合同法中的预期违约制度

在英美法系国家中,预期违约制度已成为一项特有的制度,预期违约制度在商品交易中的最大作用就在于迅速有效地保护当事人的利益,使交易中的损失降到最低点。在我国实行预期违约制度更有其现实可能性。     

论国际货物买卖合同的预期违约制度

预期违约是英美合同法上的特有制度。由于该制度基于合同法的诚实信用原则和公平原则,对平衡合同双方当事人的利益具有重要意义,因而《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》对其作出了规定,我国《合同法》也规定了预期违约制度。本文分析了公约的规定,将公约与英美法的预期违约进行了比较,并阐述了它们对完善我国合同法预期违约制度的借鉴价值。     

预期违约制度的法律探讨

预期违约（ＡＮＴＩＣＩＰＡＴＯＲＹＢＲＥＡＣＨＯＦＣＯＮＴＲＡＣＴ）,又称先期违约。是指在合同依法成立后,履行期届至前,一方当事人以语言或行为表明他届时将不履行合同,或者依其当时的具体情形可确切断定他将违约,对方当事人的债权实现成为不可期待。于此场合,对方当事人若接受预期违约,有权立即解除合同并请求损害赔偿;若拒绝接受该预期违约,坚持合同的拘束力,便有权要求预期违约者继续负担原债务,但于履行期届满前不能获得损害赔偿,并承担这段期间的风险。一、明示预期违约的法律救济第一、当事人接受明示预期违约的后…     

论《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》中的预期违约制度

预期违约制度是合同法上违约制度的重要组成部分,也是英美法系一项独创制度。《公约》吸纳了英美法系的该项理论,但又有所发展。本文通过比较研究的方法,对英美法、《公约》中预期违约制度的构成条件及救济措施的考察,分析其规定的优劣,以期在国际货物买卖实践中找到保护当事人的权益、保障交易的顺利进行的好办法,促进国际贸易的发展。     

浅析不安抗辩权和预期违约

不安抗辩权制度和预期违约制度分别是大陆法系和英美法系的重要法律制度,对调节合同履行起到了重要作用,我国合同法对两个制度都予以了确定,然而,两者在适用条件、适用选择权、适用范围等方面存在巨大差异,本文对二者进行了简要的分析。     

预期违约救济方式问题初探

预期违约制度是英美法系以判例确立并发展起来的一项特有制度,《合同法》在引进预期违约制度时存在着问题,特别是在与英美法相比时,其救济方式显得过于笼统,缺乏可操作性。同时在法律移植过程中因同时引进了大陆法系的不安抗辩权,造成了法条适用上的一些混乱。本文从历史的角度,比较的角度,指出了我国合同法的不足,并提出了完善的办法。     

预期违约救济方式问题初探

预期违约制度是英美法系以判例确立并发展起来的一项特有制度,《合同法》在引进预期违约制度时存在着问题,特别是在与英美法相比时,其救济方式显得过于笼统,缺乏可操作性。同时在法律移植过程中因同时引进了大陆法系的不安抗辩权,造成了法条适用上的一些混乱。本文从历史的角度,比较的角度,指出了我国合同法的不足,并提出了完善的办法。     

浅析合同法中的预期违约制度

本文在国际对比的视角下,指出了我国合同法对预期违约规定的不足之处,并从引入预期不能履行而删除不安抗辩权制度出发,对我国《合同法》第108条违约责任以及规定预期拒绝履行的撤销等方面提出了完善我国合同法中预期违约制度的建议。     

试论契约自由及其在我国合同法中的地位

毫无疑问,罗马法应该被视为研究契约自由的起点.正是在罗马法中,契约制度首次得到了全面规定并达到了相当的高度.而且,正是罗马法孕育了契约自由的观念和思想.契约自由从思想到原则的转变是在法国民法典中实现的,而人类进入20世纪之后,契约自由逐步受到限制.在我国合同法中,契约自由也得到了确立,它不仅是我国合同法的一项基本原则,而且也是我国合同法的最高原则.     

The risks of contract law

The economic analysis of law may be able to provide some reason why it is efficient to enforce wholly executory contracts, but (I submit) it has not done so.     

房屋买卖合同中的陷阱及法律救济

开发商和购房人之间的权利义务关系规定在购房合同中。由开发商单方面提供的格式合同已提前确定了本应由双方协商的合同条款。本文以某房屋买卖合同为例，指出在房屋买卖合同中常见的不公平、不舍法条款，针对房屋买卖合同中的陷阱提出法律救济途径。     

The limits of contract law harmonization

Contract law harmonization in the European Union has met with some significant but limited success. This Essay explores some of the psychological and political forces that can complicate or even hinder law reform efforts. Even when there is a general institutional drive for law reform, as there is in the EU, scarce reform resources force attention to be focused on salient issues, while a status quo bias in individual member states by government officials can provide a braking inertia regarding nonsalient legal reforms. This braking influence can be seized upon and enhanced by interest groups that oppose reforms, especially where there is an alternative to proposed law reforms for private entities. In the case of contract law harmonization, contract doctrine that is not focused on providing consumer protections remain nonsalient, commercial entities can solve the confusion of diverse laws by choosing their own, and interest groups in nations whose laws and dispute resolution forums are commonly chosen will oppose harmonization. Thus, the current state of affairs may prove relatively difficult to alter.     

预售商品房买受人期待权的民法保护

商品房预售是房地产开发的一种主要筹资方式。商品房预售合同签订后,作为买卖标的物的商品房尚未建成,买受人仅取得预售商品房所有权的期待权。尽管物权法和债权法有些概括性规定对预售商品房期待权的保护起了一定作用,但远不能最大限度地保护买受人所享有的期待利益。完善我国民事立法的相关规定,有助于从根本上维护预售商品房买受人的期待权,实现买受人最终获得商品房所有权的目的。     

国家干预在我国劳动合同立法中的体现

劳动合同属于兼有当事人意思自治和国家干预性质的特殊合同.本文探讨了国家干预劳动合同立法的合理性和必要性,阐述了我国在劳动合同立法过程中,国家干预起到了积极的重要作用并具体地体现在了<劳动合同法>中.     

The Chinese new Civil Code and the law of contract

China-EU Law Journal - The purpose of this contribution is to present to the readers the Chinese Civil Code which entered into force the first of January 2021, and to bring to their attention the...     

发放购房券涉嫌违法

对于财大气粗的地产开发商来说，发放购房券也许只是变相降价促销的一个手段，其中隐藏的法律泥淖却被视而不见     

Economic impossibility in Turkish contract law from the perspective of law and economics

We argue that the proposed introduction of the doctrine of economic impossibility in Article 137 of the reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations is in line with economic considerations and facilitates business transactions. This new rule gives courts the explicit power to terminate a contract and relieve the party, which owes specific performance of its obligation, without imposing any duty to pay expectation damages to the other party. We argue that a court??s decision to terminate a contract under economic impossibility should be based on three tests. First, a low-probability-event occurs between contract formation and performance. Second, this event causes an excessive increase in the costs of specific performance. Third, the concept of an excessive increase should take into due consideration the other party??s interest in specific performance. The reform draft includes explicitly the first two tests, but not the third test. We also show under which conditions an excessive performance difficulty should not lead to termination of the contract but rather to an adjustment of the agreed price. We argue that the rule of economic impossibility, if diligently adjudicated, saves the parties transactions costs in comparison to a rule under which the law insists on specific performance or damage payments. We also argue that a specific rule of economic impossibility leads to better and more business-oriented solutions to the underlying problems than the alternative, which is to solve such problems under the broad and unspecific cover of the ??good faith?? or the ??Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus?? doctrine.     

Autonomy and private ordering in contract law

This essay reviews Michael J. Trebilcock's book,The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), examining crucial and controversial social issues within the rigorous framework of the law and economics of contract. The idea that private markets are the primary institutions for the allocation of limited resources is central to any private ordering model of contract law. Yet such a premise leaves a number of fundamental questions unanswered. Trebilcock is critical of the insufficiency and ambiguity of current contract theory in addressing fundamental legal issues relating to the limits of freedom of contract. Pushing the frontiers of current legal theory, Trebilcock revisits the slippery notion of freedom of contract and tests the actual reach of economic analysis in providing a coherent answer to compelling social questions. The author pursues his ambitious task by examining the conclusions reached by competing paradigms of analysis. In spite of his declared trust in the economic approach to law, Trebilcock pays close attention to alternative analytical traditions, comparing the conclusions of various intellectual perspectives with those suggested by an economic framework of private ordering. The book objectively examines strengths and weaknesses of competing views, affording the reader a balanced position from which to conclude for herself, by illustrating the practical implications of the various approaches. In a number of instances, Trebilcock shows how different theoretical premises may indeed be conducive to similar institutional outcomes.Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University. The support of the Sarah Scaife Foundation and of the John M. Olin Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, as are the helpful comments of Jonathan C. Harris and Charles K. Rowley. Extensive remarks received from Michael J. Trebilcock prior to publication allowed me to remedy earlier omissions.