How Could China Bargain for a Peaceful Accommodation?

China's rise is a bargaining process between China and the outside world—especially with the United States. This article suggests two strategies, “socialization” and “legitimation,” which a rising power can use to seek “accommodation for identity” with the hegemon. Using China's peaceful rise after the Cold War as a case study, the essay then examines how China employed these two strategies to reach bargaining deals on the arms control regimes and anti-separatist movements in Xinjiang with the outside world. It concludes that the United States needs to take China's bargaining efforts seriously and consider possible peaceful accommodation with China.     

How the West Was One: France,America, and the “Huntingtonian Reversal”

Samuel Huntington was such a prolific scholar that it is sometimes difficult for researchers to keep up with his many policy analyses and recommendations. This article deals with one important Huntingtonian thesis, of the late 1990s. The thesis appertains to Huntington's worry about the US becoming a “lonely superpower” due to a French-led campaign to drive a wedge between America and its transatlantic allies. The authors detail the current irony inherent in what they call a “Huntingtonian reversal.” Today, unlike in 1999 when Huntington propounded his “lonely superpower” thesis, it can appear as if it is America that seeks to drive a wedge between itself and the European allies. Moreover, should the West become “one” again, it will in part be due to French efforts to revive transatlantic solidarity.     

Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy,Political Networks,and Counterterrorism

Studies of counterterrorism have argued for the importance of bolstering, or “mobilizing,” moderates in the confrontation with violent extremists. Yet the literature has not elucidated when states seek to mobilize moderates and marginalize extremists, how they do so, or when they prove successful. The received wisdom is that states should cultivate and strengthen moderate allies by reaching out to them. This approach, however, fails to grasp the political challenges confronting potential moderates, whose priority is to build and retain legitimacy within their political community. Inspired by network approaches, we maintain that moderates can more easily emerge when their political interactions with the authorities are relatively sparse. We further argue that the state's strategies, including crucially its rhetorical moves, can bolster the moderates' local legitimacy. At times, this will entail not reaching out to moderates but isolating them. Before moderates can be mobilized, they must be made, and the state's criticism, more than its love, may do much to help moderate political forces emerge. This article explains why mobilizing moderates is critical, when it is difficult, and how authorities can nevertheless play a productive role in moderates' emergence. We establish our theoretical framework's plausibility by examining two cases—India's ultimately triumphant campaign against Sikh extremists and Spain's gradual marginalization of Basque extremists. We then suggest what lessons these campaigns against ethnonational terrorism hold for the so-called War on Terror.     

Nicaragua's Sandinista project: Ideology,power building,and social manipulation

This paper examines the ideology of the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) through an evaluation of official declarations, published objectives and analyses, stated objectives, and programs pursued. Since its seizure of power in 1979, the FSLN's efforts to “Leninize” the country have occurred gradually and often have been camouflaged. For example, the FSLN has promoted a ‘'people's church” to capitalize on the strong Nicaraguan religious sentiment while extending countrol over public life and undermining the official church. The paper describes the Sandinistas’ use of “magnet” and “salami” tactics to attract useful collaborators and restrict the influence of rival political organizations. While the FSLN ostensibly has tolerated other parties’ participation in the National Assembly, the Sandinistas in reality have required support for FSLN programs and have increased their own numbers in the assembly and gained control of the top positions in all state institutions, ministries, and the executive and legislative branches of government. Organizational changes have been geared toward centralization and hierarchization. As a result, the Nicaraguan state has been fully subordinated to the FSLN. Although the Sandinistas officially espouse a “mixed” economy with some room for a private agricultural sector as well as token political opposition, the author concludes that they are likely to continue on their course of increasing centralized control of virtually all aspects of public life, Leninizing of political structures, extending and consolidating the party's powers, and creating socialized economic patterns.     

Proliferation Implications of Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Theory and a Case Study of Tito's Yugoslavia

Programs of international civil nuclear cooperation—of “Atoms for Peace”—have come under growing criticism for unintentionally fostering nuclear weapons proliferation in developing countries. However, drawing on the literature on international technology transfer and on Albert Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, this article argues that Atoms for Peace efforts may often seriously hamper developing countries’ nuclear weapons ambitions by empowering their scientific workers and by facilitating the brain drain to the developed world. The article then presents a case study of the historical nuclear program of Yugoslavia, which received very generous help from the Atoms for Peace programs of the United States, Soviet Union, and European states at a time when nonproliferation controls were minimal. The international ties of the Yugoslav nuclear program made its scientific workers much less likely to choose simple loyalty to the Tito regime, and much more likely to choose voice or exit, accelerating the program's ultimate collapse.     

Alliance Proximity and Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence

This article examines whether geographical proximity between defensive allies and a protégé increases the likelihood of successful extended general deterrence. I argue that proximate allies are better at making a credible deterrent threat because proximate allies are more willing and able to help alliance partners in times of crisis than distant ones. This claim is theorized by examining how geographical distance influences the international and domestic costs of alliance commitments. The empirical tests reveal that a potential aggressor is less likely to initiate a militarized dispute against a target with proximate defensive allies. Furthermore, I find that the power of proximate defensive allies is a more significant determinant of successful extended general deterrence than that of distance allies. Interestingly, I also find that the constraining effects of geographical distance on the effectiveness of extended general deterrence have been alleviated by advancements in military technologies throughout history.     

Change Nobody Believes In: Obama and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Despite the promise of ‘change’ in President Barack Obama's early dealings with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the policy that has since emanated from the White House was in fact commensurate with those of preceding administrations. Rather than heralding a new direction for American engagement with the conflict, the Obama Administration had displayed more patterns of continuity than change in its dealings with both parties. Specifically, by continuing to act as “Israel's attorney” during negotiations, the Obama team had in effect negated the president's early pledges to act as an honest broker in the conflict. In assessing the (in)effectiveness of the Administration's management of the Israeli–Palestinian issue, it seems that on-going mediation efforts to revive the moribund peace process have exhausted their potential. Arbitration may be explored as a more effective method to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian territorial dispute.     

The Past,Present, and Future of Mediation as Seen through the Eyes of Some of Its Founders

This article is drawn from interviews with thirty‐one of mediation's “founders,” those pioneers who began mediating in the 1970s and 1980s, when the field was young. They describe what first attracted them to mediation and why they have remained active in the field. Some told us that they have found it to be both intellectually challenging and interpersonally satisfying to assist disputing parties in their search for a mutually acceptable resolution they could not find on their own. Others see mediation's collaborative approach to decision making as a means of bringing about social and political change that might be otherwise unattainable. The mediators also described the changes they have observed since they entered the field: mediation's dramatic growth, institutionalization in the judicial system, and market domination by lawyers and retired judges. Among the concerns they expressed were the prevalence of a mediation model that focuses primarily on the legal strengths and weaknesses of each party's position, and the dollar amount that should resolve the dispute, with little interest in creative outcomes. Other concerns are a lack of quality control of mediators and trainers, and unproductive debate about whether the “correct” approach to mediation is evaluative, facilitative, or transformative. The mediators who work on public policy matters, including environmental disputes, were the most positive about the opportunity for creativity in their work, considerably more so than those mediators whose practice is primarily business/commercial. The mediators' views of the future of mediation are remarkably similar — their general sense is that the type of mediation that takes place in the shadow of the courts is likely to increase and to become even more routinized than it is at present. Several respondents told us that they also expect to see substantial growth in the use of mediation to resolve public policy issues. Many of these mediators predicted that this type of mediation is likely to be carried out by organizational insiders, rather than outside interveners. As one mediator said, “Maybe there's a new set of mediation roles for people within traditional institutions, not just for free‐standing neutrals.”     

Democracy promotion and the challenges of illiberal regional powers: introduction to the special issue

This special issue examines Western efforts at democracy promotion, reactions by illiberal challengers and regional powers, and political and societal conditions in target states. We argue that Western powers are not unequivocally committed to the promotion of democracy and human rights, while non-democratic regional powers cannot simply be described as “autocracy supporters”. This article introduces the special issue. First, illiberal regional powers are likely to respond to Western efforts at democracy promotion in third countries if they perceive challenges to their geostrategic interests in the region or to the survival of their regime. Second, Western democracy promoters react to countervailing policies by illiberal regimes if they prioritize democracy and human rights goals over stability and security goals which depends in turn on their perception of the situation in the target countries and their overall relationships to the non-democratic regional powers. Third, the effects on the ground mostly depend on the domestic configuration of forces. Western democracy promoters are likely to empower liberal groups in the target countries, while countervailing efforts by non-democratic regional powers will empower illiberal groups. In some cases, though, countervailing efforts by illiberal regimes have the counterintuitive effect of fostering democracy by strengthening democratic elites and civil society.     

Normative Power and the Liberal Peace: A Rejoinder to John O'Brennan

This rejoinder to John O'Brennan reasserts the case that the EU enlargement process has a depoliticising effect, which weakens the connections between Western Balkan states and their societies. It suggests that O'Brennan's response is more apologia than analysis; evading issues raised by asymmetrical relations of power between the EU and Western Balkans states. Here the EU is idealised, with the ascribed status of a “normative actor” projecting power merely through “soft power” mechanisms. The points raised in rejoinder seek to clarify that the more “muscular” use of conditionality and direct management of policy reforms inevitably limit the possibilities for public and political debate and consensus-making. Moreover, they distance political elites from their societies. In particular, the use of political conditionality is highlighted, to demonstrate that whether “hard” powers of imposition or “soft” powers of conditionality are used matters less to those on the receiving end of external imposition than to the EU itself, which has attempted to distance itself from its use of executive powers in the region.     

Managing the Hegemon: nato under Unipolarity

The shift to unipolarity has introduced new dilemmas for America's allies. Their level of strategic uncertainty has increased, largely because under unipolarity, allies' threat perceptions are more likely to diverge across time or issue areas and are not shaped as much by structural systemic factors. Although they want to maintain the pre-existing security arrangements as a means of managing the rising uncertainty, allies need to deal with the dual concern of either being trapped into the hegemonic partner's policies, or being abandoned by the hegemon. These two concerns—the alliance security dilemma—may become more or less prominent given the nature of the divergence in threat perceptions on different issues and at different times. To deal with this dual threat, allies employ two strategies: using the pre-existing alliance as a pact of restraint, and developing a division of labor with the hegemon. Both the dilemmas and the strategies used to mitigate them are examined here in the context of the European behavior within nato following the Gulf War, the nato involvement in Kosovo, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq.     

Learning to Think the Unthinkable: Lessons from India’s Nuclear Tests

This article examines the impact that national economic policies adopted during Indira Gandhi's final term in office (1980–84) had on four “national” social groups, namely the big industrialists, the middle class, the rich peasantry, and the poor. The study argues that the Congress (I) chose the former two as its major allies, while the rich peasantry and the poor were relegated to a secondary position. In the process, the focus of India's strategy of development shifted from the agrarian to the industrial sector, and from the rural to the urban world.     

Intervention Without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators

Existing research on international mediation emphasizes the importance of leverage in altering the combatants' ability to reach a negotiated settlement. Less understood is the role of third parties that do not have access to sources of leverage even though they comprise a substantial amount of mediation efforts. This paper highlights two potential explanations for the prevalence of “weak” mediators. First, a choice of third parties without leverage might be a product of the “supply side” preferences of the international community, in particular, the great powers. Second, the inclusion of third parties without any leverage can result from actors hedging their commitments to the peace process when they suspect with some uncertainty that one side will use third-party involvement insincerely for ends other than peace. Using data from the Managing Intrastate Low Level Conflicts (MILC) project, in conjunction with the PRIO/UPPSALA Armed Conflict data, empirical results using competing risk models confirm both logics. Mediators with weak leverage are more likely when an actor has strong incentives to stall: specifically, when the immediate costs of conflict are high, there is domestic political pressure in the absence of democratic accountability, and relative bargaining power is shifting. The findings also suggest that supply-side dynamics matter. Weak mediators are less likely in the presence of substantial foreign investment and in neighborhoods with strong states, but mediators of all types are more likely in democratic neighborhoods. To further explore the role of insincere motivations, the paper considers the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in Sri Lanka, brokered by Norway.     

Propaganda,effect, and the cold war: Gauging the status of america's “war of words”

The article examines the interrelationship among propaganda, effect, and the Cold War during congressional debates over America's first peacetime propaganda program. Although the rise of the communication research paradigm affected the production of statistical evidence to measure the effectiveness of America's Cold War propaganda, this case study argues that the “war of words” metaphor further heightened the need for empirical proof of America's status in that conflict, Just as with any physical battle that relies on body counts and land measurements to determine the success of America's war efforts, the criteria for measuring the status of America's “war of words” were driven by a similar demand for “objective” proof. The longevity of the Cold War helped ensure the institutionalization of the communication research paradigm, which rejected the use of anecdotal evidence as support for the program's impact.     

The British are “Taking to the Boat”: Australian Attempts to Forestall Britain's Military Disengagement from Southeast Asia, 1965–1966

This article examines the strategies pursued by the Australian Liberal-Country Party coalition governments of Robert Menzies and Harold Holt in their quest to secure a continuing British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore. It focuses on the first eighteen months of the Wilson premiership (October 1964–March 1966) when Labour's thinking on the future of Britain's defence role east of Suez was still fluid and had not yet crystallised into a firm decision to withdraw from “east of Suez.” In doing so, the article considers whether both Menzies and Holt did all they could to encourage London to remain politically and militarily engaged in Southeast Asia. In addressing this question, this study provides an interesting insight into the conduct of post-war Australian foreign policy and the management of Australia's relations with its major allies, the United States and Britain.     

Leaderless Resistance,Networked Organization,and Ideological Hegemony

This article examines various forms of “new terrorism,” specifically the structure of “leaderless resistance,” in connection with Robert Michels’ idea of the “iron law of oligarchy.” It is usually argued that “leaderless resistance” movements lack some of the typical obstacles of terrorist (and other) organizations, given their non-hierarchical and comparatively fluid natures. However, a new form of oligarchy develops in this type of movement, located in the propagation of key ideological concepts/arguments/symbols, the assigning of target preferences, and the elevation or demotion of others within the movement broadly. Rather than oligarchy forming via the material assets of organizations, an “ideational” oligarchy is created that shapes the goals of leaderless resistance movements: those leaders who are already established, and who control the means of communicating the movement's ideas to the widest audience, will impede the growth of groups and individuals within the movement that attempt to supplant their role. This article will use the examples of certain eco-terror groups (the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front) to explicate this development.     

Buck-passing,Chain-ganging and Alliances in the Multipolar Indo-Asia-Pacific

ABSTRACT

Christensen’s and Snyder’s neorealist-based theory of buck-passing and chain-ganging uses offence-defence balance to predict state security policy choices under multipolarity. This approach is applicable to the US-led alliance system in the multipolar Indo-Asia-Pacific. Given regional Sino-US rivalry, hedging opportunities for US ‘hub-and-spoke’ allies will dissipate, increasing the likelihood of allies choosing to buck-pass or chain-gang in the face of conflict. With defence superior in the region, it is more likely that US allies will buck-pass rather than chain-gang. Beyond Indo-Asia-Pacific states, this has implications for global actors – such as the EU – seeking to raise their security profile in the region, as buck-passing behaviour gives greater time to adjust to potential conflict scenarios than chain-ganging.     

The crisis of the state in Russia

President Dmitry Medvedev is neither a “liberal” nor a “puppet” of his mentor, Vladimir Putin. He is a capable politician, who appears genuinely to believe in the rule of law. Yet his formative policy experience has been overwhelmingly dirigiste, the approach that is unlikely to change fundamentally under his presidency. Medvedev's personal preferences in foreign policy are largely in line with the policies initiated by Putin, although his rhetoric and style will likely be more conciliatory. He will inherit a plethora of problems created by Russia's assertive policy, both in its near and far abroad. Moreover, the institutional constraints and informal rules within which Medvedev will have to operate make policy continuity more likely than policy reversal.