Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy

Executive dominance in the contemporary EU is part of a wider migration of executive power towards types of decision making that eschew electoral accountability and popular democratic control. This democratic gap is fed by far‐going secrecy arrangements and practices exercised in a concerted fashion by the various executive actors at different levels of governance and resulting in the blacking out of crucial information and documents – even for parliaments. Beyond a deconstruction exercise on the nature and location of EU executive power and secretive working practices, this article focuses on the challenges facing parliaments in particular. It seeks to reconstruct a more pro‐active and networked role of parliaments – both national and European – as countervailing power. In this vision parliaments must assert themselves in a manner that is true to their role in the political system and that is not dictated by government at any level.     

Quasi-National European Identity and European Democracy

Democracy may well be the primary virtue of political systems. Yet European politics is marked by a democracy deficit that will not disappear spontaneously. While legal and political theory on this issue is dominated by supporters of civic institutionalism and constitutional republicanism, liberal nationalists seem to be split. They justify the civic nationhood of member states, but they shrink away from the idea of a European people. This essay claims that a quasi-national conception of European identity can be conducive to the rise of a democratic political union of Europe. It discusses the mechanisms and rules for Europeanization of the sense of equal dignity and solidarity. This approach to supranational identity is explicitly instrumental and orientated towards the long run. However, the main liberal objections against it can be countered.     

An Electoral Connection in European Parliament Voting

Concerns about endogeneity often complicate attempts to estimate a causal link between public opinion and the voting records of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). In this article, I overcome this problem by exploiting a rare natural experiment—the surprising and exogenous revelation of Irish public opinion that resulted from Ireland's ratification of the Nice treaty. I find that the Irish electorate's rejection of Nice caused Ireland's European Parliament delegation to vote in a more conservative manner, while its subsequent ratification caused a partial reversal of this shift. My finding of an electoral connection on the Nice treaty casts doubt on the claim that MEPs are largely unconstrained by voter preferences on European issues, despite claims of a democratic deficit in European institutions.     

The Appointment of Rapporteurs in the European Parliament

Committee rapporteurs are central to decision making in many multiparty legislatures. It is not clear, however, whether these rapporteurs are best characterized as partisan animals or technical experts seeking consensus in nonmajoritarian institutions. We addressed this question by examining which members of the European Parliament become repeat rapporteurs. Using an original dataset comprising all committee reports from the 4th and 5th European Parliaments (1994–2004), we found that the report allocation process provides a way to pursue partisan policy goals within a multiparty, consensual institution that rewards both coalition building and expertise.     

民主过程的司法审查:法国议会选举诉讼制度评析

选举是实现国家机关政治统治合法性与正当性的制度基础。保证选举活动合法进行、依法解决选举争议是依法治国的重要内容。由议会自己来审查议员选举合法性问题的制度在法国被证明是失败的。从第五共和国开始,法国的宪法委员会承担了选举法院的角色,审理国会议员选举争议案件。法国议会选举争议裁决制度的发展过程、审查原则、处理程序对中国相关制度的完善有重要的启发意义。     

Balancing Competing Demands: Position Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament

Parties value unity, yet members of parliament have incentives to deviate from the party line. This article examines how members of the European Parliament (EP) respond to competing demands from national parties and European party groups. We examine ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior suggests that when EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. Our Bayesian item‐response analysis of roll calls in the 5th EP supports our theoretical predictions.     

Democracy and Press Freedom in Zambia: Attitudes of Members of Parliament Toward Media and Media Regulation

In Africa, colonial rule, followed often by one-party rule, resulted in the creation of authoritarian press systems. The political climate usually required journalists to align themselves with the government as propagandists rather than serve as watchdogs to inform the public. To rule Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda established a government based on a political philosophy he called Humanism, a form of African democratic socialism that valued the community over the individual and defined the role of the press as a tool for national development. Colonialism, Kaunda's Humanism and general resource scarcity have shaped the perspectives from which Zambians view press freedom. Multi-party elections in 1991 produced a democratically elected government and brought increased freedoms for the media, but the values shaped by the experiences of the elected leaders in Zambia are also important to understanding the Zambian system of press freedom. This paper quantitatively investigates support for the press and press freedom among members of the newly democratized Zambian Parliament. Regression models show that perceptions of media accuracy and fairness are not indicators of press support. The article speculates that Zambia's leaders may have to experience intergenerational value changes to overcome the past if they are to view press freedom from a more libertarian perspective.     

The European Parliament and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?

The European Parliament has generally been deeply distrustful of the comitology system, primarily on the grounds that it allows the national administrations to undermine its supervisory role in the area of implementing legislation. Parliament has therefore sought to use the political, budgetary and jurisdictional means at its disposal to counteract the spread of comitology, or at least to promote the less intrusive forms of committee procedure. These initiatives have not, for the most part, been wholly successful; neither the interinstitutional agreements nor Parliament's arguments before the Court of Justice have produced the results it had hoped for. Parliament has been able, however, to use its Maastricht powers to influence the choice of committee procedure included in legislation adopted under codecision, and its budgetary tactics have forced the Commission to rationalise somewhat the annual expenditure on committees of all kinds and to bring a modicum of transparency into their operation. The imminence of the intergovernmental conference led to a suspension of hostilities towards the end of 1996.     

The European Parliament in Treaty Reform: Predefining IGCs through Interinstitutional Agreements

Abstract:  Despite the fact that Interinstitutional Agreements (IIAs) are an established part of the mass of informal and formal rules structuring EU decision-making and interinstitutional relations, there is as yet no common understanding of their role and functions in the institutional and legal system of the EU—neither in political science nor legal studies. Tracking the evolution of the European Parliament's competencies in three areas where IIAs figure prominently—comitology, legislative planning, and the establishment of procedures to hold the Commission accountable—this article seeks to show that the European Parliament strategically uses IIAs as instruments to wrest competencies from the Council and the Commission. Having no formal say in treaty reform, the European Parliament 'creates facts' through informal but politically binding IIAs hoping that, once established, it can achieve a later codification of its new rights at IGCs. Viewed this way, the analysis of the role of IIAs in Treaty Reform could help to explain a still under-researched puzzle in European integration theory, namely the incremental parliamentarisation of the institutional system of the EU over the last two decades.     

After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy

From a social‐market perspective, European integration has reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social inequality. The article summarises the institutional asymmetries which have done most to constrain democratic political choices and to shift the balance between capital, labour and the state: the priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratise European politics will not be able to overcome these asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove them. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re‐foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that might facilitate democratic political action at both European and national levels.     

The European Parliament and the Future of Comitology after Lisbon

The history of comitology—the system of implementation committees that control the Commission in the execution of delegated powers—has been characterised by institutional tensions. The crux of these tensions has often been the role of the European Parliament and its quest to be granted powers equal to those of the Council. This process came to a head with the 2006 Comitology reform and the introduction of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny (RPS). After just over three years of experience with the RPS procedure, the Treaty of Lisbon has made it redundant through the creation of Delegated Acts (Article 290 TFEU). This article aims to evaluate the practical implications that Delegated Acts will entail for the Parliament, principally by using the experience with the RPS to better understand the challenges ahead. This analysis will be of interest to those following the study of comitology, formal and informal inter‐institutional relations and also to practitioners who will have to work with Delegated Acts in the future.     

The Constitution of a European Democracy and the Role of the Nation State

Starting from the presupposition that European democracy is necessary to the survival and development of the European Union, the author deals with the process which may entail a European constitution, and discusses the elements of the present legal structure of the EU which are conducive to a European Democracy. In particular, the author focuses on the incomplete, polycentric, and dynamic character of a possible EC/EU constitution, and on the duality of its legitimating principle. This claim is that these characteristics necessitate some institutional modifications of democratic principles if compared with national democracy, and that Euro-democracy is possible if we do not simply apply the standards of democracy valid for Member States, but succeed in developing criteria which are adequate to the institutional qualities of the EC/EU. Finally, the author maintains the legal character of the regulatory power of the Community, and invokes the mutual legal bonds linking the Member States and their peoples as the source of the Community.     

Emergencies,Executive Power,and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy

This article reexamines the question of how best to restrain executive power in a political and social context that seems to favor its dramatic expansion. Modern interventionist government amidst a dynamic social environment, where the executive faces a seemingly endless series of “crises” or “emergencies,” provides a heightened scope for executive discretion. At the same time, the US‐style separation of powers, in which an independent president faces a potentially obstinate Congress, offers executives many incentives to exploit crises, real or otherwise. The works examined in this article confront, with varying degrees of success, the seemingly inexorable expansion of executive power within the US version of liberal democracy. We can only hope to deal with the many intellectual and political tasks posed by the symbiotic nexus between executive‐centered and crisis‐oriented government by confronting some tough questions about US constitutional design and the possibility of radical institutional reform. Unfortunately, even those scholars who provide plausible accounts of the US system's fragilities seem hesitant to do so.     

近代中国联邦制的理论和实践--北洋军阀时期省宪运动述评

一　联邦制理论的传入省宪运动掀起于 2 0世纪 2 0年代 ,而联邦制思想和理论从外国的传入却可以追溯至 1 9世纪。早在 1 9世纪中叶 ,魏源在其《海国图志》(1 843年 )中对美国的联邦制就作了介绍 :“西洋称部落曰士迭 (即Ｓｔａｔｅ) ,而弥利坚无国王 ,止设二十六部头目 ,别公举一大头目总理之 ,故名其国育奈士迭国 (即ＵｎｉｔｅｄＳｔａｔｅｓ) ,译曰兼摄邦国” ,〔 1〕 只是这种介绍中并未出现“联邦”之名称。 1 86 4年翻译刊印的《万国公法》 ,〔 2〕 也有涉及美国联邦制的内容 ,称其为“合邦”。其后 ,随着西方宪政理论的不断传入 ,外…     

Tailoring Representative Democracy to the European Union: Does the European Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit?

Abstract Even if the institutions of representative democracy that have developed in the nation‐state context cannot be simply transposed to the European Union, for practical and normative reasons they do provide the main starting point for any reflection on the EU's ‘democratic deficit’. This article draws upon the Constitution prepared by the European Convention to reconstruct the concept of representative democracy in the EU. Drawing on the proposals put forward, it identifies two distinctive challenges that need to be overcome if the concept of representative democracy is to be successfully applied to the EU: the multilevel character of the polity and the shift of the centre of political gravity from legislative to executive politics. The article then examines the extent to which the institutional proposals contained in the Constitution go to meet these two challenges and also highlights some aspects in which these proposals fall short.     

Democracy,Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘European Commonwealth’

Is there a ‘constitutional moment’in contemporary Europe? What if anything is the constitution of theEuropean Union; what kind of polity is the Union? The suggestionoffered is that there is a legally constituted order, and that asuitable term to apply to it is a‘commonwealth’, comprising a commonwealthof ‘post-sovereign’ states. Is it a democraticcommonwealth, and can it be? Is there sufficiently ademos or ‘people’ for democracy to be possible?If not democratic, what is it? Monarchy, oligarchy, ordemocracy, or a ‘mixed constitution’? Argued: thereis a mixed constitution containing a reasonableelement of democratic rule. The value of democracy isthen explored in terms of individualistic versusholistic evaluation and instrumental versus intrinsicvalue. Subsidiarity can be considered in a similarlight, suggestively in terms of forms of democracyappropriate to different levels of self-government.The conclusion is that there is no absolute democraticdeficit in the European commonwealth.

     

Parliamentary Questions,Oversight, and National Opposition Status inthe European Parliament

This study examines when and why members of the European Parliament (EP) use parliamentary questions as a form of fire alarm oversight. We argue that the multilevel nature of the EU political system allows members of the EP from national opposition parties to use parliamentary questions to alert the European Commission to governments' failures to implement EU policy. Representation in the EP provides the only avenue for such oversight for national opposition parties. Using a new sample of EP parliamentary questions, we demonstrate that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to alert the Commission to violations of EU law in their own member states. These parliamentary questions may lead the Commission to take legal action against member‐state governments.     

Democracy and corruption: a complex relationship

We argue that an ‘electoral democracy’ is not sufficient to reduce corruption. Our contention is that the institutions associated with mature democracy are crucial to successfully deterring corrupt behaviour. At the core of our argument is the idea that with well-functioning institutions, the probability of detection and punishment is sufficiently high to deter most decision makers from choosing to act corruptly. The empirical evidence we present supports this idea. The nonlinearity of democracy variables is tested to confirm that an advanced stage of democracy is crucial for combating corruption.     

Balancing Security and Democracy, and the Role of Expertise: Biometrics Politics in the European Union

What is the relationship between security policies and democratic debate, oversight and rights? Does coping with security threats require exceptions to the rule of law and reductions of liberties? The inquiry that follows tries to answer such questions in the context of the European Union and takes the case of biometric identification, an area were security considerations and the possible impact on fundamental rights and the rule of law are at stake. Some hypotheses are explored through the case study: “securitisation” and “democratisation” are in tension but some hybrid strategies can emerge; the plurality of “authoritative actors” influences policy frames and outcomes; and knowledge is a key asset in defining these authoritative actors. A counter-intuitive conclusion is presented, namely that biometrics, which seems prima facie an excellent candidate for technocratic decision-making, sheltered from democratic debate and accountability – is characterised by debate by a plurality of actors. Such pluralism is limited to those actors who have the resources – including knowledge – that allow for inclusion in policy making at EU level, but is nevertheless significant in shaping policy; it explains the central role of the metaphor of balancing security and democracy, as well as the “competitive cooperation” between new and more consolidated policy areas. The EU is facing another difficult challenge in the attempt at establishing itself as a new security actor and as a supranational democratic polity: important choices are at stake to assure that citizens’ security is pursued on the basis of the rule of law, respect of fundamental rights and democratic accountability.