The Missing Fifth Dimension: The Writing of Australian History in Germany*

German historical writing about Australia can be traced back to the early periods of European exploration of Terra incognita. A corpus of German‐Australian literature exists in the historical notes that were part of early travel books, geographic sketches and emigrant guides. Historical fiction provides another element. However an empirical historiography which elevated Australian history from footnotes and established it as the focus of a professional discipline did not develop until later. Australia was too often wrongly viewed as a space without history. This article examines the professional treatment of Australian history in Germany and the difficult path which faced those who sought to establish the history of Australia as an independent research field. It focuses upon three aspects: (a) the historical background of German Overseas Studies; (b) Australian history as topic in Germany's historiography; and (c) the post‐war situation of Australian historical studies in Germany.     

Europe and the German Model: Growing Tension or Symbiosis?

Recent conflicts between the Commission of the European Communities and the German government suggest a growing tension between structures of the German political economy and the agenda of economic liberalisation fostered by European integration. Will mounting conflict ultimately force Germany to choose between its commitment to the integrity of the social market economy and support for European economic integration? This article considers the cases of Germany's public sector banks and the German postal service. Both entail potential conflict between the public service functions integral to the social market economy and the competition central to Europe's single market. Examination of these cases suggests that, rather than forcing change on a reluctant Germany and jeopardising the core of the social market economy (SME), enforcement of European competition policy from Brussels has taken place in fundamental symbiosis with the SME. Nonetheless, tensions between federal government and Länder indicate that a positive-sum relationship between Europe's single market and Germany's social market economy may be constrained by German federalism.     

Germany's power and the weakening of states in a globalised world: deconstructing a paradox

It is somewhat ironical to ponder Germany's power at a time when radical changes due to globalisation vastly limit the efficiency of state actions worldwide. Certainly, Germany's resources increased with reunification – though the country also has to bear its costs. An enumeration of the – possible – resources of German power provides us, however, with little understanding of the nature of German power, embedded as the country is in a European system from which it derives its strength. Hence, only an analysis of this system fully renders the picture, contrary to what neo-realists and liberals might assume. While Germany did exercise a semi-hegemony over Western Europe in the monetary area up to EMU, the further integration of the EU has altered the European structure and diffused Germany's power. A particular configuration allowed Germany to devise one-sidedly the rules of EMU. This configuration does not exist in other issue-areas, such as, for example, defence and enlargement. This does not mean that power is absent from Germany's tool-box: political credit in particular is abundant. Yet in a larger Europe, where coalitions are more issue-oriented and hence more volatile than formerly, Germany's power will turn out to be more limited than its demands for recognition may lead us to believe.     

The Media Salience of Germany's Bilateral Relations to the United States,France and Britain

This article provides a comparative analysis of the salience of Germany's bilateral relations to the United States, France and Britain in the German media since the end of the cold war. It offers a media content frequency analysis which identifies long-term similarities and differences in media reporting across the three relationships as well as short-term upswings of media interest in each of them individually. This is relevant because the media salience of bilateral relations is a measure of their underpinnings in public discourse and speaks to the significance of domestic drivers in conducting such relationships. The article finds that media reporting on Germany's three bilateral relations under study has significantly increased in the post-9/11 period and that US–German and Franco–German relations attract far more attention in the German media than Anglo–German relations. Short-term upswings in media coverage are triggered by specific types of events, in particular crises in European integration and international military missions.     

Post-War Japan and Asianism

In recent years there has been lively debate over the concept of an Asian community. Historically, however, an Asianism that espouses the notion of “Asia for the Asians” has been around for a long time. This article examines post-war Japan's return to Asia from the perspective of Asianism. The Asianism of post-war Japan was manifested in Japan's eagerness to advance into the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Western European nations from Southeast Asia. However, this came up against Asia's own brand of Asianism, which emphasized independence first and foremost. It was the loss of its underpinnings by this latter brand of Asianism, as from 1970 onward, colonial rule and the political leaders who shouldered independence disappeared from the face of Southeast Asia, that lent impetus to Japan's advance into the region.     

Notes on contributors

The pre-unification European and foreign policy of the ‘old’ Federal Republic was marked by four principal traits: an emphatically Western orientation, a strong commitment to multilateralism underpinned by close bilateral relations with France and the US, its civilian character, and Euro-centrism. Although it took place in radically different circumstances and under radically different conditions to the first, the second German unification nonetheless gave rise to fears among the political leaders of many other states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe – and among the proponents of some international relations theories – that it would herald sweeping changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation and profoundly destabilise inter-state relations in Europe. The contributions to this volume show that, in the decade following the second unification, there has been more continuity than change in German European and foreign policy. The most important change concerns attitudes and behaviour in respect of the use of military force. Under the pressure of its Western allies and events in the Balkans which have forced it to choose between opposition to war and opposition to genocide, Germany has shed much of its earlier inhibitions concerning the use of military force and become much more like a ‘normal’ big power in Europe. However, because this trend has been explicitly encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners and because it has taken place exclusively within the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, it does not presage the return of a political ‘Frankenstein monster’ or the revival of the pre-Second World War patterns of European inter-state rivalry. The second German unification will assuredly not turn out to be a re-run of the first.     

The Future of Energy Security for Europe: Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor

The question of energy security is one of the main concerns for the future of Europe because of the growing dependency of the European countries on third parties, namely Russia, for natural gas. The future of European energy security will be shaped by the EU's dependence on Russia and its ability to find alternative sources of energy as well as multiple routes of transport. Turkey's location between the major energy producers in the Caspian and the major energy consumers in Europe has increased Turkey's potential role as the transit country. The article addresses the Turkish role in the transport of resources from the Caspian region to the European territory. As the Caspian region's resources provide a viable alternative for the EU to diversify its energy suppliers, Turkey emerges as a major hub for energy transport and assumes a greater role in the future of energy security. This article investigates the future challenges to the transport of natural gas into Europe and the role that Turkey will acquire as a transit country, largely replacing Ukraine. The article addresses the following questions: (i) what is Turkey's potential role for energy security in Europe? (ii) what kind of challenges emerge with the increased role for Turkey in European energy routes? (iii) what are the main sources of tension over energy security? The main proposition of the article is that Turkey plays a critical role for the EU's energy security, decreasing its reliance on Russia specifically for the transport of natural gas.     

Having Your Cake and Eating It,Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co‐evolve in the same direction.     

Australian Support for an Independent Taiwan Prior to the Recognition of the People's Republic of China*

Australia's efforts between 1950 and 1972 to create an independent Taiwan are an important, largely overlooked element of Australia and Taiwan's international relations. Australia saw de jure independence for Taiwan as a means to support the US while pursuing the interrelated goals of accommodating the People's Republic of China (PRC) and minimising contradictions between US China policy and the policies of the UK and other countries important to it. Initially Australia favoured the establishment of a Taiwanese majority‐controlled state. This preference later gave way to greater support for an independent Republic of China on Taiwan under Chinese Nationalist rule. Australia nevertheless consistently justified its policy via reference to the principle of self‐determination for Taiwan's people — either immediately in the case of a Taiwanese Taiwan, or postponed into the indefinite future in the case of a Chinese Nationalist Taiwan. Championing Taiwan independence lost its utility for Australia when Sino‐ US relations improved in the late‐1960s to early‐1970s, and it became possible for Australia to make the concessions over Taiwan demanded by China without damaging its relationship with the US. This shift preceded the election of a Labor government committed to building a friendly relationship with China. Australia then dropped its policy of advocating Taiwanese independence, and established official relations with China in late 1972.     

Energy Security and Germany's Response to Russian Revisionism: The Dangers of Civilian Power

This article examines the impact of German dependence on Russian gas supplies for Europe's ability to apply effective sanctions against Russia. It demonstrates that by focusing on the environmental dimensions of energy policy and a policy of rapprochement with Russia, Germany has neglected the security of supply implications of its dependence on Russian gas. The article argues that Germany's excessive energy dependence on Russia has limited the ability of the EU to challenge Russian revisionism by targeting its energy sector through sanctions. The article makes a number of energy policy recommendations which will be essential for Germany to avoid undue Russian influence on its foreign and security policies. The article concludes by exploring the utility of Neoclassical Realism in understanding Germany's approach to energy security. In doing so it highlights the dangers of allowing ideology to cloud a sober assessment of the imperatives of the balance of theat.     

Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy

Ten years after unification, Germany still maintains its post-Second World War foreign policy course based on transatlantic multilateralism and European integration despite changes in Germany's international and domestic contexts. This study argues that neither realist nor institutionalist explanations can explain the post-unification pattern of German foreign policy. Instead, continuity and change in this policy can be understood best through a role-theoretical approach based on the civilian power idealtype. Two causal pathways are developed which account for continuity in foreign policy orientation (goals) and strategies while explaining change in the choice of foreign policy instruments. First, the apparent success of Germany's traditional foreign policy role concept during and after unification helped to reify a broad foreign policy consensus around the goals and strategies of an ideal-type civilian power. Second, major foreign policy crises, such as the Yugoslavian wars, stirred the long held hierarchy between the core values of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force (never again German militarism) and the special German responsibility to prevent genocide (never again Auschwitz). The interaction between domestic and foreign expectations provides a promising source for explaining change and continuity in Germany's foreign policy role concept and behaviour.     

The Power of Ideas: How Bundesbank Ideas Have Influenced the Reconstruction of the National Bank of Poland

This article is concerned with the qualitative rise of German influence in an enlarged European Union (EU). The point of departure is the assumption that eastward enlargement facilitates the further expansion and manifestation of German power in Europe via the institutionalisation of parts of the Modell Deutschland in the candidate countries prior to their accession. This article examines the power tools that have facilitated the transfer of Bundesbank ideas into the institutional structure of Poland's national central bank, Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbours is not only determined by the former's physical capacities but, in reflection of post-war Germany's foreign policy strategy, relies on the persuasiveness of Germany's ideational lead.     

Are We Doing Enough? Change and Continuity in the German Approach to Crisis Management

In the two-and-a-half decades since unification Germany has developed a distinctive approach towards international crisis management. This approach accepts the need to engage in the full spectrum of military and civilian operations but maintains a clear preference for the latter. Consequently, the European Union with its profile as a civil–military actor in international security is the preferred framework for German contributions. The article analyses the development of the German approach during the governments of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel in the light of three interlinked debates on German foreign policy: continuity and change; multilateralism; and leadership. The announcement of a more active German foreign policy in 2014 has reanimated these debates. Concentrating its efforts on networked security and capacity building Germany has become an indispensable player in international crisis management. At the same time Germany's deeply rooted attachment to a culture of military restraint and continued reluctance to lead, limit its ability to work for necessary reforms at the European level.     

The Supply Side of Second-Order Elections: Comparing German National and European Election Manifestos

The second-order character of past European elections is a well-established hypothesis with respect to voter turnout and voting behaviour. This paper presents a conceptual framework for testing this hypothesis on the supply side of European elections. It includes three groups of indicators allowing for the comparison of national and European election manifestos to determine the latter's second-order nature: (1) resource allocation, measured by the number of actors involved in manifesto adoption and by the manifestos' length; (2) the manifestos' content, comparing issue congruence and framing; and (3) political competition, measured by the ideological distance between manifestos. Building on this, we analyse the manifestos of all relevant German parties in the 2009 European and national elections using Comparative Manifesto Project data as well as original, self-created data on election manifestos. We find major variations between parties which can neither be explained by government participation nor satisfaction with the European Union.     

German policy towards the European union: The effects of historical memory

Reflection on the past and its implications shaped German policy towards the European Union during the early 1990s. Helmut Kohl's post‐reunification foreign policy rhetoric reveals two prominent historical themes: that European integration is a ‘question of war and peace’, and that German unity and European unity represent ‘two sides of the same coin’. In the post‐Cold War context, both themes served to orient and legitimate his European policy. They informed Kohl's strong support for the realisation of the Maastricht Treaty. And they were central to his efforts to maintain domestic political support for deeper integration.     

East Germany: another party landscape

Viewed from the heart of the EU in Brussels, German European policy has not been significantly altered by unification. A major reason for this policy continuity is the stability of the composition of German's foreign policy ‘establishment’ in the federal bureaucracy as well as in the political parties. For a combination of reasons, including the economic conjuncture, the enhanced European policy role of the Länder governments, and the lack of socialisation of east Germans into the European project after the Second World War, the political climate has, however, grown more hostile to closer integration. This may prove though to be a conjunctural phenomenon, which will change with an upturn of the German economy. There will be no ‘Britishisation’ of German European policy.     

Bringing the PDS into the coalition equation

This article is intended to be a contribution to the study of the politics of the Anglo‐German relationship, and to the politics of NATO enlargement, seen purely within this context. It is not concerned with the validity of any strategic arguments concerning enlargement, the organisational or the financial problems stemming from this policy, or the wider strategic issues raised by this policy. From 1992 until 1 May 1997 the bilateral Anglo‐German relationship exhibited ever deeper fissures in policy on European integration, and on monetary union in particular. Yet, Anglo‐German policy in respect of NATO's eastern expansion and its relations with the new Russia, which reflected an integrating Europe from a different perspective, was characterised by fundamental agreement. This paradox, it is suggested, indicates that policy on Europe suffered more from ideological conflict on European integration within the governing Conservative Party during the period under review than from an inherent or necessary conflict of national interest between Britain and Germany.     

Germany in Europe: return of the nightmare or towards an engaged Germany in a new Europe?

Especially since (re-)unification, perceptions of Germany alternate between the fear of the return of the German hegemon and – at the same time – the diametrically opposed call for more German leadership based on Germany's outstanding pro-European engagement. Nonetheless, Germany's foreign policy has changed little since 1989: it is still cautious rather than assertive. Due to Germany's experience with the two world wars, German foreign policy places great value on the enlargement as well as the deepening of the EU. In sum, Germany can best be characterised as a normal and engaged European state.     

‘Condemned forever to becoming and never to being’? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism

Despite several post-Cold War reforms which have promised far-reaching change, the Bundeswehr faces a set of deficits in force structures, capabilities, doctrines and military adaptation, which leave it in danger of slipping permanently behind its European partners. The study examines the extent to which reforms proposed by the Commission on Structural Reform of the Bundeswehr will remedy these deficiencies. It finds that the proposals of the Commission include several important measures which will accelerate German convergence with the reforms of its European partners. However, the Commission fails to address several fundamental problems which impair the Bundeswehr's capacity to adapt to ongoing operations. The article critically engages with the existing theoretical literature on German defence policy and highlights the utility of neoclassical realism in explaining the process and outcome of German defence reform. The study also points to the urgent requirement for further comparative scholarship on post-Cold War European military adaptation and civil–military relations in defence planning.     

The Hamburg election of 19 September 1993

The transformation of Polish–German relations since the end of the Cold War has been a success story. The two countries are linked by a community of interests founded on common values and goals. Although Germany, in its policies towards Central and Eastern Europe, occasionally attaches too much weight to trying to mollify Russia, the united Germany has supported the Eastern enlargement of the EU and, ultimately, of the NATO. It genuinely wants ‘Western’ neighbours to its east. German foreign policy will continue to be characterised by continuity, with a strong emphasis on multilateralism. There is a danger, however, that Germany's European engagement and support for closer integration will be weakened by its preoccupation with its domestic economic and social problems.