WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE USA: LESSONS LEARNT AND TO BE LEARNT

Abstract: In the 1970s, both Australia and the United States instituted legal reforms aimed at promoting greater accountability among public servants. Prompted by growing awareness of the need to encourage and protect federal government whistleblowers, Congress enacted whistleblower protection measures in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Although the notion of open government in Australia has never been extended to include whistleblowing by public servants, probing the issue of whether or not United States whistleblower protection can serve as a reform model in the search for more effective legal mechanisms for ensuring government accountability can provide lessons and insights of value to Australian public administrators. Analysis of the role and impact of the Office of the Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board as established under the Civil Service Reform Act reveals many difficulties associated with whistleblower protection. Research has substantiated the jurisdictional ambiguities, administrative and procedural deficiencies and lack of sanctioning power which plague this reform effort. Similar deficiencies also impede the protection of parliamentary witnesses in Australia. Evaluation of whistleblower protection leads to the conclusion that reform models in either country for ensuring government accountability must not be judged solely through examination of statutory provisions. There must also be in place strong stabilising factors such as political unity, economic comfort, social discipline, civic virtue and public service ideology in order to achieve the common public service goal of rendering governmental decision-making more accountable to persons affected by it and open to review by independent decision makers.     

Coalition politics and accountability

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy.     

Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia

Decentralization is argued to create incentives for local and regional politicians to be more responsive and accountable to their constituents, but few studies have directly tested this claim. We use survey data from Colombia to examine individual‐level evaluations of the degree to which decentralization prompts citizens to view department government as more accountable. We estimate the effect of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, controlling for participation, political knowledge, confidence in government, education, and income on perceptions of accountability. Our results indicate that administrative and fiscal decentralization improve perceptions of accountability, while political decentralization does not.     

Accountability for Performance in Local Government

The nature of accountability for performance in the public sector is explored in this paper by attempting to answer three questions: (1) How important is accountability for performance? (2) Which of the stakeholders consider themselves accountable for organisational performance, including contracts? (3) Does information asymmetry between stakeholders in regard to performance information affect accountability? This paper reports on research undertaken in Victorian local government based on the responses to a questionnaire by councillors and tier one and two managers. The results of the survey indicate that there is an understanding of accountability for performance, that both managers and councillors are considered to be accountable for performance but that information asymmetry and accountability relationships are problematic.     

The Demise of ATSIC? Accountability and the Coalition Government

ATSIC has been portrayed by the Coalition government as an organisation that is not financially accountable and, because of this, is not achieving positive service delivery outcomes for Aboriginal people. Drawing on documentary material and fieldwork data, this article argues that ATSIC is indeed accountable and that the Coalition is putting the accountability argument forward as a means of justifying the dismantling of ATSIC. Given the past and recent actions taken by the Coalition, it is unclear how much longer ATSIC will be able to survive in its current form.     

ACCOUNTABILITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION

Abstract: This paper deals first with alternative concepts of accountability and efficiency. It views accountability—and associated concepts of efficiency—in a hierarchy of increasing sophistication and potential usefulness, but corresponding operational difficulty. The lowest level is fiscal or fiduciary accountability, relating to the actual expenditure of funds and procedures by which that expenditure is accounted for. The second level is efficiency accountability, defined in terms of the ratio of some physical measure of output to cost. The most sophisticated level is effectiveness accountability, in which the output measures used reflect the attainment of objectives or programs. Corresponding to these levels is a hierarchy of approaches to auditing, namely financial, efficiency, and effectiveness auditing.
The second part of the paper looks at the present situation in Australia and at the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration in terms of this framework. It argues that the government should commit itself to a continuing, comprehensive process of analysis and evaluation of public programs and activities aimed at making programs efficiently effective in a manner consistent with regular financial procedures. A "package" for implementing this approach—including revised institutional arrangements—is discussed in terms of the difficulties likely to be encountered—difficulties such as the shortage of capable personnel and problems of extending analytical practices to the State and local spheres of government.     

市场经济现代转型中的法治与责任政府

政府在我国市场经济的建立和转型中发挥着重要的作用.然而诺斯"国家悖论"所揭示的两难困境告诫我们在充分利用政府作用的同时,必须对行政权力的不当干预和政府失责的负面影响加以防范.我国已建立了初级市场经济并正在向现代市场经济转型,现代市场经济的基础是法治,现代市场经济转型的关键在于法治的确立.而法治下的政府应该是一个责任政府,我国要顺利实现市场经济的现代转型,建立良好的市场秩序和有效保护产权,就要建立责任政府.法治是责任政府不可或缺的制度保障,责任政府是法治理念在公共行政领域的体现.责任政府作为现代市场经济体系的重要组成部分,是一切向现代市场经济转型国家必须确立的政治基础.责任政府需要一系列制度构架确保政府对人民责任关系的确立.责任政府制度构架的基本方面包括:政府责任规范体制、政府责任履行的评价制度和政府责任的问责制度.     

Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe

Are citizens in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe able to hold politicians accountable at elections? The inheritance of communism—disengaged citizens, economic flux, and inchoate party systems—might be expected to weaken accountability. Looking at the results of 34 elections in 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper finds instead a phenomenon that it calls hyperaccountability. Incumbents are held accountable for economic performance—particularly for unemployment—but this accountability distinguishes not between vote losses and gains, but between large and small losses. This result is significant in several respects. The evidence for economic voting restores some faith in the ability of voters to control their representatives in new democracies. The consistency of punishment in the region, however, may mitigate some of the benefits of economic voting. If incumbents know they will lose, then they may decide to enrich themselves when in power rather than produce good policies.     

Accountability issues of the resolution trust corporation

Abstract

No other governmental organization ever created can rival the complex patterns of accountability created to manage the bailout of the savings and loan industry. This complexity has, in turn, led to criticism that the bailout structure is too unwieldy to be managerially effective or politically accountable. While the structure does indeed immensely complicate these problems, it is an inevitable product of the political realities that shaped the bailout strategy. The real issues in maintaining accountability to the public for the bailout are: reporting clearly on how the money is being used; improving Congress's ability to track the complex management of the bailout; and using government officials, not contractors, to supervise the government's goals. Indeed, the biggest potential problem of accountability in the savings and loan rescue is not the convoluted political structure at the top but the heavy reliance on private contractors at the bottom.     

WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

REINTERPRETING THE DEBATE ON AUTONOMY IN PUBLIC SERVICE SCIENCE*

Abstract: The report of the Science Task Force of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration rekindled an old debate on autonomy versus accountability for government scientists. The rationale given there for allowing the natural science community great discretion in managing its own affairs while in receipt of very considerable public funds did not get much support in the debate. Unfortunately, the debate did little to illuminate the problems facing those charged with producing creative, but relevant research in public institutions. A more productive way of tackling the question of autonomy and accountability is to see whose interests are promoted by different stances on the issue. Some critics represent the quest for autonomy as simple power-seeking by professional elites. Yet the institutional setting for many supposedly autonomous scientists involved in successful innovation in industry often involves extensive interaction with non-scientists. User groups — such as the agricultural commodities research committees — influence scientists through a loosely coordinated network. In this situation a form of accountability exists, although it is not exerted through formal parliamentary mechanisms. The arrangements have some elements of corporatism. Autonomy is not prominent within this setting except elusively as a rationale used to blunt temporarily the impact of particular interest group demands that threaten the continuity required to realize investments in long-term research projects. In this case, autonomy is essentially a myth. However, to the extent that it allows scientific institutions to combine interaction in the practical world that their research must serve with some insulation from short-term political or interest group pressures, it may be valuable for successful research management. Science administrators sometimes regulate the research of their juniors quite closely, indicating that even individual “scientific autonomy” can be a very limited form of freedom. None the less, it can be managed in such a way as to allow creative talent to flourish within an accountable structure albeit one that departs from the conventional norms of responsible government.     

Ordering Stakeholder Relationships and Citizen Participation: Evidence from the Community Development Block Grant Program

Local administrative professionals typically are accountable to multiple stakeholders, including other governmental units, special interests in the business and nonprofit sectors, and citizens. How are these accountability relationships ordered? What is the position of citizens in that hierarchy, particularly the influence of citizen participation? Focusing on patterns of hearing participation and citizen impact on budgeting decisions for the Community Development Block Grant program, this statistical analysis employs ordered probit regression. The authors find that communities in which grant administrators feel most accountable to citizens for grant performance have higher degrees of citizen participation in hearings and higher levels of perceived citizen impact on budgetary processes. This relationship holds even in the presence of simultaneity between bureaucratic accountability to citizens and citizen participation. The findings point to the importance of instilling a public service ethic among government employees that places a high value on engaging as well as listening to citizens.     

Democratic Order,Autonomy, and Accountability

Accountability is a principle for organizing relations between rulers and ruled, and making public officials accountable is a democratic achievement. There are, however, competing claims about what is involved in demanding, rendering, assessing, and responding to accounts; what are effective accountability institutions; and how accountability regimes emerge and change. This article provides a frame for thinking about institutional aspects of accountability regimes and their cognitive, normative, and power foundations. A distinction is made between accountability within an established regime with stable power relations and role expectations and accountability as (re)structuring processes in less institutionalized contexts and in transformation periods. A huge literature is concerned with the first issue. There is less attention to accountability as (re)structuring processes. The article, therefore, calls attention to how democracies search for, and struggle over, what are legitimate accountability regimes and political orders.     

Auditing as a tool of government accountability? Exploring divergent causal mechanisms through three Honduran cases

Audits of government entities offer a potential tool to hold public officials to account and to improve the functioning of public administration; however, empirical studies of audit impacts show mixed results. This is largely due to the diversity of audit regimes with different goals and accountability mechanisms, which yield different causal chains. In this study, I compare three distinct audit regimes with distinct casual mechanisms in Honduras. I find that backward-looking audits, which aim to hold officials accountable for past behavior or performance, require effective horizontal accountability mechanisms to investigate and prosecute cases. Forward-looking audits, which aim to hold officials accountable for future behavior or performance, require independent accountability mechanisms, a systematic follow-up methodology, public dissemination, and pressure from the media and civil society. Complementary initiatives that build on audit recommended reforms are found to strengthen these weaknesses in the causal mechanism linking audits to outcomes.     

Budgeting for Accountability: Municipal Budgeting for the 1990s

The emphasis of a public budget depends on the time and circumstances in which it is developed. During the 1990s, for example, the emphasis has increasingly been on accountability due to widespread public belief in recent years that government is uncontrollable and responds only to special interests. Over the past few years, local budgeters have begun to adapt to this new environment by improving the accountability of the budget to the public. This article summarizes some of the changes taking place and suggests some additional changes that could be adopted to make local budgeting more accountable.     

Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate

Mexico??s ombudsman??s office (the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH)), established in 1990 by a nondemocratic government, posed no threat to the then ruling party. Counter to expectations, even after Mexico democratized in 2000, the CNDH remained unwilling to challenge officials for human rights violations. I argue that this is because the ombudsman (the head of the CNDH) is chosen by Mexican Senators who are not accountable??due to secret voting and a prohibition on reelection??to the Mexican public. While civil society wanted a powerful ombudsman, the three main parties did not. Ignoring the public, Senators responded to their parties and appointed a compliant individual to serve as ombudsman, thereby ensuring that the CNDH would not challenge those who held political power. The paper suggests that where accountability institutions, such as human rights offices, are chosen by unaccountable actors (in this case the Mexican Senate), the development of such accountability institutions will be limited.     

全球化与中国政府能力

较为系统地考察了中国政府在挑战全球化方面所取得的成绩,分析了中国政府驾驭全球化的能力及其存在的问题,着重阐述了中国政府在面临全球化的压力下为提高政府公共服务的质量和加强政府的公共责任所进行的改革。并且针对建立服务政府和责任政府提出了若干政策性建议。     

Against Humanitarian Impunity: Rethinking Responsibility for Displacement and Disaster in Northern Uganda

Abstract

Given that humanitarian organizations can often be responsible for enabling, prolonging or intensifying violence and conflict through their interventions into war zones, it is important that these organizations, despite their presumed neutrality and beneficence, be held accountable for the deleterious consequences of their actions. The case of northern Uganda will be used to demonstrate how humanitarian agencies have made possible the government's counterinsurgency, including its policy of mass forced displacement and internment, which has led to a vast humanitarian crisis. The Ugandan government policy will be assessed as a war crime, making aid agencies accessories to this crime. This case study is used as an example to highlight that processes which demand the post-conflict accountability of those responsible for violence may be dramatically incomplete, and unjust, if they do not include the humanitarian agencies. In conclusion it will be suggested that if humanitarian organizations built popular accountability mechanisms into their daily operations this might prevent them from being complicit with egregious violence in the first place.     

Congressional Supervision of America's Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee

In 1947, the United States created a modern intelligence community to guard against another surprise attack like the one at Pearl Harbor. This community consists of 13 major agencies, among them the CIA and the FBI. Concealed from public view, they pose a significant challenge to the concept of government accountability in a democratic society. This article examines the failure of congressional lawmakers to hold the secret agencies accountable during the Cold War. Contrary to recent theoretical research on legislative oversight, which suggests reasons that accountability has been strong in the United States, this study finds that a weak system of legislative review has permitted a dangerous erosion of civil liberties. The study also explores the efforts of the Church Committee in 1975 to fashion new safeguards that would reduce the probability of further abuse of power by the intelligence community.     

Pass the Buck If You Can: How Partisan Competition Triggers Attribution Bias in Multilevel Democracies

Voters’ ability to hold politicians accountable has been shown to be limited in systems of multilevel government. The existence of multiple tiers of government blurs the lines of responsibility, making it more difficult for voters to assign credit or blame for policy performance. However, much less is known about how the vertical division of responsibility affects citizens’ propensity to rationalize responsibility attributions on the basis of group attachment. While these two processes have similar observable implications, they imply markedly different micro-mechanisms. Using experimental and observational data, this paper examines how the partisan division of power moderates the impact of voters’ partisanship and feelings of territorial attachment on attributions of responsibility for the regional economy. Our analyses show that partisan-based attribution bias varies systematically with the partisan context, such that it only emerges in regions where a party other than the national incumbent controls the regional government. We also find that responsibility judgments are rationalized on the basis of territorial identities only when a regional nationalist party is in control of the regional government. Our results contribute to explaining the contextual variations in the strength of regional economic voting and more generally to understanding one of the mechanisms through which low clarity of responsibility reduces government accountability.