Of Garbage Cans and Rulings: Judgments of the European Court of Justice in the EU Legislative Process

This article addresses the problem of how to explain the influence that rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have on the political decision-making of the EU. It will be argued that a framework developed by Kingdon which follows the garbage can model of Cohen, March and Olson is a good approach to conceptualising this influence. This framework explains political processes in terms of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. In order to illustrate the argument, two famous rulings, Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, are examined in detail. Both rulings dealt with the same subject but had different impacts on political decision-making. The difference in influence depended on the conditions of the political arena at the time the rulings were given and not on their legal contents.     

Implementing International Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) boasts one of the strongest oversight systems in international human rights law, but implementing the ECtHR??s rulings is an inherently domestic and political process. This article begins to bridge the gap between the Court in Strasbourg and the domestic process of implementing the Court??s rulings by looking at the domestic institutions and politics that surround the execution of the ECtHR??s judgments. Using case studies from the UK and Russia, this article identifies two factors that are critical for the domestic implementation of the Court??s rulings: strong domestic, democratic institutions dedicated to implementing the ECtHR??s judgments and an overarching sense of responsibility to set a good example at home and abroad for respecting human rights and the rule of law. This article concludes with a discussion of the steps necessary to facilitate better implementation of the ECtHR??s rulings.     

The European Court's political power

The European Court has emerged as one of the most powerful political institutions in the European Union and the most influential international court in existence. National courts are the linchpins of the European legal system, making European Court decisions enforceable and creating an independent power base for the European Court. This article examines why national courts agreed to take on a role enforcing European law supremacy against their own governments and why national politicians did not stop an institutional transformation of the European legal system which greatly compromised national sovereignty. Competition between lower and higher national courts, each trying to enhance their influence and authority vis‐à‐vis each other, explains how national legal interpretive barriers and high‐court ambivalence regarding the European Court's declaration of European Law Supremacy was overcome. Politicians proved unable to reverse national court acceptance of European law supremacy, and institutional rules kept politicians from sanctioning either national courts or the European Court for judicial activism. Legal doctrine became a form of institution‐building, and a mechanism to make international law enforceable was created, giving the European Court the ability to make unpopular decisions and to compel compliance with European law.     

The European Court of Justice and its political impact

This article reviews recent advances in the study of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its political impact at the European and member state levels. New quantitative as well as qualitative analyses show with great empirical precision that member state preferences guide the Court. The article summarises these findings, but argues that greater attention needs to be given to the (over-)constitutionalisation of EU law in order to fully capture the political impact of ECJ jurisprudence. Even if European judges are less activist than is often assumed and individual decisions are more restrained in the face of member state opposition, incrementally, case law evolves in a highly expansive fashion. And, exercising caution regarding unrealistic expectations about quasi-deterministic judicial law-making, it is found that the Court’s constitutionalised jurisprudence impacts heavily on European and member state policy-making.     

Domestic legislatures and international human rights law: Legislating on religious symbols in Europe

This article examines the dynamics of domestic legislatures' application of international human rights law. Specifically, this article asks the following: What factors shape how domestic legislatures apply international human rights law while they enact national law and policy? Lawmakers have a variety of motives for invoking and deliberating international law. Given these motives, the article identifies two factors — civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law — that are likely to contribute to if and how national legislatures interpret and apply international human rights law while legislating. These factors are examined through case studies on religion in schools in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. This article argues civil society actors and legal experts and the flexibility of international law inform lawmakers' estimation of political costs related to compliance and thus how they apply international human rights law to domestic legislation.     

The European Court of Justice as a Federator

The European Court of Justice is often seen as the motor ofEuropean legal integration because it "constitutionalized "the treaties establishing the European Communities (EC) throughits jurisprudence. In reality though, the Court's role has ratherbeen that of a promotor or provocateur because the member statesand the national courts have been, by and large, cooperativepartners in this process, and many of the political consequencesof the Court's rulings have been hidden in its legal language.The Court will likely be careful in the future about continuingits judicial activism with the same vigor. Since the Treatyon European Union, many politically divisive issues are potentiallyopen to the Court's interpretation. In addition, the cooperativeattitude, by member states and the national courts, is no longerguaranteed.     

The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands

Studies of the impact of European integration on the national administrations of the member states of the European Union (EU) have pointed towards an uneven process of "Europeanization." While there has unquestionably been a growing range and frequency of contacts between national administrations and the EU system, there is little evidence of an expected convergence towards a common institutional model. This uneven Europeanization is presently explained with reference to a neo-institutionalist framework, drawing primarily on the work of March and Olsen. It is argued that the politico-administrative systems of the member states differentially adapt to the pressures of European integration in a manner which reflects the preexisting balance of domestic institutionnal structures, as well as th broader matrices of values which define the nature of appropriate political forms in the case of each national polity. Distinctive national patterns of institutional adjustment, rather than appearing anomalous, emerge as corresponding to a basic logic of differentiation indissociable from the integration process itself. The general argument is illustrated by an extended comparative study of France and the Netherlands, examining both the making and the implementation of European policy in the two countries.     

Out of tune or well tempered? How competition agencies direct the orchestrating state

This article analyzes the impact competition agencies have on the orchestrating role of states in domestic private regulation. I argue that these agencies can significantly affect interactions in the governance triangle through the way they apply a “logic of the market” to evaluate agreements between firms. The regulatory framework of European Union competition law has increasingly constrained the ability of firms to take into account broader interests when making agreements to foster social objectives. This logic of the market clashes with the ever‐increasing emphasis governments place on enabling firms to enter into such agreements. I analyze this tension through a case study of a pact of Dutch retailers to collectively introduce higher animal welfare standards for poultry. Using regulatory network analysis I trace the governance interactions between the governance triangle on the one hand (government, non‐governmental organizations, and firms), and the Dutch competition authority, Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM) and the European Commission on the other hand. Attempts by the Dutch government to instruct the ACM to be more lenient toward private regulation were blocked twice by the European Commission. As a result, the Dutch government abandoned private regulation as the preferred mode and proposed a bottom‐up process that would generate public regulation as a way to avoid conflict with competition policy. I argue that paradoxically enough the intervention of these non‐majoritarian competition agencies against the “will” of the governance triangle has potentially increased the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration processes.     

Europäisierungsdruck und Parteiendifferenz in den deutschen Bundesländern

Based on the 2008 Rüffert judgment by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which dealt with wage-related compliance requirements laid out in several German federal state procurement laws (Tariftreueerfordernis) the convergence induced by Europeanization through law is being investigated. Contrary to the initial presumption of unilinear adjustment, three different responses are identifiable. Conservative-liberal governments abolish the respective regulations. Conservative governments which are subject to influence from associations representing small- and medium-sized business enterprises absorb the adjudication by a rapid adjustment consistent with the European requirements. Coalitions led by the Social Democratic Party tend to a policy expansion influenced by smaller coalition partners. They codify more rather than less social and environmental standards in policy amendments. The case study points out the persistence of political party differences in the face of Europeanization which is dependent on a sufficient degree of programmatic incongruence as well as on the plurality of European law.     

Strategic interaction among courts within the preliminary reference process – Stage 1: National court preemptive opinions

Abstract.  While scholars today are well-acquainted with how the European Community preliminary reference process works, little research has been done to investigate strategic court interaction – that is, intentional, procedural court behaviour employed to influence the substantive direction of legal evolution, within that process. The present investigation, which is part of a larger project examining such court behaviour throughout the referral process, focuses on the initial stage: the decision to refer. Within that stage lies the opportunity for national courts to stack the interpretive deck for the entire decision-making process via a preemptive opinion, the submission of which is neither required, suggested nor prohibited by written procedural guidelines. It is assumed that courts are strategic institutions that seek to maximize their policy objectives, and therefore, national courts submit preemptive opinions to obtain that goal. Such strategic behaviour, however, is influenced by intervening factors – namely the acceptance of European Court of Justice intervention, national judicial procedure, issue complexity and individual court experience.     

Globalization and legal change: The “Americanization” of European law?

Intensified global economic competition, economic liberalization, and the rise of EU governance have led some observers to argue that there has been a trend toward the “Americanization” of the European “way of law.” This article addresses that contention, focusing on legal change in European member states. It first describes ways in which the American legal tradition has differed most sharply from the national legal systems of Western Europe (including Great Britain) and the political and economic factors that account for this “American legal distinctiveness.” Similar political and economic factors currently are at work in Europe, the article acknowledges, creating incentives for legal convergence. But it also argues that European legal culture and the political organization of European national states generate path‐dependent forces that impede European movement toward American ways of law, and it discusses six important differences between European and American law that remain entrenched and are unlikely to disappear.     

Constructive Ambiguity: Comparing the EU’s Energy and Defence Policies

This article explores the paradox of constructive ambiguity. Based on a focused, longitudinal comparison of the European Union’s energy and defence policies, it analyses the role played by strategies of ambiguity in European integration. Ambiguity is found to be an attractive strategy for political entrepreneurs when member state preferences are heterogeneous and the EU’s legal basis is weak. It is likely to be effective, however, only if it is embedded in an institutional opportunity structure – that is, a formal-legal context – that entrepreneurs can fold into their strategic repertoire of ideas. While ambiguity can be strategic in circumstances where clarity would create strong opposition, it is not sufficient to entrench a European policy if it does not rest on an institutional basis. This suggests that European political entrepreneurs should be wary of relying on coalition building by ambiguity only.     

The politics of judicial discretion: Rethinking the interaction between national courts and the Eurpean court of justice

The recognition that courts play a significant role in the process of European integration has focused attention on the interaction between national judges and the European Court of Justice. The prevailing theoretical model of this interaction holds that a variety of incentives impel national judges to co‐operate with the ECJ by providing it with frequent preliminary references. This article tests the ability of the model to account for the behaviour of national courts during the period 1972–94. In assessing the utility of the model two central claims are made. First, that the model as currently constructed is incapable of explaining the patterns of references originating from various member states, particularly the consistent lack of references from British courts. Second, that the level of British references, and patterns of judicial co‐operation in general, can be better understood by questioning the model's core assumption ‐ that national judges face powerful incentives to refer to the ECJ. As a first step in this direction, the article examines how the discretion to make or withhold references bestows on national judges the power to hasten or retard the pace of integration as well as to influence specific policy outcomes.     

Compliance and Conflict Management in the European Union: Nordic Exceptionalism

Why and to what extent do states differ in their implementation of international norms? Furthermore, why and to what extent do states differ in their mode of resolving conflicts regarding non‐implementation of international norms? In this article the empirical focus is on implementation of Community legislation by the member states of the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The analysis shows that over time there has been an overall reduction in the deficit in transposition, but the number of conflicts regarding non‐implementation has increased in the same period. While states converge on transposition, they diverge regarding their mode of handling conflicts related to non‐implementation. In general, the larger member states more frequently use court rulings to settle such conflicts. By contrast, the smaller states, and in particular the Nordic states, pursue a more consensus‐seeking approach, with limited use of courts. These observations indicate that domestic traditions and styles of decision making are more important for explaining variation than the enforcement capacity of the European institutions, and the extent of participation and power in decision making at the European level.     

Getting Their Way: Bias and Deference to Trial Courts

How much do trial judges influence the law in the United States? I analyze a model of adjudication by a trial judge who engages in fact finding before deciding a case, but whose decision may be reversed. The model makes three broad points. First, it provides an informational rationale for ex post deference to biased trial judges that does not require an ex ante commitment by an appellate court to a standard of review. Second, it shows how procedural discretion can bring biased trial judges' rulings closer to appellate doctrine despite enabling trial judges to “get their way” more often. Third, de facto law as represented by trial judges' case‐by‐case adjudication will differ substantially from de jure law. As long as there are not too many extremist trial judges, de facto law will reflect the predispositions of trial judges, not legal doctrine.     

The Stein Rokkan Lecture 2016 Mission impossible? Reconciling economic and social Europe after the euro crisis and Brexit

During the crisis, the European Union's ‘social deficit’ has triggered an increasing politicisation of redistributive issues within supranational, transnational and national arenas. Various lines of conflict have taken shape, revolving around who questions (who are ‘we’? – i.e., issues of identity and inclusion/exclusion); what questions (how much redistribution within and across the ‘we’ collectivities) and who decides questions (the locus of authority that can produce and guarantee organised solidarity). The key challenge facing today's political leaders is how to ‘glue’ the Union together as a recogniseable and functioning polity. This requires a double rebalancing: between the logic of ‘opening’ and the logic of ‘closure’, on the one hand, and between the logic of ‘economic stability’ and ‘social solidarity’, on the other. Building on the work of Stein Rokkan and Max Weber, this article argues that reconciliation is possible, but only if carefully crafted through an extraordinary mobilisation of political and intellectual resources. A key ingredient should be the establishment of a European Social Union, capable of combining domestic and pan‐European solidarities. In this way, the EU could visibly and tangibly extend its policy menu from regulation to (limited, but effective) distribution, reaping the latter's benefits in terms of legitimacy. The journey on this road is difficult but, pace Rokkan, not entirely impervious.     

Providing information and building capacity: interest group involvement in the application of EU law

Practical implementation has attracted significant scholarly attention in the European Union in the last decade, and the EU compliance literature started to focus more on the players in the domestic arena to help understand the application of EU law. However, a systematic analysis on interest group activities at the application stage is yet to be conducted. Relying on enforcement and management approaches, this article argues that interest groups act as providers of legal and technical information that are needed for correct application of EU law. Also, interest groups actively demand information from political actors to build internal capacity during this period. The results show that interest groups act as providers of information, but only in the national political arena. Moreover, motivation to learn is another factor that explains the level of access seeking during application, and this type of interaction takes place in both European and national venues.     

Is the Sun Setting on Cosmopolitan Justice?

Reports on the UN criminal tribunals and the related hybrid courts raise grave concerns about their sustainability in terms of costs and their legal standards in respect of evidence. The effectiveness of the current courts is compared to the domestic prosecution of offenders from the Auschwitz concentration camp. Although the Auschwitz court failed to capture the enormity of the crime of genocide, there are nonetheless good reasons to re-visit the use of domestic courts and other remedies for such crimes today, particularly after adoption of the genocide law by nation states. Ideals of cosmopolitan justice behind the UN courts are being exported to societies that are ill-equipped to apply or afford them; and domestic legal development suffers as a consequence.     

How to Measure the Europeanisation of a National Legislature?

While there is no shortage of research on national parliaments and European integration, empirical studies on the impact of EU on domestic legislatures are lacking. This article contributes to the literature by discussing the challenges involved in measuring the Europeanisation of national parliaments and through suggesting several hypotheses and indicators – EU-related national laws, the use of control instruments (confidence votes and parliamentary questions) in EU matters, and the share of committee, plenary and party group meeting time spent on European matters – that can be used in subsequent comparative research. Evidence from Finland shows the differentiated impact of Europe: while the share of domestic laws related to EU is smaller than often argued, particularly committees are burdened to a much larger extent by European matters.     

Managing conflicting ‘Truth Claims’ – ambiguity in the diplomat's toolkit in East-Asian Island conflict

The article is a study of managing interstate relations via ambiguity and secrecy. At the focal point of the article is the different constitutive logic of domestic politics and diplomacy in conceiving and managing social reality; with the former implying the notion of community and the latter separateness – the difference that allows for diplomatic conduct to rely on tacit agreements and ambiguity for managing contradictory ‘truth claims’, as China and Japan did in the case of the Ryukyu and later the Senkaku Islands. Such successful management is conditional on the parties' ability to control domestic narratives avoiding contradictions in their ‘truth claims’ becoming too blatant. Yet, modern technologies increasingly undermine states' capacities for this. The leaking on YouTube of the collision of a Chinese trawler with the ship of the Japanese Coast Guard in 2010 offers a perfect example. The incident aggravated the conflict and triggered intense debates on secrecy in Japan. The article concludes by arguing that once ambiguity and tacit agreements break down, leaders should turn to their public – recognize that noisy nationalist are frequently but a minority – and attempt to renegotiate ‘truth claims’ domestically to create the basis for a compromise.