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Because of its dynamic nature, those confronting the al-Qaeda threat must follow its evolution very closely. As demonstrated here, this task is particularly challenging when counterterrorism is carried out under the aegis of international organizations. This article explores the threat identification function of the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee (also known as the 1267 Committee) charged with supervising the UN sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and its associates. Examination of the role of threat identification in the committee's work, and of the content of the threat analysis presented in the periodic reports of its subsidiary monitoring team, suggests the marginality of strategic threat assessment and underscores the constraints created by bureaucratic and political factors. The article also demonstrates the failure of the Committee and the monitoring team to thoroughly engage in central questions regarding al-Qaeda's nature, objectives, and organizational strategy.  相似文献   

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This article will develop an explanatory theory on terrorist safe havens. Focusing on Islamist Terrorist networks, this article argues that four specific conditions are necessary for the establishment of a safe haven for Islamist terrorist networks: geographic features, weak governance, history of corruption and violence, and poverty. At the conclusion of the article, the developed theory is applied to the Tri-Border Area of South America (TBA), where the frontiers of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, an area overlooked by the 9/11 National Commission Report's list of Islamist terrorists' safe havens.  相似文献   

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This article reports on a recent survey designed to capture understandings of cyberterrorism across the global research community. Specifically, it explores competing views, and the importance thereof, amongst 118 respondents on three definitional issues: (a) the need for a specific definition of cyberterrorism for either policymakers or researchers; (b) the core characteristics or constituent parts of this concept; and (c) the value of applying the term “cyberterrorism” to a range of actual or potential scenarios. The article concludes by arguing that while a majority of researchers believe a specific definition of cyberterrorism is necessary for academics and policymakers, disagreement around what this might look like has additional potential to stimulate a rethinking of terrorism more widely.  相似文献   

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States often target terrorist leaders with the belief that the leader's death or capture will cause the terrorist organization to collapse. Yet the history of this strategy of “leadership targeting” provides a mixed record—for every example of effectiveness, there are similar examples of ineffectiveness. The central question of this article is: what makes a terrorist leader important? Specifically, what does a terrorist leader do that no one else can do (or do as well) for the organization? To answer this question, I develop a theory of terrorist leadership that argues that leaders might potentially perform two main functions: they can provide inspiration and/or operational direction (or not for both). I also theorize as to how and why the provision of these functions changes over time as the organization itself changes. The consequences for leadership targeting flow naturally from this theory—when leaders provide these functions to the organization, leadership targeting is most likely to be effective. Case studies of Algeria, Peru, and Japan offer insights into why some cases of leadership targeting were effective and why others were not. The conclusion extends this model with an analysis of al-Qaeda's prospects after the death of bin Laden.  相似文献   

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What does the American public label as “terrorism?” How do people think about the factors motivating violence, and in turn, the policies that are favored? Using ingroup and outgroup dynamics, we argue that the terrorist label is more readily applied to Arab-Americans than Whites, and to members of militant groups. Moreover, people attribute different motives to violence committed by Arabs versus Whites, and favor different policies in response. We conducted an experiment where we randomly assigned one of six stories about a failed armed attack, each with a different combination of ethnicity and group affiliation. We find that an Arab ethnicity and Islamist group affiliation increase the likelihood of labeling an act as terrorism. Attacks by Whites and members of a White supremacist group are less likely to be labeled terrorism. Rather, Whites are more likely to be called “mass shooters.” Despite never discussing motive, Arab-American attackers are more likely to be ascribed political or religious motives, while White suspects are more likely to be seen as mentally ill. Lastly, an Arab ethnicity increases support for counterterrorism policies and decreases support for mental health care.  相似文献   

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After a discussion of the United Kingdom's responsibilities under the European Convention of Human Rights and the political background to the re‐emergence in 1968–69 of terrorism and the stationing of British troops in the Province, the article analyses those human rights issues which derive from the way the fight against terrorism has been conducted over the past 20 years. The issues discussed are, deaths resulting from the actions of the security forces, complaints of ill‐treatment by the police during interrogation, the detentioning of terrorist suspects, the use of exclusion orders to deport from the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland persons formerly resident in that Province, the use of juryless courts (Diplock Courts) for terrorist and other offences, and the banning of political organizations.  相似文献   

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Despite over a decade of government funding and thousands of newcomers to the field of terrorist research, we are no closer to answering the simple question of “What leads a person to turn to political violence?” The state of stagnation with respect to this issue is partly due to the government strategy of funding research without sharing the necessary primary source information with academia, which has created an unbridgeable gap between academia and the intelligence community. This has led to an explosion of speculations with little empirical grounding in academia, which has the methodological skills but lacks data for a major breakthrough. Most of the advances in the field have come from historical archival research and analysis of a few field interviews. Nor has the intelligence community been able to achieve any breakthrough because of the structure and dynamic of this community and its lack of methodological rigor. This prevents creative analysis of terrorism protected from political concerns. The solution to this stagnation is to make non-sensitive data available to academia and to structure more effective discourse between the academic and intelligence communities in order to benefit from the complementary strengths in these two communities.  相似文献   

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What can cancer and HIV tell us about terrorism? How would we proceed if terrorism were a disease? A comparison of cancer and HIV can suggest alternative ways of conceptualizing terrorism and counter-terrorism using contrasting disease models that emphasize differing connections between etiology and prevention and control. A public health model also can help us think about terrorism as a basic research problem to be translated into therapeutic and preventive applications rather than primarily as a policy or political problem that makes only selective use of research studies. Through this re-conceptualization of terrorism as a basic and translational research challenge, we can draw upon the examples of the U.S. ‘War on Cancer’ and response to the ‘Aids Epidemic’ to help identify gaps in organizing academic and other resources to wage the ‘War on Terrorism.’ Recognizing and addressing these gaps could ultimately pave the way for more effective strategies in understanding and responding to the significant threats posed by terrorism, from the identification of factors that produce terrorist acts to the implementation of informed measures for the prevention and control of terrorist, and even proto-terrorist, activity.  相似文献   

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