides with a fiscal year (FY). In addition, the rule implements policy changes affecting the IPF PPS teaching adjustment. It also rebases and revises the Rehabilitation, Psychiatric, and Long-Term Care (RPL) market basket, and makes some clarifications and corrections to terminology and regulations text.     

Medicare program; hospital inpatient prospective payment systems for acute care hospitals and the long-term care hospital prospective payment system and FY 2012 rates; hospitals' FTE resident caps for graduate medical education payment. Final rules

We are revising the Medicare hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) for operating and capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems and to implement certain statutory provisions contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively known as the Affordable Care Act) and other legislation. We also are setting forth the update to the rate-of-increase limits for certain hospitals excluded from the IPPS that are paid on a reasonable cost basis subject to these limits. We are updating the payment policy and the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and implementing certain statutory changes made by the Affordable Care Act. In addition, we are finalizing an interim final rule with comment period that implements section 203 of the Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010 relating to the treatment of teaching hospitals that are members of the same Medicare graduate medical education affiliated groups for the purpose of determining possible full-time equivalent (FTE) resident cap reductions.     

医务人员的“医患沟通”能力是和谐医患关系中的重要保障

本文分析了医务人员在医患关系中所处的地位,认为构建和谐医患关系的主要力量是医务人员;同时在如何构建和谐医患关系方面,又探讨了“医患沟通”对医患关系改变的重要作用;进而阐述了“医患沟通”的内涵特征,同时指出提高医患沟通能力的注意要点。通过本文的探讨,可以认为提高医务人员医患沟通能力是构建和谐医患关系的重要保障!     

Medicare program; change in methodology for determining payment for extraordinarily high-cost cases (cost outliers) under the acute care hospital inpatient and long-term care hospital prospective payment systems. Final rule

In this final rule, we are revising the methodology for determining payments for extraordinarily high-cost cases (cost outliers) made to Medicare-participating hospitals under the acute care hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS). Under the existing outlier methodology, the cost-to-charge ratios from hospitals' latest settled cost reports are used in determining a fixed-loss amount cost outlier threshold. We have become aware that, in some cases, hospitals' recent rate-of-charge increases greatly exceed their rate-of-cost increases. Because there is a time lag between the cost-to-charge ratios from the latest settled cost report and current charges, this disparity in the rate-of-increases for charges and costs results in cost-to-charge ratios that are too high, which in turn results in an overestimation of hospitals' current costs per case. Therefore, we are revising our outlier payment methodology to ensure that outlier payments are made only for truly expensive cases. We also are revising the methodology used to determine payment for high-cost outlier and short-stay outlier cases that are made to Medicare-participating long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) under the long-term care hospital prospective payment system (LTCH PPS). The policies for determining outlier payment under the LTCH PPS are modeled after the outlier payment policies under the IPPS.     

域外医疗纠纷第三方调处机制研究

如何有效化解日益增长的医疗纠纷,维系医患关系的良性运转,是域外许多国家和地区普遍面临的重要问题.美国、德国、法国和日本等国家都建立了颇具特色的医疗纠纷第三方调处机制,并在实践中发挥了重要作用.高度重视行业性、专业性组织的作用,以完善的法律与制度保障医疗纠纷第三方调处机制的顺利运行,通过健全的医疗责任保险制度确保第三方调处效果的最终实现是上述国家的一致做法.     

Hospital care for the "self-pay" patient

The number of hospitalized patients lacking an identifiable source of third-party payment has risen substantially in recent years. This study examines trends in the hospitalization of "self-pay" patients and investigates causal influences on the propensity of hospitals to accept such patients for treatment. Our analysis pays particular attention to the relationship between Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS) and hospitals' self-pay patient share. Our results show an overall increase in both the number and proportion of self-pay patients treated by hospitals between 1980 and 1985. Substantial differences existed among the types of hospitals that accepted such patients, with major teaching hospitals treating an increasingly disproportionate share. The mix of self-pay patients in terms of age, sex, and reason for hospitalization remained stable during the period under study. Our conclusion is that the regression analysis shows no evidence that PPS reduced hospitals' willingness to treat uninsured patients.     

Medicare program; photocopying reimbursement methodology. Final rule

This final rule increases the rate of reimbursement for expenses incurred by prospective payment system PPS) hospitals for photocopying medical records requested by Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs), formerly known as Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organizations (PROs). We are increasing the rate from 7 cents per page to 12 cents per page to reflect inflationary changes in the labor and supply cost components of the formula. This final rule also provides for the periodic review and adjustment of the per-page reimbursement rate to account for inflation and changes in technology. The methodology for calculating the per-page reimbursement rate will remain unchanged. We are also providing for the payment of the expenses of furnishing photocopies to QIOs, to other providers subject to a PPS (for example, skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies), in accordance with the rules established for reimbursing PPS hospitals for these expenses.     

A threat or a promise: acquisition of teaching hospitals by investor-owned chains

In the early 1980s, acquisition of a small number of teaching hospitals by investor-owned chains raised the spectre of a for-profit takeover of teaching institutions. Drawing on experience to date, as well as interviews with affected parties, this article assesses the likely scope of such acquisitions and their impact on the education, research, and indigent care that teaching hospitals provide. Our assessment concludes that relatively few teaching hospitals are likely to satisfy the financial criteria chains apply to acquisitions; that hospitals with modest rather than extensive commitments to education and research are most likely to satisfy these criteria; and that terms of sale typically enhance, rather than undermine, these institutions' resources for research, education, and, to a lesser extent, indigent care, at least in the short run. In the long run, continuation of these activities is more likely to be a function of third-party payment policies than of proprietary versus nonprofit hospital ownership.     

Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS); TRICARE program; reimbursement--DoD. Proposed rule

This rule proposes to revise certain requirements and procedures for reimbursement under the TRICARE program, the purpose of which is to implement a comprehensive managed health care delivery system composed of military medical treatment facilities and CHAMPUS. Issues addressed in this proposed rule include: implementation of changes made to the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) upon which the CHAMPUS DRG-based payment system is modeled and required by law to follow wherever practicable, along with changes to make our DRG-based payment system operate better; extension of the balance billing limitations currently in place for individual and professional providers to non-institutional, non-professional providers; adjusting the CHAMPUS maximum allowable charge (CMAC) rate in the small number of cases where the CMAC rate is less than the Medicare rate; and implementing the government-wide debarment rule where any provider excluded or suspended from CHAMPUS shall be excluded from all other programs and activities involving Federal financial assistance, such as Medicare or Medicaid, and adding violations of our balance billing or claims filing requirements to the list of provider actions considered violations of the TRICARE/CHAMPUS program.     

Medicare program; home health prospective payment system rate update for calendar year 2011; changes in certification requirements for home health agencies and hospices. Final rule

This final rule sets forth an update to the Home Health Prospective Payment System (HH PPS) rates, including: the national standardized 60-day episode rates, the national per-visit rates, the nonroutine medical supply (NRS) conversion factors, and the low utilization payment amount (LUPA) add-on payment amounts, under the Medicare prospective payment system for HHAs effective January 1, 2011. This rule also updates the wage index used under the HH PPS and, in accordance with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act), updates the HH PPS outlier policy. In addition, this rule revises the home health agency (HHA) capitalization requirements. This rule further adds clarifying language to the "skilled services" section. The rule finalizes a 3.79 percent reduction to rates for CY 2011 to account for changes in case-mix, which are unrelated to real changes in patient acuity. Finally, this rule incorporates new legislative requirements regarding face-to-face encounters with providers related to home health and hospice care.