Right‐wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization

The purpose of this article is to identify the distinctive features of right‐wing terrorism and to develop an analytical typology of particularistic terrorist organizations. The article is based on the conceptual framework of the process of delegitimization developed earlier by this author. It argues that right‐wing radicals usually reach terrorism through a trajectory of split delegitimization, which implies a primary conflict with an ‘inferior’ community and a secondary conflict with the government. Six sub‐types of right‐wing terrorism are identified: revolutionary terrorism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, racist terrorism, millenarian terrorism and youth counterculture terrorism.     

Responding to terrorism across the technological spectrum

The ‘revolution in military affairs’ arguably heralds a new era of warfare dominated by the American military's mastery of the conventional battlefield. This ‘revolution’, however, will have little if any impact on American military capabilities so far as countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla warfare are concerned. With regard to terrorism specifically, a combination of the resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative and the implications that it has to trigger acts future of mass, indiscriminate violence; the proliferation of ‘amateur’ terrorist groups which may contribute to the loosening of previous self‐imposed constraints on operations and lethality, and the growing sophistication of established, more ‘professional’ groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and destruction than in the past.     

TERRORISM,ENGINEERING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS

The study of countering terrorism came to the fore following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York. The study has taken many paths. These include looking at the sociology/psychology of the terrorist or terrorist group, the understanding of terrorist organisations, the use of risk management techniques to identify targets that may be of interests to terrorists, the design of security infrastructure to counter or ward off terrorism and the consideration of how built infrastructure/environment may be strengthened to mitigate the effects of terrorism.     

International Cooperation,Spoiling, and Transnational Terrorism

Do interstate relations influence the sources and targets of transnational terrorism? A considerable body of recent research suggests that the answer to this question is yes, and that one state may sponsor terrorist attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states. We suggest, in contrast, that positive or cooperative actions invite terrorist attacks from a different source: nonstate groups wishing to spoil interstate cooperation that they oppose. We assess this argument with a dyadic dataset using monthly data on transnational terrorist attacks and cooperative and noncooperative actions between states. Our results suggest that spoiling in response to interstate cooperation is an important determinant of transnational terrorism.     

Terrorists,scholars and ordinary people: confronting terrorism studies with field experiences

Fieldwork in the study of terrorism remains the exception, allowing for scores of publications to be produced each year with little or no contact with the perpetrators of terrorist violence and scarce direct observation of the social realities in which it occurs. While examining some of the serious drawbacks and pitfalls such research can entail, this article makes a case for more fieldwork in terrorism studies, arguing that it can bring greater depth to our understanding of terrorist violence. The discussion focuses on a common assumption – the existence of the ‘terrorist’ as subject – and a common practice of terrorism studies – the concentration on extraordinary events at the expense of ‘ordinary life’ and ‘ordinary people’ – and how they are called into question by the material gathered during field research conducted in the Southern Philippine region of Mindanao. The article concludes with a reflection on some of the challenges facing researchers in danger zones, from their dependence on local knowledge for security to the need for methodological flexibility when faced with the complexity of research in conflict areas.     

Wake-up call for the Lowlands: Dutch counterterrorism from a comparative perspective

The Netherlands is one of the few countries in Western Europe that did not experience massive terrorist attacks and where counterterrorism actions did not feature prominently on the political agenda. Until quite recently, the Netherlands had neither emergency legislation for terrorist incidents nor a specific Act that criminalized terrorist offences. In response to the European Union framework legislation, a bill was produced that penalizes participation in a terrorist organization, flanked by a vast array of other measures. This article analyses the policy, institutional and legislative responses to terrorism in the Netherlands and compares these with responses from other European states. The events of 9/11, as well as the political and public anxiety over the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, acted as a firm wake-up call for the Netherlands insofar as the threat of terrorism is concerned. Whilst most countries adopted an incremental approach to countering terrorism, the Netherlands witnessed a radical shift in criminal justice and law enforcement policy following these events.     

From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists' Achilles Heel

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to uncover a primary source of vulnerability in the global Jihadist terrorist network. It offers a critical examination of the traditional money lead for countering global Jihadist terrorism, and concludes that in this case, it is not the most effective method. Rather, the concept of transnational mobility, both as it relates to socialization into and professionalization within the Jihadist network, is identified as the lifeblood of the network, and thus an arguably more appropriate focus for countering strategies. Issues surrounding travel document security are analysed within an overarching dichotomous framework of offensive/defensive counter-terrorism strategies, emphasizing the need for active penetration by intelligence forces into the terrorist networks and relevant mobility-related realms.     

Understanding the media/terrorism relationship: An analysis of ideology and the news in time magazine

Conservative terrorism scholars have made the claim that the media have become a propaganda tool for terrorists and sympathetically portray terrorist activities. This article provides quantitative and qualitative data from Time magazine in 1986 suggesting that this view is mistaken. News production is treated as a social process that both informs and obscures, rather than as a neutral process that simply provides ‘objective’ facts. The results of the investigation reveal seven ways in which ideology is manifested in the terrorism news: semantics, language, headlines, social and historical context, treatment of objectives, trivialization, and amplification of violence. The ideological uniformity and lack of diversity apparent in terrorism news suggests that this kind of treatment results in a lack of understanding of the media/terrorism relationship and serves to support conservative views about the nature of terrorism and appropriate responses to it.     

Bermuda triangle: comparing official definitions of terrorist activity

Terror has been officially defined by many states and international actors. Although these definitions differ from each other to a certain extent, the basic divergence appears in the definition of the terrorist, since it reveals who is considered an ‘enemy’ by those actors. The difference between the definitions and lists elaborated by the United States and by the European Union on ‘terrorism, terrorist, and terror organization’ indicates their respective perceptions of the enemy as well as their differing global policies on terrorism. In Turkey, a country marked by a 20 year long struggle against terrorism, the definition of these concepts is mostly limited to domestic politics. The objective of this paper is to compare and contrast the official definitions of terror, terrorist, and terrorist organization by these three actors, including their respective international positions on terrorism.     

On the victims of terrorism and their innocence

Contrary to common usage, neither ‘victims’ nor their ‘innocence’ are necessary to the definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Though the primary targets ‐ as distinguished from audiences ‐ of most terrorist actions are people, and if the aim of the terrorists is to sow unreasoning fear, then symbolically important non‐human targets such as unmanned power sources, unoccupied government buildings and the like may serve the same purpose. Moreover, given that ‘victims’ are chosen for the shock value their death or injury may have, their ‘innocence’ (or even ‘guilt') may be incidental or even irrelevant to the violence visited upon them. A definition of ‘terrorism’ that focuses, generically, on its targets rather than on their qualities offers a more normatively neutral approach to the problem.     

Excerpts from research study ‘weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: Proliferation by non‐state actors’

In the wake of the Cold War, a new world disorder seems to be emerging wherein the legitimacy of many states is being challenged from within by increasing non‐state calls for self‐determination from the likes of religious cults, hate groups, isolationist movements, ethnic groups and revivalist movements. These movements often prey on the insecurities of the population, offering to fill psychological, sociological, political or religious security needs of those who would join them. Religious oriented groups appear to share a common ideological thread that rejects existing social, economic and political structure demanding a structural revision of the world, a world where they become the authoritarian, dominant influence. Emanating from these movements will be the ‘Post Modern Terrorists’ who possess a ‘ripeness’ to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction.

This article concerns asymmetric warfare: terrorism, specifically Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism. It argues that the terrorist WMD threat will emanate from non‐state groups operating under a veneer of religion and ethnic‐racist hate. These groups, plus the occasional cult, are the most likely candidates to threaten use of weapons of mass destruction in a mass casualty causing ‘super‐terrorist act’.     

A Review of: “Rogelio Alonso. The IRA and Armed Struggle.”

ABSTRACT

In the conceptual literature on terrorism, there is no shortage of answers to the question: “What is terrorism?” Indeed, the terrorism literature has been heavily criticized for a deluge of definitions. And yet the booming quantitative terrorism literature generally examines a narrow set of “what is terrorism?”: how country-level factors explain variation in the number of terrorist attacks. This article demonstrates the variety of ways in which scholars currently operationalize terrorism and compares them to the ways it could be operationalized. I replicate studies using alternative operationalizations of terrorism to examine the consequences of the terrorism literature’s collective bet to focus on attack counts at the country level. Finally, I discuss the implications of the narrow set of operational choices with an eye towards how a greater variety of approaches would produce a more robust research agenda.     

A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist

A conceptual framework is presented for addressing psychological issues in the development of the terrorist. In particular, the authors suggest that viewing terrorism as a process may lead not only to better conceptual development in analyses of the terrorist, but may also lead to the development of more practical and efficient counterterrorism initiatives. Additionally, viewing terrorism in this way may finally lead to the formation of a clear and unambiguous position for psychology within an interdisciplinary approach to analyses of both terrorism and the terrorist.     

Rape as terror: The case of Bosnia

When ethnic minority parties are excluded from government coalitions, are group attributes such as religion related to the groups’ use of political violence? We argue that extremist factions within minority groups make use of divergence in religion to mobilize support for violent action when the group is excluded from government. Thus, we posit that while religion per se is not a source of violence, extremist elements of ethnic minorities, whose religion differs from the majority, may use religious divergence to mobilize group members to perpetrate terrorism. Specifically we test the hypotheses that extremist factions of an excluded group will be more likely to carry out terrorist attacks when the group's members belong to a different religion as well as when they belong to a different denomination or sect of a religion than the majority. To test these propositions, we use data on ethnic minority party inclusion in government coalitions, ethnic minority group religion, and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by matching perpetrators with ethnic groups for all democracies, 1970–2004.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.     

Surveillance to Combat Terrorist Financing in Europe: Whose Liberty,Whose Security?

Abstract

This article analyses recent developments in the campaign to combat terrorist financing in Europe and questions the utility of financial surveillance as a method to counter terrorism. A background presentation of surveillance in modern society is followed by an overview of earlier international initiatives to interdict money laundering. The measures used to combat terrorist finance are built upon this foundation of surveillance and criminal investigation. Applying these measures in the ‘war on terror’ has unintended consequences for the financial transactions of citizens and non-citizens alike. The article concludes by considering these problems and their impact on society within the context of a larger concern for the impact to individual liberty from these surveillance practices in pursuit of security in the early twenty-first century.     

Canada's counter‐terrorism experience

This article traces Canada's experience with modern terrorism from its beginnings in 1963 to the present, with particular emphasis on the policies and crisis management techniques which have evolved over those 30 years. A brief review of the Canadian system of government and constitutional framework is provided to assist with understanding Canada's response to the terrorist threat. While Canadians have largely escaped the tragedies of domestic and international terrorism which have plagued other parts of the world since 1968, it is also true that Canada had an early experience of modern terrorism when the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) began its campaign of politically motivated violence in Montreal on the night of 7 March 1963. Canada has been applauded for the firm and expeditious manner in which it dealt with the FLQ threat, and for the security provided for major international events held on Canadian soil (e.g., 1976 Olympic Games, 1981 Economic Summit). Beginning in 1982, however, a series of terrorist incidents brought about a fundamental reassessment which led to the introduction of major policies and measures ‐ based on the ‘lead Minister’ concept ‐ that continue to form the basis of Canada's approach to counter‐terrorism.     

What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?

This article assesses the validity of the concept of ‘religious terrorism’ and its consequences for research and policy practices. It explores the origins, assumptions and primary arguments of the term and subjects them to an analytical assessment. It argues that the distinctions typically drawn between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ terrorism are problematic, both conceptually and empirically, and that the term is misleading in its typical assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as ‘religious terrorist’. In particular, it shows that the behaviour of those thus labelled is so diverse, and often so indistinguishable from their ‘secular’ counterparts, that the term has little meaning without further qualification, while simultaneously obscuring important aspects of both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ violence. It then goes on to illustrate how the term, rooted in a particular historically situated understanding of religion and a particular set of power structures, serves as a disciplinary device to domesticate ‘political religion’, delegitimising certain actors while legitimising a number of highly contentious counterterrorist practices designed to deal with those described as ‘religious terrorists’. The article ends with some suggestions for alternative ways to study the role of beliefs and institutional structures, religious or otherwise, in producing political violence.     

Cancer,HIV, and terrorism: translating public health models for prevention and control to counter-terrorism

What can cancer and HIV tell us about terrorism? How would we proceed if terrorism were a disease? A comparison of cancer and HIV can suggest alternative ways of conceptualizing terrorism and counter-terrorism using contrasting disease models that emphasize differing connections between etiology and prevention and control. A public health model also can help us think about terrorism as a basic research problem to be translated into therapeutic and preventive applications rather than primarily as a policy or political problem that makes only selective use of research studies. Through this re-conceptualization of terrorism as a basic and translational research challenge, we can draw upon the examples of the U.S. ‘War on Cancer’ and response to the ‘Aids Epidemic’ to help identify gaps in organizing academic and other resources to wage the ‘War on Terrorism.’ Recognizing and addressing these gaps could ultimately pave the way for more effective strategies in understanding and responding to the significant threats posed by terrorism, from the identification of factors that produce terrorist acts to the implementation of informed measures for the prevention and control of terrorist, and even proto-terrorist, activity.