From Promoting to De-emphasizing ‘Ethnicity’: Rethinking the Endless Supervision of Kosovo

International statebuilders’ strategy to achieve a peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo has shifted from the top-down institutionalization of a multi-ethnic society in the UNMIK period (1999-2008), to the neutral and technical administration of society, with a focus on the reduction of the ethnic divide (EULEX and ICO after 2008). However, despite this evolution in the understanding of statebuilding, this article identifies a dominant sentiment among practitioners of both periods, shared also by academic scholars: further international assistance is key to building a truly inclusive peace. It is argued that this shared assumption rests on the belief that the problems in Kosovo are caused by ethnic thinking—a psychosocial dysfunction. This psychosocial framing of the problem—no matter whether the solution is a process of promoting or de-emphasizing ‘ethnic’ differences—involves a constant and endless international management of Kosovo.     

Introduction: Kosovo’s Symbolic Importance

ABSTRACT

This introduction to the special section argues that Kosovo is important to the West because it is considered to symbolise Western power and efficacy. The intervention, and subsequent statebuilding project, were less about Kosovo, and more about a determination to project a particular image of the West as both benevolent and powerful. Over the past twenty years, the clash between the motivations of the external actors and the aspirations of Kosovo’s citizens have become more apparent catalysing a tension between the official Western narrative which presents Kosovo as a “success” and the reality on the ground.     

Continuity or Change?: Intervention and Statebuilding after Kosovo

ABSTRACT

The significance of Kosovo can only be understood by first situating the intervention in 1999 and the subsequent statebuilding process in a historical context. While there is a profound difference between 1999 and today, we should not conclude that this means the practice of humanitarian intervention has gone into decline as a result of waning western power. Decisions on intervention at that juncture, as indeed they are today. I conclude by arguing, however, that the theory and practice of statebuilding, has changed markedly since 1999; expectations as to the capacity of international administrations to transform post-conflict societies have declined markedly.     

The Planning and Implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the European Union in Kosovo

Abstract

This article evaluates the planning process and initial implementation of the Rule of Law Mission of the European Union in Kosovo (EULEX). It shows that the original intention was to have a smaller presence than the predecessor United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Yet as a result of a lack of settlement on the international status of Kosovo, the European Union ended up with a robust mandate and it was unable to make a fresh start in order to distinguish itself from the United Nations. EULEX has, nonetheless, successfully established itself, but it remains too early for a final judgment.     

Privatization in Kosovo: ‘Liberal Peace’ in Practice

This article examines internationally led privatization in Kosovo as an example of international statebuilding. It concentrates on the period from 1999 to 2008, when privatization was planned and implemented under formal international management. International statebuilding is typically sought justified with the idea of ‘liberal peace’, and this article shows how the tension between the political and economic tenets of the idea of liberal peace manifested itself in Kosovo's internationally led privatization.     

Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: Advanced Lessons in Statebuilding from Cambodia

Abstract

Statebuilding as a panacea for post-conflict societies is a largely uncriticised notion, like the liberal democracy it articulates. But, according to some, the policy framework of large-scale transitional statebuilding is often inappropriate, in particular where its focus on liberal democratic forms either ignores or tries to overwrite structural determinants shaping particular national behaviours. Democratic assumptions run so deeply that, without necessarily having overt intent, the lack of reflection upon the paradigmatic assumptions of Western models, often results in the denial of legitimate and viable alternatives. A more minimal approach, which could be based upon limited externally-supported electoral support encouraging indigenous organisation, however, offers to reverse the imperious and democracy-orientated trend, and to promote internally legitimate plural-indigenous systems with long-term sustainability.     

Peacebuilding as Security in ‘Failing’ and Conflict-Prone States

Abstract

Peacebuilding activities in conflict-prone and post-conflict countries are based upon the assumption that effective—preferably liberal—states form the greatest prospect for a stable international order, and that failing or conflict-prone states represent a threat to international security. Peacebuilding is therefore a part of the security agenda. This has brought obvious benefits, most obviously much-needed resources, aid and capacity-building to conflict-prone countries in the form of international assistance, which has contributed to a decline in intrastate conflicts. However, there are a number of negative implications to the securitization of peacebuilding. This article considers the implications of this, and concludes that it is difficult to mediate between conventional and ‘critical’ views of peacebuilding since they are premised upon quite different assumptions regarding what peacebuilding is and what it should be.     

Security Sector Reform in Liberia: An Uneven Partnership without Local Ownership

Abstract

The security situation in Liberia is currently quite good, and at a glance the peacebuilding process seems to be moving ahead. However, the root causes of the conflict have not been adequately addressed, but have in fact become more interlinked in the aftermath of the civil war. Instead of addressing local perceptions of insecurity the international community made plans for Liberia without considering the context in which reforms were to be implemented. The peace in post-conflict Liberia is therefore still fragile and the international presence is regarded as what secures the peace. Still, the UN is supposed to start its full withdrawal in 2010—indicating that the international community will leave the country without addressing the root causes of conflict.     

Postwar Reconstruction,the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward: Bis Repetitas?

Abstract

While comprehensive studies on UN peacebuilding assert that ‘learning has not … been one of the strengths of the United Nations’ (Chesterman 2004, p.256), research so far has largely ignored the UN's institutional infrastructure for learning. This essay seeks to contribute to closing this gap by surveying the evolution of the UN's learning infrastructure from the early 1990s to the present. Despite some progress in recent years, the lack of resources, coordination and political will means that turning the UN bureaucracy into a learning organization is unfinished business at best. Rather than focusing all attention on the new Peacebuilding Commission, policymakers and researchers alike should invest additional resources in analysing and strengthening the learning capacity of the UN peacebuilding apparatus.     

Statebuilding and Force: The Proper Role of Foreign Militaries

Abstract

Recent military interventions, both peace operations authorized by the United Nations and actions by individual countries, have aimed at helping build new or reconstituted states. The legitimacy and success of these state-building interventions are often contested by local actors. Yet state-like structures are needed to ensure the rule of law and economic growth. This paper argues for a new approach: to direct the use of foreign force toward roles that helped states emerge as the most successful governance structures in historical Europe, by defending populations from outside attack, protecting them from banditry and violence, and enforcing predictable rules for commerce and civil life (while training local forces to assume these duties). This approach focuses attention on the practical need to prepare military forces for both traditional defence and police-like roles.     

The Authority–Identity Relation: Symbolic References and Interpretative Authority in Postwar Kosovo

In postwar Kosovo, international and Kosovar political actors claiming authority in the democratization and statebuilding process lacked a long-standing ‘authoritative relation’ with each other and the citizenry. To analyse the structural conditions for the emergence of political authority, the article suggests applying the analytical framework of ‘interpretative authority’, which captures the relational character and simultaneity of authority generation by international and Kosovar actors. Given that Kosovo had unsecured symbolic conditions for authority – no commonly shared symbols of unity for all communities and no commonly agreed interpreter of symbols of unity – political actors were competing intensely for the identity and symbolizations of the ‘new’ Kosovo in their attempts to gain authority in various institutional opportunity structures. The competition over authority and the attempts to denationalize public communications made by the international administration, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), led to the reimbursement of particularistic symbolic references of Kosovar actors, thereby keeping the unsecured symbolic conditions and the weakness of interpretative political authority in Kosovo stable.     

JISB Interview: The European Union and Statebuilding in the Western Balkans

Christopher Bickerton and David Chandler interviewed Paddy Ashdown, international High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 2002–January 2006, at the House of Lords, 5 July 2006. He is currently working on a book distilling the lessons of his experience of statebuilding in the region.     

The Practice and Theory of US Statebuilding

Abstract

The United States has employed three models of statebuilding over the last century, each animated by a different political theory. Statebuilding 1.0, developed and used from the late 1890s through the end of the Cold War, emphasized building loyal and politically stable subordinate states. Privileging American geopolitical and economic interests over those of local populations, the model was premised on the theory of realpolitik. Statebuilding 2.0 arose under and, in many ways, came to characterize attempts by the United States to construct a New World Order after 1990. The key shift was from seeking loyalty to building legitimate states. Under this model, the United States attempted to build broad-based popular support for nascent states by creating democratic institutions and spearheading economic reforms. In this ‘end of history’ moment, liberalism reigned triumphant in statebuilding practice and theory. Statebuilding 3.0 is now being ‘field-tested’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. This new model seeks to build legitimacy for new states by providing security and essential public services to their populations. It rests on social contract theory, and its core tenet that legitimacy follows from providing effectively for the basic needs of citizens. Successive sections summarize the practice of statebuilding under each model and discuss its implicit political theory. A critique of each model then flows naturally into the practice and logic of the next. The conclusion outlines why a statebuilding 3.1 is necessary, and what such a strategy might entail.