Why Violence Abates: Imposed and Elective Declines in Terrorist Attacks

Previous scholarship on variations in violence within a given terrorist organization has primarily focused on factors that lead to the inception or destruction of that organization. However, violence varies substantially even during the “prime” of an organization's life. This article aims to understand why violence varies in the short term within many organizations, and places a special focus on declines in violence. Specifically, I argue that terrorists face countervailing incentives in terms of how much violence to use, and that when declines in violent activity do occur, they can be divided into two types: a) elective declines, which are usually temporary and used for organizational or reputational recovery; and b) imposed declines, which are dictated by changes in the relative capability of an organization, and are more likely to be permanent. The causal pathways to each type of decline are discussed, and a plausibility probe, consisting of case studies of three terrorist organizations, is then developed to substantiate this theory. The findings have notable implications for counterterrorism policy, as they illustrate not only when and why terrorists choose to curtail violent attacks, but also the conditions that determine whether declines in violence are temporary or permanent.     

The Palestinian intifada: An analysis of a popular uprising after seven months∗

This study challenges the conventional wisdom that the Internet is a reliable source of operational knowledge for terrorists, allowing them to train for terrorist attacks without access to real-world training camps and practical experience. The article distinguishes between abstract technical knowledge (what the Greeks called techne) and practical, experiential knowledge (mētis), investigating how each helps terrorists prepare for attacks. This distinction offers insight into how terrorists acquire the practical know-how they need to perform their activities as opposed to abstract know-what contained in bomb-making manuals. It also underscores the Internet's limitations as a source of operational knowledge for terrorists. While the Internet allows militants to share substantial techne, along with religious and ideological information, it is not particularly useful for disseminating the experiential and situational knowledge terrorists use to engage in acts of political violence. One likely reason why Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists have not made better use of the Internet's training potential to date is that its value as a source of operational knowledge of terrorism is limited.     

Desperate times and desperate measures: false-representation and distortion of terrorism in post-9/11 superhero films

In the wake of 9/11 there has been a marked increase in depictions of terrorism in Hollywood film. This shift has been particularly significant in superhero films. This genre of films has not historically relied upon terrorist narratives, but this article highlights contemporary ideological overlaps between terrorist and superhero narratives that explain why they have been more frequently presented together in contemporary film. In particular, both rely upon what Giorgio Agamben and other scholars refer to as a “state of exceptionality” and they feature ideological categories, such as those delineated in the work of Teun Van Dijk. This article analyses these themes using the methods of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. The article finds the growing number of depictions of terrorists in superhero films problematic because they deny terrorists rationality or political consciousness. The article analyses the binarism that this creates, finding that the proliferation of terrorist narratives in superhero films ultimately is detrimental because it proliferates a shallow and misleading understanding of terrorism which can undermine popular understanding of terrorism.     

How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?

This article examines, compares, and contrasts the ways in which “global jihadis” have trained for terrorism in Western Europe. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, the terrorists received training in Al Qaeda paramilitary camps. After invasion, they had to find alternative training methods and arenas. It is widely assumed that the Internet has taken over the role of the Afghan camps. The current survey suggests that the Internet's role as a “virtual training camp” might be overstated. Although the Net has become an important tool for terrorists on many levels, they maintain an urge to obtain real-life, military-style training in jihadi combat zones. Despite difficulties and risks, many of today's terrorists attend terrorist training facilities in Pakistan or other places. The main characteristic of training practices after the invasion of Afghanistan seems to be that, from an organizational perspective, the push for training and preparation comes from “below” rather than from “above.”     

Is this Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness in Counterterrorism

We analyze a seemingly simple question: When should government share private information that may be useful to terrorists? Policy makers' answer to this question has typically been “it is dangerous to share information that can potentially help terrorists.” Unfortunately, this incomplete response has motivated a detrimental increase in the amount of information government keeps private or labels “sensitive but unclassified.” We identify two distinct types of private information that are potentially useful to terrorists and identify the range of conditions under which sharing each can enhance counterterrorism efforts. Our results highlight the complex trade-offs policy makers face in deciding how much openness is right in a world where protecting the people from terrorists has become a central duty of government.     

Why Democracies Make Superior Counterterrorists

The conventional wisdom is that terrorists tend to target democracies because they are uniquely vulnerable to coercion. Terrorists are able to coerce democracies into acceding to their policy demands because liberal countries suffer from two inherent counterterrorism constraints: (1) the commitment to civil liberties prevents democracies from adopting sufficiently harsh countermeasures to eradicate the terrorism threat, and (2) their low civilian cost tolerance limits their ability to withstand attacks on their civilian populations. This article tests both propositions of the conventional wisdom that (a) terrorists attack democracies over other regime types because (b) liberal constraints render democracies vulnerable to coercion. The data do not sustain either proposition: illiberal countries are the victims of a disproportionate number of terrorist incidents and fatalities, and liberal countries are substantially less likely to make policy concessions to terrorists, particularly on issues of maximal importance. A plausibility probe is then developed to explain why democracies have a superior track record against terrorists. The basic argument is that liberal countries are comparatively resistant to coercion—and hence inferior targets—because they are superior counterterrorists. Liberalism's commitment to civil liberties and low civilian cost tolerance are, in the aggregate, actually strategic assets that help democracies prevail in counterterrorist campaigns, thereby reducing the incentives for terrorists to target this regime type. These findings have important implications for how democracies can defend their liberal values and physical security in the age of terrorism.     

The Escalation of Terrorism: Microlevel Violence and Interstate Conflict

Following the 9/11 attacks, transnational terrorism is seen as a potential catalyst for interstate war. Yet, the willingness of states to fight in response to terrorist violence is puzzling, given that the damage created by terrorism is relatively marginal. This raises the question: if terrorists are so weak and create such little damage, and interstate conflicts are so costly, why are states willing to initiate seemingly ruinous wars to fight terrorist groups? This essay proposes an explanation to address this question using current theoretical and empirical research on terrorism and interstate violence. Recent work indicates that while terrorists appear weak compared to states, terrorists can wield significant coercive power in smaller geographic areas. I argue that if these areas are strategically crucial to the government, such as areas with oil wells or mineral deposits, terrorist activity may precipitously weaken states relative to their rivals. I therefore argue that even if groups are only capable of killing at low levels, terrorism may lead to macrolevel power shifts, which may contribute to interstate violence.     

Terror of the talk: a new framework for countering terrorism within the institutionalisation of the terrorism industry

The “terrorism industry” that has been constructed by the war on terror has become institutionalised in the past decade, contributing in part to a significant increase in the overall public perception of terrorism and a dilution in meaning of the term “terrorist.” A linear regression analysis of the relationship of poll data collected from American citizens and frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks shows that this increased awareness has occurred despite the fact that terrorist attacks on American soil have decreased over the past decade. Considering the often-stated purpose of terrorists is to inspire fear, a central goal of the industry and the government should be to diminish these effects. However, the frequent and offhand use of the term “terrorist” fails to contextualise and counter the varied dispositions and motivations of terrorists and other non-state actors. To reduce public worry while working within the boundaries of the institutionalised terrorism industry, the study of terrorism should be conducted, and counterterrorist policies designed, using a new interdisciplinary framework that would allow the terrorism industry and the government to move beyond the binary designation of “terrorist” and “non-terrorist” to a greater spectrum of classification, from terrorists and violent non-state actors, to guerrillas, insurgents or criminals. A more nuanced framework could reduce public fear of terrorism and increase the effectiveness of counterterrorist policies.     

Terrorism and Profiling

A key problem for counterterrorism is how large numbers of individuals can be screened most efficiently to discover terrorists. This question arises at security checkpoints of all kinds, from roadblocks to airline security counters. Some argue that certain categories of individuals, for instance, young Muslim men in the airline context, should be screened more heavily than others. Others deride this as racial profiling, and argue that any such scheme would be easily evaded. I examine a model of searching for terrorists among a population divided into categories that vary in their potential reliability or ease of recruitment as agents of terrorist attacks. The equilibria in the model feature profiling, in that different categories are searched with different intensities. Practical difficulties in implementing a rational profiling scheme are discussed.     

Putin's foreign policy toward North Korea

Since coming to office in 2000, President of the Russian Federation,Vladimir Putin, has taken a pragmatic and calculating approachto the conduct of foreign policy in order to promote Russia'sgeopolitical and economic interests. For him, a higher profileon Korean issues has been an opportunity to show that Moscowcan influence Pyongyang and play a meaningful role in greatpower diplomacy on the Korean peninsula. As a result of activediplomacy toward North Korea, the two former communist alliesput a period to the deteriorating relations in the 1990s; afterthe September 11 terrorists attack and the launch of the waron terrorism Moscow's influence over Pyongyang reached its peak.The beginning of the North Korean nuclear crisis in October2002, however, relegated Moscow to a marginalized position inthe Korean issue. This paper examines how Putin's pragmaticdiplomacy was put into effect in Russia's foreign policy towardNorth Korea and how circumstances on the Korean peninsula haveaffected Russia–DPRK bilateral relations. An analysisof these factors shows why Russia's role in the ongoing Six-Partyprocess has become insignificant. At the present time, it iscertainly plausible that Russia will not activate diplomaticefforts to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis and will besatisfied with merely securing a seat at the multilateral talksin Northeast Asia.     

The Institutionalization of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI)

A number of observers have expressed serious concerns that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), as it expands in the Sahel, may become strong enough to be a threat to Europe and carry on the global mission of Al-Qaeda as conceived by bin Laden. This fear seems unwarranted. Using institutional analysis to study the AQMI behavioral fluctuations over the last decade, this article argues that AQMI's need to find a compromise between external and internal legitimacy has constrained its behavior. The affiliation of the Algerian terrorists with Al-Qaeda was in many ways a marriage of convenience that created a number of internal contradictions. At the cognitive level, implicit Algerian nationalism to rid the country of its corrupt regime remains at odds with pan-Islamic views shared by Al-Qaeda's leadership. At the normative level, indiscriminate suicide bombing supported by Al-Qaeda is abhorrent to many Algerian terrorists, who construe their mandate in the spirit of the Algerian war of independence where it is their duty to protect civilians. These and other contradictions prevent AQMI from developing a coherent political agenda and thus it is less likely to engage in a long-term conflict against European societies.     

Terrorism: A matter for moral judgement

If politics and military affairs often raise moral questions, terrorism is a politico‐military matter that veritably flings moral problems in our faces. This essay, initially prepared for military chaplains, explains why terrorism is a form of political depravity and a form of armed activity bearing little resemblance to legitimate guerrilla warfare. Dr Harmon analyzes how terrorists nonetheless use arguments ‐ moral and political ‐ to try to transform public attitudes and even paralyze the body politic into inaction and impotence. Common arguments of the terrorists and their public supporters and apologists are analyzed and rebutted. Conclusions include the proposition that internecine blood‐letting among terrorists themselves, and the self‐defeating character of terrorist logic, make these ostensible architects of new societies more adept with the wrecking ball than with the blueprint.     

Why terrorists target children: Outbidding,desperation, and extremism in the Peshawar and Beslan school massacres

ABSTRACT

Why do terrorists engage in behavior that is extreme even by their own admission—killing children? This behavior poses a major puzzle to our understanding of terrorism, but it has been surprisingly underexplored. This article addresses the question of why terrorists intentionally target children with a comparative study of the two deadliest attacks in which children were deliberately targeted by a militant organization: the Peshawar (2014) and Beslan (2004) school massacres. The article identifies two factors that increase the likelihood that a terrorist group will target children. The first is the presence of internal rifts within an already highly violent organization. This is likely to trigger outbidding and, thus, result in more brutal attacks. The second is existentially threatening external pressure, which seriously weakens the group and, thus, leads it to select soft and shocking targets, such as schools. The findings are based on evidence drawn from primary and secondary sources, including interviews conducted in Peshawar and Islamabad, Pakistan, and Moscow, Russia.     

Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves,Terrorist Groups,and Attack Lethality

Scholars, politicians, and pundits increasingly suggest lone wolf terrorists are substantial threats, but we know little about how dangerous these actors are—especially relative to other terrorist actors. How deadly are lone actor terrorists? A growing body of empirical research focuses on terrorist organizations, but similar work on lone actors is sparse. Furthermore, attempts to explicitly compare these or other types of terrorist actors are almost non-existent. This article considers theoretical arguments for why lone wolves ought to be especially lethal. However, it presents an argument for why terrorist groups should generally be more lethal. This argument is conditional upon the environment in which actors operate. Lone wolves should only be more deadly in states with especially strong counterterrorism capacity. The article uses data on terrorist attacks in fifteen developed countries, 1970–2010, to compare the lethality of terrorist acts. Around the world, attacks by organizations tend to be far more lethal than attacks by other actors. In the United States, however, lone wolves are generally the more lethal terrorist actors. This is argued to be because the robust counterterrorism capacity makes organized terrorism more difficult to accomplish.     

The role of ideology in terrorists’ target selection

Ideology plays a crucial role in terrorist's target selection; it supplies terrorists with an initial motive for action and provides a prism through which they view events and the actions of other people. Those people and institutions whom they deem guilty of having transgressed the tenets of the terrorists’ ideologically‐based moral framework are considered to be legitimate targets which the terrorists feel justified in attacking. As an extension of this, ideology also allows terrorists to justify their violence by displacing the responsibility onto either their victims or other actors, whom in ideological terms they hold responsible for the state of affairs which the terrorists claim led them to adopt violence. While it is not the only factor which determines whether a potential target is attacked, ideology provides an initial range of legitimate targets and a means by which terrorists seek to justify attacks, both to the outside world and to themselves.     

The Usefulness of Examining Terrorists’ Rhetoric for Understanding the Nature of Different Terror Groups

ABSTRACT

This study advances a distinction between two generic types of terrorists’ rhetoric: (1) ideological rhetoric candidly reflecting the terrorists’ genuine beliefs and values regarding their military targeting policy (who is a legitimate target), even when adopting such rhetoric involves high image/diplomatic costs; and (2) a PR-oriented rhetoric which consciously misrepresents the terrorists’ intentions and behavior in an attempt to project a more benign and humane image, thus maintaining sympathy and rebuffing criticism. We contend that such a distinction can provide a highly useful metric for assessing terrorists groups’ rationality and pragmatism: the most pragmatic groups will shift between these two types of rhetoric depending on changing strategic needs. To show the practical usefulness of this distinction we provide criteria for categorizing terrorists’ rhetorical responses to (mostly liberal-minded) criticism that they have killed innocent civilians in their enemy’s camp. We apply our criteria by examining terrorists’ (sincere and insincere) apologies.     

Insights into Selected Features of Pakistan’s Most Wanted Terrorists

This article attempts to provide insights into selected features of Pakistan’s most wanted terrorists using a dataset of 895 high-profile terrorists provided by the Counter Terrorism Wings of the Criminal Investigation Departments of regional police offices of Pakistan. It identifies spatial patterns of terrorist supply at subnational levels. The educational background of terrorists has also been analyzed. Noteworthy variations are observed in the supply of different types of terrorists across the geographical landscape of Pakistan. Findings also reveal that though terrorists are relatively more educated than the population group they emerge from, there is a higher probability of them emerging in districts with lower socio-economic performance.     

Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?

The current study uses the content analysis method while focusing on identification of repeated patterns of behavior by suicide terrorists and the society within which they grow and develop. The present study presents a typology—a classification into categories, each represented by a prototype, of suicide terrorists in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also identifies prerequisite factors (as without these factors, there is little opportunity for a particular prototype to emerge) and supporting factors (which may assist in the emergence of the prototype, but are not essential) for each of the suicide terrorist prototypes. The suggested typology is based on a convenient sample: details which have been published in the literature describing suicide terrorists. The typology suggests four categories of suicide bombers: religious fanatic, exploited, avenger, and nationalist fanatic. This typology is based on the main motive of the perpetrator, and different trajectories which each suicide bomber undergoes from recruitment to detonating the bomb. The major difference among the four categories lies in the prerequisite factors and their relative importance in comparison to the supporting factors.     

Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling: The Case of Aviation Security

In this article, we examine the relationship between hardening a target and the value that a terrorist group derives from attacking it. We use a simple expected value framework to compare how the expected value of attacking a hardened target varies between a violence-based approach, where terrorists are presumed to be maximizing the physical damage done to the target, and a signaling-based approach, where terrorists are presumed to be maximizing the symbolic value of their attack. We argue that, if it is proper to understand terrorist attacks as costly signals of terrorist strength or determination, hardening a target actually increases the expected value of attacking a target (relative to its value before hardening), even if the attack fails. We go on to examine the evolution of aviation security, and trace how al-Qaeda's views of airplanes and airports as targets have changed since 9/11. As aviation targets were hardened with increasingly onerous security measures, al-Qaeda began to see even attacks that did not result in detonation as successes, in large part because of what they signaled about al-Qaeda's abilities, and the ability of al-Qaeda to impose costs on the U.S. and other countries even in the absence of explosions.     

“Glory to Breivik!”: The Russian Far Right and the 2011 Norway Attacks

This article documents Anders Behring Breivik's reception on the Russian far Right, with a comparative view to Western Europe. On July 22, 2011, Breivik carried out two terrorist attacks in Norway, killing 77 people. Based on a variety of open sources, the article finds that Breivik has received much more open support in Russia than in Western Europe. I suggest there are three main reasons why Russia stands out. First, a weaker social stigma attached to Right-Wing extremism reduces the cost of publicly embracing Right-Wing terrorists. Second, higher levels of violence in Russian society increase desensitization and violence acceptance. Third, the embrace of Breivik fits into a vibrant tradition of iconizing Right-Wing militants on the Russian far Right. The article highlights Russia as a hotspot of Right-Wing extremist activism in Europe. It also provides insights that may prove useful in future comparative research on cross-national variation in Right-Wing violence and terrorism.