Intergovernmental Innovation and the Administrative State in Canada

Canadian federalism has experienced considerable pressure for change and innovation in recent years. There have been calls for more collaborative federalism and demands for public sector reforms consistent with the precepts of New Public Management. This article examines the hypothesis that these pressures might be expected to have resulted in some intergovernmental institutional innovation in the arena of federal–provincial–territorial relations. Using a conceptual distinction between federalism, intergovernmental relations, and intergovernmental management (IGM) as the basis of analyzing institutional innovation at six levels in the Canadian intergovernmental administrative state, the authors find a differentiated impact with more institutional innovation evident at the micro levels of IGM and innovation more constrained at the macro levels of the administrative state by the traditional institutional infrastructure of executive federalism.     

Changing your political mind: The impact of a metaphor on citizens’ representations and preferences for federalism

Federalism is often presented through metaphors, but little is known about the impact of such metaphors. Two experiments were conducted in Belgium presenting federalism as Tetris – with control and treatment groups – in order to grasp the influence of this metaphor. The first experiment reveals that being exposed to text with the Tetris metaphor influences respondents’ representations of federalism towards a more institutional representation and towards more regional autonomy. The second experiment confirms the importance of the text, and more specifically of the metaphor, if political knowledge is taken into account. Respondents with a lower level of political knowledge are those who are influenced by the metaphor, whereas respondents with a higher level are not. Therefore, framing the future of Belgian federalism using the metaphor of Tetris does matter: it affects both individuals’ representations of the federalization process and, consequently, their preferences vis-à-vis the institutional future of the country.     

Comparing federal institutions: Power and representation in six federations

The study of comparative federalism is often hampered by the diverse range of federal institutional arrangements in practice, as well as the ambiguity surrounding the concept of federalism. This article identifies three main conceptual approaches to federalism – sociological, constitutional, and governmental – then proposes a revised governmental approach that takes account of the institutional effects of federalism, for application in comparative politics research. Minimally defined, all federations are products of institutional rules that create separate territorial spheres of authority. This article compares Canada, the United States, Australia, Austria, Germany and Switzerland along two key institutional dimensions that structure politics in the federal state: resource allocation, and the representation of constituent units in federal-level decision-making.     

Bicameral bargaining and federation formation

This paper takes a political economy approach to fiscal centralisation through federation formation. We analyse a two-region model of federalism with inter-regional policy spillovers. Departing from a state of independence with decentralised provision of public policy, we analyse the proposed formation of a federation to internalise the spillovers. We consider equilibrium allocations under alternative institutional environments involving: simple majority voting, a restriction of uniform taxation, and regional bargaining through a bicameral legislature. Bicameralism facilitates federation formation for the largest set of parameter values of the model, which is consistent with the observation that bicameralism and federalism often appear together.     

From 'Fightback' to 'Biteback': The Rise and Fall of a National Dental Program

This paper presents a case study of policy introduction, implementation and termination. It demonstrates how the coupling of a well-defined problem with a workable solution by advocates can generate policy change, even in an area where there has previously been scant governmental interest. It also reveals that increased public funding associated with policy implementation can provide administrators with the legitimacy and authority to advance reform. Finally, this case study indicates the fragility of policies which: have short histories of governmental attention and financing; cross major party political differences towards federalism and Commonwealth/state responsibilities; and solely benefit repressed interests.     

‘Will it stay or will it go?’ Federalism and the sustainability of Belgium

This article provides an overview of the federalisation of Belgium. It first discusses why Belgium acquired a federal character when the politics of the centre already recognised the multilingual character of the Belgian state. Subsequently the authors discuss the specificities of the Belgian federal system when it is placed in a comparative perspective. The presence of two different types of regions – Regions and Communities – the steering capacity of a small group of political elites reluctant to give up political control, the presence of institutional asymmetries, the initially dual nature of dividing competencies and the slow development of intergovernmental relations are highlighted as specific features of Belgian federalism. In the final section, the authors assess the assets and liabilities of federalism from the viewpoint of institutional stability. They argue that while Belgian federalism contains significant institutional shock absorbers and issues of common interest, the further unravelling of the centre in a confederal direction is more likely.     

Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policy

Despite political scientists' growing appreciation of the ways in which institutions influence political processes, the “new institutionalism” has so far had a limited impact on the comparative study of welfare state development. This article discusses some broad issues concerning institutions and public policy by exploring the implications of one set of institutions — those associated with federalism — for the politics of social policy. Federal institutions encourage three distinctive dynamics: they influence the policy preferences, strategies, and influence of social actors; they create important new institutional actors (the constituent units of the federation); and they generate predictable policymaking dilemmas associated with shared decision-making. Comparisons between social policy development in Canada and the United States are used to demonstrate that while federalism clearly matters, how it matters will depend on the characteristics of a particular federal system and the ways in which federal institutions interact with other important variables.     

Federalism and Health Care Cost Containment in Comparative Perspective

Despite widespread agreement over the connection between federalismand social expenditures during times of welfare state expansion,disagreement exists concerning federalism's role in the retrenchmentera. Existing approaches fail to recognize institutional variationamong federal states. Analysis of Britain, Germany, and Canadasuggests that federalism may promote or hinder health care retrenchmentdepending upon how it structures the relationship between regionaland national governments. Power-sharing federalism hinders healthcare reform by increasing the institutional obstacles to unpopularcutbacks. Power-separating federalism facilitates reform bycreating opportunities for blame avoidance without substantiallyincreasing the number of veto players. These findings challengetraditional linear or dichotomous models of federalism, suggestingthe need for an approach that captures how particular typesof federalism affect retrenchment politics.     

How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.     

From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism: The Europeanization of the Spanish State of the Autonomies

Intergovernmental relations in Spain have undergone a significanttransformation during the past 22 years. With the transitionto democracy, Spain has developed from a unitary-centralistinto a quasi-federal polity in which the 17 autonomous communitiesenjoy significant political autonomy. However, Spain is notonly moving toward federal democracy, it is also approachinga cooperative model of federalism in which multilateral intergovernmentalcooperation and joint decision-making supersede the bilateralnegotiations and regional competition that traditionally characterizedintergovernmental relations. The shift from competitive regionalismto cooperative federalism is the result of the progressive Europeanizationof the Spanish state and its autonomous communities, which hasencouraged consultation and cooperation between the nationalgovernment and the regions. As traditional forms of intergovernmentalrelations proved ineffective for necessary coordination andcooperation, the Spanish government and the autonomous communitiesestablished a new procedure for cooperating in European affairs-thefirst institutional framework to provide for the joint participationof all 17 autonomous communities in central-state decision-making.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.     

From quiescent bureaucracy to “undocumented wonder”: Explaining the Indian Election Commission's expanding mandate

Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India's Election Commission (EC) has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. We use a process‐tracing approach to explain the EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state‐based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers. Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to the EC's broader role. The EC's experience suggests that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under federalism, state‐based electoral forces can produce strong national institutions.     

The Politics of Universalisation: Establishing National Health Services in Southern Europe

Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain have enacted reform laws during the last 20 years with the intention of turning their health insurance systems into national health services. Universalisation of access to public health care was at the centre of the political debates which led to the passing of the reform laws. This article analyses the policy-making processes that allowed for such institutional change, as well as achievements and shortcomings of the implementation processes that followed. The analysis draws on the insights of the actor-centred neo-institutionalist approach in the policy sciences.     

Testing Federal Student-Aid Fungibility in Two Competing Versions of Federalism

This study employs twenty-three years of federal, state, andinstitutional student-aid data to investigate the effects offederal grants to students on the behavior of higher educationinstitutions. Unlike previous studies, this research differentiatesbetween federal-aid programs according to whether a federalprogram follows "redivision federalism" or "cooperative federalism"concepts. Pell grants, exemplifying the former, appear highlyfungible and inversely related to institutional grants to students,while campus-based federal programs, exemplifying "cooperativefederalism, " appear less fungible and positively associatedwith institutional grants. The results also suggest that grantsto students are more important to higher education opportunitythan indicated by some previous research.     

Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: the Cases of Italy and Nepal

Federalism has been discussed as a potential system of governance in many countries, but in some it has failed to take shape. This has been the case in Nepal and, to a certain extent, in Italy. In fact, in Italy the federal option was rejected at the time of Risorgimento, and constitutional reforms in the 2000s never transformed the country into a federation as desired by political actors such as the Northern League despite some decentralization. In Nepal, the 2007 interim constitution specified that the country would be federal, but the first Constituent Assembly elected to write a new constitution was unable to produce a federal map acceptable to the major political parties and the second is wrestling with the same issue. In both cases, federal structuring was attacked by political actors who argued that it could promote disunity, undermine solidarity, and possibly lead to disintegration. This article argues that the idea of federalism held by prominent political actors as promoting division and conflict played strongly against its implementation.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

How Nation States 'Hit' Europe: Ambiguity and Representation in the European Union

This article analyses how differences in domestic institutional constellations shape the representational roles of member state officials when attending the EU Council of Ministers. The conceptual framework used draws on theories of political representation, institutional theories and the Europeanisation literature. Our primary argument is that role perceptions are considerably conditioned by actors' domestic institutional embeddedness. Comparing Belgian and Swedish officials attending working groups within the Council of Ministers substantiates this argument. Belgian officials are more supranationally oriented than their Swedish counterparts. This difference is related to varying levels of vertical and horizontal specialisation, federalism, competition among veto-players, the role of the Foreign Ministry, and the level of trust in domestic government compared to the level of trust in the EU.     

Gender Equality Architecture: The Intergovernmental Level in Federal Systems

This article provides a first overall account of the intergovernmental components of Australia's gender equality architecture in the period 1978–2014. From the 1990s this is largely a story of institutional fragility. In explaining this, factors identified by scholars of state feminism, such as lack of political will, partisan ideologies and discursive shifts, particularly the increased influence of neoliberal approaches to governance, are taken into account. The new factor introduced is that of executive federalism, characterised by decision‐making behind closed doors. When women's intergovernmental bodies attempted to open doors to community input this proved fruitless, particularly in the area of economic decision‐making. Repeated attempts to introduce gender‐disaggregated reporting on the outcomes of Commonwealth‐State agreements were also largely unsuccessful. The article concludes that the democratic deficits associated with executive federalism – lack of parliamentary oversight or accountability and lack of community consultation – are closely related to the deficits in gender mainstreaming.     

Föderalismus und Wohlfahrtsstaat im historischen Kontext: Der Fall Kanada

Federalism and the welfare state in Canada have always been mutually reinforcing. The pattern of welfare state development, however, has never followed a single narrow historical path since the critical juncture of confederation in 1867. It has instead been shaped by two conflicting approaches: a pan-Canadian approach and a province-based approach to the welfare state. An institutional configuration in accordance with the interstate model of federalism has enabled Ottawa and the provinces to initiate, restructure and recalibrate social policies, predominantly by voluntary negotiations but also by unilateral federal and provincial action. Efforts to reform the welfare state have been at the public policy level and also aimed at the institutional framework in which public policies are embedded. The interplay of such institutional features as policy pre-emption by the provinces and evolution of the federal spending power alongside a dual tax structure on the revenue side has promoted a dynamic which can hardly be captured by a narrow conception of path dependency.     

A Second Republic for Italy?

Radical change in the representative dimension of Italy's political system was expected to bring a transition to a 'Second Republic' in Italy. That has not happened. Nevertheless, after three consultations using the new parliamentary electoral system, studies focusing on the 'input' side of Italian politics are beginning to agree that substantial change has occurred. It is, however, too early to identify the extent of change in public administration and centre–local government relations, whilst even in parliament it is argued that consensual decision-making continued at least into the late 1990s. The impact of party system change on policy-making has thus been shown to be less direct than many expected, providing rich material for research into the relationship between institutional and policy change. Nevertheless, institutional change continues, particularly with regard to the decentralisation of government, and some studies suggest that this is the key to Italy's political transformation, rather than electoral reform or even change in the form of government. Still, the election of Italy's first right-wing majority government in 2001 may yet bring change in parliamentary practice and policy-making more generally.