印度后期瑜伽行派的现量观 --兼与西方相关思想的比较

以陈那和法称为主的印度后期瑜伽行派对属于因明学和知识论领域的"现量"作出了更为完备和深入的探讨,他们把现量规定为本源性的、新生的、"离分别"的和脱离了名言概念的"感性直观",并揭示了现量的"自证"结构等重要内涵,借此,他们在其知识论中显示了一种几乎与当代胡塞尔的现象学相近的特殊而深刻的理性.     

唯识“八识”说与“自证分”浅析

唯识学的“八识”说重在揭示意识的各个不同的层面,而“自证分”学说则意在阐明意识的“自身构成”的本源结构或枢机。借用当代现象学的有关见解,我们将能对唯识宗的上述学说获得一种统一的和更为透彻的理解。     

Prudence and the Obama Doctrine

This article examines the Obama Doctrine's main tenets, assesses its operation— focusing on the geopolitically crucial regions of Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East–and then offers concluding observations about the trajectory and consequences of this doctrine.     

古杰拉尔主义及其对印度外交的影响

1996年6月至1998年大选,是印度联合阵线政府执政时期。联合阵线政府执政时期不长,在国内发展方面建树不大,但在外交政策方面却提出了具有深远影响的主张,被称为“古杰拉尔主义”,这标志着印度外交思想和外交政策从此进入了一个新的时期。本文拟就“古杰拉尔主义”这一印度的外交政策和思想及其印度外交的影响作些探讨。     

The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists

The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of both the debate over the war in Iraq and its implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy by examining the relationship between neoconservatism and realism. The article begins by establishing the connection between the tenets of neoconservatism and the arguments for war against Iraq. The primary focus is on the neoconservative Bush Doctrine that served as the primary justification for the Iraq War. Next, we turn to the arguments that realists put forth in their attempt to steer America away from the road to war. The realists, however, proved to be unsuccessful in their attempt to prevent war and in the final section we address the central question of the article; why did realism fail in the debate over Iraq?     

The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire

The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the “neoconservatives”—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.     

Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine

The "Bush Doctrine" asserting the right to preemptively attack states that support or harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has bitterly divided world opinion. Many seemingly long-settled questions of international politics, especially involving the unilateral use of force, have been reopened. Although we are concerned about the implications of the Bush Doctrine, we do not agree that it fundamentally changes world politics as some have asserted. Instead, we argue that the global debate leading up to the war in Iraq signals widespread support for existing international norms. Most states continue to see force as a last resort, properly subject to multilateral control in all but the most urgent cases of imminent self-defense. The nature of American diplomatic maneuverings in the United Nations and the public statements of high-level officials suggest that even the United States continues to recognize the importance of these norms.     

Doctrine and violence: The impact of combatant training on civilian killings

Military theorists and practitioners have long argued that training shapes how combatants treat civilians during war. Yet there is little systematic evidence regarding the impact of training on wartime behavior, and almost none for non-state armed groups, despite the fact that such groups intensively train their fighters in order to shape their behavior towards civilian populations. This article argues that among insurgent groups that emphasize the strategic and tactical importance of restraint towards civilian populations, political training can reduce civilian killings. We test the observable implications of our theory in the case of Colombia, using survey data on former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgents and sub-national data on civilian killings. We find support for our hypothesis, with results that are robust to a range of model specifications and controls, including alternate sources of combatant discipline and obedience, such as military training and punishment.