Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947

During the post-war negotiations in the years of 1945 and 1946, the Soviets launched a bitter war of nerves against Turkey in order to establish a military base in Istanbul and share control of the Straits. It was crucial for Britain that the USSR be prevented from gaining any influence in Turkey. However, as Britain was in no position to support Turkey financially, American authorities encouraged by London and Ankara took over the responsibility for Turkey. This articles examines the Great Powers rivalry over Turkey and Turkey’s response to it. It argues that regional factors other than US–Soviet confrontation, such as Turkey’s security search against the Soviets, also played a crucial part in starting the Cold War in the Near East.     

Sailing through the Cold War: Indian Navy's Quest for a Submarine Arm, 1947-67

ABSTRACT

It took approximately two decades for the Indian Navy to acquire submarines even when the first naval plan prepared by the Naval Headquarters in New Delhi and informally submitted to the British Admiralty in September 1947 contained an active submarine component. Other littoral navies in the Indian Ocean went for submarines much earlier. Using Indian, British, and U.S. archives, this article argues that the delay in India’s submarine arm was largely a result of the vagaries of the Cold War. Both Britain and the United States wanted the Indian Navy to contribute to the Western effort for a collective defense against the communist threat, which was largely conceived to be submarine based. This resulted in a surface heavy force structure. However, as India’s threat perceptions changed in 1960s, its quest for submarines gained momentum. When negotiations with the Western powers did not result in anything concrete, Indian Navy turned to the Soviets for initiating its own submarine arm. This decision had long-term implications for the Indian Navy as its underwater fleet thereafter remain dependent upon Soviet assistance for the rest of the Cold War.     

Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the "Soviet Other" in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1919–1945

Standard accounts on Turkey's foreign policy identify Molotov's communication of 1945 (better known as "Stalin's demands") as the catalyst behind Turkey's post-WWII decision to strain its relations with the USSR and turn to the United States (US) for defense support. The aim here is to complement these accounts which have stressed the military and ideological threat posed by the USSR as the catalyst behind Turkey's foreign policy change, by offering an analysis that explores the conditions of possibility for such change. The aim here is not to question the seriousness of the risks involved in failing to stand firm against the USSR in the immediate post-WWII period. Nor is it to dispute the appropriateness of Turkey's search for "Western" allies at a time when its economic, political and military vulnerabilities were acknowledged by friend and foe alike. The following mediates through accounts that stress the military threat and those that emphasize the ideological threat and presents an analysis that looks into the production of representations of the USSR as a "threat" to Turkey and the context which allowed for the production of such representations of the USSR.     

Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion

In this article, I build a theory of European Union (EU) expansion using Social Identity Theory. The theory proposes that the development of a national identity in relation to Europe is the most significant contributing factor to a policy to support/oppose expanding the EU to include applicant countries. According to the theory, strength of identity—whether more national or European—is the key variable in explaining the policy toward applicant countries. As a preliminary exploration of the theory, I look at why some decision-makers within EU countries support Turkey's accession while others do not. The identities among top decision-makers within Britain, Germany, and France are used to examine the policy preferences regarding Turkey's bid for membership into the EU during these three recent progressions: the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999, the development of a timeline for full membership in 2002, and the beginning of accession negotiations in 2005.     

The Cold War and Counter-Insurgency

Due to the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, theories surrounding counter-insurgency, or COIN, have aroused intense debate in political, military, and academic circles in the United States, Britain, and other Western countries. This article shows that current thinking about how to fight and defeat insurgent movements is based primarily on Cold War-era theories and conflicts. It traces the evolution in COIN thinking both before and during the Cold War—incorporating Western and Eastern bloc experiences of war against insurgents from Malaya to Afghanistan—but also illustrates the conceptual difficulties of applying doctrines based on the historical record of this era. The article concludes by arguing that theories derived from the experiences of states involved in COIN campaigns from 1945 to 1991 still retain utility, but that there are significant differences between Cold War insurgencies and current conflicts associated with the “war on terror”/“long war” which affect the applicability of doctrines based on historical analysis and the works of Thompson, Kitson, Galula, and other “classic” theorists.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

Running with the Hare,Hunting with the Hounds: The Special Relationship,Reagan's Cold War and the Falklands Conflict

This article reconsiders the negotiations between the United States and Britain at the outbreak of the 1982 Falklands War. The Reagan Administration did not support Britain, its staunchest NATO ally, and on the contrary assumed an even-handed position that recognised Argentina as a key ally as much as Britain. Not only did American mediation fail; it also caused a major crisis in Anglo-American relations. The underlying reason for the American decision was the obsessive importance that the Administration attached to fighting communism in Latin America after establishing covert co-operation with the Argentinian military junta in 1981.     

“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.     

Israeli-Turkish Tensions and their International Ramifications

The deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey, culminating in the “Gaza flotilla” affair of June 2010, are part of a reorientation in the Turkish foreign policy over the past several years: a move away from the West and toward Muslim states and non-state groups, including such radical actors as Iran, Hamas and Hizballah. This article reviews the rationale for the Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership in the 1990s and the early years of this century. It then documents deviations in Turkish foreign policy from Western patterns. Next it examines how changes in Turkey's twenty-first century strategic environment, as well as in the domestic arena, led to a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy and to current tensions in bilateral relations. And finally, it assesses the impact of the changes in Turkish foreign policy on the Greater Middle East and global politics.     

Power, sovereignty, and the great republic: Anglo-American diplomatic relations in the era of the Civil War

Historians have tended to view the American Civil War (1861-65) as a milestone in Anglo-American relations. It marked the transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States in the Western Hemisphere. As Great Britain backed the losing side overwhelming American power brought about a British withdrawal. This article argues that this is a very oversimplified interpretation of their relations in this period. Britain did not intervene in the Civil War because it was not good policy; throughout the British relied on deterrence because, save for the war years, American power could not be translated into military power. The British secured most of their policy objectives thanks to a combination of prudent and conciliatory conduct, and a desire to avoid war, but also due to calm resolution that belied belligerent and sometimes outlandish public statements. British leaders have often been criticized for hypocrisy and double standards, but such criticisms seem unfair. Their belief that the Civil War was futile resulted from a humanitarian desire to halt the killing. It should be remembered that although the nineteenth century witnessed many local conflicts, great wars seem to have disappeared. It therefore appeared to be a laudable objective to attempt to arbitrate in what turned out to be the greatest war after 1815. It is also important to recall that Europeans were less interested in this conflict than the Americans themselves, and that preoccupation with affairs closer to home led to hasty and erroneous judgements.     

British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back

The American Civil War is an important test case for offensive realism because it was the last occasion when offshore balancing by Britain could have prevented the United States from becoming a regional hegemon. Instead, Britain drew on the norm of nonintervention to justify a policy of neutrality. Offensive realists reject the idea that Britain was constrained by normative considerations but disagree about why Britain failed to operate as an offshore balancer. I acknowledge the importance of the offensive realists' regionalized approach to the international system, but use English School thinking to argue that the normative framework that Britain and the United States subscribed to must be taken into account to provide a coherent explanation of Britain's response to the Civil War. Detailed archival research demonstrates that despite concern about u.s. regional hegemony, Britain was unequivocally constrained by normative considerations. The case study suggests, therefore, that societal constraints were stronger than systemic ones.     

The British government and the sale of arms to the lesser European powers, 1936-39

This article considers sales of British arms in the prelude to the Second World War, during the end of last Baldwin government, and the Chamberlain government, which had political as well as commercial motivations. Particular attention is paid to the leading British arms manufacturer, Vickers-Armstrong, and sales to Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland. There was often a concern that a failure to procure British arms would lead countries to turn to Germany and Italy. The interest in meeting these requests often conflicted with growing domestic defence needs for the same equipment. The conclusion is drawn that Britain ultimately failed to inspire potential allies with sufficient confidence to commit themselves to Britain.     

"Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind": British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates

This paper raises the issue of moral credibility in international relations and shows that considerations of preserving moral prestige can become crucial for armed humanitarian intervention. It contrasts realist and constructivist explanations about the causes of humanitarian intervention and demonstrates that traditional accounts do not provide a complete understanding of the phenomenon of intervention. In the case studied here, Britain engaged in a relatively costly humanitarian intervention against the Barbary pirates, slave trade in Christian Europeans due to her willingness to defy moral criticism and exhibit consistency with her professed moral principles. No material incentives and/or constraints influenced the British decision, and neither was it affected by a sense of felling, with regard to the Christian slaves. Instead, allegations that Britain urged Europe to abolish the black slave trade out of selfish interests, while at the same time turning a blind eye toward the Christian slave trade of the pirates, undermined British moral prestige and became the cause of the Barbary expedition.     

Great Powers,Counter Secession,and Non-Recognition: Britain and the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”

The role of Great Powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. This analysis examines how Britain rallied international opposition to the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC]. The British Government tried hard to prevent the UDI. Once it occurred, Britain led efforts to condemn the move. It resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, which declared the TRNC illegal and called on states not to recognise it. As well as exploring the diplomacy behind the counter-secession efforts, this examination also answers a long-standing question as to whether any countries aside from Turkey ever recognised the TRNC. It also challenges the widely held view amongst Greek Cypriots that Britain invariably supports the Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus Problem.     

The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: proposals for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, 1980–1981

Although not unexpected, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was still largely a shock to the West. It was the first time since the Second World War that the Soviets had directly intervened in a country outside the Warsaw Pact. Despite the intervention eventually being seen as Moscow's ‘Vietnam’ the West was initially unsure about what the invasion meant for stability in the region or the future conduct of East–West relations. In response to the crisis the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) proposed that Afghanistan revert to a neutral and non-aligned status in an attempt to create the basis for a viable political settlement, one that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw troops without losing face. It launched the proposal in early 1980, lobbying other countries to support and champion the idea, culminating in a visit to Moscow by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in July 1981. In this early phase of Soviet intervention the British proposals were premature but not without merit. They anticipated the strategy the Soviets would eventually adopt in their attempt to achieve an orderly withdrawal.     

The Impact of EU-based Populism on Turkey-EU Relations

ABSTRACT

The May 2019 EP elections once again highlighted the current cultural backlash throughout Europe against progressive values such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism, which impacts on the ‘future of Europe’ debate, raising important questions for the evolution of Turkey-EU relations. Even though Turkey is no longer a hot topic in EU political parlance and public opinion, opposition to Turkish EU membership continues in the form of nativism, particularly with reference to the issues of immigration and Islam, as the cases of AfD in Germany and UKIP in Britain show.     

Analysis: The effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey

This article examines the potential repercussions of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. An introduction to the Kurdish problem and its securitisation in Turkey precedes an analysis of the Gulf War's impact on Turkey's policies towards the Kurds—in both Turkey and Iraq. The article briefly documents the struggle between the EU's pressures on Turkey after 1999 to improve Kurdish rights and the state's reluctance to implement reforms. Impacting reforms is the heightened sense of insecurity in Turkey after the Iraq War and the perceived threat of greater autonomy for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In response, Turkey has identified the Turkmen minority as a key strategic concern. None the less, increasingly the ruling Justice and Development Party's attitude towards Iraqi Kurdish groups indicates the evolution of a more pragmatic approach. In conclusion, two possible options emerge: the continued desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey or its re-securitisation.     

Reflections on the Cold War: A comment

For mutually reinforcing cultural reasons, the study of international history at American universities has declined. Nevertheless, opportunities for multinational research on the Cold War are greater than ever. Much innovative work takes place abroad or outside conventional history departments. This article appraises the contributions of three leading scholars in the field. It adumbrates the failure of the Roosevelt administration to formulate a coherent policy for postwar Germany and emphasizes the fitful process through which the Truman team despaired of accommodation with the USSR. It intimates that Marc Trachtenberg's elegant structural analysis may make that process seem clearer than the truth, and underscores the findings of Klaus Schwabe and Georges Soutou, who show that Europeans had their own concerns and did not view the Cold War through the optic of the bilateral Russian-American relationship.     

High Hopes,Bold Aims,Limited Results: Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950–1953

Although a great deal has been written about British policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the reorganization of the Southern flank of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe after the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the assumption of NATO's naval Mediterranean Command by Britain has attracted little attention. This article analyses British aims and policy on the formation of the Mediterranean Command, the talks between London and Washington concerning the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief, the attitudes of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey towards British policy, and finally, the establishment of NATO's Mediterranean Command in conjunction with the reorganization of SHAPE's Southern flank. For strategic as well as prestige reasons, Britain tried to retain its traditional dominant eastern Mediterranean position by encouraging the establishment of an Allied naval Mediterranean Command under a British Commander-in-Chief. However, the decline of British military and naval power and political influence meant that Britain secured a compromise settlement which only partially satisfied its aspirations.     

Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the rebirth of the ottoman empire

For more than three decades Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz played a crucial role in the development of military relations between the German and Ottoman Empires. He trained and advised the Ottoman army, and commanded Ottoman troops in the First World War. He was a firm believer in the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's political and military revival, this belief reflecting his own conservative, militarist ideology. From 1898 onwards he was also a firm advocate of a German‐Ottoman alliance in a future war against Britain, arguing that Ottoman expeditionary forces sent against Egypt and India could deal mortal blows to Britain's world power.