Ideology and Disengagement: A Case Study of Nationalists and Islamists in Chechnya

Abstract

Disengagement from militant groups has often been explained in individual terms such as battle fatigue or the desire to rejoin family and friends. We seek to examine empirically which other factors, beyond individual-level determinants, have influenced disengagement processes among militants belonging to different types of Chechen militant organisations. Drawing empirical insights from unique in-depth interviews with former members of the Chechen insurgency, their relatives, eyewitnesses to the Chechen wars and experts with first-hand knowledge of the researched phenomena, this study examines disengagement among jihadist and nationalist Chechen militants. Focusing on group-level factors, such as the capacity to resist external pressures, the use of violence, in-group social bonds and group cohesion, this article demonstrates that disengagement has been a less viable course of action for Chechen jihadists than for nationalist militants.     

Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe

Abstract

This article investigates the importance of the invasion and occupation of Iraq as motivation for recent acts of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. It analyses the mass casualty terrorist attack attributed to a group of Islamist militants in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the killing of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam by an Al Qaeda–inspired terrorist network. The first case has been assumed to be mainly motivated by the Iraq war, whereas the other case has been perceived as an act by an individual, motivated by domestic factors in Holland. The article situates these acts of terrorism within the theory of so-called spillover effects from armed conflicts to international terrorism. It argues that the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists in both cases, but that the terrorists linked the Iraq issue with perceived injustices against Muslims in Europe and globally.     

Understanding the Idea: Dynamic Equivalence and the Accurate Translation of Jihadist Concepts

This article argues that inaccurate translation of commonly-transliterated jihadist terms poses a major difficulty to scholars and policy makers who are seeking to understand the appeal and potential weaknesses of jihadist movements. Jihadist English-language propaganda is filled with transliterated terms, usually from Arabic. Although these transliterated terms (such as jihad and sharia) are extremely common, the shorthand English translations of these terms (such as “holy war” and “Islamic law”) often fail to accurately convey the connotative meaning experienced by the jihadist groups using them.

The translation theory of dynamic equivalence suggests that accurate translation consists not of word-for-word correspondence between an original source language and a reception language, but instead by finding concepts in the reception language that provide the same sense of emotive meaning that exists in the community using the source language. This concept-to-concept model of translation offers insights into both the community using the source language and the community for which the scholar is writing.

A brief overview of dynamic equivalence and its merits for translation is followed by redefinitions of ten commonly-transliterated Arabic words found within the ISIS publication Dabiq. A refined understanding of some of these jihadist terms provides insights into both the appeal and weaknesses of jihadist groups. This model of translation and these improved definitions can serve as the foundation for a longer-term project providing an updated, comprehensive lexicon of jihadist terms.     

The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War-Fighting: The Bosnia Precedent

This article examines the manifestation of jihadist ideology in the strategic thought and behavior of war-fighting forces. Employing the “strategic approach,” it aims to determine whether jihadist ideology is a military asset or a strategic disadvantage for armed forces. It hypothesizes the impact of jihadist ideology on the use of force by examining its potential effects in seven strategic aspects: vision, threat perception, objectives, strategy, constituency, legitimacy, and conduct. It concludes by discussing the contradictory effects of jihadist ideology on the utility of force. Theoretical arguments throughout the article are elaborated by a discussion of jihadist forces in the Bosnian civil war.     

Book Review

The madaris located in Pakistan have played an important role in spreading militant jihadist ideologies and some have even labeled the madaris “terrorist factories.” After the War on Terror began the Pakistani government was forced to deal with their violent religious schools. The federal government did produce a plan for reform; however, the already unimpressive strategies have not been followed through successfully and the militant schools still remain a major threat even today. The reform will need to focus on three different aspects of the madaris: the financing, the curriculum, and the state's authority over the institutions. In order for permanent reformation to occur, the Pakistani government will need to strictly implement policies that will demilitarize the madaris.     

Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter in 2013–2014

Abstract

Social media offer unprecedented opportunities to terrorist groups to spread their message and target specific audiences for indoctrination and recruitment. In 2013 and 2014, social media, in particular Twitter, overtook Internet forums as preferred space for jihadist propaganda. This article looks into Arabic statements by Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic State and jihadist forum administrators and online activists to argue that, beside the easier use of social media and disruption and infiltration of the forums, the conflict between the jihadist groups accelerated the migration to social media and the building of a presence on Twitter that provided relative resilience to suspensions.     

Failed States and the Spread of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Plagued by systematic state failure, sub-Saharan Africa's failed states have helped facilitate internationally sponsored terrorist networks and operations. However, until recently, this type of activity was primarily relegated to North Africa and the Horn. But that has begun to change. Now, what was once a seemingly benign terrorist presence in sub-Saharan Africa is starting to transform into a movement, with states such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) now lending arms, financial support, and radical militants to the extremist jihadist movement of internationally sponsored terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Further, with the recent bombings in Kenya and Somalia, and the failed bombing attempt on a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian national, it is becoming increasingly evident that internationally sponsored terrorist networks have found a permanent home in sub-Saharan Africa and within the hearts and minds of its people, which poses significant challenges for the international community, given the region's patchwork of failed states, where terrorists can easily hide and thrive. Consequently, this study discusses how the conditions of state failure have fostered support for internationally sponsored terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorist groups are now actively recruiting more militants from within the region and popular support for extremist acts is on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the article argues sub-Saharan Africa will soon become the site for the next generation of terrorists, and the next wave of terrorist activity.     

De-radicalizing Pakistani society: the receptivity of youth to a liberal religious worldview

The reported rise in radicalism among youth in Pakistan since 9/11/2001 has been attributed to religious education in madrasas and schools. However, education in Pakistan is only part of the historical and contemporary forces that contribute to the prevailing exclusivist religio-political discourse. Although most policy papers have recommended a secularization of public education, such efforts by the Pakistani Government have been counterproductive. These efforts by the Pakistani Government to reshape education, with massive funding from international donors, have faced strong opposition and there are signs of psychological reactance as evidenced by even greater levels of religious radicalism among Pakistani youth. The current study suggests a viable alternative for reshaping education in Pakistan. A nationwide survey of educated urban youth (N = 386) conducted by the first author, revealed that when considering radical religious, Western secular and liberal religious ideas, Pakistani youth were overwhelmingly supportive of a liberal religious approach to education that highlights an inclusive Islam emphasizing freedom and compassion. Findings have implications for Government reforms, peace education initiatives and long-term conflict transformation in Pakistan.     

Resolving the Kashmir Conflict: Pakistan,India, Kashmiris and Religious Militants

This article introduces a conflict resolution framework to address the Kashmir ¹ 1. Henceforth in this article, ‘Kashmir’ refers both to the independent territory under Dogra dominion since 1846 to 1947 and to the territory that nowadays encompasses ‘Jammu and Kashmir’ (JK), under Indian control, and ‘Pakistan Administrated Kashmir’ (PAK), under Pakistan. Throughout the article the term ‘Pakistan Administrated Kashmir’ encompasses both Azad Kashmir and the Federally Administered Northern Areas. View all notes conflict. Firstly, Kashmir is mapped out as a multi-dimensional dispute between various parties: besides the interstate dispute between India and Pakistan, Kashmir is also an armed conflict both between India and the Kashmiris over the right of self-determination and between India and the religious militants who are waging a jihad to create a theocratic state. Secondly, in order to understand the complexity of Kashmir, I introduce an original framework based upon six levels of sovereignty that helps us in underscoring the implications of the bargaining process between India, Pakistan and Kashmir. Based on this, I propose a roadmap for peace, which comprises three successive steps: confidence-building measures, restoration of the asymmetric original status of Jammu and Kashmir and, finally, shared sovereignty (partial or total condominium) between India and Pakistan.     

The Evolution of the Structure of Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe: The Case of Spain

This article studies the structure of jihadist terrorism in the West from the perspective of the existence or absence of links between grassroots militants and organizations such as Al Qaeda Central and its regional affiliates. It undertakes a comprehensive case study of jihadist militancy in a European country (Spain) over a period of almost two decades, from 1995 until December 2013. The study analyzes the results of 64 antiterrorist operations carried out during this time.     

Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Critique of Jihadi Practices

This article deals with the attempts by the radical Islamist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to reclaim scholarly authority over jihad, a phenomenon he has helped promote but that has led to excesses he disagrees with and has increasingly become the prerogative of fighters instead of scholars. These attempts by al-Maqdisi to reassert his own jihadi authority are expressed through criticism of certain jihadi practices and advice to jihad fighters. Because al-Maqdisi has been in the forefront of radical scholars calling for jihad, his criticism has been dismissed by some jihadis as revisionism of his earlier views and as the words of a man lacking any fighting experience himself. This article argues that al-Maqdisi's criticism of certain jihadi practices does not constitute revisionism of his earlier views but is an effort to take greater scholarly control of the jihadi trend that he has partly inspired but which—in the hands of militants—has also developed beyond what he sees as useful and even Islamically legitimate.     

Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism

In 1989, the term fatwa became globally known, following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death-fatwa issued on Salman Rushdie for his novel, Satanic Verses. Today, the Internet has become a useful platform for posting of fatwas and interpretations of fatwas. The present article highlights the use of jihadist fatwas, and especially online fatwas, as a major instrument in bridging the current wave of terrorism and religion. The analysis, based on a database collected in a 12-year-long project of monitoring thousands of terrorist websites, illustrates how cyber-fatwas are related to key issues in promoting terrorism: justifying the use of suicide terrorism, the killing of innocents, the killing of children and women, the killing of Muslims or the use of various weapons (including weapons of mass destruction and cyberterrorism). There are two implications of the trends documented in this study: First, the analysis of the online fatwas and the fatwa wars may provide insight about the terrorists, their motivations, their doubts and fears and, secondly, it may guide countercampaigns.     

Spain as an Object of Jihadist Propaganda

The purpose of this article is to look at the importance and treatment that Spain receives in jihadist propaganda. This study offers a series of empirical observations based on a content analysis of a sample of propaganda produced by jihadist groups between January 1994 and September 2008. The analysis of this material, the context in which it was spread, and a comparison with other Western countries leads to the conclusion that the role played by this country in jihadist propaganda can only be understood by taking into account “structural factors” that have little to do with a greater or lesser level of interference in “Islamic affairs.”     

A Struggle for Power: Al Nusra and Al Qaida in Syria

Abstract

Relying on interviews with members of the organization, the article argues (contrary to the prevailing view) that Al Nusra never split from Al Qaida and even more so from the global jihadist movement. Instead the leadership of Al Nusra was locked in a power struggle with Al Qaida over the control of jihad in Syria and possibly even over the future of Al Qaida itself. Efforts to unify the Syrian opposition, even those limited to jihadist groups, failed also because of the leadership of Al Nusra kept trying to co-opt other opposition groups, rather than forming alliances with them.     

Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan

Pakistan's security environment has deteriorated through its adoption of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998. Internal fissures have widened along regional and sectarian lines as the Pakistani economy falters, unable to sustain even limited external sanctions following decades of internal mismanagement. Tensions with India have also increased as Pakistan's security managers adopt interventionist policies, based on a misplaced belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The international community, in particular, the USA's failure to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation, has emboldened Indian advocates of nuclear deployment. If India deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Pakistan will follow suit. Operation-ready nuclear weapons will increase the prospects of an India - Pakistan conflict that could assume a nuclear dimension. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorised or preventive nuclear attack. Changed domestic and external priorities alone can buttress Pakistani security.     

Understanding Perspectives on WMD and Why They Are Important

Although contemporary jihadist terrorists are most well known for perpetrating operations that generate mass casualties, they also conduct violent acts that yield fewer victims, such as beheading hostages. Examining the religious and cultural contexts that surround jihadist beheadings, developments in new media, and drawing on examples from the Chechen Wars and the Iraq War, this article argues that jihadists have employed this tactic for a range of reasons, including obtaining ransom payments, hampering foreign investment, discrediting transitional states, and recruiting supporters. It also suggests that jihadists' beheading of their captives corresponds with aspects of cosmic war, particularly on how religious terrorists' desires to please a deity and secure a place of honor in the hereafter has devalued the lives of both captor and prisoner. Consequently, contemporary jihadist beheading is an outgrowth of the practice of terrorist hostage taking. As this article goes to press (February 2007) UK authorities disrupted a terrorist cell allegedly plotting to behead British Muslim soldiers who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to broadcast the filmed executions through jihadist websites. Journalists have described the intended beheadings and their dissemination as “Iraq-style.” There is no doubt that jihadist beheading became more widely known as a result of the Iraq conflict. However, the beheadings in Iraq were largely used to recruit future jihadists and to demonstrate jihadists' strength to their potential support base, the global Muslim community. In contrast, the alleged UK beheading plot was aimed at striking terror into Muslims living in the UK so that they would not support or serve their government. Indeed the Iraq beheadings were intended to persuade, and the UK plot was intended to dissuade. These alleged activities suggest that contemporary jihadist beheading is not only an extension of hostage-taking, it is also an independently evolving terrorist tactic.     

Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag

This commentary examines the issue of global jihadist recidivism and identifies it as a potential long-term international counterterrorism concern. Although there are no comprehensive and accurate statistics on global jihadist recidivism, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that suggests that the tendency for released imprisoned global jihadist terrorists is to return to terrorist activity. It is important to understand that arresting, indicting, and sentencing a captured global jihadist terrorist is not the end of the counterterrorism skirmish. In fact, the next stages of incarceration and reformation are more crucial to the endgame. The problem of global jihadist recidivism is at the core a manpower issue. Prisons have always been an important front for all types of terrorist groups. Recidivism or the failure of prison rehabilitation programs is simply one component of this front. Terrorist groups do not want their imprisoned members to reform and resign from the organization. Further research needs to be conducted on the recidivism rate for terrorists and whether religious terrorists would have a higher rate than secular ones. The academic, think tank, and U.S. government communities need to examine this issue to determine if it is a long-term international counterterrorism problem. The author believes it will be.     

Network Powers: strategies of change in the multipolar system

Abstract

The multipolarity of the 21st century is fundamentally different from that of its harbingers because in the past decade change and innovation have been induced through sites of negotiation and by the establishment of intergovernmental foreign policy networks. New powers like Brazil, China and India have gained relative weight thanks to their status as agenda setters, brokers and coalition builders. This paper examines the relevance of different foreign policy networks such as India–Brazil–South Africa ( ibsa ) and Brazil–South Africa–India–China ( basic ) for their strategic approaches and argues that they are crucial vehicles for their ascension. Drawing on the work of Hafner-Burton et al, who raised the question of how states increase their power by enhancing their network positions, a typology of foreign policy networks is proposed: mediation, advocacy and substitution networks play important roles in today’s shifting global order. The paper analyses how the different network types work together and how particular states have adapted better to the new environment than others.     

Pashtun Jirga and prospects of peace and conflict resolution in Pakistan’s ‘tribal’ frontier

ABSTRACT

There is growing recognition and appreciation of traditional approaches towards peace and conflict resolution across the world. This article aims to highlight the crucial role and consequential importance of traditional mechanisms of peace and conflict resolution in Pakistan’s terror-hit Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas, formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These ‘peripheral’ areas of Pashtun tribes stand in relative isolation from the ‘centre’ of the Pakistani ruling establishment. Moreover, with the onset of militancy since 2001 in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, the situation has turned worse for the local Pashtun tribes. The article discusses the changing role of traditional mechanisms and local structures of peace and conflict resolution, arguing that colonial legacies have failed to prevent, manage, resolve or transform conflicts in post-colonial states such as Pakistan. Furthermore, the Pashtun cultural code of Pashtunwali, along with its various tenets and structures, especially Jirga (Pashtun tribal council) and Lashkar (tribal militia), is also discussed in the article. The article concludes that the changing socio-political situation, along with the rise of the secular Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), is presenting a challenge to ‘tribal’ Pashtun patriarchal values as well as traditional structures like Jirga in the region.