欧盟法律一体化的难题分析

欧盟作为世界上一体化程度最高的区域性政治经济组织,欧盟在经济一体化道路上走得比较深入,但政治与法律一体化却进程缓慢。本文阐述了欧盟法律一体化进程中的难点问题,分析了欧盟法律一体化进程缓慢的原因,并论述欧盟一体化的全球意义及对东北亚的启示作用。     

欧盟多层宪政体系分析

欧盟宪政从历史的眼光看,它是一个不断变化发展的体系。欧盟宪政模式继承了宪政的基本要素,即权力的分立、对抗与合作。但欧盟在体制上还存在诸多矛盾,欧盟缺乏直接有力的超国家机构,没有完全构建真正意义上的实体＂硬件＂,因此现行的欧盟宪政也仅是一种低密度、低层次的宪政。欧盟有其特殊性,各成员国与欧盟在经济、政治、社会、文化、法律等诸多因素中相互交织、相互竞争、相互合作,这种竞争构成一种制约与平衡,而这种过程是一种在宪法约束下的动态平衡过程。     

关于思想政治教育本质的探讨

认识思想政治教育本质这一思想政治教育理论与实践中的基本理论问题，可运用马克思主义哲学方法论，贯彻层层推进的认识思路，构建思想政治教育本质理论的逻辑体系，认为思想政治教育本质的意义，思想政治教育哲学意义上的本质、思想政治教育本质的内容，可作为思想政治教育本质理论的一种认识思路，正确认识和处理思想政治教育政治本质的阶段性与科学性，一元性与多样性，不变性与变动性的关系，对于探索思想政治教育本质理论在新形势下的运用具体特别重要的现实意义。     

权力政治在构建欧洲政治秩序中的作用分析

在全球相互依赖程度不断加强的今天,权力政治似乎已经渐渐地淡出了历史舞台,人们听到的越来越多的是"制度"、"观念"等词藻。伴随着欧盟的成功,欧洲一体化从经济领域不断向其它领域扩溢,欧洲正在迎接全面一体化时代的到来。与此同时,冷战后的多年努力使欧洲政治秩序也在逐渐重新形成。在这样一种时代背景下,传统的权力政治是否还会在欧洲政治秩序重建过程中发挥作用,以及它是如何影响欧洲政治秩序重建的,本文就此对以上问题进行了简要的分析与探讨。     

欧盟宪法发展进程中的双重变奏——共和主义与自由主义的视角

欧盟宪法较之于民族国家的宪法的一个突出特征在于，欧盟宪法不是来自于一次政治决断，而是由多个连续性的决断构成，这就表现为欧盟宪法的发展或欧盟统合秩序的形成是一个由多种力量或因素参与其间的法律与政治进程，其中，共和主义与自由主义最为重要，从而欧盟宪法的发展进程也就体现为共和主义与自由主义的双重变奏。共和主义是欧盟宪法的灵魂与骨架，而自由主义在欧盟宪法发展之初是作为一种积极的力量而存在的。随着欧盟宪法的发展，因触及了各个民族国家的政治、社会发展模式及成员国人民的福利，自由主义则成为欧盟宪法发展中重要反对性力量所借助的思想资源，但是，源于“欧洲梦”的追求，共和主义较之于自由主义始终具有正当性与统摄性。欧盟宪法未来的发展，在一定意义上就取决于共和主义与自由主义之间的平衡。     

市场缺陷与政治资源的开发

在现代社会，单纯靠政府或市场难以实现资源优化配置，因为政府不是万能的，市场存在缺陷。在政治学意义上，政治资源是社会资源的一部分。在现代化进程中，应充分重视政治资源的保护和开发，这对弥补市场缺陷，优化社会资源的配置，促进经济繁荣和政治发展具有重要意义。     

从历史的深处走来——漫议转型时期的当代中国政治与司法改革

发端于20世纪80年代的当代中国司法改革，乃是中国社会整体性转型的重要组成部分，其特殊的政治语境尤其值得人们关注。一方面，政治改革必定涉及司法机制和相关原则的调整；另一方面，不断深化的司法改革在一定意义上将推动政治改革和发展，而不仅仅是纯粹法律制度意义上的变革。当代中国直面的这种政治与司法的关系具有深厚的历史根源，政治语境乃是历史性地生成的。     

中国地缘政治的战略思考

地缘政治与国家安全利益紧密相联,中亚地缘政治格局的变迁与中国国家安全息息相关。自第一次世界大战以来,中亚地缘政治的发展演变对中国的周边安全曾产生过直接或间接的重大威胁及重要影响。这些年来,中国正在逐步探索并形成了一种摆脱冷战思维、超越传统安全理念的新型安全观。这是当代国际关系史上具有非凡意义的外交实践,开创了地区新型安全合作模式。在这个意义上,地缘政治对我国国家安全有很重要的意义。     

论欧盟宪法危机认知之理论方法

如何看待所谓的欧盟宪法危机,在很大程度上是一种理论分析形态选择的问题。分析欧盟这一政治体系或者政治体的各种理论,其共同之处在于解释欧盟现象因何而生又如何发展的问题。欧盟宪政的发展过程实际上就是欧盟法律人格丰富与健全的过程。分析欧盟法律人格的构成因素以及各个因素之间的逻辑联系,既能解释欧盟宪政的历史演进,又能分析目前欧盟宪法危机的症结所在。欧盟法律人格构成因素的丰富与强健,既是欧盟宪政发展的动力之一,同时也给欧盟宪政发展带来了挑战,无论是保持欧盟发展的动力还是避免欧盟宪政发展所遇到的挑战,都依赖于欧盟法律人格构成的三个因素———规制性支柱、规范性支柱与认知性支柱———之间的平衡。     

文本·结构·功能——软法之于欧盟宪政的地位描述与作用分析

在欧盟宪政发展进程中，在硬法发挥作用的同时，欧盟软法所占据的地位与所发挥的作用也同样值得重视与研究。在文本意义上，欧盟软法在欧盟宪法性条约中占有很大的比重，在结构意义上，欧盟软法成为了欧盟治理结构发展、变化的一个重要机制，在功能意义上，欧盟软法成为了欧盟法律秩序形成的先导性力量。     

宪法基本假设的探析

宪法应有基本假设。宪法的基本假设应从市民社会与政治国家的分离与互动发展中寻找。宪法的基本假设是市民社会是理性社会;政治国家是市民社会的工具;政治国家与市民社会间适用自然法则。宪法的基本假设奠定了宪法运行和宪法理论的基础。     

再议宪政

18世纪晚期以来,民主一直是人类政治生活的主题,民主化进程成了社会进步的主要评判标准,然而,实现了民主并不能保证没有了政治迫害,现实的民主远没有实现人类赋予它的使命。民主不能使任何个人的利益都得到切实的实现和保障。为了切实的保障个体的权利和利益,人类在反对一切特权民主的同时不得不对民主本身(民主本身也是一种特权,多数人的特权)加以限制,这就是宪政。那么宪政的真正涵义是什么?宪政的基本精神是什么?它与宪法到底是什么样的关系?宪政与民主到底是什么样的关系?本文将就这几个问题作出初步的回答。     

Habermas's European constitution: Catalyst,reconstruction, refounding

Jürgen Habermas has long been one of the EU's most prominent and influential critical friends, engaged as much at the level of legal and political praxis as social theory. In particular, he has a close and complex longstanding interest in the idea of an EU constitution. On the occasion of his 90th birthday, I want to discuss three treatments of the EU constitution located in Habermas's work: constitution as catalyst, as reconstruction, and as refounding. We find the different treatments, and the priorities that underscore them, emphasised at different times—partly reflecting changing political circumstances. We also observe some tension between the different approaches. Yet, as someone broadly sympathetic to his overall project, I argue that the best understanding of the Habermasian position, and certainly the most attractive version of that position in today's political climate, involves reconciling all three treatments within a single package.     

The economic constitution and the political constitution: seeking the common good in the post-national setting

In the post-national setting, the concept of the ‘economic constitution’ has been seen as design template and saviour; whether based on transactional certitude or founded on ordoliberal precepts, the economic constitution is assumed to legitimate economic integration across national borders in the absence of comprehensive political settlement. Nevertheless, recent tensions – not only within the European Union (EU) but also, more strikingly, within the World Trade Organization context – indicate the limits of economic constitutionalism. This article seeks to identify the roots of recent dysfunction within the history and theory of economic constitutionalism. It traces the evolution of an adjudicational economic constitutionalism and its place within the EU legal order, including the new EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and contrasts this vision with the more comprehensive and/or socialized models of economic constitutionalism found not only within the Weimar Republic but also within the post-revolutionary/post-conflict constitutional context. The article also places a major emphasis on theorizing around the apex of economic-constitutional thought, ordoliberalism, but concludes that no concept of the economic constitution can be seen in isolation from its social-political context, or from notions of the common good. To this exact degree, failures in modern economic constitutionalism may derive from a misplaced universalism – a technocratic absolutism that abdicates political responsibility for the common good, locating it instead in an ‘idolatry of the factual’ or a new naturalism of market inevitability.     

宪法至上与权威合法化

权威是保证国家政治忠诚、维持稳定的重要元素,它需要合法化支撑。合法化与合法性不同。合法性涉及规范和评价,合法化是一个过程。法治国家权威是形式宪法与实质宪法的结合体,其合法化条件包括社会力量和利益冲突、力量对比、工具意义上的宪法。宪法权威合法化的生成除修改宪法之外,尚需积累进化理性形成宪法惯例及发展宪法解释,以促进政治忠诚与自主性的结合,保持社会发展的活力。     

Political Constitutionalism and the European Union

What kind of constitution is emerging in Europe? There are two approaches to answering this question. The first, a ‘foundational’ approach, rejects the premise: there can be no real constitution in the absence of a ‘demos’, a foundation which exists only nationally. The second, ‘freestanding’ approach, depicts it as paradigmatic of a broader phenomenon of cosmopolitan constitutionalism, based on individual rights guaranteed through a transnational rule of law. Rejecting both for their failure to account for European constitutionalism as a historical process of polity‐building, a third approach, ‘political constitutionalism’, is proposed, capturing the dynamic quality of constitutionalisation in the EU. From this perspective, what is emerging in Europe is a constitution that reflects a common good (predominantly conceived in economic terms), albeit one which is legally, political and socially contested. It is by capturing this complex picture of the political formation of Europe that the constitutional question will be most fruitfully pursued.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.     

宪法：从政治法到治政法

将宪法称为政治法,虽然由来久、流传广,但弊病多、危害深,不宜继续提倡。政治事务虽然由宪法集中规范,但宪法不只是规范政治事务。单纯从宪法与政治的关系上讲,宪法不是政治统治法、被政治控制之法,而是控制政治之法、治理政权之法。人民是政治与治政的主体,宪法是人民治政的依据与准则。将宪法作为治政法,体现了民主与民治的要求,有利于增强宪法的法律属性与价值理性,有利于实现宪治、实现民主、实现自由。     

论宪法与政治文明

在政治文明史上 ,宪法的产生具有里程碑的意义。宪法是权利的保障书 ,人权是政治文明的终极关怀 ;宪法是民主政治的法律化 ,民主政治是政治文明的保障 ;宪法是治国之法 ,法治是政治文明的基本运作方式 ;宪法是宪政的前提 ,宪政是政治文明的核心。宪法与政治文明相辅相成、不可分离