Realignment of Great Power Relations

Wang: Speaking of Sino-U. S. relations, actually it touches upon great power relationship. The current Iraqi crisis became a focus in UN. There is a clear demarcation line between those countries supporting a war and those countries in favor of weapons inspections within the     

Do Great Powers Have Great Responsibilities? Great Powers and Moral Agency

Since 1815 it has been generally understood that the Great Powers acting in concert have some responsibility for ensuring/underwriting order and stability within international society—although it is clear that only occasionally have they actually discharged this responsibility. Contemporary conditions, where there is only one superpower, change the situation radically; the United States may be able to take the lead in organising the provision of global public goods such as an open global economy and a secure strategic environment, but it also may possess the capacity to promote its own particular conception of the good in the world— the conservatism characteristic of a concert of Powers may not dominate the actions of a single superpower. However, changes in the nature of "power' ' in an age of globalisation and "Empire'' may actually limit the capacity of any actor, or collection of actors, to discharge its responsibilities.     

Stateness problems or regime unification? Explaining obstacles to democratization in Burma/Myanmar

The fact that Myanmar is not democratic is too often taken as a given in international policy discourse without analysis as to why it has not democratized or what conditions might allow for democratization. Plausible theories to explain Burma's authoritarian politics include poor levels of economic development, colonial history, regional geopolitical factors, problems of state formation and the unification of the military. Determining which theories have the most explanatory power is important because different understandings of Burma's authoritarianism steer one toward some remedies and away from others. In this paper, I argue that problems of state formation – ‘stateness’ in one strand of the democratization literature – and ‘regime unification’ theories stand the best chance of explaining the lack of democracy in Myanmar. I examine the logic and evidence for each theory and conclude that while both explain some of the status quo, ‘stateness’ had more explanatory power before 1988 but in post-1988 Myanmar, ‘regime unification’ explains more.     

Politics or prejudice? Explaining individual-level hostilities in India’s Hindu–Muslim conflict

ABSTRACT

Multiple explanations have been proposed for what drives India’s Hindu–Muslim conflict. Harnessing novel approaches to data acquisition and analysis, this paper uses insights from an electronic survey with 1,414 respondents to test three prominent theories of why individuals promote conflict with out-groups. The results show that security concerns for the future are strong predictors for a hostile stance and approval of violence. Experiences of violence in the past do not seem to systematically perpetuate hostility. Personal experiences with out-groups strongly correlate with hostile sentiments. These results hold across model specifications, post-stratified estimation based on census data, and a benchmark relying on Finite Mixture Models.     

Security,profit or shadow of the past? Explaining the security strategies of microstates

Which factors determine the security strategies of microstates? Many microstates are either secluded island states or have very close political, economic and cultural ties to a larger neighbouring ‘protector state’. They have had, therefore, little use for more traditional alliance arrangements. However, the patterns of security cooperation between states have shifted as the significance of flexible ad-hoc coalition-building as a means to coordinate international interventions has increased. Consequently, the strategic security challenges and opportunities for microstates have been transformed. Focusing on the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, this article explores some of these challenges and opportunities. Three hypotheses regarding the decisions made by the respective microstates to join international ad-hoc coalitions are studied: (1) participation provides increased security, (2) participation provides economic gains, and (3) participation reflects the lessons of past security challenges. The explanatory powers of each hypothesis are examined using a comparative case study of 11 Pacific microstates.     

With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: On Foucault’s Notions of Power,Subjectivity, Freedom and Their (Mis)Understanding in IR

This article demonstrates how Foucault’s notion(s) of power can be misappropriated to International Relations (IR) thought. After considering Foucault’s early and late work, the article reveals the complexity of his thought, describing how he developed his notion(s) of power and their effects on subjectivity and freedom. Although a number of IR scholars have revealed the challenges of appropriating Foucaultian thought to IR, their approaches highlight the effects rather than the causes of such (mis)appropriation. By unveiling the causes, this article informs IR scholars on how to avoid this (mis)appropriation and points their attention to the interplay among power, subjectivity and freedom, which is often neglected. Therefore, critical value is added to the Foucaultian IR debate by analysing how Foucault perceived freedom, its association with power and the effects on the subject’s agency.     

Who Liberalizes? Explaining Preferential Trade Liberalization

Despite the growth in research on preferential trade arrangements (PTAs), few studies have systematically explored why some PTAs have been more successful than others at liberalizing trade among members. In this paper I test four hypotheses concerning intra-PTA liberalization: a regional system structure hypothesis, an international institutions hypothesis, a domestic institutions hypothesis, and an economic hypothesis. Although all four types of variables are statistically significant, only international institutions have substantively large effects on intra-PTA liberalization. This suggests that policymakers have considerable latitude to promote integration, as the impact of “choice” variables such as international institutions far outweighs that of “given” factors such as regional system structure or the nature of member economies.     

Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50)

American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic.     

An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?

This article examines whether the outbreak of an insurgency after the U.S. invasion of Iraq was an avoidable policy failure or whether the structural conditions surrounding the occupation made such an outbreak inevitable. Several U.S. policy mistakes, in particular the deployment of too few troops, a lack of comprehensive political and military planning for the occupation, disbanding the Iraqi military, the failure to establish a government in waiting, and overly aggressive de-Baathification, greatly exacerbated rather than ameliorated the various structural problems. More fundamentally, structure and policy choices interacted at all levels to explain the Iraq failure. The unavoidable conditions that coalition forces encountered in Iraq—a divided society devastated by years of war, sanctions, and misrule—and the political context in the United States made the challenge for successful policy execution difficult. This structure constrained and delimited the options open to U.S. policy makers but, even within those narrow limits, the United States made many bad choices that further diminished the chances of success.

A particularly important series of policy mistakes occurred well in advance of the buildup to war itself. The orientation of the U.S. armed forces away from counterinsurgency, the failure to establish a political settlement before invasion, and other controllable policy choices in the prewar period all led to enormous difficulties during the occupation itself. Thus, by the time of the invasion, these policy choices had become almost like structural constraints and the failures had a snowballing effect, making policy corrections far more difficult.     

Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval

How do economic sanctions affect presidential approval? Competing claims have been made about the domestic political consequences of economic sanctions. One claim is that sanctions are unpopular because they have negative economic consequences; another claim is that sanctions are popular because they project an image of strength; and another claim is that sanctions are neither popular nor unpopular because the public is uninformed about international affairs. These arguments imply competing identification restrictions. I test these competing models using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. The results show that sanctions have a moderate negative effect on presidential approval. I use these findings as a basis for a broader set of auxiliary analyses. Despite received wisdom, sanctions imposed for different reasons against different target states do not produce disparate effects on public opinion. These analyses resolve an important empirical dilemma that weighs on a range of theoretical perspectives in the sanctions literature and highlights fruitful avenues for future research.     

Alliance Forging or Partnership Building? China’s Policy in the Asia-Pacific under the Xi Administration

ABSTRACT

Should China forge a military alliance? Some scholars believe it should, others believe it should adhere to a policy of non-alignment. For China many risks are associated with military alliances. On the one hand, China would likely be involved in unwanted conflicts and confrontations created by potential allies. On the other hand, China would be bound to compete with the existing hegemon, the United States, which has already established a huge alliance system, to win more allies. China just cannot afford this. The intensified strategic competition between China and the United States may also lead to a new antagonism in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, China’s ‘non-alliance’ policy does not mean China has to abandon the development of strategic cooperation with other countries or renounce the right to build a cooperative partnership network. Since Xi Jinping came to power, the Chinese government has continuously expanded its strategic partnership network in the region. This policy could avoid US-China competition over military allies and enhance strategic trust between China and its neighbouring countries, creating conditions for China’s peaceful development and global strategic stability.     

Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?

The percentage of Israelis killed by terrorism is higher than in any other democracy. The article analyzes the threats Israel has faced, the impact terrorism has had on Israel, and the counter-terrorism policies Israel has adopted. Terrorism has had a decisive effect on Israeli elections and national security decisions, but not the economy. Israeli counter-terrorism has often been conducted without a coherent overall policy, has failed to reflect and conflicted with broader objectives, and has greatly undermined Israel's international standing. Conversely, it has enabled Israel to live in relative security and thrive, and provided its leaders with the latitude to pursue various policies, including peace, should they wish to do so.     

NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?

Abstract

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) declared the NATO Response Force (NRF) a fully operational capability. Yet only 8 months later – and behind closed doors – the Alliance's military authorities rescinded the declaration as it became increasingly clear that member states were unwilling to make the necessary commitments to the force. To this day, the force has been a qualified failure: while many allies have benefited from participating in the NRF, lack of concrete troop commitments and disagreement as to the force's operational role have largely eroded its credibility. This could change with the allies' recent adoption of a revised NRF-construct. However, as NATO is still in a state of strategic confusion, the NRF is likely to continue to be different things to different nations.     

International,national or local? Explaining the substance of democracy promotion: the case of Eastern European democracy promotion

The EU is one of the most prominent democracy promoters in the world today. It has played an especially important role in the democratization of its Eastern European member states. Given the acknowledged success and legitimacy of EU democracy promotion in these countries, it could be expected that when they themselves began promoting democracy, they would borrow from the EU's democracy promotion model. Yet this paper finds that the EU's model has not played a defining role for the substantive priorities of the Eastern European democracy promoters. They have instead borrowed from their own democratization models practices that they understand to fit the needs of recipients. This article not only adds to the literature on the Europeanization of member state policies but also contributes both empirically and theoretically to the literature on the foreign policy of democracy promotion. The article theorizes the factors shaping the substance of democracy promotion—how important international ‘best practices’ are and how they interact and compete with donor-level domestic models and recipient democratization needs. Also, this study sheds light on the activities of little-studied regional democracy promoters—the Eastern European members of the EU.     

China and America: The Great Divergence?

While there have been many sources of tension in U.S.-China relations since the Cold War, they have been held in check generally by circumstances that have inclined the governments to cooperate. Yet, the relationship remains multi-faceted and fragile, and various frameworks and forecasts—like the contemporary “Great Divergence” framework, which speaks to the apparent disjunction between economic and security affairs—have proven to be incomplete and incorrect.     

The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the Legacy of Fear – or Reproducing It?

Abstract

Drawing on the constructivist concept of ‘securitisation’, this article analyses Russia's perceptions of, and responses to, Norway's Svalbard policy in the 1990s and 2000s. The analysis focuses on three policy issues which have figured prominently on Russia's arctic security agenda in recent years: (1) the establishment and use of civilian radars and satellite ground stations on the archipelago, (2) the adoption of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act, and (3) the Norwegian Coast Guard's fishery enforcement measures in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. The article concludes that despite the changes that have taken place in the Euro-Arctic region after the Cold War, Svalbard has not ceased to be a security concern for Russia.