Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50)

American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic.     

China＇s Soft Power and the Development of China-Africa Relations

With the deepening of China-Africa relations in all fields, China's influence in Africa has been strengthening. This is     

Vajpayee’s China Tour and the Sino -Indian Relations

OnJune 2 2 - 2 7,AtalBihariVajpayee ,India’sPrimeMinister,paidafruitfulvisittoChina .ThePrimeMinistersofthetwosidessignedaprogrammaticdocumentforthedevelopmentofrelations - -“DeclarationonPrinciplesforRelationsandComprehensiveCooperationbetweenthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandRepublicofIndia .”①Theyalsoconcludedninerelatedagreements .TheeventsshowedthatSino -Indianrelationshaveenteredanewphaseofdevelopment.Thetwogovernmentsshouldcon tinuetomakeeveryefforttoelevatethegood -neighborlya…     

Ronald Reagan’s Strategies and Policies: Of Ideology,Pragmatism, Loyalties,and Management Style

This analysis interrogates how ideology, pragmatism, personal loyalties, and management style all contributed to policy and strategic decisions made by President Ronald Reagan and his Administration (1981–1989). This approach helps to clarify Reagan’s achievements and shortcomings in what is still a somewhat conflicting historiography of his time as president. When woven together, generally, although not always, the three produced effective strategies for achieving clear objectives.     

Global Reordering and China’s Rise: Adoption,Adaptation and Reform

Abstract

While much of the debate over the implications of China’s rise tends to dichotomise around either status quo or revisionist predictions, the reality seems to lie somewhere in between. In broad terms, China has embraced multilateral forms of cooperation and governance. This does not mean, however, that it is satisfied with the distribution of power in many international institutions, or some of the norms and principles that underpin them. This has resulted in a reformist position, with China increasingly willing to offer its own supplementary alternatives. China’s rise has also provided an important economic alternative to dealing with the West, and considerably undermined the ability of others to establish their preferences and world views. China’s lack of commitment to democracy and the external promotion of human rights remains a key reason why some analysts remain unconvinced about the long-term ambitions of an illiberal actor in a global liberal order.     

China’s rise as a strategic challenge and opportunity: India’s China discourse and strategy

The simultaneous rise of China and India is one of the most important developments in contemporary world politics. Given their steadily growing power and aspirations and China’s more assertive posture in Asia, the management of China’s rise is one of the major challenges for India’s foreign policy. However, India is often said to have no guiding strategic framework for its China policy, which is seen as incoherent and reactive. This article, by contrast, shows that India has an evolving China strategy and that the alleged inconsistencies in India’s China policy are rather the result of an ambivalent image of China. Drawing on constructivism and discourse analysis, the article identifies the dominant perception of China in India’s foreign policy discourse and the resulting foreign policy strategy. In a next step, the article analyzes the China policy of the Congress-led UPA Government and investigates whether it conforms to the strategic policy frame of the dominant China discourse.     

The Politics of China’s Aid to North Vietnam during the Anti-American Resistance, 1965–1969

Behind the public display of Sino–North Vietnamese unity in the anti-American resistance during the height of the People’s Republic of China’s Cultural Revolution from 1965 to 1969, Beijing’s insistence on Hanoi’s acceptance of Maoist ideology coupled with its assertive demand for Hanoi to denounce Soviet revisionism politicised its economic and technical assistance to North Vietnam. Although appreciating Beijing’s enthusiasm to aid North Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV] resented Beijing’s political and ideological objective of promoting Maoism and anti-Soviet revisionism in North Vietnam. In response, the DRV government asserted independent decision-making and bureaucratic control over the management of foreign economic and technical aid, which in turn collided with the Chinese assertion of superiority and insistence on their control over all China-aided projects. The fragmentation of Chinese bureaucratic institutions and the political chauvinism of some radical Maoists at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi, who oversaw Chinese aid to North Vietnam, further hindered Beijing’s ability to exert significant influence over Hanoi.     

China’s Public Diplomacy Rhetoric, 1990–2012: Pragmatic Image-Crafting

During Hu Jintao’s period of leadership, careful public diplomacy language was deployed by the People’s Republic of China from 2000–2012 to describe the international system and China’s role within it. The terms looked at in this analysis are those introduced in the 2000s to recalibrate the ‘multi-polarity’ [shijie duojihua] emphasis of the 1990s. These terms have been deployed within a general ‘reassurance diplomacy’ that emphasised concepts like ‘responsible Great Power’ [fuzeren da guo], ‘multi-lateralism’ [duobian zhuyi], ‘good neighbourhood policy’ [mulin zhengce], ‘democratisation of international relations’ [guoji guanxi mingzhuhua], ‘peaceful rise’ [heping jueqi], ‘peaceful development’ [heping fazhan] and ‘harmonious world’ [hexie shijie]. Ambiguities, implications, impact, and tensions surrounding these terms are considered, and China’s deliberate adjustments pinpointed. China’s soft power intentions emerge from its instrumentalist use of diplomatic rhetoric, though a credibility gap also emerged between actions and words by 2012.     

Evolution,retreat or rejection: Brazil’s,India’s and China’s normative stances on R2P

This paper outlines the development and evolution of the normative positions of China, Brazil and India on issues surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P) by charting their engagement in the ‘institutionalized conversation’ within the United Nations. In doing so, it seeks to dispel characterizations of these states as having adopted individual or common positions that either wholly reject or accept R2P. The nuances of the adaption and adoption of their postures need to be appreciated. Indeed, of the three component ‘pillars’ of R2P, they find themselves in general accord regarding Pillar One (state responsibility) and Pillar Two (prevention and assistance). It is on Pillar Three (reaction and response) that they diverge from each other and find themselves most at variance with ‘Western’ agendas of intervention and regime change. This divergence is most sharply drawn at present, in light of the Libyan and ongoing Syrian experiences.     

India-Singapore Bilateral Relations (1965–2012): The Role of Geo-Politics,Ideas, Interests,and Political Will

This paper is a critical historical analysis of the trajectory of geo-political and economic relations between India and Singapore. This paper argues that India’s perception of its interests and its geopolitical orientation towards the Cold War prevented India’s security and economic integration with Southeast Asia. Apart from geopolitics, the economic orientation of India was also a critical factor that influenced the trajectory of India – Singapore economic engagement. However, there was a dramatic change after the Cold War ended. The structural change from bi-polarity towards a unipolar moment transformed both geopolitics and economic engagement. Moreover, India’s own economic orientation had also changed by the end of the Cold War. In sum, this paper attempts to elucidate upon how ideas construct economic and political interests and how geopolitical interests, once constructed, drive economic relations.     

Sporting Relations: Diplomacy,Small States,and Germany’s Post-war Return to International Sport

ABSTRACT

Germany’s post-war return to international sport was not uniform across all federations. The nature of each sport—summer versus winter, team versus individual—influenced the speed with which each international sport federation dealt with the issue of Germany’s return. Some federations allowed German participation even before they formally re-admitted the country to federation membership. However, sporting relations were not the only issue considered by international federations. The historical political relations between Germany and its smaller European neighbours were as important. The combination of the historical relationship amongst European states—especially memories of the Second World War—and internal sport federation dynamics affected state relations within the broader international system. The actions taken by the international sport federations provided examples—in areas that would not result in another world war or destroy Western alliances—of how Germany could return as a full member of the international community. The debates regarding Germany’s return across a number of international sport federations reveal the complex interaction among memory, politics, and practical matters.     

UNRWA’s First Years, 1949–1951: The Anatomy of Failed Expectations

The birth of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Near East Refugees (UNRWA) in 1949 represented the culmination of two years of international diplomacy to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. The United States, Britain, and the international community not only sought an agency to take charge of refugee relief, but also envisaged a body to facilitate direct programmes for public works to wean the refugees away from aid dependency whilst also contributing to the economic productivity of host Arab nations. It was hoped this would support the refugees on a self-sustaining basis and even lead to their re-settlement and re-integration into the region. This analysis examines how and why Britain, the United States, and international bodies established UNRWA and identifies why UNRWA, by 1951, was unable to fulfil the task for which it was initially conceived.     

Ethnic Actors and International Crises: Theory and Findings, 1918–2001

One of the most sustained debates among students of international politics concerns the linkage of systemic polarity to levels of stability. The present investigation attempts to contribute to this dialogue in two ways.

First, prior studies of polarity and stability are reappraised in terms of the central concepts and presumed causal linkage, leading to several changes in approach. Specifically, polarity cannot be assessed only in terms of the distribution of power; the concept also should incorporate the notion of autonomous decision centers. With respect to instability, war is considered to be a less complete indicator than international crisis. Incorporating these revised concepts, a model of security regimes is devised deductively, including a rank‐ordering of polarity configurations in terms of stability levels.

Second, renewed testing focuses on the presumed ordering of configurations from most to least stable: bipolarity (1945–62), multipolarity (1929–39) and polycentrism (1963–85). Data from the International Crisis Behavior Project on 292 cases from 1929 to 1985 provide the evidence to compare the phases of polarity. A set of bivariate indicators and a multivariate index are used in the assessment of instability, with each confirming the hypothesized ordering of polarity configurations.     

Beyond ‘Engagement and Integration’ : An Analysis of the Adjustment of the Obama Administration’s Economic Policies toward China

As part of its new strategy of ＂returning to the Asia-Pacific region＂, the ~Obama administration has adopted some tough economic policies towards China, notably promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP） and attempting to establish new rules of international trade and investment aimed at strengthening economic ties with other Westem countries through the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement（TTIP ）,     

China’s Diplomatic Strategy and Peaceful Development:Opportunities and Challenges

The strategy of peaceful development pursued by China in the present international environment is faced with both opportunities and challenges, with the former outweighing the latter. To make proper use of the opportunities and cope with the challenges so as to accelerate the process of China’s peaceful development, it is crucial to improve our diplomatic strategy and ideas and plan our diplomatic work from an overall strategic perspective. This is also a major issue posed to China’s diplom…     

Learning geoeconomics: China’s experimental financial and monetary initiatives

China’s rise is increasingly impacting on the global financial and monetary order. To manage its growing centrality in global financial flows and its new relevance for patterns of currency usage, Beijing has been creating a set of new institutional arrangements in three crucial fields: the provision of crisis liquidity, development financing, and a global infrastructure to internationalize its currency. In contrast to the dominant power political interpretation of such developments, this article highlights the strong linkages of Beijing’s new initiatives with the changes in China’s capitalist development path and stresses their experimental character that serves to manage the economic and political risks of China’s accelerating financial internationalization. With a distinct learning attitude regarding its rising geoeconomic prominence and engagement, Beijing’s risk-averse strategy involves a very careful linking, layering, and nesting of new arrangements.     

America,Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945

In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to “quit India” than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.