Millenarian groups and law enforcement agencies: The lessons of Waco

Why do violent movements participate in elections? To answer this question, we examine Hamas's formation of the Reform and Change Party and its iconic victory in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council. We argue that Hamas's formation of this party was a logical step, following nearly two decades of participation in local and municipal elections. Hamas's need to attract resources from external donors, who make funding decisions based on civilian support for the movement, best explains why Hamas decided to participate in local elections in the early 1990s, taking Hamas on a path that eventually led to its 2006 legislative victory. Hamas's foray into elections was consistent with its dual strategy of directing violence against Israel and building Palestinian support through welfare services. We demonstrate that changes in political opportunities (Fatah's decline and the increase in Hamas's popularity), institutional incentives (lax electoral laws and the holding of municipal elections), and the rise of moderate voices within Hamas explain the timing of its entry into legislative elections. Finally, we discuss Hamas's electoral victory, the need for cooperation between Fatah and Hamas, and the role played by international actors as significant factors influencing prospects for peace and democratization in the region.     

Terroristic Narratives: On the (Re) Invention of Peace in Northern Ireland

This article shows how Hamas legitimized its policy choices during the Al-Aqsa intifada and the Gaza war. The organization's policy moved from violent during the initial stages of the uprising to more moderate during later years. While this entailed huge changes in the organization's course of action, Hamas nevertheless always managed to frame its choices in a way that seemed consistent with its long-held beliefs. The same occurred during the Gaza war, when Hamas moderated its discourse even further. This shows Hamas' flexibility and pragmatism but also that seemingly rigid ideological views can change quite dramatically when circumstances change too.     

Islam and resistance: Hamas,ideology and Islamic values in Palestine

This article investigates the historical evolution, values and Islamic reference points of Hamas. A product of fieldwork in the Middle East in 2009–2010, it allows Palestinian Islamists and their supporters to explain their views on Islam, whilst analysing the implications of these in regards to Hamas’ wider programme of resistance. Interviews and surveys, as well as Hamas’ ongoing use of Islamic terminology and the Islamisation of the Gaza Strip, reveal that religion remains intertwined with the movement’s political and social activities. Secular analyses clearly demarcating political and religious spheres in such cases are inadequate. The interpretation of Islamic values is not immutable, however, but rather part of a dynamic process subject to evolution and change.     

Rebel-to-political and back? Hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion,politics and governance

ABSTRACT

After winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections and subsequently taking control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, the Palestinian Hamas – a hybrid political, social and military actor – undertook a complex process to ascertain authority and control over Gaza. The article focuses on understanding Hamas’s performance as a political party and a “rebel government” as well as the impact of this newly acquired role on the group’s strategy. Relying on primary sources, field-work and interviews with members of the Hamas government and its security sector, the study looks at Hamas’s role as a security provider and analyses the complex relationship between the institutionalized security sector and the group’s insurgent armed wing. Examining Hamas’s logic as a security provider and exploring the inherent tensions between political and insurgent logics allows for a better understanding of both the rebel group’s role as a political actor and the broader challenges behind the successful rebel-to-political transformations of non-state armed organizations. In doing so it contributes to the emerging literature on non-state actors’ shifts between ballots and bullets and on their potential role as alternative governance providers.     

Political factors affecting cooperation between Italy,Greece and Turkey

The rise of political Islam in the EU's southern neighbourhood represents a political as well as conceptual challenge to the EU as a foreign policy actor. In the past, the EU reacted to this challenge based on its essentialist perception of political Islam and its overarching interest in regional stability and security. However, the growing salience of ‘contingencist’ interpretations of political Islam and the resolution of the EU's democratisation-stabilisation dilemma in the wake of the Arab Spring have recently provided an opportunity for greater engagement and cooperation. This has enabled a switch in EU policies from a strategy of containment to a strategy of engagement. Despite this, problems remain as the EU continues to expect Islamist actors to adjust to its own discursive framework and as intra-European divisions revive as a result of the renewal of secular-religious divisions in the neighbourhood. This will complicate EU attempts to build a new partnership with Islamist democracies and will fuel old stereotypes and animosities.     

Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad

Using twice-yearly data from 1991 to 2003, we analyze the incidents of suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad within Israel and the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Given the exploratory nature of the question, we have first estimated the relevant coefficients by using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Ratio and then checked their robustness by reestimating the model with the help of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) as an interrelated system. The results indicate that the two groups deliberately use suicide bombings as strategic weapons within the larger Israeli-Palestinian political milieu. With the Western world locked in an armed struggle with the militant extremists of Islam based on millenarian ideologies, this study emphasizes the need to develop appropriate analytical capabilities to distinguish among terrorist groups and their motivations, ideologies, and tactics.     

Democratization,Instability, and War: Israel's 2006 Conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah

In 2006 Israel resumed military operations in the Gaza Strip and conducted a war in Lebanon following attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah, respectively. Due to the elections that had recently taken place in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, these events seem to support the argument that democratizing nations are particularly war-prone. Yet the dynamics this perspective identifies as dangerous were largely absent. To address this puzzle, this paper offers three arguments. First, democratization enhanced the power of groups openly hostile to Israel, increasing Israel's perception of threat. Second, democratization was threatening because it occurred within highly divided societies governed by weak state institutions that allowed radical groups to attain political power. Finally, Israel's response to the increased threat posed by these groups was ultimately counterproductive because it further eroded the capacity of the Palestinian and Lebanese governments, heightened polarization within both societies, and therefore exacerbated the same conditions that made democratization threatening to begin with.     

What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process

Increasingly, scholars are applying Social Movement Theory to explore how radical Islamist groups strategically employ framing to legitimize the use of violence. What has not been explicitly examined, however, is under what conditions radical frames are more resonant with the public than more moderate alternatives. This article argues that the strength of a particular frame depends on the credibility of the competing claim-makers. Drawing on public opinion polls from the Palestinian Territories, the article shows that the resonance of Hamas’ frames vis-à-vis the peace process between 1993 and 2006 depended on the ability of the Palestinian leadership to maintain its legitimacy. Since the Gaza take-over and Hamas’ shift to a position of leadership rather than opposition party, the organization's inability to deliver in the economic realm or to even feign any progress regarding the peace process damaged its credibility and reputation. Accordingly, its frames vis-à-vis the peace process also started losing their resonance with the public. An understanding of the dynamics of credibility can also help explain the continued moves towards national reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.     

The Challenge of Talking about Terrorism: The EU and the Arab Debate on the Causes of Islamist Terrorism 1

The Arab “hegemonic debate” on the causes of Islamist terrorism nurtures (pan-) Arab, anti-Western sentiments and delegitimizes criticism of the political status quo. The European Union's emphasis on multilateral means of conflict resolution and trade promotion leads to official pronouncements that barely address the Arab world's domestic problems, instead referring to international tensions such as the Arab-Israeli conflict as a particular cause of Islamist terrorism and the need for cooperation with Arab governments. By failing to challenge the official narratives of authoritarian Arab regimes the EU obstructs interests in the democratization of the region and the delegitimization of Islamist violence.     

Hamas: Suicide Bombings,Rockets, or WMD?

Much debate has recently focused on Hamas' development of short-range missiles and on the organization's alleged interest in chemical weapons. Successful employment of such technology could potentially be very destructive and would have an immense effect on the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This article seeks to address the question of likelihood of Hamas' technological progression by examining the issue as a cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the organization's leadership. The article presents suicide bombings, missiles and chemical weapons as possible tactical options for Hamas, and discusses the possible costs and benefits of the individual options as they pertain to the movement's long-term and short-term objectives. Additional factors likely to influence the organization's decisions in terms of weapons selection are also addressed. An interpretation of current Hamas' actions as well as an attempted forecast of Hamas' military activities is provided in the conclusion.     

The role of religion in Islamist radicalisation processes

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to bridge the gap between social and religious explanations for Islamist radicalisation in the West by understanding the role of religion through the under-utilised perspective of sociology of religious emotions and Wiktorowicz’s concept of cognitive openness. The article draws on interviews with 23 different actors with first-hand knowledge of Islamist radicalisation, and analyses five in-depth interviews with former so-called radicals, four of whom were converts to Islam. The analysis thus has a special focus on the narratives and experiences of converts to radical Islamist worldviews. The radicalisation process of the formers was characterised by an interplay between context specific experiences and individual religiosity. There are social causes for seeking religion as it can provide an emotional meaningfulness in a state of cognitive openness connected to personal family social background, which can stretch over a long period. However, the interviews also show that religiosity affects the social: the religious emotions within radical Islamist groups create a tight-knit community of self-perceived righteous believers, tied to an emotional experience of empowerment that amplifies their radicalisation. The article concludes that the primary role of religion is to structure and direct the emotions from which so-called radical Islamists think and act within religious frameworks.     

Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

In recent years there has been increasing academic interestin Islamism in the Middle East, not least in Palestinian Islamismchampioned by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whichare waging a war of attrition against the Israeli occupationof the West Bank and Gaza. There has been less concern withIslamism among the Palestinian refugees dispersed in MiddleEastern countries such as Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The articleoutlines the sources of Islamism (‘political Islam’)among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The rise of Islamismis a complex mix of contingent factors that is fuelled by socialand political deprivation and shaped by divergent views on Palestiniannationalism (secular vs. Islamist), the Islamist revival inLebanon and ‘strategic localization’ that turnsrefugee camps into battlefields between Palestinian factions.The Islamist groups cater for narrowly defined segments of therefugee population and have been unable to attract wider support.Instead, they cater for minor, camp-based constituencies whichcompete with secular groups for internal control of the campsand, by implication, of the Palestinian nationalist cause itself.     

The US discourse on political Islam: is Obama's a truly post-‘war on terror’ administration?

In this article, I examine the legacy of the discourse on political Islam in the context of George W. Bush's ‘war on terror’, reflecting on the role this discourse has performed in constructing and affirming the United States' self-identity as a beacon of ‘democracy’, ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’, in contradistinction to an Islamist ‘other’. It will evaluate the three most prominent manifestations of the modern rationalist paradigm in relation to the ‘war on terror’ discourse: the tendency to ‘ideologise terror’; the tendency to conflate Islamist movements and view them solely within a security/counterterrorism framework; and the tendency to employ double standards when distinguishing between what is regarded as legitimate and illegitimate uses of political violence. This article will then consider to what extent it is appropriate to label the period since the Obama election as a truly ‘post-war on terror’ politics.     

Islamist moderation in perspective: comparative analysis of the moderation of Islamist and Western communist parties

What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of moderation? Although a prevalent question in recent years, less is known about the causes and forms of Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion. By building on the findings of Communist moderation literature, we introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist party moderation over time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation refers to the kind of moderation where radical parties make a decision on whether to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to shifts in a platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to gain greater popular support. Empirically, we analyse the Italian Communist Party and the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco in a comparative perspective. In providing evidence through structured comparisons and field interviews, we hope to advance a more universal, generalizable theory of radical party moderation.     

Parties,Party Systems and Democracy in the European Union

Since the late 1980s, research on political Islam has been much in vogue in Europe and the US. This phenomenon is typically viewed as an expression of religion rather than of politics. Precisely because of the assumed “religious” underpinnings of political Islam, most Western attempts to engage with Islamists often remain trapped in an attempt to test their “democratic credentials”. By focussing on what Islamists think about democracy, many studies have ignored the political, social and economic contexts in which Islamists operate. Accounting for the political underpinning of Islamist movements can both help understand their political evolution and open up fruitful avenues for comparative analysis. For this reason, attention is turned to Europe to seek best practices of external engagement with domestic opposition movements in authoritarian contexts, such as Western engagement with opposition actors in Franco's Spain, Kuchma's Ukraine and Shevardnadze's Georgia.     

Myths and realities of the impact of political Islam on women: female employment in Indonesia and Iran

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on targets in the USA, debates concerning the situation of women in the Muslim world have tended to focus on the extent to which they are victims of religious dogma. Like any other religion, Islam can be oppressive towards women; however, working women are not affected only by religious factors. This paper reviews women's experiences in Indonesia and Iran, countries in which Islamist movements have taken a leading role in the government. In the former, the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s precipitated civil unrest and brought an Islamist government to power. Since then, female employment in Indonesia appears to have been affected more by the economic crisis than by the Islamist movement, which was itself a by‐product of the crisis. In Iran, it might have been expected that women's formal employment would have declined after two decades of Islamisation, but in fact it has increased. A review of these two cases shows that the impact of the rise of political Islam is complex and cannot be captured by simple stereotypes.     

The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism

This article will develop an explanatory theory on terrorist safe havens. Focusing on Islamist Terrorist networks, this article argues that four specific conditions are necessary for the establishment of a safe haven for Islamist terrorist networks: geographic features, weak governance, history of corruption and violence, and poverty. At the conclusion of the article, the developed theory is applied to the Tri-Border Area of South America (TBA), where the frontiers of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, an area overlooked by the 9/11 National Commission Report's list of Islamist terrorists' safe havens.     

Transnational Islamist Networks: Western Fighters in Afghanistan,Somalia and Syria

Abstract

Western Muslims have joined jihadi groups in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Somalia and Syria to defend Islam from its perceived enemies. Transnational Islamist networks have played a pivotal role in bringing them to conflict zones by fulfilling three functions: radicalisation through mosques, radical preachers, and the Internet; recruitment which can be conducted either physically or digitally; and identity formation that provides the radicalised recruits with a larger cause to fight for as members of an imagined global community. Transnational Islamist networks are multifunctional entities on the rise.     

Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements

This article analyzes the global transformations of jihadist movements towards abandoning and de-legitimizing political violence in general and terrorism in particular. It focuses on the de-radicalization process of Libya's largest armed Islamist movement: the Islamic Fighting Group. It analyzes the causes behind those transformations and outlines the necessary conditions for, and policy implications of, successful de-radicalization. The article is mainly based on primary sources, field work, and interviews with former jihadist leaders, mid-ranking commanders, grassroots activists, security and intelligence officers, and state officials.